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IT  haplxns that experiences long since past seem to be 
and that knowledge apparently forgotten proves again of 
This is illustrated by the subject of railroad reorganization. 
In the years bctwecn 1893 and 1899 an imposing group of  American 
railroads passed  into receivers'  hands.  In  1893 alone  more  than 
2i,-  miles, with an aggregate capitalization of  almost $~,OOO,OOO,- 
ooo, were  taken over by  the courts, and in the following years the 
amount was largely increased.  Foreclosure sales aggregated 10,446 
milcs in  1895, 12,355 in 1896, and 40,503 bctween 1894 and  1898. 
Among the more important failures were those of  thc Richmond & 
West Point Terminal, thc Reading, the Eric, the Northern  Pacific, 
the Atchison, and the Baltimore  & Ohio;-  to say nothing of  the 
Norfolk  & Western, the Louisville, New  Albany  & Chicago, the 
Ann  Arbor, the Seattle, Lake Shorc  C(r  Eastern, the Pecos Valley, 
and many other smaller lines. 
The railroads which  failed between  1893 and  1898 were  subse- 
quently reorganized.  In  order to restore  t he  equilibrium between 
income and outgo the companies turned to thcir creditors, and de- 
manded the surrender of  a part of  thc rights of  which  bondholders 
were  then  possessed.  This demand  the  creditors  were  forced  to 
concede.  Some of  them yielded without legal compulsion, assenting 
to "  voluntary reorganizations " ;  some insisted upon the sale of  the 
ProIRrty securing their loans, but  without escaping the loss which 
fell upon their more pliant associates.  Much injustice to individuals 
Came to light at this time.  Men who had invested in good faith were 
to sacrifice thcir  holdings through  no  fault  of  thcir  own. 
savings of  years were swept away.  The demand  of  the rail- 
roads was one, nevertheless, which the courts supported, and rightly. 
The  companies could  not  be  operated  unless  the  creditors  were 
dcd~ed  of part of their legal rights.  At  the same time, these rights 
longer had a material basis on which to rest, and their surrender 
meant but the recognition of  a loss which had already taken place. 
of the  reorganizations were  completed by  the  year  1899. 
date the improvement in railroad earnings has been mar- PREFACI;  vii 
vellous.  Gross  carnings  froni  opcration  wcrib $1,300,000,000  in 
1899, thcy \vrrC $2,300,000,000 in  1906, the last yiar for which the 
tijiurcs of  the Intcrstatc Conimi*rcc  Cominission arc at present avail- 
able.  'I'otal  inconic, aftcr the deduction of  o1)crating csl)cnscs, \\.as 
$605,000,000 in  1899, and $1,046,000,000 i11  1900.  It is not  to bc 
wondcrctl at tha:  tlir distress of  the ycars I 893-9  has not hcn  dup- 
licatcd during the ycars 1900-7.  On the contrary, weak roads have 
had ol)l)orti~nity  to strengthen their positions, ant1 strong ones havc 
slwnt cnornious sllnis for inil,rovcmc.nts, and liavc. dcclarcd lilxral 
dividends ksidiss.  In no  !car  save  1905 has the nibw mili,agc 1)ut 
into rcccivcrs'  hands I)ccn greater  than 800 milrs, and in  hut  one 
has tlic milcagc sold at forcc.losurc ccluallrtl that figure.  Upcrating 
cx~wnsi~s  Iia\,c incrcasrd  lx~causi.  the  amount  of  business has cx- 
1-ecdcd thc ability of thc railroads to handle it.  Equipment has bccn 
so inadcquatc as to  ~)rovok~  drastic  legislation  by  the 1cgisl;ltures 
of many  statcs;  yards  and terminals  havc  \~'cn  crotvdctl  until  a 
prominent  railroad olliccr has dcclarrd the csl)cnctiturc of  ovcr five 
billion  dollars to I)c ncc.cssnry  to rcstorc  tlic  equilibrium  Ixt\vccn 
facilitii.~  and trnliic. 
Tlicsc~  1-onditions havc causcd thc rnrlicr ~)rol~lc~ms  of  failure and 
rcorganizntion  to \x lost  to view.  Ncvcrthclcss,  thc financial panic 
of  Octolx.r,  1907, and the rrccssion  in  activity 1vhic.h has kcomc 
morc and morc a1)l)arcnt sincc that  timcb,  have again  I)rought tlirsc 
problcms  forward.  Thc Scal)oard Air  I,inc,  onc of  the important 
railroad  systems of  tlic  South,  failrd  on  January  5,  1908.  The 
Chicago  Grcat  Wrstcrn  follotvcd  thrcc  days latcr.  The Detroit, 
Tolcdo  &  lronton, tlic  Chicago, Cincinnati  & l.ouisvillc,  the In- 
tcrnational  Pi  Great  h'orthcrn,  the  \Yestern  llaryland,  and  the 
Macon  &.Birmingham havc since bccn put in rcccivcrs' hands.  In 
all, thc operation of  5938 rnilcs of  railroad, with a cal)italization of 
ncarly $415,000,000, and total liabilities of  $462,000,000, has kcn 
taken ovcr by the col~rts  during the first ten \vecks of  1908. Whcthcr 
this is but tlic kginning of  still morc estcndcd trouble it is of  course 
impossiblc to say. Thcrc arc a numbcr of  \vc.ak lines in thc Amcrican 
railroad systcm, and thC difliculty in obtaining crcdit is bound tore- 
vcal wcakncssrs \vhcrc they csist.  At  prcscbnt new  loans havc for 
some months ken ditticult to obtain, and cvcn strong railroads haw 
resorted to the issue of  short timc notcs.  Thc Erie, indeed, escapcd 
bankruptcy on April 8,1908,  only through the timely aitl of  important 
bankers who took up  its maturing notcs.  This points to serious con- 
scqi~cnccs  for thc weaker lines.  It is true, on the other hand, that 
American  railroads arc generally in  better  financial and  physical 
condition than thcy were in  1893.  It is not  probablc that any rail- 
road collapse will  be so widespread now  as it was thcn.  Whether 
this be  so or not, the failure of  ncarly 6wo  miles of  railroad in ten 
weeks invcsts reorganization  ~)roblems  at prcscnt  with  an import- 
ance which they havc not had for ten ycars.  How, it will bc askcd, 
shall the  financial 01)erations necessary  to reorganization  be  pr- 
formed?  What  mcthods shall tx  adopted,  what  dangers avoided, 
and what results cxlxctcd ? 
'J'hc  cxyxricnce of  earlier ycars will providc  answers to many of 
the clucstions asked in 1908.  In the hoj~,  therefore, that a study of 
railroad reorganization, on which thc ai~thor  has bccn intermittently 
engaged during the last six .years, will prove of  ,service, the following 
pages have hen  published.  Thcy tliscuss in some detail the finan- 
cial history of  thc scvcn most important railroads which failed from 
1892-6,  and that of  one railroad, thc  Rock Island,  which  was re- 
organizctl in  1902; and summarize in a final chapter the charactcr- 
istics of  the various reorganizations in  which  thcsc roads have bc- 
comc involved.  In some rcsrccts the history of  cach road considcrcd 
is peculiar  unto itself.  Thc Kcading had coal to sell, the Atchison 
did  not.  Thc Southcrn ran through  a sparsely wttlcd country, the 
Baltimore  8:  Ohio through  a  thickly  settled  one.  The Eric  has 
never  rccovcrcd  from  the  campaigns  of  Gould,  Drcw,  and  Fisk 
from 1864-72,  the Northcrn  Pacific was not opcned until 1883.  In 
othcr  rcslccts,  howcvcr,  th~  roads  havc  had  much  in  common. 
Excepting only  thc Rock  Island, cach  of  thcm  has found  itself  at 
onc timc or another una1)lc to pay  its dcbts, and has had to scck 
mcasures  of  rclicf.  The problcms  of  the  diffcrcnt  companies  at 
these times have lxtcn strikingly alike.  Howcvcr causcd, their finan- 
cial  diflicultics  havc  bccn  exprcsscd  in  higk fixcd  chargcs,  and, 
usually, in excessive floating dcbts.  Grcatcr annual obligations have 
been assumed than thc roads could mcct, and currcnt liabilities have 
Qcumulatcd  while pressing dcmands havc bccn  satisfied.  To  this 
of affairs the remedy has been  sought  in  comprehensive ex- 
changes of  old  sccuritics for ncw.  The exchanges, it  is true, have viii  PREFACE 
been  carried  out  in  differeht  ways, and the  colIateral expedients 
employed have not been the same.  To similar problems different 
solutions have been applied.  It is possible, for this very reason, for 
a careful study of  the alternative reorganization methods which have 
been developed to point out some policies which have been danger- 
ous, and to make clear others which are both just,  and likely to be 
successful.  Such a study also throws light upon the history of  the 
companies upon which it is based. 
For the way in which the different roads have been handled, the 
reader is referred to the text.  The order of  treatment is very roughly 
determined by geographical location ;  that is, the Eastern roads are 
first considered, then the Southern, and then the Western.  Each 
chapter, except the last, should be  examined as a "case"  in reor- 
ganization experience,  and as part,  therefore, of  a  united  whole. 
No one has been so continuously with his work as the author him- 
self, and no one can more keenly realize its defects.  It is offered as 
a contribution in a field in which very little has as yet  been  done, 
and it is hoped that it will prove of  value to those concerned with 
reorganization plans, as well as to those interested in the develop- 
ment of  corporation finance during the last generation. 
Without  the unselfish and intelligent assistance of  the  writer's 
Mother, the preparation of  this book would have been long delayed. 
To  her, hst  of  all, thanks are due.  To  Professor William Z. Ripley, 
of  Harvard  University, should be made warm  acknowledgment of 
his constant interest and helpful suggestions.  To the Carnegie In- 
stitution the author is indebted for grants in aid of  research in this 
special field.  Grateful  acknowledgment  should  also be made of 
gifts by friends of  the University to cover the expenses of  publication. 
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CHAPTER  I 
BALTIMORE  &  OHIO 
Early history -  Extension  to Chicago -  Trunk-line  rate  wars -  Effect  on the 
company -  Extension to New York -  Sale of  bonds to pay off  floating debt - 
Unsatisfactory  traffic  conditions -  Receivership -  Mr.  Little's  report -  Re- 
organization -  Subsequent history. 
THE  Baltimore  & Ohio Railroad was the  first important railway 
company to  be incorporated in  the United States.  It was designed 
to aid the city of  Baltimore in securing the Western trade, and not 
only private citizens but the city of  Baltimore and the state of  Mary- 
land  early  subscribed  to  its stock.  When  in  the course of  con- 
struction it became expedient to extend  into Virginia, the  city  of 
Wheeling and the state of  Virginia likewise subscribed, though the 
action  of  the  latter  was  subsequently withdrawn.'  As  a  result 
the funds required  for first  construction were  obtained  from the 
sale of  stocks instead  of  bonds.  In  1844,  seventeen  years  after 
the granting of  the charter, the annual report  showed  $7,000,000 
in  stock as against $985,000 in  6 per  cent bonds; while  in  1849, 
though the loans had been increased, they yet stood in the propor- 
tion of  one to 
On December I, 1831, the first train was run over the line, then 
724 miles in length.3 The early history of  the road does not much 
concern us.  It was one of  steady growth, not through an unsettled 
territory,  as with  our Western  roads,  but  through  a  country  the 
industries of which were  already established.  Tracks led, not  into 
Prairies,  but  to  populous cities; and the  future of  the company, 
once the initial difficulties should have been  overcome, was  at no 
Milton Reizenstein, The Economic History of  the Baltimore  & Ohio Railroad, 
Johns Hopkins University Studies, July-August,  1897. 
'  Reizenstein estimates the original cost of  the first 379 miles to have been $37,612 
per mile, and, adding the cost of reconstruction and extension to 1853,  he gets a  figure 
Of  $41,237  per mile.  Vide infra, ..  75. 
6th Annual Report,  1832,  p. 4. 2  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
time uncertain.  Thus extension to Cumberland increased the gross 
receipts from $426,492  to $575,235, and that to  Wheeling  in  1853 
likewise brought a great increase in traffic. 
The Civil War bore upon the Baltimore  & Ohio heavily because 
of  the peculiar location of its mileage.  On May 28, 1861, possession 
was taken  by  the Confederates of  more than  one hundred  miles 
of  the main stem, embracing chiefly the region between the Point of 
Rocks and Cumberland.'  Government protection was temporarily 
restored in 1862, but raids occurred until the end of  the war.  Each 
time the Confederates occupied the line they tore it up, and as soon 
as they retired the company hastened to make repairs.  The road 
did not default.  A portion of  the track yielded a revenue from first 
to  last, and presumably the Government paid  generously  for  the 
transportation of  its troops. 
It was after the Civil War that the real history of  the road began. 
The key-note was competition; -  competition of  the fiercest  sort 
between parallel lines from Chicago to the seaboard, intensified by 
the rivalry of  the great seaboard cities, and involving traffic in both 
directions.  The decade 1850-60  had  seen the extension of  Eastern 
roads to Western connections.  In 1851 the Erie had reached Lake 
Erie; in 1853 the New York Central and Lake Shore, and in  1855 
the  Pennsylvania and Fort Wayne had opened continuous routes 
from the Atlantic to Chicago.  In 1857 the Baltimore  & Ohio had 
obtained  connection with  Cincinnati  and St. Louis; and in  1858 
the Grand Trunk had arrived at Sarnia on its way  from Portland 
to Chicago.  After the Civil War there was both consolidation and 
extension.  The New  York  Central  was  united  with  the Hudson 
River,  and the  Pennsylvania  leased  the  Pittsburgh,  Fort  Wayne 
& Chicago  in  1869.  The Baltimore  & Ohio reached Chicago in 
1874, and the  lines which in April, 1880, were consolidated into the 
Chicago  & Grand Trunk were completed between Port Huron and 
Chicago in February of that year.  The conlpletion of  these through 
routes opened the way for very bitter competition. Five independent 
lines struggled for Chicago business, and all of  them were prepared 
to cut rates deeply in  order to test their rivals'  strength.  In par- 
ticular the Baltimore  & Ohio was aggressive.  "At  the time of its 
[Chicago branch] opening," said Mr. Blanchard before the Hepburn 
'  35th Annual Report, 1861. 
committee, "it  was  heralded  all  over the  Northwest  as a  'Re- 
lief for the Farmer,'  'the Grangers'  Friend,'  and all other sorts of 
headlines  were  put  into  the  Chicago and Northwestern  papers; 
and president  Garrett's public utterances, and those to his Board, 
sere filled with enough statements to show what he intended to do. 
, . .  I heard him [say] that  upon the completion of  his lines, like 
another Samson, he could pull down the temple of  rates upon the 
heads of  these other trunk lines." 
Under these circumstances a dispute between the Baltimore  & 
Ohio and the Pennsylvania in  1874 over the former's connection 
with  New  York  had  far-reaching  consequence^.^  The Pennsyl- 
vania refused to carry  Baltimore  & Ohio cars over its line north 
from  Philadelphia, and as a retaliatory measure the Baltimore  & 
Ohio reduced passenger fares from Washington and Baltimore to 
Western points from 25 to 40 per cent.'  The reduction in rates thus 
begun inaugurated the first of  the great railroad  wars.  The cuts 
soon extended to east-bound passengers  and to freight, and forced 
corresponding cuts on the Pennsylvania, the Lake Shore & Michi- 
gan  Southern, the Michigan  Central, the New York Central, and 
the  Erie.  Rates on fourth class and grain from  Chicago to  New 
York, which had been 60 cents per IW pounds in  December,  1873, 
and 40 cents in December,  1874, fell to 30  cents in March, 1875. 
Rates on special, or sixth class,'  went as low as 12  cents from Balti- 
Testimony of  Mr.  Blanchard,  Hepburn Committee Report, p. 3171.  See also 
Chron. 20: 547, 1875. 
The Baltimore  & Ohio had no line to New York.  The Pennsylvania had had 
one since 1873, and over it Mr. Garrett was forced to send all his New York business. 
Disputes arose over the proper pro-rating of  charges.  President Garrett alleged that 
the terminal charge of  four cents per IOO  pounds which the Pennsylvania Company 
imposed on freight coming to or going from New York was exorbitant, and that he 
Was paying for  100 miles of transportation when the real distance was only 90.  Pre- 
sident Scott replied that  the rates for terminal services in New York  were not suf- 
ficient to cover the cost of doing the business, and that the Pennsylvania's New York 
and Philadelphia line was open to the Baltimore & Ohio on the same terms as to 
others.  R. R. Gaz. 7:71-z,  1875. 
'  R.  R. Gaz.  6: 8,1874.  The outcome wasan agreement whereby the Baltimore & 
Ohio restored rates and fares, and the Pennsylvania agreed to haul two of the former's 
tfains daily each way between West  Philadelphia and Jersey City, to sell through 
tl*ts  West over the Baltimore & Ohio, and  to give that road all  necessary facilities 
for the handling of  through freight. 
'  Sugar, coffee, salt, etc. 4  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  BALTIMORE & OHIO  5 
more and Philadelphia to Chicago.  Passenger fares from Chicago 
to  Baltimore and  Washington were  reduced  from $19  to  $9,  to 
Philadelphia  from $I~  to $12, to  New  York from $22  to $15,  and 
to Boston from $22  to $15.  The New  York Central and the Erie 
quoted fares from New  York to Chicago of  $18  and to St. Louis 
of  $20,  and the  Baltimore  & Ohio replied  by  a cut to  $16.25  to 
Chicago. In April, 1875, the Baltimore & Ohio cut freight rates from 
Cumberland to Baltimore over 50 per cent on the four regular classes, 
and the Pennsylvania at once announced still greater reductions.' 
The effect of  this warfare on railroad revenues was sufficiently 
serious to cause the Baltimore  & Ohio  to  recede  somewhat from 
its independent  position and  to  enter  into negotiations with  the 
Pennsylvania;  but  the terms of  the resulting agreement proved 
unsatisfactory to the other trunk lines, and no general pacification 
was obtained.  Late in 1875 rates nevertheless generally advanced, 
and in December a general agreement was  concluded, followed by 
a general increase.  This agreement was again hopelessly disrupted 
by the following April, when cuts in east-bound rates followed each 
other with rapidity.  The published rates on grain, which had been 
45 cents at the beginning of  March, 1876, fell to 40 cents on March 7, 
35 cents on April 13, 223 cents on April 25, and 20 cents on May 5. 
In June rates  on west-bound freight fell to 25  cents  first class to 
Chicago,  and  16  cents fourth  and fifth  class,  actual  rates  going 
The traffic between Cumberland and Baltimore was mostly coal.  In  an interview 
the last of  May or first of  June, 1875, President Garrett said that as soon as the right 
was conceded to his road to enter New Yorkover the Pennsylvania Railroad as he had 
been doing for thirty years, and to make such rates from Baltimore and Chicago as 
he chose, he  was ready for peace and  not  sooner. . . .  The Saratoga  combination, 
which had been  gotten up to ruin the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, had only served to 
establish the road and give it a standing in the West. . .  .  It had been and was now 
his firmobject to maintain the freight rate on fourth class, the principal freight shipped 
from the West, at 35 cents per 100.  This was a reasonable rate and gave his company 
a fair profit.  The other lines had to submit to this rate or there could be  no peace. 
R. R. Gaz.  7 : 237,  1875. 
".  R. Gaz. 7: 261,1875;  Ibid. 7: 270,  1875; Ibid. 7: 289,  1875; Chron.  20: 593, 
1875.  The compact was to last for ten years, the companies to agree upon and to 
maintain moderate rates between all competing points.  Each board of  directors was 
to appoint a special committee to which was to be referred all di5erences which might 
arise.  The Pennsylvania  opened its lines to the Baltimore  & Ohio between  Phii- 
adelphia and New  York on the same terms that it gave other connecting roads at 
Philadelphia. 
lower;  and it  was  possible  to  travel  from  New  York  to 
Chicago first class for $13.' 
Warfare  between  railroads  became  intensified  by  the  competi- 
tion between the cities which the railraads served, and by  1876 the 
question of  relative rates to New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore 
had grown to be of  primary importan~e.~  By  an agreement in  1869 
Baltimore had  been  given  a  differential on  east-bound freight of 
Io cents per  IOO  pounds,  which  had  been  reduced  to  5 cents on 
grain  in  1870.  On west-bound  freight  Baltimore had  enjoyed  a 
differential in  1875 which had ranged from 10 cents on first class 
to 5 cents on special class freight, and Philadelphia one which had 
been 2 cents less except on first class, where the ~hiladelihia  differ- 
ential had been  3 cents less than that to Baltimore.  A temporary 
agreement of  March,  1876, had  replaced these allowances  by  dif- 
ferentials of  13 per cent in favor of  Baltimore and 10 per cent in 
favor of  Philadelphia  as against  New  York.  This relation  was 
fought over in the rate war of  1876.  In December of  that year an- 
other agreement wasreached on the basis of  equal rates from Western 
points to Europe on export traffic via all four competing seaboard 
cities, and reduced percentage differentials on local traffic to those 
cities; but this proved temporary, the subsequent advances in rates 
were not general, and final agreement was not secured until April, 
1877.  The contract then executed was in the nature of  a compro- 
mise.  The differential to Baltimore was reduced from 13 per cent 
to 3 cents, and from Philadelphia from 10 per cent to 2  cents, to 
apply equally to local and to export traffic.  Rates to Boston were 
at no time to be less than those to New York.  Differentials on west- 
bound traflic were to be the same as those on east-bound  on third 
class,  fourth class,  and  special  freight,  and on  first  and  second 
classes to be 8 cents less per hundred from Baltimore and 6 cents 
less from Philadelphia than from New Y~rk.~ 
'  See Interstate  Commerce Commission, Railways  in the United States in rpz. 
Part  2, entitle.&  'I A Forty-year Review of  Changes in Freight Tariff," p. 79. 
a  For an account of  the differentials at di5erent times see the argument of  counsel 
and the opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission,"In  the Matter of  Differen- 
tial Rates to and from North Atlantic Ports,"  April 27,  1905, in Elkins Committee 
Report, vol. 5, Appendix E.  See also 7 I. C.  C. Rep. 612. 
"Albert  Fink, Report on Adjustment of  Railway Rates; also Testimony of Mr. 
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The years following the agreement of  1877 were marked by  low 
and fluctuating rates, extensive cutting under the published schedules, 
and frequent attempts at pooling and at apportionment of  traffic. 
At  a meeting at Chicago on December  19,  1878, tariff  rates were 
agreed upon by  all  lines, but  the existence of  time  contracts de- 
pressed receipts for months thereafter.  Another meeting on May 8 
was followed by  sharp competition.  In June an agreement to raise 
rates  was  made,  but  proved  unsatisfactory  owing  to  long  time 
contracts.  "During  the period  between  December 18,  1878,  and 
July 5,  1879," said Mr. King in  a letter  to  the  Trunk-Line Arbi- 
trators on  July  17,  1879, "the  Baltimore  & Ohio  Company has 
practically been out of  the market, on account of  the low rates by 
the Northern  lines.  It has not secured  enough east-bound freight 
to give return  loads for the small west-bound  traffic sent over its 
lines  to  that  city, and has repeatedly moved  its cars empty from 
Chicago to other points on its lines east of  that city." 
Early in  1881 the cutting of  rates became sufficiently important 
to force official recognition by the chairman of  the trunk-line pool.a 
By  June  17  quoted rates on grain were  15  cents per  IOO  pounds 
from Chicago to New York, and a railroad war was in full swing.3 
By  October the grain rate had  been reduced from 15 cents to 123 
cents; by August passenger fares were $7  from  New  York to Chi- 
cago, and $16  from  Chicago to  New York, and there was  quoted 
besides a $5 Boston to Chicago rate over the Grand Trunk.  The rad- 
ical nature of  these cuts can be appreciated from Mr. Albert Fink's 
"Additional  Arguments on the Division of  [Dead] Freight from Cincinnati of 
the Atlantic & Great Western,"  etc., N. Y.  1879,  p. 5.  Speaking from the standpoint 
of  an impartial observer, Mr. Fink declared that $1,840,494  had been lost between 
December  19,  1878, and May I, 1879, through the failure of  the Michigan Central, 
Lake Shore, Pennsylvania,  and Baltimore  & Ohio and their connections to observe 
their published tariffs.  Chron.  28: 578, 1879. 
By agreement of March 11,  1881,  the chairman  of  the Joint  Executive Com- 
mittee, Mr. Fink, was given authority to proclaim a general reduction in published 
rates when it should be shown that any pool line had been  accepting traffic at less 
than the regular rate.  This authority he exercised in  April.  Rates were restored 
almost immediately by special action of  the Joint  Executive Committee, only to be 
reduced again in June for similar reasons. 
a  The actual outbreak  of  the  war was due to the conviction of  the New York 
Central that traffic was  being diverted  to other  mads by  secret departures from 
the published tariff. R. R.  Gaz. 13:  347, 1881. 
testimony before  the  Hepburn  and Cullom Committees.  Fifteen 
cents, said he in  1879, just  covered the actual cost of  hauling the 
gain ; twenty cents, he asserted in 1885, was the bare cost of  move- 
ment, including the general  expenses,  but  without  any  profit  to 
fie road.'  Grain was therefore not  repaying the specific cost  of 
hauling, and passengers were obviously in similar case.  Temporary 
relief occurred  through  the large increase in business which took 
place  at the end of  1881.  In October  the  Pennsylvania and the 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  advanced  east-bound  rates  because  of  the 
abundance  of  traffic offering,  and the  New  York  Central,  Erie, 
md Grand Trunk followed to a less degree.  In November further 
advances occurred, though  west-bound rates  remained low ; but 
throughout December and January rates were low and fluct~ating,~ 
and negotiations were  carried  on  for the  settlement of  the differ- 
ential question which underlay the trouble.  None of  the combatants 
were open to conviction; the only outlet was therefore arbitration, 
and this was reluctantly resorted to.'  In January,  1882, the roads 
divided  the through trunk-line business, agreed to raise rates, and 
left the subject of differentials to be investigated by  Messrs. Thur- 
man, Washburn, and Cooley.' 
This solution settled nothing.  During the following three years 
constant disputes arose over the proper division of  traffic,'  and in 
1884 the old struggle was resumed with unabated  vigor.  Rates on 
grain to the seaboard fell from 30 cents to 20 cents on March 14 
of that  year,  and to  15  cents on  March  21;  remaining  low and 
Hepburn  Committee Report, vol.  3, p.  558. 
Cullom Committee Report, vol.  2, p.  98. 
a  In January  the Pennsylvania announced that  it  would  take  provisions from 
Chicago to New York for ten cents per hundred pounds.  R. R. Gaz. 14:  28, 1882. 
'  See Albert  Fink, Report upon the Adjustment of  Railroad Transportation Rates 
to the Seaboard,  1882;  also, Letter to a New York Merchant, by the same, Hepburn 
Committee Report, vol.  2,  Exhibits,  pp.  106-119. 
'  For agreement  see  Chron.  34:  116,  1882. The Commissioners' functions were 
Pumly advisory.  They reported in July that "no  evidence has been offered before 
US that the existing differentials are unjust, or that they operate to the prejudice 
either of  the Atlantic seaboard cities."  Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce 
(Elkins Committee),  1905,  vol.  2, pp.  I243 ff. 
"he  question was passed upon by C. F.  Adams as arbitrator in  November, 1882 
(Chmn. 35:  603,  1882), and by the Trunk-Lie  Board of  Arbitration in January,  1% 
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fluctuating through the year.l  Immigrant business from New York 
to Chicago was handled by the Pennsylvania at one dollar a head. 
By  February,  1885, rates for traffic in  both  directions were com- 
pletely  demoralized.  Nominal  east-bound  charges  on  grain  were 
25 cents, or a 10 cent advance since the preceding March, but actual 
rates were as low as 8 and 10 cents.  Meanwhile published rates on 
west-bound freight were a third less  than the standard  tariff, and 
passenger rates in both directions were, roughly, one-half the regular 
charges.  The following month  still  further  reductions  occurred. 
The warfare was finally terminated  by  an agreement to maintain 
rates late in 1885,~  followed by an elaborate pooling agreement be- 
tween the competing lines3 
From 1875 to 1885 the trunk lines to the Atlantic ports were thus 
engaged  in  active  competition.  What  was the effect of  this upon 
the Baltimore & Ohio?  This road was highly prosperous in  1875. 
Dividends of  6 per cent and 10 per cent were being paid.  The cap- 
italization was  small  and  the  management  conservative.  During 
the ten years following 1875 the rate of dividend was not materially 
decreased.  In 1876 10 per cent was paid.  In 1877 the old 8 per cent 
rate was restored, and the following year the distribution was made 
in stock instead of  in cash.  After the agreement  of  1878 one-half 
year's dividend was paid in cash; and in 1879 9 per cent cash, and 
in  1880 10 per  cent  cash  was  declared, this  rate  enduring  until 
1886.  But although  dividends were  maintained,  the effect of  the 
railroad  wars  appeared  in  the slowness with  which  net  earnings 
increased.  A comparison  of  the net returns of  1884 with those of 
1874 reveals a gain of  40 per cent, on a mileage 27 per cent greater ; 
but the figures for  1885 show an increase of  less than  2  per  cent 
over those for 1874, while the totals for 1884 were not again equalled 
until  1900.  Meanwhile more bonds had been  issued, and the per- 
centage of  fixed charges to net earnings had increased  from 16 in 
1874 to 63 in 1884.  In other words,  money was borrowed  to put 
into the road which did little more than keep the net earnings from 
The attempt of  the Pennsylvania  to cut off  the New  York  connection of  the 
Baltimore  & Ohio caused  especial  bitterness  between  those  roads.  See  Chron. 
39: 420,  1884. 
'  Chron. 41: 393,  1885. 
Cullom Committee Report, vol. I, Appendix, pp.  237,  and 240  ff. 
declining.  In that same time the stock increased  $2,900,000,  and 
according to the profit and loss account $15,559,636 were put into 
the  property,  making  a total of  $55,743,092  (of this $37,197,696 
were bonds); the only result of  which was the building of  313 miles 
of  line, and the securing of  an increase  in  net  earnings for 1884, 
which was swept away the following year. 
In 1884 the  elder  Garrett died, and his son Robert was elected 
to succeed him.  The old  policy of  independence and competition 
was  continued,  the  objective  point  being  now  an  entrance  into 
New  York.  "When  in  1885  the  other  trunk  lines harmonized 
their  differences, . . .  " said  the  Chronicle,  "the  Baltimore  & 
Ohio . . . pursued  its  policy of  aggression. . . . The road  must 
reach Philadelphia . . . nay, must push . . .  on to New York. . . . 
Instead of  seeking to avoid rivalry,  its every effort  seemed to en- 
courage it.  Rates were reduced, concessions made to shippers and 
travellers, the one idea apparently being to get traffic no matter what 
the cost."  The necessity of  a secure  New  York  connection  had 
been impressed upon  the company in the course of  the rate wars. 
The  first  step was  to  be  actual  construction  to  Philadelphia, the 
second, construction  or  traffic  agreements  from  Philadelphia to 
Xew  York.  Bonds were  issued  in  April, 1883. for construction of 
a so-called  Philadelphia  branch  from  Baltimore to  the northern 
boundary of  Cecil  County, Mar~land,~  there  to connect with  the 
Baltimore & Philadelphia Railroad, which was being built through 
Delaware  and Pennsylvania to Philadelphia.  Entrance  into Phil- 
adelphia  was  secured  over the Schuylkill River East Side Railway, 
a  corporation  organized  under  the  laws  of  Pennsylvania  and 
doing business in  the city  The distance was approximately 
ninety-nine miles; the cost was later asserted to have been $20,000,- 
000.  Beyond  Philadelphia  the  Baltimore  & Ohio relied  on  an 
agreement with the Philadelphia & Reading for trackage to Bound 
Brook, New  Jer~ey,~  and  on  a  traffic contract with the Central of 
New Jersey for its line from Bound Brook to Elizabeth.'  Terminals 
Chron. 45: 692, 1887. 
The amount of  issue was ~Z,~OO,OOO  ($11,678,400) at 44  per  cent,  maturing 
1, 1933, and placed through Brown, Shipley & Co. of  London.  Chron. 36:426, 
1883. 
Chron. 40: 453, 1885. 
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on Staten Island were secured by purchase of  a controlling interest in 
the Staten Island Rapid Transit Company,' and connection between 
Elizabeth and the  Island was obtained  by new construction.  The 
strength of  this route was in its directness and in its independence 
of trunk-line control ;  its weakness was in its excessive cost between 
Baltimore and Philadelphia, and in its reliance upon traffic contracts 
north of  the latter city.  A proposition was  advanced to  unite  the 
Baltimore  & Ohio, the Philadelphia  & Reading, and the Central 
of  New Jersey with the Richmond Terminal System. This, however, 
fell thro~gh,~  and the possibility still existed that the Baltimore & 
Ohio might some day construct a line of  its own from Philadelphia 
to New York. 
Pending  the  completion  of  the  preceding  arrangements  rate 
conditions remained  naturally  unsatisfactory.  The Pennsylvania 
objected to the paralleling of  its Philadelphia-New York branch, and 
refused to allow temporary use of  that line by the Baltimore & Ohio 
while the latter's independent connections were being establi~hed.~ 
Freight rates were slowly and painfully raised after  the conflict of 
1884-5,  and did not regain a high level.  In 1886 the Baltimore & 
Ohio was forced to reduce its dividends from 10 to 8 per cent.  The 
following year  it cut to 4 per cent, and in  1888 no dividend at all 
was declared.  The surplus on the year's  operations, which had not 
since 1878 fallen below $~,ooo,ooo,  dropped  to $110,819  in  1885, 
and to $36,259 in  1886.  As  dividends decreased, the funded debt 
increased,* the percentage of  fixed charges to net income rose from 
63 to 89, and the floating debt attained the portentous amount of 
The Staten Island Rapid Transit possessed an extensive water front on Staten 
Island, besides franchises for two ferries from Staten Island to the Battery, New 
York  City.  Some trouble was experienced in securing permission to bridge the Kill 
von Kull between Staten Island and the New Jersey mainland.  Congress passed an 
act permitting construction, New Jersey protested, and the courts upheld the author- 
ity of  Congress.  Stockton v. Baltimore & New York Railroad Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 9. 
a  R.  R. Gaz.  19:  170, 1887;  Ibid. 19:  490,  1887.  For an account of  the  Rich- 
mond  & West  Point Terminal Railway & Warehouse Company see the chapter on 
the Southem Railway. 
a  R. R. Gaz.  18:  49, 1886. Interview with Mr.  Albert  Fink.  A  passenger  rate 
war between the Pennsylvania and the Baltimore  & Ohio took place early in 1886, 
and resulted in the indirect cutting by the former of the pool rate which it had agreed 
to maintain.  Chron. 42 : 73, 1886. 
From $34,713,696  in  1884 to $56,868,201  in  1887. 
$rr,148,~7-  The only item which did not grow was net earnings. 
There was nothing occult in the situation.  Every one was well aware 
that the competition to which the Baltimore & Ohio had been sub- 
jected had been severe, and that the cost of  its New York extension 
had  been  large.  In 1887 the bonds outstanding were $56,868,201, 
the stock  $19,792,566, and the  accumulated  surplus  $48,083,720, 
or a total of $124,744,487.  This stood for the sums invested in the 
property.  Net  income on the other hand was $4,994,721 ;  so that 
on  an investment of  over  $~oo,ooo,ooo  but 4  per  cent  was  being 
obtained to  cover  interest, improvements, and whatever  dividend 
might be declared. 
That no general apprehension was felt by  investors before 1887 
was due to the great prestige which the Baltimore & Ohio enjoyed. 
The long series of dividends counted heavily in favor of  the road. 
The enormous accumulated surplus, said to have been invested in 
valuable improvements and extensions;  the enterprise of  the com- 
pany in making extensbns; the large volume of  business; and the 
confident statements of  the president, all conspired to prevent a too 
keen  analysis  of  the  business returns2  Relief  of  two  sorts  was 
nevertheless required.  In the first place the floating debt had grown 
so  large that  some means of  paying it  off  was  necessary; in  the 
second place the road needed a sufficient reduction in fixed charges 
to restore some of  the margin of  non-mortgaged earnings which had 
been so great a safeguard in the early days.  Only the first of  these 
requirements was  met.  Cash  the road  had  to have; the existing 
fixed charges, it was thought, it could endure if  only some abatement 
of the intensity of  trunk-line competition could be obtained. 
The method chosen for raising cash was the sale of  bonds.  In 
September, 1887, J. P. Morgan & Co.  announced that a prelimin- 
ary contract had been entered  into between  the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad Company and J. S. Morgan & Co.,  Baring Bros. & Co., 
and Brown, Shipley & Co., of  London, and their  allied houses  in 
America, for the negotiation of  $5,ooo,ooo Baltimore & Ohio Con- 
'  Such as connecting lines, iron  bridges over the  Ohio River, elevators, wharves, 
facilities, etc. 
'  The lowest average price  of  the  common  stock  before  announcement of  the 
measures taken for relief was  160,  from which point the quotations rapidly dropped 
to  125, and on January 5, 1889,  to 85. I2  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
solidated  5s  and of  $~,OOO,OOO  preferred  stock, for the purpose of 
paying off  the entire floating debt, and of  placing the company upon 
a sound financial  basis.'  The consolidated  bonds were to be part 
of an authorized issue of  $29,600,000, of  which $21,423,000  were to 
be  reserved  to retire the main stem mortgage indebtedness when it 
should fall due, and $8,177,112  were to be exchanged for securities 
in  the company's  sinking fund,  the freed securities to be used  to 
pay the floating debt in part.  In case this exchange should not be 
made, $7,5oo,ooo of  the issue might be  sold direct, and the syndi- 
cate  before  mentioned  agreed  to  take  $~,OOO,OOO  of  this  amount 
and to place $~,OOO,OOO  in preferred  stock on condition: 
(a) That the statements of  the company should  be verified; 
(b)  That the management  of  the company should  be  placed  in 
competent hands, satisfactory to the syndicate; 
(c)  That satisfactory contracts should be made between the Balti- 
more  & Ohio and other roads for New York business, which should 
remove  all  antagonism  between  them  on  the  subject, and should 
ensure the permanent working of  the first-named in entire harmony 
with  the other  trunk  lines,  besides  avoiding  the construction, or 
the  threat  of  construction,  of  expensive  lines  north  and east of 
Philadelphia. 
Annual payments to the Baltimore  & Ohio sinking funds were 
to be made in the future in consols instead of  in cash.2 
The essence of  this  arrangement was  a  funding of  the floating 
debt, plus agreements with other roads in order to maintain earn- 
ings.  The funding involved, however, a certain increase of  charges 
through  the  issue  of  bonds,  while  the  agreements offered  but  a 
doubtful chance of  increased  earnings.  Only by an effective com- 
munity of interest  or of  ownership among the trunk lines could a 
saving have been secured on which the new bond issues could safely 
have  relied.  That this was  to take place  through the syndicate, 
that body  was emphatic in denying.  "The statement,"  said Vice- 
Chron. 45: 304,  1887; Ibid. 45: 824, 1887. 
About $5,coo,ooo of  the floating debt in March, 1888, consisted of  advances by 
the syndicate, for which they held 50,000 shares of  Western Union Telegraph Company 
stock, and 15,ooo shares of  United States Express Company stock, which at current 
prices about covered their loan.  Statement of  President  Spencer, Chron. 46: 344, 
1888. 
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president  Spencer,  '(that  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  has 
passed into the hands of  a syndicate, of  which J. P. Morgan is the 
head,  is  absolutely  without  foundation. . . .  The syndicate  has 
the greatest interest now in the growth of  the Baltimore  & Ohio, 
to  secure this growth and progress  absolute independence of 
other corporate  predominance is essential, and the road  must  be 
worked in the interest  of  the states and territories  it  reaches." ' 
This declaration left only informal agreements as a resort ; for pool- 
ing had been forbidden in 1887.  It did more, it implied the neces- 
sity of a maintenance of  competition, for to work the Baltimore  & 
Ohio  in  the interest  of  Baltimore  meant  to  work  it  against  the 
interest  of  New  York.  In  principle  the  plan  was  nevertheless 
Bondholders  saw no necessity for a  radical  reorganiza- 
tion, and were willing to consent only to a new issue of  bonds.  Cer- 
tain  modifications were, however, imposed.  The exchange of  new 
bonds for securities in the sinking fund was abandoned, and the 
alternative of  direct sale was embraced.  It was found impossible 
to secure the consent of  stockholders to an increase in the preferred 
stock,  three attempts to obtain the required  authorization  failing 
in  the week  ending  January  20,  1888.~ Furthermore,  the failure 
of  the stock issue led President Spencer  to request that the city of 
Baltimore  extend for five years at 4 per cent a $~,OOO,OOO  loan to 
the company, which was to mature in two years, and that it return 
the sinking fund of  $2,4w,ooo which had accumulated in its hands 
for the eventual cancellation of  the debt.'  It  may be added that this 
suggestion was not accepted. 
Ry. Age,  12: 640,  1887. 
'  "If it [the stock] is sold," said a statement in the New York Tribune,  purporting 
to represent the views of  Senator Gorman, a large stockholder, "  it will  place the 
control  of  the  road  practically  in  the  hands  of  the  syndicate. . . . It is  clearly 
Preferable to keep the control of  the stock here [Baltimore], as the road is a city and 
State institution  of  the first importance to our business interests."  Ry. Age,  13:  44, 
1888.  Another objection was that an issue of additional preferred stock would post- 
Pone indefinitely dividends upon the common. 
a  Mr. Spencer had succeeded Robert Garrett in December,  1887. 
'  Chron.  46:379,  1888.  In connection  with  this  proposition  President  Spencer 
made the following statement: Of  the $11,148,007  floating debt, December,  1887, 
57>769,3~4  consisted of  loans and bills payable.  This is now reduced to $6,446,173. 
There will probably be added to this $1,4oo,ooo for equipment, already either under 
Contract or to be  constructed in the company's shops.  In addition there should be, 
'"  the near future, not less than $2,000,000 additional put into this property for the 14  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  BALTIMORE  & OHIO  I5 
While  awaiting  final  settlement  of  the  syndicate  scheme the 
Baltimore & Ohio obtained some cash from the disposal of  all  its 
free resources ; that is, from the telegraph, express, and sleeping-car 
businesses which it had conducted since early in the administration 
of  John  Garrett.  In August,  1887, it  sold  its express  business  to 
the United States Express Company for a period of  thirty years, in 
return for $1,5oo,ooo  of  the capital stock of  the express  company 
plus a certain percentage of  the annual earnings of  the express lines 
handed over.'  In  October of  the  same year its telegraph business 
was  turned  over  to the  Western  Union  Telegraph  Company in 
return for $5,000,000 of  the Western  Union  stock, and an annual 
payment of  $60,000 in cash.2 Finally, in June,  1888, its sleeping-car 
equipment and franchises were transferred to the Pullman Company 
for a period of  twenty-five years at a reported price of  $1,250,000.~ 
The company agreed to  furnish all the sleeping  and  parlor  cars 
required.  This brought  the  incidental advantage of  ending long- 
continued suits over patents.  The terms of  sale to the telegraph and 
express companies brought  in  no ready money, but  the securities 
obtained were readily salable, and being independent for their value 
of  the commercial success of  the Baltimore & Ohio were  available 
for times of  difficulty.  It was  this policy  which  offset  the refusal 
of  the city of  Baltimore to return the sinking fund to the company, 
and which by  March, 1888, rendered the road even to some extent 
independent of  the syndicate.  At  that date a modification of  the 
syndicate agreement took place.  The bankers gave up all claim to 
the $~,OOO,OOO  of  stock so long under discussion, and took instead 
the balance ($2,500,000) of  the  $7,5oo,ooo consolidated mortgage 
bonds which the company was authorized to sell.  "The syndicate 
acted,"  said the Baltimore Sun, "in an entirely friendly spirit, and, 
purpose of  improvement.  The total  requirements  are thus  $~o,ooo,ooo.  Of  this 
$5,ooo,ooo will be disposed of  by assets in the hands of  the syndicate as collateral, or 
in the hands of  the company.  Of  the remaining  $~,OOO,OOO,  $1,5oo,ooo is floating 
debt.  This will be more than provided for by the $2,5oo,ooo of  consolidated bonds 
remaining in the hands of the company for its future use after the sale of  the $5,ooo,000 
to the syndicate.  The remaining $3,500,000 needed  foi equipment and improve- 
ments it is the desire of  the company to provide for by that portion of  the $~,.$oo,ooo 
not required for the floating debt, and by the $2,500,000 in the sinking-fund loan of 
I@.  Chron.  46: 344. 
Ry. Rev.  28:192,  1888.  '  Ry.  Age,  12 :  728,  1887. 
R.  R.  Gaz.  20: 41 7,  1888. 
with a desire to continue its financial relations with the company, 
tmb the remaining $2,5oo,ao . . .  at a better price than was paid  .- 
for the $5,000,000." I 
with temporary  financial  requirements provided  for,  President 
Spencer was  enabled to  achieve some  much-needed reforms.  At 
a meeting of  the directors on March  14 a complete  reorganization 
,f  the service was authorized, with changes and transfers affecting  "x  ---- 
employee~  from the first  vice-president down.  Later a committee 
of  experts was organized "to  examine thoroughly all 
the shops, shop tools, etc., of  the entire Baltimore  & Ohio system, 
and to report on all the improvements needed."  The form of the 
annual report. was improved.  The much-quoted surplus, which had 
proved  such an  unreliable support, was cut in two by  the writing 
off of bad investments, the marking down of  the price of  securities, 
and the  like; and,  finally, a committee was appointed  to  make a 
general examination of  the financial  as well  as the  physical con- 
dition of  affairs3 "  Great anxiety,"  said a resolution of  the direct- 
ors, "exists in  the  public mind as to the  financial  condition and 
the value and earning capacity of the road and property . . .  [and] 
it is due to all interests that a full, frank, and complete statement of 
its affairs should be made public."  So far as lay in his power Pre- 
sident Spencer, and through him the syndicate, tried to secure a real 
and  permanent improvement in  the condition of  the road, and to 
gain, through increased efficiency in operation,  the  margin which 
the  refusal  to  cut  down  fixed  charges  had  denied.  The  failure 
of  the attempt  may be  ascribed to the continuance of  the Garrett 
family in  power.  Any  irregularities or  mistakes which  had  taken 
place in the past  reflected  on  the Garretts, so  that it was to their 
interest to stifle investigation. Moreover, any change in policy for the 
future implied a criticism of their acts to which they were reluctant 
to accede.  In 1888 the Garrett holdings amounted  to  from 50,000 
' Ry. Rev. 28: 192, 1888. The amiability of  the syndicate was profitable to it.  On 
May 21 the subscription books of the $~,~oo,ooo  mortgage were opened  in London 
and New York, and the whole issue was subscribed in London before the inhabitants 
Of the American city, in spite of their proverbial alertness, were out of bed.  In Septem- 
ber, 1888, the Baltimore  & Ohio was reported  as ''having all the funds needed for 
the Present."  R. R. Gaz.  zo: 343,  1888. 
RY.  Rev. 28: 163,  1888. 
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to 60,000 shares out of  a total of  150,000 shares, or, deducting 32,500 
shares held  by  the city of  Baltimore, which  were not  entitled  to 
vote, to about  one-half  of  a  total  of  117,500  shares.  This gave 
undisputed control.  The effect was seen in the annual election in 
November.  Of  12  old members of  the board only 5 were reBected, 
and of  the 7 dropped 3 formed part of  the investigating committee 
engaged  in  securing "the  full,  frank,  and complete  statement  of 
the company's condition"  promised at an earlier date.'  The same 
month  President  Spencer was ousted and Mr.  Charles F.  Mayer 
was elected in his place. 
This revolution  was fatal to any radical reform,  so that during 
the next  seven years the condition of  the Baltimore  & Ohio im- 
proved but little.  Net income grew, it is true, up to the panic year 
of  1893, but fell so sharply after that that the reported figures for 
1895 exceeded those of  1888 by but $1,283,843, and even this gain 
was  practically  wiped  out during the following year.  Meanwhile 
fixed charges grew from $6,550,972  in  1888 to $6,934,052 in 1895, 
and to $7,303,781 in 1896; an increase which transformed the profits 
of  the company the following year into a deficit.  A comparison of 
the balance-sheets of  1888 and 1895 shows an increase of  $10,207,434 
in  stock, of  $16,261,000  in  funded  debt,  and of  $4,554,939 in 
floating  debt.  These  changes  were  offset  mainly  by  increases  in 
bonds and stock owned, or in the hands of  trustees, by advances 
to subsidiary lines, and by  a reduction  of  $11,08o,ooo  in bonded 
debt secured by collateral or by mortgage on the main line.  During 
this time dividends were nevertheless steadily paid on the preferred 
stock,  and,  beginning  in  1891,  upon  the common  stock  as well. 
The liberal  tendencies  of  the  management  were  also  evinced  by 
a  20  per  cent dividend  upon  the common  stock, declared  in 1891 
to  compensate  shareholders  for  expenditures in  betterments and 
improvements of the physical condition of  the pr~perty.~  It will be 
Ry. Rev. 28 :  678,  1888  ;  Ibid. 28:  689, 1888. The coincidence was so suggestive 
that it was thought necessary to "credibly  inform"  certain bankers that the investi- 
gating committee was expected to continue its investigation and to make a full report. 
In December the committee was instructed by a directors' resolution  not to report 
till its full statement was ready, and further notice does not appear. 
Ry. Age, 16:  882,  1891.  At the same time the directors decided to sell $5,096,600 
additional  common  stock to meet expenditures which  would  be  necessary in con- 
nection  with the World's  Fair at Chicago. 
seen how  different this  was  from the policy of  retrenchment and 
economy which  had  been  inaugurated  by  President  Spencer, and 
might  fairly have been expected from a corporation barely 
escaped from bankruptcy. 
Traffic  conditions  from  1887  to  1893 were very far from satis- 
factory.  The difficulties between  the  Baltimore & Ohio  and the 
peDnsylvania were  indeed  patched  up,  and  the  opening  of  the 
former's lines to New York rendered it independent of  other trunk- 
line connections ;  but frequent charges of rate cutting were made in 
1887, and a war in dressed-beef rates was inaugurated by the Grand 
Trunk in November of  that year.  In 1888 rates were pretty much 
demoralized.  Published rates on grain dropped from 273 cents in 
January  to  20 cents in  October.  Emigrant rates from New York 
to  western points became  the subject of  active  competition; and, 
most important of  all, the dressed-beef controversy was pushed till 
it developed into a war of  the most active kind.  The trouble here 
was  started by cuts on dressed beef  by the Grand Trunk.  In May 
other lines  retaliated  by cuts in  live-stock rates; by  July  14 pub- 
lished rates on cattle from Chicago to New York were 5:  cents per 
loo pounds, and on dressed beef  and hogs 7 cents.  In November 
the New York Central extended the contest by a general reduction in 
west-bound rates.'  These struggles, though terminated  for a time 
by  an  agreement  of  February,  1889,~  seriously  diminished  rail- 
way  revenues, and  prevented  the rapid  growth which the general 
prosperity  of  the country  might  have  oc~asioned.~  In fact, the 
Erie management  stated  in  their annual report for  1888 that their 
company  had  retired  altogether  from  certain  classes  of  through 
Chron. 47:  575,1888.  It is impossible to give an adequate account of  these wars 
without straying too far from our subject.  Some of  the methods by  which rebates 
were  granted are revealed in the case of  Jacob Shamberg V.  Del., Lack.  & W. R. R. 
Co.  ef a/., 4  I. C. C. Rep. 630.  The differential question took on a new phase in 1888 
the demand of weaker roads for protection against stronger.  This had long 
been a demand of the Grand Trunk, and had  been conceded to it in the last part 
Of  1887. In January,  1888,  the Pennsylvania and the New York Central agreed to 
besides  a  differential  rate  to  the Erie, the Lackawanna, the West  Shore, and 
the.~altirnore  & Ohio, which should vary from five rents per hundred pounds from 
Chicago to New York on first class to one cent on fifth and sixth classes. R.R. Gaz. 20: 
2651888;  Chron. 46:5f,  1888.  This did not prevent active warfare throughout the year. 
Known as the Presidents'  and Bankers'  Agreement. 
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business  for a time during the preceding twelve  months, owing  to 
the unremunerative level  of  rates.  Conditions during the greater 
part  of  1889  were  better,'  and during the  following  three  years 
constant attempts at agreement and arbitration, joined  with a con- 
siderable volume of  business,'  prevented a long continuance of any 
difficulties which arose. 
It was  perhaps  traffic  conditions  such  as  we  have  described 
which  led  the  Garrett  family  to  favor  a  community of  interest 
scheme which should improve the Baltimore  & Ohio connections 
with the West.  In June, 1890, Mr. E. R. Bacon formed a syndicate 
to control the  stock of  the Baltimore  & Ohio Company.  Acting 
in  harmony  with  the  Garrett family, the syndicate was  made up 
of Philadelphia,  New  York,  Baltimore, and  Pittsburg  capitalists, 
including the Richmond Terminal, Pittsburgh  & Western, Northern 
Pacific, and Reading interests.  The plan was to establish a com- 
munity of interest between a vast network of  lines reaching from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from New York to the Mississippi. 
"The buyers,"  it was said, "came  in  simply as investors without 
condition that their other properties would  be benefited, although 
it was of  course intimated that something was to be done."  They 
were  required  to  pool  their stock for three years, and to give an 
irrevocable proxy  for that period to  President  Charles F.  Mayer. 
The amount of  the syndicate purchase was 45,000 shares, of  which 
32,500 were obtained  from the city of  Baltimore, and 9686  (pre- 
ferred)  from  the  state of  Maryland ;4  and the  purchase  brought 
The compafative peace of  1889 was due as much  to the abundance of  traffic 
offering as to the  efficacy of  the agreement  concluded in  February  of  that year. 
According to the Chronicle the apportionment of  traffic then contemplated proved 
difficult to carry out, and considerable discontent arose.  Chron.  50: 892, 1890. 
In 1890 difficulties occurred  through the competition of  the Canadian Pacific, 
and more particularly through the attempt of  the Lake Shore to reduce the differ- 
ential formerly granted to the Grand Trunk.  Chron. 50: 850,1890.  The matter was 
left to arbitration, Chron. 51 :  625, with the result that the lines north of  Lake Ontario 
were allowed to charge two and one-half cents less per hundred pounds on dressed 
beef  to the seaboard than the lines further south.  R. R. Gaz. 23: 64,1891.  This had 
the effect of  putting the  Canadian Pacific on an equality with  the Grand Trunk. 
Late in 1892 still another agreement between the trunk lines was found necessary 
to maintain rates.  Chron. 55 :  857, 1892. 
Ry. Rev. 30: 382, 1890. 
'  Chron. 50: 800, 18go; Ibid. 50: 833, 1890;  Ry. Rev. 30: 348, 1890; R. R. Gaz. 
22 :  448,  1890. 
the incidental advantage of  removing city and state from any direct 
aterest in  the road.  The preferred state stock the syndicate later 
exchanged for common stock owned by the Johns Hopkins Univers- 
ity.  The purchase once made, the pool was formed on well-known 
lacs.  The stock was deposited with  a  trust  company, trust certi- 
ficates were  issued, and proxies transferred to Charles F.  Mayer.* 
The shares to be deposited were limited in amount to IIO,OOO;  the 
actual amount put in was 89,750.  The results of  the agreement were 
less sensational than the forecasts made.  It undoubtedly did much 
to  promote  friendly  feeling  among the  roads  concerned.  When, 
in  1891, the Baltimore  & Ohio was compelled to vacate the Chicago 
terminals of  the Illinois Central, which it had occupied for years, 
it was able to make prompt arrangements with a corporation con- 
trolled by the Northern Pacific for the use of  its facilities both for 
passengers and for freight.  But the influence of  the Garrett family 
was  not  lessened,  and inasmuch  as the  main  competitors of  the 
Baltimore &Ohio were not  included there was no  check to com- 
petition, and earnings showed no striking change. 
Matters stood thus at the beginning of  1893.~ No progress had 
been  made toward  restoring the Baltimore  & Ohio to a perman- 
ently stable condition, and the prosperity which its reports declared 
was  fictitious only.  The reorganization to which bondholders had 
refused to submit in the comparatively prosperous times of  1888 
was  compelled by  the depression following the panic of  1893.  In 
1894 earnings fell off.  The gross earnings for the year ending June 
30, 1893, were $26,214,807, and the net income $9,210,666 ;  the fol- 
lowing year the same items were $22,502,662 and $8,719,830.  The 
directors reduced  the  dividend  and  called  attention  to the losses 
"curred  through protracted strikes in the coal and coke industry.' 
Application for listing of  Trustee certificates, Chron. 54: 369, 1892. 
Certain extensions had been made, which it is not necessary to describe at length. 
The most important had been those of  the Pittsburgh  & Western in 1891, Chron. 
52: 238, 1891, the Akron & Chicago Junction,  Chron.  53: 756, 1891, and the West 
Virginia 8I Pittsburgh, Chron. 54: 725, 1892. In 1893 the Baltimore & Ohio South- 
western and the Ohio & Mississippi Railway companies consolidated, and the Balti- 
more  Ohio guaranteed the principal  and interest of  the first consolidated mort- 
gap  gold bonds of  the consolidated company for $~~,OOO,OOO.  Chron. 56: 332,1893.  .  Chr~n.  59: 696, 1894.  In October, 1893, the  Baltimore & Ohio was borrowing 
IandOn  on one year 5 per cent promissory notes, and 2 per cent commission, pay- 
%  the~~~l  an equivalent of  7 per cent interest.  Ry. Times, 64: 499,  1893. 20  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  BALTIMORE & OHIO  2 1 
The following  January  (1895)  President  Mayer  stated  that  the 
fixed  charges,  including  the car  trusts,  sinking funds,  etc.,  due 
January I, amounting  to  nearly  $1,ooo,000,  had  been  paid  with.. 
out  borrowing  one  dollar.  "I name this fact especially,"  said he, 
"because  it is not unusual for us to make a loan for the unusually 
heavy  payments  January  I.  I  doubt if  the Baltimore  & Ohio 
has owed  so  small  a  floating  debt  for  twelve  or  fifteen  years, 
perhaps longer,  and it  never had the large volume of  stocks and 
bonds  it  now  has, something over  $16,000,000, not  put  down  at 
their face value but rather at their market value, or far below their 
intrinsic value.  I can safely say the road has not been in so strong 
a position as now for at least fifteen years." ' 
It required  more  than  confident  statements by  the  managers, 
however, to demonstrate the secure position of  the road; and this 
all the more because the acts of  these gentlemen belied their public 
assertions.  Dividends on the common stock were passed  in  1895, 
and again in 1896.  The ratio of  charges to earnings, according to 
the company's  reports,  rose from  75  per  cent  of  net  earnings in 
1894 to 80.2  per cent in 1895, and to 98.2  per  cent in  1896; that 
is, less than 2 per cent of  the net earnings of  $6,300,000 was admitted 
to be available for dividends on $30,030,000 of  stock.'  Some relief 
was evidently necessary.  In January,  1896, it was announced that 
arrangements had been  made with  a  strong syndicate to  provide 
for all immediate financial  requirements; but the appointment of 
receivers  in  February  could  scarcely  have  come  as  a  surprise. 
During the two weeks just  before  the failure  Mr. J.  K.  Cowen, 
who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Mayer  in  the presidency,  spent a  great 
deal  of  time  in  New  York  trying to  borrow  money  to  meet  the 
Chron. 60:  42,  1895. 
In 1895 the  directors speak  of  the  unremunerative  rates  prevailing.  Chron. 
60:  711,1895.  At the end of  the year Mr. Alexander Shaw, chairman of  the board 
of  directors,  felt called upon to say, "The  two subjects which are giving the new 
board  of  directors  the most  to think  about  are  the floating debt and the future 
management of  the property.  We have to fund the former, and as to the latter there 
is a difference of  opinion among the directors. . . . I deny specifically that the  Jan- 
uary interest on the bonds of  the company will be passed; that a receivership, either 
friendly or otherwise, is contemplated; that the Baltimore & Ohio and the Southern 
Railway systems are to be consolidated; and the statements that there has been an 
irregularity in the manner of  keeping the books of  the company."  Chron. 61:  11533 
189s. 
pressing  demands.  On his  eventual  failure and  return  to  Balti- 
~llore  the  directors  felt  that a  friendly receivership  was the  only 
To the well-wishers of the road  this failure may  have seemed 
an opportunity as well as a disaster.  It was now possible to accom- 
plish what the management in  1888  had refused  to attempt, i.  e. 
a reduction  in the fixed charges of the company which should re- 
move the burdens under which the road had labored, and should 
open up the way for a long period of improvement and prosperity. 
At least one more unpleasant experience was, however, to be passed 
through.  With a view to determining the Baltimore  & Ohio's real 
position, an expert  accountant, Mr.  Stephen  Little, had been  set 
to work upon  its books,  and from time to time notices had been 
appearing that he was  at work,  that his  examinations confirmed 
the statements of  the company, and that questions raised by hostile 
critics would be considered in his report.  Thus in April  a reorgan- 
ization committee, composed of Messrs. Alexander Shaw, C. Morton 
Stuart, and six others, with whom were deposited the Garrett shares, 
issued a circular  referring  to the large  amount of new capital, es- 
timated by them  at $30,000,000, which  had  been  received  by  the 
company since 1888 "without  adequate or satisfactory results," and 
to the floating debt, which they  asserted had been increased from 
about $3,500,000 to $16,000,000.  "We  make no charges, or even 
intimations of  wrongdoing,"  wrote  their secretary, "but desire and 
require that a full explanation of  the  management of  the property 
from the  year  1888,  when  the  road  was  set  on  its  feet  by Mr. 
Morgan, shall be given, and that the causes which led to the wreck- 
ing  of  the property  shall be  clearly  shown."  To which  another 
committee, which directly represented the management, replied by 
reference to Mr. Little.2 
The much-heralded report came out in December, having been 
withheld  since  the  previous  March for  fear  of  the  effect  on  the 
company's securities ; and so far from sustaining the management, 
it contained  charges of  irregularity almost  as sensational  as those 
made against  the  Atchison  at an earlier date.  The books  of  the 
Qmpany,  according to Mr. Little, were in error to the amount of 
Ry.  Rev. 36:  138,  1896. The receivers were appointed February 29. 
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$11,204,858.  During  the  period  of  seven  years and two  months 
which his report covered he found : 
An overstatement of net income of  $2,721,068 
A mischarge of  worn-out equipment to profit and loss of  2,843,596 
Improper capitalization of charges to income under the  head of 
construction, main stem,  2,064,741 
Improper capitalization of so-called improvements and betterments 
of  leased and dependent roads,  3,575,453 
Total,  $11,204,858 
Deducting these  sums from the  annual  income returns  of  the 
company, he found  that but $97~,447  had  been earned which had 
been properly applicable to dividends, whereas $6,269,008 had becn 
declared in  the  seven  years,  of  which  $3,312,089  were  cash  and 
$2,956,920 stock.  Earnings had been  increased by  the most arbi- 
trary of  book-keeping devices.  In 1892  the value of  the  Western 
Union stock held  in the treasury since the sale of  the Baltimore & 
Ohio telegraph lines  in  1888 had  been  written  up  $468,038,  and 
the  stock of  another  company,  the  Consolidated Coal  Company, 
had been  written up $114,300.  Not only had  advances to branch 
lines bcen entered as assets, but the interest on these advances had 
been credited to income, the only basis being that it was hoped that 
such interest would some day be paid; and on the other side of  the 
account, charges against operating expenses had  been  charged to 
profit  and loss on the same principles by  which  the  Garretts had 
rolled  up their fictitious surplus of  1888.  Turning to  the capital 
account, Mr. Little showed  an increase in  liabilities from 1888 to 
1895 of  $22,180,000, not including $5,481,835 representing chiefly 
the company's endorsements of  notes of  its subsidiary roads which 
stood here for the first time revealed.  This money apparently had 
been  put into the property, and yet  Mr. Little's  corrected figures 
showed net earnings to be actually smaller in  1895 than in the ear- 
lier years.  Criticisms of  the report attached themselves mainly to 
the last items treated.  That the extensive endorsement of  branch- 
line notes, absent as any mention of  the practice was from the an- 
nual reports, was most misleading and unsound, nobody could deny; 
The  period  covered  was  from  September  30,  1888,  to  November  30,  1895. 
Report of  Mr. Stephen Little to General Louis Fitzgerald, chairman of  the  reorgan- 
ization committee. 
but  the  broad  question  of  what  charges during  the seven years 
should have been  paid out of  income, and what not, gave rise to 
lively discussion.  Severe strictures on Mr. Little's statements were 
by  Patterson and Corwin, two accountants  appointed  to re- 
examine the books of the company.  "  It would appear,"  said they, 
fithat Mr. Little has made some curious errors, and has been strik- 
ingly inconsistent." ' Nevertheless the more damaging of  the lat- 
ter's accusations seem to have been  accepted, and the Baltimore & 
Ohio took its place with other American corporations, the manage- 
ments of  which have indulged in secret juggling with the books. 
Pending Mr. Little's report, reorganization was of  course delayed. 
The receivers were  then in  control,'  and under their  diraction a 
policy of  improvement was carried out.  The rolling stock 
of the system was found  to be insufficient to handle its business, 
and the m~tive  power was in similar condition.  All testified to the 
consistent desire of  the old  management  to  employ every device 
which  might  contribute to  greater  apparent  earnings.  Contracts 
for poo  freight cars were let as esrly as May, 1896, to be  paid for 
in  receivers'  certificates, and bids for  75  locomotives were  at the 
same time re~eived.~  During  their  whole  administration  the  re- 
ceivers purchased over 28,000  freight cars, 216 locomotives, 123,000 
tons of  rails,  besides ties,  ballast,  new  steel bridges, and miscel- 
laneous improvements of various sorts.'  On the financial side they 
had to resist an attempt to compel payment of  dividends  on  the 
preferred stock.  The case dragged on  through 1897 and 1898, and 
was finally decided in favor of  the c~mpany.~ 
After the publication  of  Mr.  Little's report there remained no 
serious bar to reorganization, while the needs to be met were more 
apparent than ever before.  If  the proportion of  charges to earnings 
Chron. 64:  999,  1897. 
a  President J. K. Cowen, Vice-President Oscar G. Murray. 
'  Chron. 62:  907, 1896. 
'  bid. 69:  128,  1899. 
R.  R. Gaz. 28: 781,1896;  Ibid. 29: 563, 1897  ;  Chron. 65: 110,1897;  Ry. Rev. 
j8:  628,  1898. The status of  the Baltimore & Ohio stock was somewhat peculiar, in 
when first issued to the state of Maryland it had been accompanied by a guaran- 
tee~  or conditional guarantee, of  dividend payments; and Johns Hopkins University, 
to  the stock had been transferred, maintained that this contract, added to the 
motinuous payment of  dividends for over Sfty years, gave them rights even against 
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had been too heavy on the management's own showing, how much 
more  burdensome  was  it  when  the  reported  earnings had  been 
proved too high, and the reported liabilities too low!  The first step 
after the  appointment  of receivers had  been  the springing up of 
reorganization  committees.  The  two  most  prominent  were  the 
Fitzgerald Committee, representing the directors, and the Baltimore 
Committee.  There were besides committees representing the 5 per 
cent bonds of  the loan of  1885, the consolidated mortgage gs, the 
6 per cent  bonds of  1874, the preferred  stock, and others.  These 
were all to some extent antagonistic.  It was hoped to secure a re- 
organization without  foreclosure, but  to  provide  against  all  con- 
tingencies a bill was introduced and passed  through the Maryland 
legislature, permitting a new company to succeed, after reorganiza- 
tion, to the property of  the Baltimore & Ohio system. 
By  April, 1898, a reorganization plan was ready, and was with- 
held only on account, first of  the threatened, and then of  the actual, 
war with Spain.  Two months later this difficulty seemed no longer 
serious, and a plan was formally announced.'  There were contem- 
plated two great issues of  bonds and two of  stock as follows: 
33  per cent prior lien gold bonds,  $709000,- 
4 per cent first mortgage gold bonds,  507-2- 
4 per cent non-cumulative preferred stock,  35,-9- 
Common stock,  357-9000 
These were to be parts of  larger amounts authorized but not issued. 
Thus the  authorized  amount  of  prior  liens was  $75,000,000,  of 
which $5,000,000 were to be reserved, and to be issued after January 
I, 1902, at the rate of  not exceeding $1,000,000  a  year, for enlarge- 
ment, betterment, or extension of  properties covered by the prior lien 
mortgage; or for the acquisition of  additions theret~.~  The author- 
ized amount of  first mortgage qs was $165,000,000.  Since the prior 
liens matured in  1925, and this mortgage not till 1948, $75,000,000 
were reserved for retirement  of  the  prior  issue.  $7,000,000  were 
Chron. 66: 1235, 1898. 
'  The prior lien bonds were "to be secured by a mortgage upon the main lime  and 
branches,  Parkersburg Branch and  Pittsburg Division when  acquired by  the  new 
company, covering about 1017 miles of  first track, and about 964 miles of  second, 
third, and fourth track  and sidings, and also all the equipment now owned by  the 
company of the value of  upward of  $2o,ooo,ooo, or hereafter acquired in any manner 
by the use of  the $34,ooo,ooo reserved first mortgage bonds, as hereinafter stated." 
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f&er  put aside for the new  company; $6,000,000 for the retire- 
ment of  the Baltimore Belt  Line gs,  and $27,000,000 for enlarge- 
ments,  betterments,  or  extensions,  etc.,  at  a  rate  not  exceeding 
$I,5~~,cm  a year for four years,  and not exceeding $1,000,000  a 
year thereafter.'  The reserves  from  these  two  mortgages, there- 
fore,  made liberal provision for new capital requirements. All of the 
common stock authorized was  to  be  issued  at once;  but  besides 
the $35,000,000 preferred stock before mentioned, $~,OOO,OW  pre- 
ferred were to be held in reserve for the new  company. 
Of  the  immediate  issues  $60,073,090  prior  liens,  $36,384,535 
first  mortgage 4,  $17,218,700  preferred  stock,  and  $31,178,000 
common  stock  went  toward  the  retirement of  old securities; and 
$g,ooo,ooo  prior liens, $12,450,000 first mortgage qs, and $16,450,000 
preferred stock were for cash requirements.  The better of  the old 
mortgages received cash for their overdue interest, something over 
par  in  prior liens for their principal, and from  123 to 32  per cent 
in first mortgage 4s and preferred stock to compensate for reductions 
in their annual return.  Inferior bonds received new first mortgage 
qs with preferred stock (except in one instance) as a douceur. The 
old stock, common and preferred, and the Washington City & Point 
Lookout  6s got  mostly new stock for the  principal of  their hold- 
ings, and preferred stock for their assessments.  The fundamental 
principle on which  the  exchanges were  based  was  the retirement 
of  old  bonds bearing high interest rates by an increased volume of 
new  bonds  bearing lower  rates;  thus  permitting a  much  smaller 
reduction  in fixed  charges than occurred  in  other  reorganizations 
which  we  shall consider.  To some  extent  reductions in  annual 
yield  were  made  up by allowance of  preferred stock.  The consol- 
idated mortgage 5s of  1887, on which interest was reduced from $50 
annually to $41.75,  received  $85  in 4 per cent preferred stock as a 
The first mortgage qs  were to be a first lien "upon the Philadelphia, Chicago, and 
Akron divisions and branches and  the  Fairmount, Morgantown & Pittsburg Rail- 
'Dad, covering about 570 miles of  first track, and about 332 miles of second, third, and 
feu* track  and sidings, and also on the  properties now  included in  the  present 
& Ohio Terminal mortgages of  1894, when said  lines and  properties are 
by  the  new  company; also on the Baltimore Belt Railroad, if  and when 
same  shall be acquired by  the new company.  They will also be  a lien subject 
to the Prior lien mortgage upon the lines, properties, and equipment covered by the 
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compensation. The Baltimore & Ohio Loan of  1874 saw a reduction 
in  interest from $60  to  $40.41,  partially made  up from the divi- 
dends on $160  of  new preferred stock.  In fact, out of  thirteen cases 
in which new bonds were given for old, ten included an allowance 
of preferred stock, thus bringing the Baltimore & Ohio in line with 
other reorganizations of the period.  But the proportion of  preferred 
stock given was small in each case, and the principle was not well 
carried out.' 
The cash requirements of the system were estimated at $36,092,- 
500; being swelled by arrears of  interest, receivers'  certificates, need 
for working capital, reorganization expenditures, and the like.  The 
plan proposed to cancel them by assessments on stockholders and by 
the sale of  securities before described.  On the first preferred stock, 
$2  a share was levied, $20 on the second preferred, and $20  on the 
common  stock, with a syndicate guarantee for each.  This netted 
$5,460,000.  Stockholders  received  new  preferred  stock for  their 
payments.  Deducting $5,46o,m preferred stock from the  secur- 
ities  reserved  under  the  plan  to be sold  for  cash, there remained 
h,ooo,ooo prior liens, $12,450,000 first mortgage 4,  and $~o,gp,- 
ooo preferred stock, or a total of  $32,440,000; all of  which a syn- 
dicate agreed to take.2  In addition the  company disposed of  se- 
a  Annual Yield of  Old and New Securities: 
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,-urities in the treasury, including $3,800,000  stock of  the  Western 
union Telegraph Company, for $3,5oo,ooo.' 
~0th  classes of  stock were  vested  in  five voting trustees, for a 
period  of  five  years.  The trustees  might,  however,  deliver  the 
stock at an earlier date in  their discretion, and in  fact did so  in 
~ugust,  1901.  NO additional mortgage  was  to  be put  upon  the 
property, and no increase in the amount of the preferred  stock was 
to  be  made, except in each instance after obtaining the consent of 
the holders of  a  majority of  the whole amount of  preferred stock 
given at a meeting of  the stockholders called for that 
purpose, and  the consent of the holders of a majority of  such part 
of the common stock as should  be  represented  at  such  meeting, 
the holders of  each class of stock voting separately.  During the 
existence  of  the  voting  trust  similar  consent  of  holders  of  like 
amounts of  the  respective classes of  trust  certificates was  to  be 
necessary for the purposes indicated.  Only a portion of  the leased 
and dependent lines were provided for in the plan, but the various 
cases  were  left to  be  passed  on  separately.  Thus the  Baltimore 
Belt  Line was  finally leased  at a  rental  equivalent to 4 per  cent 
on  the outstanding 5 per  cent bonds; while the acquisition of  the 
Baltimore  & Ohio  Southwestern and  the  Central Ohio railroads 
involved the payment of  a cash bonus, and an increase in the pre- 
ferred and common stpck outstanding.  The mileage of  the system 
suffered little change.  Many  of  the  branches  were  sold  at fore- 
closure, and bought in by the parent line ;  and a glance at the bal- 
ace-sheet in  1899 shows  that besides  the  prior liens and  the &st 
4,  an issue of  Pittsburg Junction and Middle Division bonds was 
the principal tool employed.  These securities, bearing 33 per cent, 
ad  falling due  in  1925,  were  issued;   st,  to  retire  branch-line 
Securities, and to weld  the system into one united whole; and 2d, 
provide  new  capital  for  enlargement and betterment  and ex- 
tension. 
The success of this Baltimore  & Ohio reorganization plan was 
largely due to the time at which it was put through.  In other 
the reorganization was completed just  when an unparalleled 
The Western Union stock was sold to the same syndicate which took the Baltimore 
&Ohio's securities, at a price said to be about go.  At  this price the yield would have 
bn  ~3,420,ooo;  so evi&ndy very little other stock was sold. BALTIMORE  & OHIO  29 
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era of  prosperity was fairly under way.  The moderate reduction 
in fixed charges which it secured proved more than adequate when 
earnings rapidly grew.  The net  earnings of  the  property for the 
year ending June  30,  1898, were  estimated at $7,724,758, and the 
new  fixed  charges were set at $6,252,351.'  Net  earnings for  1899 
were $6,621,599.  In 1900, on a mileage  11 per cent greater, they 
were  $12,359,443,  and  fixed  charges were  $6,831,463  only.  In 
subsequent years,  with  an increase both  in  mileage  and in  earn- 
ings, the margin between charges and income further increased.  In 
1903 $3,500,000 were  spent  out of  earnings for  additions and im- 
provements ;  $7,370,482 were declared in dividends ;  and $2,947,68~ 
were carried to  surplus.  In 1907  $3,000,000 were  spent in  addi- 
tions and improvements, $6,965,245 paid in  dividends, $7,480,385 
carried to surplus.  This situation was  in  no  way  due  to  the  re- 
organization plan, and would  have  restored  the  company to  solv- 
ency even if  no reorganization had taken place.  It may  be said that 
the  receivership did  much  to  enable the road  to  take advantage 
of the later prosperity.  The character of  the receivers'  work has 
been  mentioned.  By  June  30,  1899, they  had  spent  as much  as 
$I~,O&I,OOO  for cars alone, $2,500,000  for locomotives, $2,1oo,ooo 
for rails, and other sums for improvements and renewals of  all kinds. 
The maintenance of  way pay-rolls in three years amounted to nearly 
$~a,ooo,ooo,  and the total expenditure aggregated about $35,ooo,ooo; 
of  which  $15,000,000 were  secured  by the  issue of  receivers'  cer- 
tificates,  and  the  balance  through  car  trusts,  earnings  from the 
property,  and  from the  reorganization   manager^.^  This was  an 
indispensable and invaluable preliminary to a growth in  earnings, 
but was, however, distinct from the financial problems of  reorgan- 
ization.  In brief,  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  increased  its  nominal 
capitalization more, and reduced its fixed charges less than any of 
the seven other reorganizations of  the nineties which we  shall con- 
sider except  the  Erie.  Its need  was perhaps less crying,  but not 
sufficiently so to explain the difference. 
It will be remembered that, while provision had early been made 
for foreclosure, it had been hoped to avoid such a drastic step.  Hopes 
in this respect were fulfilled, and while a number of  branch lines were 
In  fact they were  never quite so low as this. 
a  Chron.  69:  128,  1899. 
sold the main stem escaped.  Vigorous objections to the plan came 
from the preferred stock, which was in 1898 suing to compel pay- 
lnent of its dividends.  In July, at a meeting of  shareholders it was 
declared to be the sense of  the meeting that the preferred stock could 
not justly be required to determine whether it would accept the pro- 
position published by the reorganization committee before the case 
in the Supreme Court should be decided.'  Late in July an injunction 
was obtained, which, however, was dissolved in October.  Still later 
in that year the suits were settled by the sale of the bulk of  the first 
preferred stock to the reorganization c~mmittee.~  The only other 
considerable complaint came from the holders of  the 43 per cent 
Baltimore & Ohio Terminal bonds, and was  a  protest against the 
reduction of  3 per cent in their interest without, as they said, the 
smallest compensation.  Suits for the foreclosure of  the mortgages 
of  1887, 1872, and 1874 were instituted in October, 1898.  Decrees 
were  obtained in  February.  Decrees were  also  given  against the 
Philadelphia Division, the Parkersburg  Branch, the Staten Island 
Rapid Transit Company, and others.  Separate receivers had pre- 
viously  been  appointed  for  the  Sandusky, Mansfield  & Newark, 
the  Central  Ohio,  the  Washington Branch,  and others.  Decrees 
were  not  asked for against the main line.  In August,  1898, only 
three months after the publication of  the plan, the reorganization 
managers were able to pronounce it effective. 
The receivers surrendered control  July  I, 1899,~  and the  com- 
pany  started  on its new  career amid a buzz  of  satisfaction  from 
all who had participated in its reorganization.  In an address before 
the Maryland Bar Association Mr. John K. Cowen summarized the 
result as follows : 
(I) Every  bondholder of  the  Baltimore & Ohio  Railroad  has 
received  new  securities which  substantially pay  his full debt.  In 
other words, the bondholders have been paid in full. 
(2)  The floating debt creditors have received every cent of  their 
indebtedness. 
(3) The first  preferred stockholders have received  in cash 75  per 
cent of the par value of  their stock, the court overruling their claim 
preference over the bondholders and creditors.  The second pre- 
ferred stockholders have  received  securities which, after payment 
'  Chon. 67:  27, 1898.  a  Ry. Rev. 38:  656, 1898.  R.R.  Gaz. 31: 500, 1899. RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  BALTIMORE  & OHIO  3' 
of  the assessment, net. about $70  per  share, at the  market price, 
and at times over $80  net could have been realized. 
(4) The common stockholders, instead of  being wiped out, have 
received their common stock in the new company upon paying an 
assessment, the net amount of  which  (because of  the value of  the 
securities received for such assessment) would  not exceed $5  or $6. 
(5) The company  saves its old  charter for whatever value may 
be  attached to it.' 
This statement presents the favorable side of  the picture.  On the 
whole,  securityholders  were  tenderly handled, though  the  bond- 
holders were by no means paid off  in fd. And on the other hand, 
this  very  tenderness  made  a  voluntary  reorganization  possible, 
whereby  the  charter  of  the  company  was  saved.  The pertinent 
objections were from the point of  view of  the company itself, and 
these were silenced by the increase in earnings. 
Since reorganization the  Baltimore  & Ohio has been  enjoying 
great  prosperity.  On a  mileage operated, which  was  some  1800 
miles greater in  1907  than in I~w,'  it earned a return increased 
by over $40,000,000; while its income from  dividends and  interest 
mounted  from less than half  a  million to over  $3,000,000.  Ton 
mileage  figures  were  about  11,300,000,000  in  1907  as  against 
6,800,000,000 in  1900;  passenger mileage had grown from 459,000,- 
000 to 723,000,000.  This prosperity has but reflected the condition 
of  the country at large, but the Baltimore  & Ohio has taken ad- 
vantage of  it in far-sighted fashion.  No less than $17,000,000  have 
been spent from earnings for additions and improvements between 
June 30,  1899, and June 30, 1907, not to mention maintenance of 
way  expenditures which  have  ranged  from  about  $1500  to  over 
$2500 per  mile of  road operated.  Besides the provision  made by 
the reorganization  plan,  $15,000,000 convertible debentures were 
issued  under  date  of  March  I,  1901,  for  new  construction  and 
improvements.  There  were  authorized  $40,000,000  of  common 
stock in November,  1901, to go in part for improvements, and the 
bulk  of  $27,750,000 new  common  stock  of  1906  will  be  applied 
to similar ends.  As  a result the company's equipment has largely 
increased,  grades  have  been  reduced,  curves  straightened, light 
1 Ry.  Age  28: 570,  1899. 
3 The chief addition has been that of the Cleveland, Lorraine & Wheeling. 
replaced  by  heavy,  and subsidiary  track increased.  There 
were  two miles of second, third, and fourth track and sidings for 
eveq three miles of main track in 1900; there were three miles to 
every four in 1907.  A considerable increase in average freight train 
load has accordingly occurred.  In  1900 the average load was 366 
tons; in  1907  it  was 433.02.  That this figure has not  still more 
patly increased from the 406.53  tons of 1901 i.i  probably due to 
the somewhat greater proportion of  manufactures handled and to 
a considerable decrease in  average distance hauled,  and is corn- 
pensated for by  an increase of over one cent in the average rate 
received. 
The events of  most vital importance in the Baltimore  & Ohio's 
recent history have been connected with its control.  In September, 
18~8,  Philip D.  Armour, Marshall  Field,  and Norman D.  Ream, 
executors of  the Pullman estate, together with James J. Hill of the 
Great Northern, bought a large interest in the stock, though whether 
or not sufficient to control no one knew.  From statements by Mr. 
Cowen it would appear that the deal was somewhat similar to the 
earlier one in which the Northern Pacific had been interested: that 
is, it involved the sale of  Baltimore & Ohio stock to secure the good 
will  of men strong enough to support the road in case of  difficulty, 
and influential enough to open desirable connections or to modify 
the stringency of  competition.  "The recent transaction," said Mr. 
Cowen, "has been the realization of  my  hopes about the future of 
the  road."  It was  not  Mr.  Hill's  influence,  however,  that  was 
destined to be dominant.  By  the end of  the year rumors connected 
the  Pennsylvania with the purchase of  an  interest in the property, 
and the election of  Mr.  S.  M.  Prevost, third vice-president of  that 
company, to a directorship, gave assurance of  the truth of  the re- 
Ports.  It was, of  course, impossible to purchase actual control so 
10%  as the  Baltimore  & Ohio stock remained in trust; but the 
trustees seemed very ready to accord to new buyers that representa- 
tion  and  influence to which  their  stock  might  give  them claim. 
At the annual election in November, 1900, an additional represent- 
ative of  the  Pennsylvania was  elected to  the  board, showing the 
Probable increase of  the Pennsylvania holdings, and the following 
Year  an absolute majority was said to have been passed, the shares 
by  Mr.  Hill  and  his  associates, and apparently sold to the 3 2  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
Pennsylvania, being thought  to  contribute  powerfully to  that re- 
sult.'  In May, Mr. Hill and Mr.  Charles H.  Tweed, chairman  of 
the Southern Pacific, resigned from the directorate, to be replaced 
by two further representatives of the Pennsylvania.  In June, Pre- 
sident Cowen was replaced by Mr. S. F. Loree, fourth vice-president 
of  the  Pennsylvania lines west  of  Pittsburg,  and  in  August  the 
voting trust was dissolved. 
The last step has been the sale of part of  the Pennsylvania hold- 
ings to  the  Union  Pacific  system.  It appears  that  the  former's 
interest in the company was largely due to anxiety over the coal situ- 
ation.  Before 1895  rates  on bituminous coal  had  been depressed 
and demoralized.  Rebates  had  been  freely given  in  spite of any 
agreements which c6uld be arranged.  Under these circumstances 
the Pennsylvania had determined to buy enough stock of  the Chesa- 
peake & Ohio, the Baltimore & Ohio,  and the Norfolk & Western 
companies  to  control  the  policies  of  these  roads,  and,  through 
stock  ownership in  the Reading  by  the Baltimore & Ohio, to in- 
fluence that company ah2  Unfortunately for the project public 
attention  became  concentrated  on  the  coal  industry  at this time 
because of  the discovery of  certain flagrant abuses, and it seemed 
wise for the Pennsylvania to dispossess itself of  a part of  its stock.' 
The Union Pacific was in the market with large resources derived 
from its  sale of  Great  Northern  and Northern  Pacific  stock.  It 
was out of  the question for the Pennsylvania to sell its shares to a 
competitor, but there was less objection to a sale to Mr. Harriman, 
providing a  reasonable  portion  should be  retained.  Accordingly, 
the  Pennsylvania sold  and the  Union  Pacific interests bought, in 
Chron. 72 :  1079,1901.  In  February, 1906, the Pennsylvania  Railroad and three 
other companies which it controlled owned $28,480,~~~~  of  Baltimore  & Ohio pre- 
ferred  and $42,9oo,ooo of  Baltimore  & Ohio common stock out of  an authorized 
capital of  $~O,CXXJ,WO  preferred and $IZ~,CXXJ,OW  common.  Report of  the Interstate 
Commerce Commission on the Pennsylvania community of  interest, February 6,1906. 
See  Chron.  76: 102,  1903;  and  Interstate Commerce Commission, Report on 
Discriminations and  Monopolies in Coal and Oil, January 25,  1907.  The interest 
of  the Baltimore  & Ohio in the Reading dated from  1902, and was influenced in 
turn by the ability of  the Reading to control the Central of  New Jersey, over which 
the Baltimore  & Ohio reached New York.  The latter's holdings of  Reading stock 
were shared with the Vanderbilts.  Both the Baltimore & Ohio and the Lake Shore 
sold a block of  their Reading stock in 1904. 
a  See statement by the Pennsylvania management in Chron. 83: 563,  1906. 
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october, 1906, some $39,540,600 in Baltimore & Ohio common and 
preferred stock, being  in the neighborhood of  half of  the former's 
holdings.  This is the present situation of  the property.  The Balti- 
more  & Ohio is independent, in the sense that it is not controlled 
by any single interest, but large amounts of  its stock are owned by 
its competitor, the Pennsylvania, and by its connection, the Harri- 
man system.  On the whole the alliance with these interests augurs 
sell  for the future of  the company.l 
1 ~t is not necessary to do more than to mention the recent  contest between  the 
Jjaltimore  & Ohio and the Hill-Morgan people over the Chicago Terminal Transfer 
Railway.  By arrangement with this company the  Baltimore  & Ohio had enjoyed 
facilities  at  Chicago on  favorable terms.  When  the  Terminal  Railway 
went bankrupt the Baltimore  & Ohio paid off the first mortgage bonds in order to 
prevent the loss of its privileges.  Litigation followed, to end finally in an agreement 
between the Hill and Baltimore  & Ohio interests for joint ownesship of  the Chicago 
~ermind  by the Burlington and the latter, and for  the use of  its facilities in accordance 
with  an equitable division of  its trackage.  The Pere Marquette and the Chicago 
Great Western, which had shared in the use of the property to that time, were left 
to shift for themselves.  Ry. World, August 23,  1907. ERIE 
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Second reorganization -  Development of  coal  business -  Extension  to Chicago 
-  Grant &Ward-  Financial readjustment -New  York, Pennsylvania & Ohio- 
Third reorganization -  Later history. 
THE  New  York  & Erie  Railroad  was  organized in  1833  in the 
hope of  bringing to the southern tier of  counties in New York State 
a  prosperity equal  to that which the  Erie Canal  had secured for 
the northern tier.  It was to run from New York or some suitable 
point in its vicinity to Lake Erie.  A six foot  gauge was adopted, 
partly  because  the  grades  encountered  were  thought  to  require 
locomotives with more power than a narrower gauge could accommo- 
date, and partly because it was wished to make the road independent 
of  any co~ection  which might lead trade away from the city of 
New York.' 
The events of  the early years may be briefly dealt with.  Di6- 
culty was  experienced  in  getting subscriptions, and in  1836  the 
legislature granted a loan of  $3,000,000.  An  assignment was made 
in  1842, due to the difficulty of  getting the enterprise under way, 
which  resulted  in the release of  the company from liability to the 
state on condition that it complete its line from the Hudson to Lake 
Erie by  1851.  Stockholders were to exchange two shares of  old for 
one  share of  new  stock, and a  first mortgage of  $g,ooo,ooo  was 
authorized.'  In  1851  the  lime was completed to Dunkirk on Lake 
Erie, and the following year it reported a bonded indebtedness of 
$14~~~000,  capital  stock of  $6,ooo,000, and floating debt to the 
amount of  $3,080,000, or a total of  $43,961 per mile of  line ;  a high 
figure, but probably necessarily so in view of  the difficult work to 
be  performed.  Although nominally completed, the troubles of  the 
road were  not  over; and  a  precarious existence was  maintained 
only by the placing of  additional loans in 1852 and 1855, and by the 
aid of Daniel Drew on two distinct occasions.  A war of rates with 
1 E. H. Mott, Between the Ocean and the Lakes  -the  Story of Erie.  N. Y. 1@9. 
a  Ibid. pp.  79-80. 
the New York Central aggravated the situation ;  heavy storms and 
ice floods in  January,  1857, caused serious loss,  and the panic of 
that year, with the ensuing depression, proved more than the road 
could stand.  Proceedings were begun  in  1859  by  the trustees of 
the  fourth mortgage,  and  ih  August  a  receiver  was  appointed.' 
The wonder was that such action had been delayed so long.  The 
income of  the road had been so far short of  meeting current expenses 
that claims for labor, supplies, rents, and unpaid taxes, and judg- 
ments  rendered  against  the  company before  the  receivers  were 
appointed, had mounted up to $741,510;  while not only had in- 
terest on  three mortgages fallen due in April, May, and June,  but 
the  principal  of  the  second  mortgage, amounting  to  $4,000,000, 
had matured.  The settlement of  claims and the reorganization  of  the 
company were put in the hands of  J. C. Bancroft Davis and Dudley 
S.  Gregory.  Since the earnings of  the road were at so low an ebb, 
wisdom would have seemed to dictate some scaling of  the charges 
to  correspond.  This did not enter into the views of  the  trustees; 
instead, they proposed to give preferred stock for all unsecured in- 
debtedness, to extend the principal of  the second mortgage coming 
due, to exchange old common stock for new, to levy an assessment 
of  23 per cent on both classes of  new stock, and with the proceeds 
of  the assessment to pay all coupons in arrears.  Provision was made 
for the retirement of  certain fourth mortgage bonds, and for a sale 
under foreclosure of  that mortgage.  By the arrangement no saving 
in  fixed charges worth  mentioning was secured; no sacrifice was 
demanded of  bondholders ;  and, save for the payment of  assessments 
and the (new) stock given for floating debt, the stockholder's posi- 
tion was not made worse.  The scheme was an easy and temporary 
means  of  escape from an embarrassing position.  Before  the reor- 
ganization the bonds outstanding had amounted to $18,006,000, the 
stock to $~~,ooo,ooo,  and the unsecured indebtedness to $8,504,000. 
After reorganization  the  totals  were:  indebtedness, $17~9~3,000, 
and stock, $1g,911,ooo  (of  which $8,911,000  preferred) ;  or a capital- 
ization of  $67,728 per  mile.  The road was sold  in  1862, and the 
Erie Railway took the place of  the original New York  & Erie Rail- 
road Company. 
With  1864 began  the career of  the Erie as a  speculative Wall 
Mott, p. I 29. Default was also made on the bt,  second, third, and Uth mortgages. 36  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  ERIE 
Street stock.  Its large capitalization and the painful slowness with 
which its earnings grew kept the quotations of  its shares normally 
at a low  figure and invited  speculation; while  the location of  its 
lines tempted  more serious efforts to obtain control.  Up to  1867 
Daniel Drew was ir power, while Commodore Vanderbilt spent his 
best efforts to drive him out ;  after that date Jay Gould and Jim Fisk 
became more and Inore promi~ent,  and manipulated the Erie se- 
curities with enthusiastic regard to profits which they might derive 
both from the Erie Company itself  and from operators who wished 
to speculate in  its stock.  In the course of  the abundant litigation 
to  which  Gould's  methods  gave  rise,  various receivers were  ap- 
pointed; but the orders of  appointment were subsequently vacated, 
and the receiverships were nominal only.  The details of  the Wall 
Street struggles have little interest for us here.'  But the result is of 
importance.  In the eight years from  1864 to  1872,  when  Gould 
was turned out of  Erie by General Sickles and his English backers, 
the bonded indebtedness of  the company increased from $17,822,- 
900 to  $26,395,000,  and the common  stock  from $24,228,800 to 
$78,000,000; in the one case a growth of  48 per cent and in the other 
of  221  per cent, at a time when  the mileage increased 53 per cent 
and the net earnings but 22 per cent.2 No more disgraceful record 
exists for any American railroad.  The stock was not issued for the 
sake of  improving the road,  and it  was subsequently shown  that 
the road was not improved ;  but it was thrown upon the market at 
critical times in  support of  bear operations by the Erie managers, 
while portions of  it, on at least one occasion, were bought back with 
the funds of  the company to aid speculation for a rise.  The result 
was to ruin the credit of  the Erie, and to make it the favorite tool 
of  cliques of  gamblers.  The increase in bonds occasioned an un- 
mistakable increase in fixed  charges, which  rose from 20 per cent 
of  gross earnings in 1864 to 25  per cent in 1871, 21  per cent in 1872, 
and 30 per cent in  1873, while the purchase of  worthless bonds of 
subsidiary roads,  such  as  the  Boston,  Hartford & Erie,  lessened 
the assets without disclosing the real position to the casual observer. 
In 1872  the  control of  Erie  was  taken  from Gould through  a 
vigorous campaign managed by  General Daniel E. Sickles, and an 
See Adams's  Chapters of  Erie, Boston, 1871. 
a  The capital per mile rose from $81,068 in 1864 to $117,760 in 1872. 
''e&entIy  respectable"  board  of  directors  was  elected.  Tem- 
PO  ray relief was obtained  from the  use  of  $6,ooo,m,  available 
from an issue of  bonds previously approved, '  and dividends, first 
on  the preferred and  then on  both  preferred and common  stock 
were declared.  Unfortunately the dividends were not earned ; and 
this fact, which was suspected from the previous record of  the com- 
and the marvel of  its so early restoration to a dividend basis, 
shown in  the statements of  ex-Auditor S. H.  Dunan, who re- 
signed in March, 1874, alleging that the accounts had been falsified 
to  suit  the  company's  purposes,  and  that he was  unwilling  any 
longer to be a party thereto.'  Investigations conducted by represent- 
atives of E~glish  bondholders showed that in the three years ending 
in  September,  1875, the profits of  the  road had  been  $1,008,775 
instead of  $5,352,673 as stated in the company's accounts ; and the 
severity of  this tinding was scarcely mitigated by the conclusion that 
Q  the  opinion  of  the  committee the  dividends on  the  preferred 
stock at least were justified  by  the books.'  At  the same time the 
report of  Captain  Tyler,  another English representative, laid  em- 
phasis on the necessity for a change of  gauge, a double track, im- 
prove~lents  in gradient, fresh extensions and connections, and other 
similar matters. 
The real position of the company at the time was shown but too 
well  by  the frequency of  strikes upon its road.  Thus in February, 
1874, a strike of freight brakemen on the Susquehanna division broke 
out, caused principally by an order to discharge one of  the brake- 
men  from each freight crew, leaving only three on a train ; and at 
the same time there was a strike of  the switchmen on soQe of  the 
divisions owing to a decrease in pay.  In March occurred a serious 
strike among the employees of the road in Bdalo, mainly on account 
of irregularity and delay in payment of  wages, and, finally, in April, 
there was trouble both in the Susquehanna shops and in the Jersey 
City freight yard over this same cause.  The indications afforded by 
he  troubles were borne out by the figures of  the annual reports. 
The gross earnings of 1874 were $1,413,708  less than those of  1873, 
Chron. 12:  203,  1871; Ibid. 16:489, 1873. 
R.  R.  Gaz. 6: roo, 1874.  See affidavit  of S. H. Dunan in the suit of John C. Angell 
%ahst the Erie Railway Company and others, reprinted  in  Hepburn Committee 
:~n,  ml. 2,  Exhibits, pp. 591-610. 
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while the decrease in operating expenses was so slight as to reduce 
net earnings by nearly the same amount.  If, now, there is deducted 
from the net earnings of the years 1871-3,  inclusive, the sum which 
the London accountants declared to have been improperly reported 
as profits, there results an average of $4,175,699 net ;  or less than the 
net earnings for either 1864, 1865, or 1866,  although the average 
charges for the yeart mentioned exceeded the average of the earlier 
period by $1,769,060 each year.  These figures exclude the influence 
of  the panic of  1873, which, as has been seen, caused a still further 
falling off  in the earnings of  the company.  It was a time, moreover, 
when  the Erie could not be content to sit still and wait, for com- 
petition was daily becoming more severe.  By  1874 the Baltimore 
& Ohio, the New  York  Central, and the Pennsylvania had con- 
nections with Chicago, and the Erie was competing with them for 
business  by  means of  traffic  agreements with  connecting lines. 
The next decade was to see the bitterest rate wars that the country 
has ever known ; and the Erie, with its exceptional gauge and single 
track, was to compete with rivals of  normal gauge, who were adding 
third  and fourth tracks to the two which they already possessed. 
The one bright spot was the development of  the coal traffic, which 
in 1874 formed the greatest item of  the Erie's  tonnage, and was in 
a measu-e apart from the competition of  other lines. 
Suit was brought in July,  1874, for the appointment of  a receiver. 
The complaint reviewed alleged improper acts  of  the management 
in  declaring  dividends,  in  buying  Buffalo,  New  York  &  Erie 
stock and sundry coal lands,  and in  issuing the new  $3o,ooo,ooo 
mortgage before  mentioned.'  In  October the Attorney-General of 
New  York  instituted  suit on  nominally  the  same grounds;  not, 
as he explained, in the expectation that the appointment of  a receiver 
would be required, but in order that this action might  be taken if 
the conduct of  the directors should make it necessary.  Still other 
suits were begun before the year was out. 
Meanwhile the management was changed.  Whether or not Mr. 
Watson, who had been president since 1872, had done all humanly 
possible  to  set  the  Erie  on  its feet,  his  administration  was  not 
unnaturally in bad odor after the charges of  Dunan and the report 
of  the London accountants, to say nothing of  the admittedly low 
Angell suit, R. R. Gaz. 6: 269,  1874. 
for the  year  1874.  An  attempt was made to secure the 
very best  man  possible for the presidency, and to support hi  in 
nece,sary  reforms,  in  the  hope  of  some  different results  from 
+.hose  with  which securityholders had become familiar.  The man 
for the place was thought to be Mr. H.  J. Jewett, a railroad man 
then in  Congress from Ohio; and this gentleman was accordingly 
secured at an extremely liberal salary.  Soon after his election a ten 
per  cent cut  in salaries was decreed, and an examination of  the 
accounts of  the stations along the line in behalf  of  the company 
was begun.  It was too late, however, for the company.  The busi- 
ness of  the last of  1874 and tirst of  1875 was poor;  floods in the 
spring damaged the property of  the road, and rumors of  a receiv- 
ership were  rife.  On May  22 a  private  meeting of  stockholders 
in  New York passed resolutions to the effect that the borrowing of 
money by the sale of  7 per  cent bonds at 40 cents on  the dollar, 
and other means adopted by the Watson administration, would in- 
evitably result in bankruptcy;  that sound interest required that the 
money  needed  to  pay  interest should be raised by  an assessment 
on  the  stockholders,  and  that  the  directors  should  be  thereby 
requested to open books to examination, and to invite stockholders 
to contribute voluntarily a sum sufficient to keep the company from 
immediate failure.'  The proposal showed a proper spirit, but was 
impracticable.  Four days later Mr.  Jewett was appointed receiver 
on application of  representatives of  the Attorney-General and of  the 
Railr~ad.~ 
This was the second receivership which the Erie had had to face, 
and the situation was materially worse than at the previous failure. 
According to the statement of  President Jewett the funded indebted- 
ness in May, 1875, amounted to $54,394,100,  and the fixed charges 
to $5,0s9,828; while the net earnings for the previous nine months 
had decreased 13.4  per cent from the corresponding period for the 
Previous year, and a serious deficit was in view.  Temporary meas- 
ures of  relief  had served but to drag the company further into the 
mire ;  and, most important of  all, the causes for the existing diffi- 
'  R.  R. Gaz. 7: 224,  1875. 
'  Chmn. 20: 520,  1875. 
"mrn  a loan of  &,-,coo  placed in London, the  company had received but 
&1,2~2,oz~  in  cash; £508,431  being retained by the London Banking Association 
and by James Maenry for daims  and  commissions on which the critical condition ERIE 
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culties were of  a permanent nature, so that the future gave promise of 
still harder conditions than had existed in the past. What was needed 
was a reorganization which  should undo  the evil work of  Gould, 
Fisk, Drew, and their associates, and which should secure the margin 
of  surplus earnings which  the reorganization of  1859-62 had failed 
to provide.  Perhaps the chief  difficulty lay in the fact that the men 
who were responsible for the increased capitalization were not at all 
those on whom the brunt of  reconstruction would fall; for while the 
managers of  the road had been Americans, the gullible investors had 
been Englishmen ;  and it was reported that much of the watered stock 
of  the Gould rCgime had been unloaded on the English market. 
Committees sprang up promptly.  The most important of  them 
were  the  English  committees  of  bond-  and  stockholders,  soon 
consolidated  under the chairmanship of  Sir  Edward Watkin.  On 
August 7,  Sir Edward left England on a visit of  inspection, accom- 
panied by Mr. Morris, counsel for the bondholders.  Conference with 
the board of  directors and with President  Jewett  followed, and a 
provisional scheme of  adjustment was decided upoa.  In his report 
to his English constituents Sir Edward outlined the results.  Current 
indebtedness, said he, was $42,180,075 ; estimated net revenues for 
the year ending in June last were $3,715,609;  operating expenses 
had been for that year 79  per cent, due largely to the cost imposed 
by exceptional gauge, while the chief lines with which the Erie com- 
peted  showed  proportions  of  only from  60  to  66  per  cent.  Out 
of  fourteen branches only three showed a profit above rentals, and 
pay-rolls had ordinarily been months in arrears.  These facts were 
familiar;  the remedy proposed was unfortunately familiar as well. 
"Let it be hoped,"  said this English financier, "that the bond- and 
stockholders will  have the courage now  to  submit to  a  period  of 
self-denial, and will consent to pay their debts and complete essen- 
tial  obligations out  of  available  net  profits,  the bondholders re- 
ceiving in place of  cash such equitable obligations, realized out of 
surplus revenue in the future, as each, according to right of  priority, 
may justly  expect." '  What could this have meant save an issue of 
stock or income bonds for coupons falling due, with the result of 
of the company enabled them to insist.  Chron. 20: 500, 1875.  For statement of the 
physical condition of the property, May  26,  1875, see  Extracts from  joint  letter to 
Hon. H. J. Jewett, Hepbum Committee Report, vol. 2,  pp. 517-518, Exhibits. 
See R. R. Gaz.  7: 423,  1875. 
adding to the unwieldy capitalization of  the road instead of  reduc- 
iog it as should have been done!  For  the rest, Sir Edward Watkin 
concluded with Mr. Jewett  the following arrangement : 
(1)  Three  nominees of  the  bond- and  stockholders'  committee 
P  reposed by Watkin were to take seats in the Erie board ; 
(2)  Mr. Morris was to be associated with counsel for the receiver 
and for the company, and was to be regarded and treated as one of 
be  professional agents and officers of  the undertaking; 
(3) Mr.  Jewett was  to  transmit  a memorandum of  his views on 
; 
(4) Net earnings were to be retained for a while, and bondholders 
sere to have a voice in  their expenditure.  Thus a vote  was  to be 
taken under the charge of  the stock- and bondholders' committee in 
London on the constitution of  a committee of  consultation, consist- 
ing of representatives of  each class of  bondholders and of  preferred 
and ordinary stock, and that committee was to designate a special 
representative whose consent and approval were to be taken by Mr. 
Jewett  in the expenditure of  net earnings; 
(5)  Monthly  reports  of  actual  earnings  and  expenditures, to- 
gether with reports from the president and receiver, were to be regu- 
larly transmitted to the office of  the committee in London ; 
(6)  Bond- and stockholders were to be urged to give power of  attor- 
ney and proxies to Watkin, or to such other person or persons as the 
above representatives  of  the bond- and stockholders should designate ; 
(7) Any scheme of reorganization was to include a provision giving 
bondholders a voting power. 
On the above resolutions Jewett, with his board, and Watkin, with 
his  committee, agreed to cooperate.'  Under  the circumstances the 
increased power given the bondholders was both a natural and a just 
demand, and it is probable that Mr. Jewett's  prompt  acquiescence 
in  it had something to do with Sir  Edward's advice to the security- 
holders "to rely on the honor, as I feel you may also upon  the anx- 
ious labors and full experience of  the President and Receiver." 
The report did not go uncriticised.  It was pointed out, first, that 
a majority of  English proprietors could not unhesitatingly share the 
'Onfidence  expressed in Mr. Jewett ; second, that the first mortgage 
bondholders were  well  secured, and would  surely refuse  to  fund 
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their indebtedness; and third, that the payment of the floating debt, 
according to the Watkin plan, would  simply create  another  debt 
of equal or greater amount due to the bondholders whose coupons 
were not  paid.  The only sound way,  said a committee of  bond- 
holders in Dundee in a letter to the Watkin Committee, is resolutely 
to shun an accumulation of  mortgage liabilities on the one hand, and 
on the other to give increased reality to the bonds and stocks of  the 
company already existing as items in capital account, i.  e.  an assess- 
ment on the stock and a sweeping reduction in the interest on  the 
bonds secured by the second mortgage:-the  first mortgage bonds 
are in different case -  they represent investment of  cash instead of 
mere water, and even if  foreclosure is difficult, they have beyond 
question an absolutely good  security for the  ultimate payment of 
both principal and interest.' 
In September,  1875, a plan of  reorganization was anonymously 
put forward as follows:  Instead of  assessment on the shareholders, 
it suggested the issue of  50 per cent more common stock; one new 
share for  every  two  shares  then existing.  If  a  price  of  $25  per 
share  could  be  obtained  a  total  of  $~o,ooo,ooo  cash  would  be 
thereby secured.  Besides the new stock issued bond- and preference- 
holders were to capitalize their interest for two years in  bonds or 
shares bearing their present  priorities.  This funding should yield 
$8,ooo,oco;  and the $18,oco,ooo in all obtained was to be expended 
on the road over  the  next two years,  during which period the new 
shares were to be paid up by half-yearly instalments.  With the line 
furnished and equipped as proposed, continued this optimistic plan, 
the working expenses could be reduced from 79  per cent to 60 per 
cent, and the traffic within three years would be at least $24,ooo,ooo 
per year, affording a net revenue  of  $9,6w,ooo  per  annum, suffi- 
cient to meet all bond and preference liabilities and to leave 3 per cent 
for the ordinary  charge^.^  The all sufficient criticism to this plan was 
that it required too great a combination of  favorable circumstances 
to ensure its success.  In some respects, however, it was not unlike the 
plan ultimately adopted. 
Two months later appeared a plan by  Mr.  John C. Conybeare, 
an English bondholder, which was superior to the foregoing in that 
it proposed an assessment, and made some slight provision for an 
R.  R.  Gaz.  7:  479-80, 1875.  Chn.  21:  277,  1875. 
ultimate reduction in  fixed charges.  Mr.  Conybeare proposed to 
@ess  preferred stock $11  and common stock $9.  Payment of  the 
Bssessment  was not to be compulsory, but was to have the effect of 
to the stock which did pay a right to dividends before any- 
gggshould be received by  that which did not pay.  Shares of the 
by the plan would thus have ranked as follows : 
(I)  Preferred shares on which assessment had been paid, entitled 
to  per cent dividends before any other dividends were paid. 
(2)  Preferred shares on which no assessment had been paid, with 
rights inferior to the preferred A shares, but superior to the common 
&ares. 
(3) Common stock on which assessment had been  paid, entitled 
to 4 per cent before further dividend on the common. 
(4)  Unprivileged, unassessed common stock which was to take what 
there was left. 
In addition there was  to  be  a  pre-preference 8 per  cent  stock, 
ranking before all the above, which was to be issued to exchange in 
part for second preferred and convertible bonds.  First consolidated 
bonds and sterling bonds of  1865 were to accept one or two per cent 
of  their  7  per  cent interest in bonds, secured perhaps by the coal 
property  of  the  company,  while  the  second  consolidated and the 
convertible gold bonds were to receive 4 per cent in  gold and 3  per 
cent  in  the new  pre-preference  stock as above.  To the  obvious, 
possibility that the stockholders would refuse  to pay an assessment 
the plan opposed no remedy.  In this case the very moderate amount 
of interest funded would have been the only relief  secured.' 
These  plans  were,  however,  but  preliminary  to  the  elaborate 
Watkin  scheme  which  appeared  in  December.  The most  pro- 
minent feature herein was, as previously indicated, the funding of 
COU~ons,  both those past due and those to become due for a time 
into the future.  Given net earnings sufficient to meet fixed charges, 
the  Postponement  of  interest  by  this  plan  would  obviously have 
Ideased revenue with which to make needed improvements on the 
road- This funding was to be, however, limited to the first consoli- 
dated 7% convertible sterling 6s, second  consolidated  7s, and con- 
venible gold  7s; the  six earlier issues were  to be left untouched. 
-anent  reduction was also to be made, in that for the second 
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mortgage and convertible 7s were to be given two classes of  ninety. 
year gold bonds: the first for 60 per cent of  the principal, with in. 
terest at 6 per cent, and payable in  bonds of  the same class  from 
the dates of  default until March, 1877, and thereafter in gold; the 
second for  40 per  cent of  the principal,  carrying 4 per  cent until 
1881  and thereafter  5  per  cent, payable  only out of  net earnings. 
To start the company on its way and to meet present obligations an 
assessment was proposed  of  three dollars on the preferred and six 
dollars on the common stock, in return for which 5 per cent income 
bonds were to be given ; while finally the dividends on the preferred 
stock were to be reduced  from 7 to 6 per cent, and foreclosure was 
contemplated, so that the opposition of  an irreconcilable minority 
might  be  more  easily overcome.'  According  to the figures in the 
Watkin plan, the old and new capitalization and interest compared 
as follows : 
The amount of  capital stock was unchanged. 
Total bon&d  indebtedness  Principal  Interest 
Before reorganization,  $54,394,100  $4,073,106 
After reorganization,  61,330,241  41139,240 
Increase  $6,936,141  $66,~34 
Indebtedness on which interest was obligatory : 
Principal  Interest 
Before reorganization,  $54,394,100  $4,073,106 
After reorganization,  46,634,134  3,316,238 
Decrease  $71759,966  $756,868 
The net earnings for 1874-5  had been $3,715,6051, and those from 
1871-3  inclusive, with the deductions declared proper in the report 
of  the London  accountants, had  averaged  $4,175,651~  each  year, 
so that a safe margin seemed to intervene.  The extent of the margin 
depended, however, on the fixed charges, such as rentals, over and 
above interest on the funded debt; and although it was proposed to 
cancel burdensome leases and contracts the actual leeway after 1880 
was to be very small indeed.  To  speak briefly, the plan was definite 
but not sufficiently radical to meet conditions which were likely to 
arise.  In counting upon the ability of the company to spare con- 
siderable  sums  from revenue  for  improvements  during the  ned 
few years, it was leaning on a broken reed ;  in increasing the nodal 
R.R. Gaz. 7:533,  1875; Chron. 21: 612,  1875. 
am0  unt of bonded indebtedness, it was making a step in the wrong 
direction ; and by interposing additional claims on earnings while 
leaving the volume of stock the same, it took from the stockholders 
any very lively interest in the road's future welfare.  The plan was 
nevertheless accepted by the English securityholders, subject to such 
as might afterwards be found desirable.' 
The next  step was  to  obtain the unanimous  acceptance of this 
wat~  scheme.  Messrs. Robert  Fleming and 0. G. Miller  were 
accordingly sent to New York in February, 1876, to consult with the 
officers  of  the company and the securityholders in America.  No very 
vigorous interest  was taken on this side, but  the Erie directors ap- 
pointed a committee to confer with the English representatives, and 
discussions took place for something over a month.  The committee 
criticised  the plan  proposed  from the point  of  view  of  the stock- 
holders; they maintained that it would destroy all their interest in the 
property unless they made further sacrifices, which they were unable 
to do, and suggested that the funding of  from four to eight coupons 
by the first consolidated, gold convertible, and second consolidated 
bonds was all that would be needed to put the road in a prosperous 
condition, provide for steel rails, and for the narrowing of  the gauge.' 
This was so  plainly inadequate that it is a matter of  surprise that it 
was  entertained by the English committee;  and even they  insisted 
that the stockholders agree to put a  majority of  the $86,ooo,ooo of 
stock in the hands of  the bondholders as a preliminary, and would 
do no more than lay the proposal before their constituents. 
On their return home in April Messrs. Miller and Fleming stated 
that the essential conditions to a successful reorganization were : 
(I) An effective  control of  the management by the real owners, - 
the bondholders ; 
(2)  The restoration of the equilibrium between the compulsory in- 
terest charge on the mortgage debt and the minimum net earnings; 
(3)  A change of  gauge from 6 ft. to 4 ft. 83 in.3 
(( The  foreclosure  scheme  of  the  committee"  (Watkin  plan), 
they,  "is certainly the soundest plan  and would doubtless be 
Preferred by those shareholders who really care for the welfare of 
tbeu Property."  Then referring to the directors'  plan, "If  it were 
Possible to present to the bondholders the scheme of proceeding by  ' 
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amicable arrangement  as practicable, and therefore as presenting 
a real alternative for their acceptance, we  should suggest to you at 
the same time to lay the option before them.  We feel, however, that 
that scheme can only be regarded as such an alternative when stock- 
holders enough have signified their willingness to vest  their shares 
in trustees on the footing of  it, and so secure an effectual control 
to the bondholders for a certain period.  We must, therefore, content 
ourselves for the present with suggesting that the committee should 
proceed with vigor in the direction of  foreclosure, at the same time 
inviting the  stockholders to  signify  their  willingness  to  vest  their 
stock in trustees as above mentioned." ' 
The suggestion of  the directors was the last alternative plan pro- 
posed, and from April, 1876, the only question was how to perfect and 
carry through the Watkin  plan.  As  eventually  put  forward, this 
differed in  a few points from its form as earlier announced.  The 
fundamental principle was still the funding of  coupons of  the first and 
second consolidated and the convertible bonds.  Of  these the first 
consolidated  mortgage and  sterling 6 per cents were  now to fund 
alternate coupons from September I, 1875,  to September I, 1879, 
instead of  funding all coupons to March I, 1876, and receiving cash 
thereafter:  and whereas in the earlier plan mortgage  bonds of  the 
same class had been given for funded interest, the later plan created 
special issues of  funded  coupon bonds, secured by  deposit of  the 
funded coupons, and bearing the same interest as the first consoli- 
dated bonds themselves.  A more serious dzerence appeared in the 
treatment  of  the  second  mortgage  and  the  gold  convertibles.  It 
will be remembered that it had  been proposed  in December, 1875, 
to exchange these for two classes of  new bonds, of  which 60 per cent 
were to bear interest at the rate of  6 per cent and 40 per cent were 
to consist of  4 per  cent income  bonds.  The new  plan  did  away 
with this permanent reduction in fixed charges.  Instead, the second 
consolidated and convertible gold bonds funded alternate coupons 
from June I, 1875, to December I, 1879, and received a new 6 per 
cent bond  for the principal of  their holdings,  and funded coupon 
6 per cent bonds for the interest thus postponed ;  the new mortgage 
bonds not having the right of  foreclosure until  after default for six 
successive interest periods (3 years).  The  funded coupon bonds  were 
1 Chron.  2~:423,  1876 
to  be  funded at  the existing rate of  interest on  the second  consoli- 
dated and convertible bonds, i.  e.  7 per cent, so that the reduction 
in  interest was compensated for by the greater volume of  securities 
given;  and both classes of  these coupon bonds were to bear lower 
interest at first than  that to which they  would  ultimately attain. 
The assessment proposed in 1875 was retained in  1876, except that 
stockholders were  given  the choice of  paying $6  on  common  and 
$3 on  preferred  stock and obtaining therefor income bonds, or of 
P  aying $4 on common and $2  on preferred and receiving nothing 
but  new  stock,  dollar  for  dollar  for  their  old.'  One-half  of  the 
shares of  the new company (after foreclosure) were to be issued in the 
name of  one or more sets of  trustees, who were to hold them to vote 
on  until a dividend had been  paid on the preferred stock for three 
consecutive years.  Provision was made for an issue of  $2,500,000 
in prior lien bonds, to take precedence of  the remainder of  the second 
consols, the proceeds to be applied to capital requirements.  Voting 
power was conferred on the first and second consols, funded income 
bonds, prior lien bonds, and income bonds, in all about $57,ooo,ooo; 
one  vote  to every $100  of  bonds2  The property of  the company 
was to be foreclosed by or under the direction of  certain reconstruc- 
tion  trustees,  for the choice  of  whom  careful provisions  were  in- 
serted. 
Divested of all complications, what this reorganization plan pro- 
posed for the salvation of  the property was the  funding of  the cou- 
pons on four classes of  bonds from 1875 to 1879;  the reduction of 
the interest to be paid on $25,ooo,ooo second consolidated and con- 
vertible 7s one per cent per share ;  and the raising of  a certain amount 
Amounts received from assessments to January 18, 1878, were : 
$3 per share on  23,372 Preferred,  $70,116 
$2  58,095  116,190 
$6  72,982 Common,  437,892 
$4  (598,095  2,792,380 
Total,  $3,416,578 
Shares forfeited for non-payment, -  Preferred,  3902 
Shares forfeited for non-payment, -  Common,  8923 
R. R.  Gaz.  11 :  30,  1879.  Report of  Pres. Jewett, Chron. 28: 67-8,  1879. Shares 
Ntha~~e~~ment  paid sold in  October, 1878, at $15 for common  and  $30  for pre- 
ferred.  R. R. Gaz. 10: 516, 1878. 
Chron.  23: 233, 1876 ; Ibid. 26:419 ;  Ibid. 29:358, 1879 ;  Hepbum Committee 
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of  cash by assessment upon the stockholders ;  while it dropped the one 
point of  the earlier plan which might have given a key to the solution 
of  the whole problem,  viz. the exchange  of mortgage  and income 
bonds for the old second consolidated in the ratios respectively of 
60 per cent and of  40 per cent.  When we remember  the desperate 
straits to which the company had been reduced, the permanent relief 
seems slight enough ; and given the fact, which proved but too true, 
that the net earnings were to fall off  until the road was little more 
than able to meet the alternate coupons which it was obliged to pay 
in cash, it appears to have been nothing at all.  If  we  suppose no 
changes to have occurred in capital account between 1878 and 1883 
save those provided for in the plan of  reorganization itself, a com- 
parison of  the two periods would have stood as follows: 
Before  reorganization 
Sterling convertible 65, 
First consolidated 7s, 
Convertible 7s, 
Second consolidated  79, 
Old Mortgages, 






















After December I, 1883  Principal  Interest 
Consolidated 7s,  $20,005,794  $1,400,405 
Consolidated 65,  33,516,666  2,01 1,000 
$53,522,460  $3,411,405 
Old bonds,  13,155,500  921,062 
Guaranteed bonds,  etc.,  6,003,360  449,4I I 
Rentals,  742,226 
$72,681,320  $5,524,104 
Total before reorganization  60,692,574  4,975,482 
Increase,  $1 1,988,746  $548,622 
It thus appears  that this reorganization  plan  contemplated an 
immediate increase in the cumbrous capitalization of  the companY 
to the amount of  nearly $12,ooo,ooo,  and an eventual increase 
bed  charges of  over $~OO,OOO.  It offered no reasonable assurance 
that  the solvency of  the company could be  maintained  under  the 
average conditions existing in the past, and left no margin for con- 
tiogencies of  any kind.  The trouble lay in the unwillingness of  bond- 
holders to sacrifice any part of  their holdings  to  meet  difficulties 
caused largely by inflation over which they had had no control.  This 
reluctance was  natural, -it  should  have  been  met,  however,  by 
the realization that the question was  now  of  the future and not of 
the past, and that the best  interests of the bondholders themselves 
demanded a  reconstruction  sufficiently radical to leave no doubt of 
&e ability of  the new company to pay its debts. 
The plan adopted, foreclosure was in order, and suits which had 
been begun as early as 1875 were taken up and pushed.  In Novem- 
ber,  1877, a  decree  of  foreclosure  under  the second  consolidated 
mortgage was obtained, appointing a  referee  to conduct  the sale, 
and providing for the sale of  the road to representatives of  the bond- 
holders in case they made the highest bid.  The  opposition, which had 
not been able to prevent the approval of  the plan, now appeared with 
a multiplicity of  suits to prevent its consummation.  In January, 
1878, demands were made to secure a  re-accounting from the re- 
ceiver, and the reopening of  an earlier suit of  the people against the 
Erie which had been  previously discontinued.  On January 18  the 
postponement of  the sale to March 25 was obtained.  On January 19 
a suit demanded the removal of  Receiver Jewett,  making sweeping 
charges of  fraud; and on  January  30,  in  still other  proceedings, 
Mr.  Jewett  was  arrested  on  a  charge  of  perjury  for  swearing to 
incorrect statements in the annual report  to the state engineer; - 
a culmination as disgraceful as it was absurd.  In February a  suit 
in  Orange  County, New  York,  demanded  the removal  of  the re- 
ceiver, and the appointment of  a special receiver during the pendency 
of  the action,  with  an injunction to  prevent  the sale of  the road. 
In March  a  petition of  one Isaac Fowler, a  stockholder,  for  per- 
mission  to examine the company's  books, was granted; argument 
Was  heard on the petition of  James  McHenry  to intervene  in  the 
foreclosure suits and further to postpone the sale;  the application  "  fbert  Betz  and others to  be  made parties  was  granted;  and 
mstponement  of  sale to April  24 obtained.  Last of  all, on April 
23  and 24, arguments in behalf of  John F. Brown and F. W. Isaac- 
Spn  were heard, asking for postponement to a still later date.  The 
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the courts could relieve against any injustice occasioned by the sale, 
and on  April  24  the  property of  the  Erie Railway was  sold  for 
$6,000,000 under foreclosure of the second consolidated mortgage.1 
The new corporation formed to take over  the railroad was called 
the New York, Lake Erie  & Western Railroad Company, and had 
its articles of incorporation regularly filed at the office  of the Secre- 
tary of  State.  Mr. Jewett was elected president.  In May the receiver 
was di~charged,~  and a new stage in the history of  the road began. 
For about seven years the Erie was to be free from the necessity 
for further reorganization.  This result, unexpected from the nature 
of  the adjustment of  1878, was due to the vigorous policy of  Mr. 
Jewett,  first, in  developing the coal traffic for which the Erie was 
well located;  second, in improving the condition of  the road;  and 
third, in securing connections with Chicago. 
For some time the Erie had been  a considerable carrier of  coal 
and a large owner of coal lands as well.  In 1877, the first year in 
which  the  figures were  separated in  the  annual  report,  roughly 
273,000,000 out of  1,113,000,ooo  ton miles reported, or something 
over one-quarter, were due to the carriage of  coal;  and $~,6~7,776 
out of  a total of  $10,647,807 of  the freight earnings came from that 
business.  The lands owned by the company consisted of  8000 acres 
in fee, and large tracts in leasehold and mining rights in the anthra- 
cite territory in the northeast comer of  Pennsylvania;  together with 
14,000 acres in fee and 13,000 acres of  mining rights in the bitum- 
inous territory in the northwest portion of  the state.3 Mr. Jewett felt 
that this property could be made of  great value to the road, and it 
was under his administration  as receiver that steps were taken to 
extend the holdings of  bituminous land, and to control branch roads 
leading into the district.  The result appeared in a remarkable exten- 
sion of  the company's business.  While the total freight ton mileage 
from 1878 to 1884 increased 103 per cent, the ton mileage of  coal 
increased 190 per cent, or nearly tripled;  and while the gross earn- 
ings on ordinary freight grew from $7,950,031 to $11,687,520,  those 
Chron.  26:419, 1878. 
a  Ed.  26:469,  1878.  For  indenture  executed by  the  new  corporation and  for 
text of the first and second consolidated mortgage and of  the second consolidated 
funded coupon mortgage, see Hepburn Committee Report,vol. 2, Exhibits, pp.315-5" 
a  Mott, p. 268. 
coal increased from $2,697,776 to $5,437,000.  At the same time 
~~Kean  County, directly north of the coal lands, and containing 
large tracts purchased by the Erie in the course of  its other negotia- 
tions, turned out to be an abundant oil-producing  district, and made 
the Bradford branch, which tapped it, Erie's most valuable collateral 
-' 
~t was  partly because of  the success of  the  policy  in  respect  to 
,,J lands that the  Erie was enabled to  spend large sums in  the 
improvement of  its road.  In the six years from 1878 to  1883 the 
company put  nearly  $14,ooo,ooo  into improvements of  the road, 
property and equipment, and of  this about one-half was paid out 
of  earnings.  In' December, 1883, alone, $304,565 were spent, 
and  in  the  three  suceeeding months nearly  double that  amount; 
making a total of  nearly $~,ooo,m  in the four months previous to 
April,  1884.  The money went toward reducing grades, straighten- 
ing curves, increasing weight of rails, etc., including the completion 
of  a third rail to Buffalo by  which the  serious disadvantage of  an 
exceptional gauge was removed.  Its result was seen in the decrease 
in the ratio of  operating expenses from 75.13 in 1875 and 77.16  in 
1876 to 64.78 in 1883; and in the rise of  net earnings per ton mile 
from .251 cents to .261  cents, while the gross earnings per ton mile 
decreased from 1.209 cents to .780 cents.  No policy which the Erie 
managers pursued met a more crying need, and none did so much 
toward  maintaining the solvency of  the company. 
The project of  controlling a  line of  their own  to  Chicago was 
brought actively to the attention of the Erie managers by the danger 
of being cut off from a connection with that city.  The original line 
of the Erie had run to Dunkirk on Lake Erie, from which a branch 
to  Buffalo had  soon been  built.  For western traffic  the Erie had 
had to rely largely on the Atlantic & Great Western (later the New 
Pennsylvania & Ohio), which connected with the  main  line 
at  Salamanca, New York, and extended  by  1884 west  to  Dayton, 
Ohio.  In 1857 the Erie fkst leased this property.  Placed in receivers' 
hands in  186~,  the Atlantic & Great Western was re-leased to the 
Erie on January I, 1870; sold July I,  1871, it was again leased to 
Ihe'Erie in  May,  1874, only to enter upon a new receivership on 
December  of that year.  The persistent attempt to control the road 
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showed the value which the Erie placed upon it, and in fact it was 
invaluable as a link in a prospective line to the West.  Even while 
the leases were in force, however, the Erie lacked that connection of 
its own with Chicago which seemed necessary to make it a successful 
competitor for trunk-line business.  In 1882 it was forwarding pas. 
sengers over not less than five different  routes, over no one of  which 
could it feel assured of  the continuance of contracts of  a favorable 
nature.  In 1881 Mr. Jewett relieved the situation by acquiring con. 
trol of  the franchise of  the Chicago & Atlantic Railway, extending 
from Marion, Ohio, on the line of  the New York, Pennsylvania  & 
Ohio towards Chicago, and soon after he entered into a contract with 
certain private parties for construction of  the road.  In 1883 he exe- 
cuted a new lease of  the New York, Pensylvania & Ohio, which he 
hoped would secure for the Erie permanent control of  the property, 
and about the same time (1882) he purchased a controlling interest 
in the stock of  the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton, which extended 
the Erie system to the important city of  Cincinnati. These operations 
put the Erie upon a footing which was secure so long as the obliga- 
tions which they entailed could be met, and showed a broad-minded 
appreciation of  strategic necessities.  The terms of  the arrangement 
with the Chicago  & Atlantic were as follows:  For the construction 
of  the road the Erie agreed to give to the directors the entire proceeds 
of  the mortgage bonds of  that branch  ($6,500,000), and its entire 
capital stock ($~o,ooo,ooo)  ; making  an  aggregate of  $61,710  per 
mile of  line.  The proceeds were, however, to be deposited with the 
president of  the New York, Lake Erie  & Western in trust, together 
with certain subsidies which  had  been  voted by  the counties and 
townships along the line, and upon him was to devolve the duty of 
seeing to the proper  application thereof;  and besides this,  go  per 
cent of  the  stock  was  to  be  deposited  and an  irrevocable proxy 
given thereon for the thirty years' life of  the bonds.'  The obligation 
which the Erie assumed amounted in practice to guaranteeing that 
the  road  should  be  constructed for  the  sum  provided,  and that 
interest on the bonds should be  paid.  In leasing the New  Yo& 
Pennsylvania & Ohio the Erie involved itself more heavily.  As lessee 
it agreed to pay the minimum sum of  $1,757,055 yearly (the net earn- 
ings of  1882) ; the actual rental to be 32  per cent of  all gross earn- 
Annual Report, 1882. 
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kgs up to  $6,ooo,ooo and 50 per cent of  all gross earnings above 
g66,ooo,ooo,  until the average of  the whole rental should be raised 
to 35 per cent, or until the gross earnings should be $7,2oo,ooo.  If 
32 per  cent  of  the  gross  earnings  should  ever  be  less  than  the 
$1,757,055 to be paid yearly, then the deficiency was to be made up, 
interest, out of  the excess in any subsequent year.  Out of 
the rental the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio was to pay the inter- 
est on its prior lien bonds, the rentals of  its leased lines, the expenses 
of  maintaining its organization in  Europe  and America,  and for 
five years a sum of $260,000  each year to the car trust.l  Finally, 
in  purchasing the Cincinnati, Hamilton  & Dayton, the Erie gave 
to the holders of  the $z,ooo,ooo of  stock which it bought beneficial 
certificates to the amount of  $1,5oo,ooo, on which it agreed to make 
good any  failure of  the Cincinnati company to  pay 6 per cent  per 
annum. 
But though the Erie managers did their best with the conditions 
which they were called upon to face, they were unable to hold the 
company up under the enormous capitalization and heavy charges 
left by the reorganization of  1874-8,  at a time when rate wars were 
sapping its resources, and when contracts which it was being forced 
to make were  entailing an annual  10~s.~  In spite of  the declaration 
of  sufficient dividends on the comparatively small amount of  pre- 
ferred stock to terminate the voting trust, it is certain that for most 
of  the years from 1874 to 1884 the solvency of  the road was a pre- 
carious matter, and that there never was a time when any consider- 
able falling off  in  earnings or any severe shock to its credit would 
not  have driven it to the wall. 
Such a shock was  preparing in  the early months of  1884.  For 
some weeks before the last of  April there had been a tendency for 
the quotations of  Erie securities to fall ; no rea.son was assigned, but 
it was hinted that default miglit be made in the payment of  the June 
interest on the second consols, and that a receivership was not un- 
likely.  This weakness was accompanied, and perhaps accentuated, 
Chron. 36:  427,  1883.  For the necessity of  Erie's  extension westward see testi- 
mony of  First Vice-President Felton before the Senate Committee on Transportation 
Interests of  the United States and Canada, ~1st  Congress, 1st Session, Report no. 847, 
PP 130-1. 
For  some account of  the trunk-lime rate wars see the chapter on the Baltimore 
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by a strike of  the brakemen on the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio 
in consequence of  an order reducing the number of  brakemen on 
each train from three to two.  The truth of the matter came out in 
May, when  the  failure of  the Wall Street firm of  Grant & Ward 
both precipitated a stock exchange panic and laid bare the straits 
to  which  the  company had  been  reduced.  Investigation showed 
that a large floating debt had been piling up for four principal pur- 
poses: First, advances to the Chicago & Atlantic Railroad;  second, 
advances for  coal  mines;  third,  advances  for  improvements  on 
the Hudson River at Weehawken ; fourth, equipment insta1ments.l 
Attempts to raise funds to cover the debt had resulted in the negotia- 
tion of  promissory short time notes with the firm of  Grant  & Ward, 
for which $2,5oo,ooo of  Chicago  & Atlantic second mortgage bonds 
had been deposited as security.  The company had been attracted 
to Grant  & Ward by their offer to purchase and dispose of  Chicago 
& Atlantic bonds at a price 15 per cent  above that offered  by any 
other parties;'  and had trusted so implicitly in their integrity as to 
deposit notes and collateral for  its short time loans detached and 
independent, one from the other, so that Grant  & Ward were able 
to, and did, fraudulently raise money upon them to an amount much 
larger than the advances they had made.  The losses entailed by  the 
transaction  were  serious, and the blow  to  Erie's  credit was  even 
more severe.  The floating debt which had been  so hard to carry 
became doubly menacing now that the possibility of  further short 
time loans was practically cut off;  and to cap the climax, the earn- 
ings for the first half  of  the year  1884 showed  an unusually large 
decrease with the cessation of  the fall business.  Under these circum- 
stances it was the part of  wisdom to take advantage of  every loop- 
hole of  escape, and the peculiar provisions of  the second consolidated 
mortgage, denying to these bonds the right of  immediate foreclosure 
in case of  default, were turned to for relief.  It will be remembered 
that by  the terms of  the reorganization of  1878 no right of  action 
was  to  accrue to the second mortgage bondholders until on  each 
of  six successive due dates of  coupons (three years) some interest 
secured by  the second indenture should be in  default.  This being 
the case the Erie directors decided to pass the June interest on these 
bonds.  "As a general rule,"  said they  in  a  circular, "the business 
Chron. 39: 234, 1884.  Annual  Report,  1884, p.  12. 
and earnings of  the company are much  less for the first half  than 
for the last half of  the year.  The falling off  in earnings for the first 
six months of  the previous  year  has  been  unusually  large.  The 
coupons of  the second consolidated mortgage bonds are due and 
payable on the first of  June prox. . .  .  Under ordinary circumstances 
the board might at the present as on the former occasions provide 
to some extent for the deficit of  the first six months, relying on the 
usual increase in earnings of  the last half of  the year, but in the pre- 
sent depressed condition of  the business of  the country and of  the 
earnings of  this company, as well as of  others, the board does not 
feel at liberty to deal with anything but the business and earnings 
as now  ascertained, and therefore deems it wise to accept the pro- 
visions of  the mortgage as the lawful rule for their government in 
the existing emergency . . ."' 
However necessary the action, the bondholders of  the company 
could  not have been expected to receive it quietly; and naturally 
again,  the  indignation  was  intense  among the  English  security- 
holders, to whom,  more than to any one else, the existing situation 
was due.  In June,  1884, a meeting of  stockholders of  the company 
was held in London, at which much complaint was made of  the fall 
in value of  the securities of  the company, and an inquiry into the 
management was demanded.  A committee was appointed, and two 
of  its members, Messrs. Powell and Westlake, landed in New York 
July 15, with protestations of  a friendly spirit toward all concerned. 
The situation was not encouraging.  The day before  their arrival 
President Jewett had offered his resignation, and the directors were 
busy  selecting hi successor;  a large floating debt was  demanding 
most  vigorous attention, and confidence in the company was  at a 
low  ebb.  Beyond a doubt the raising of  a large amount of  cash, 
$4,000,000 to $5,ooo,m, was a pressing necessity, and the  English 
representatives were anxious to make  it  plain that at least a  fair 
share of  this should come from American as well as from  English 
bondholders.  Force of  circumstances compelled them to give assur- 
ance that the money would be raised, and this done, Mr. John King 
the position which Mr. Jewett  professed himself  ready to 
Pending  the annual election Mr.  King  took  the  position 
Of  bistant  to the President. 
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On their return to London Messrs. Powell and Westlake reported 
the floating debt to be as follows: 
Unpaid coupons, June I, 1884,  $1,007,922 
Balance of actual and early maturing liabilities  other than the June I 
coupons  over  and above  cash in hand and money assets con- 
sidered good and available,  $4,447,316 
"All  the purposes, the expenditures on which have caused the 
floating debt,"  said they, "seem to us to have been  in themselves 
wise and politic, but the piling up of  a large floating debt for even 
the best of  purposes is always more or less imprudent and danger- 
ous.  The company's credit might have borne the strain of the panic, 
but it was broken down by  the Grant  & Ward disaster, and the 
funding of  its  floating debt is now  indispensable. . . .  We have 
suggested to the president and directors, and now recommend to the 
committee that an effort should be made without delay to raise a 
permanent loan on the securities available for a total of  $5,m,ooo." 
This, it  will  be  observed,  was  the  old remedy.  Inability  to meet 
current expenses was to be removed  by capitalizing the debts which 
this inability had caused. 
The year 1885 was taken up with suits brought against the Erie 
by  certain  of  its  branch lines.  In February  the  directors of  the 
Buffalo & Southwestern Company brought suit to recover $345,000 
interest  defaulted  during  the  previous  January.  The complaint 
alleged that the Erie was insolvent, and asked that it be restrained 
from using the gross receipts of  the road  until the default should 
have been made good.  The Erie paid the back interest, but in July, 
after another default, an  injunction was  obtained forbidding it to 
divert any part of  the earnings received or to be received  from this 
property.  It was recited that on May 24,1881, the Buffalo & South- 
western had  been  leased  to  the Erie for 35  per cent of  the gross 
earnings, subject to certain deductions; that the Erie had delayed 
payment  of  the rental due in January, 1885, and had refused to pay 
that due in July, 1885, but that it was still receiving the gross earn- 
ings of  the plaintiffs'  road, and  had applied these to the payment 
of  its debts other than the rentals of  this road?  In November, after 
Chron. 39: 349, 1884. 
'  R. R.  Gaz. 17:  446, 1885. 
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the Erie's other troubles were settled, the litigation was terminated 
by an agreement to reduce the Buffalo & Southwestern rental from 
35 per cent to 274  per cent.  Other suits arose, directly or indirectly, 
because  of  the  control which  Mr.  Jewett  maintained  as  trustee 
of the stock of the Chicago  & Atlantic and the Cincinnati, Hamil- 
ton  & Dayton  railways even  after his resignation  from  the  Erie 
Company.  On  the  one  hand  President  King was  anxious  to  re- 
possess  himself of  these important  branches for the Erie, and on 
the other Mr.  Jewett  was not  disinclined to  do what  damage he 
could to the managers who had  succeeded in supplanting him.  In 
the matter of the Chicago & Atlantic  Mr. Jewett  gained  the  first 
victory  in  a  temporary  injunction  forbidding  the  Erie  to  divert 
traffic  from  this  line  contrary  to  contract.  This  injunction  was 
soon,  however,  substantially  vacated, and President  King  in  his 
turn obtained a  decision  that  Jewett  had been  made  trustee  of 
the  Chicago  8z Atlantic simply because  he  had  been  at the time 
vice-president of  the  New  York, Lake Erie  & Western Railroad 
Company and could be relied upon to control the road as the west- 
em outlet of  the Erie.  A receiver was  subsequently appointed and 
the road reorganized as the Chicago & Erie Railroad Company, the 
Erie  agreeing to guarantee  payment  of  its  first mortgage bonds, 
and receiving in return the $~oo,m  of  capital stock and $5,m,ooo 
in  income bonds,  besides  $z,ooo,m first mortgage  bonds  which 
were  in  part payment  of  old advances.'  In his  action  concerning 
the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton President King was less success- 
ful; and Mr. Jewett was sustained in his refusal to deliver proxies 
for the stock held to the larger company.  The result was  to  turn 
the  Erie to the Big Four, upon which, instead of  upon the Dayton 
road, the management was for  some time to  rely for an entrance 
into Cincinnati. 
During  these  various  contests  the  suggestions of  the  English 
committee were  not  lost to view,  and  in  the  latter  part of  1885 
they crystallized into definite propositions.  The floating debt then 
consisted of  two parts :  first, the defaulted coupons on the second con- 
solidated bonds ;  and second, the current liabilities accumulated for 
the purposes before described.  The relief  proposed was  likewise in 
For  terms of  reorganization see Annual Report, 1890; also R. R. Gsz. 19: 188, 
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two parts, and involved the issue of  a 5 per cent mortgage, secured 
by  deposit  of  the second  consolidated  coupons maturing and to 
mature  in  June and December, 1884, June,  1885, and June, 1886, 
and  a 6 per  cent  mortgage upon  the property of  the Long Dock 
Company, comprising the valuable terminals of  the Erie at Jersey 
City.'  The funding of  the coupon issue proved  simplicity itself; 
the  funded  coupons  were  exchanged  for  bonds of  the new  gold 
mortgage, which were to be redeemable at 105 at the pleasure of  the 
~ompany.~  By  the end of  1886 these bonds had been accepted by 
the holders of  $32,982,500  of  the outstanding  $33,597,400  of  the 
second consols, and $3,957,9~  of  them had been  issued.  Dealing 
with the Long Dock Company was slightly complicated by  the fact 
that 8000 shares of  that company were pledged as part security for 
the issue of  Erie collateral bonds.  To free them $800,000  in  cash 
were deposited with the trustee of  the mortgage, which were in turn 
employed by  him to pay  off  $727,000 of  the 6 per cent collateral 
bonds, thus reducing the interest charge on that issue $43,620 per 
annum. This done, the Long Dock Company extended the lease of  its 
property and franchises to the Erie to 1935 at a rental of  $480,000 
per  annum,  and  contemporaneously  therewith  placed  a  consoli- 
dated mortgage upon  its property to secure $7,500,000 of  50-year 
6 per cent gold bonds; of  which $3,000,000 were reserved to retire 
existing indebtedness,  and  the  proceeds of  $4,500,000  were  paid 
to the Erie for the cancellation of  its floating debt.  The total result 
was to increase fixed charges by $270,000 of  interest at 6 per cent on 
the Long Dock bonds, and by  $197,895 on $3,957,900 of  the new 
funded  gs,  less  the  reduction  of  $43,620 on  cancelled  collateral 
bonds; leaving a net  increase of  $424,27~.~  For its ingenuity the 
scheme was to be  admired; from any other point of  view  it was  to 
be condemned as another example of  that borrowing to pay interest 
which had brought the Erie to its existing straits.  The incapacity 
of the creditors of  the company to realize that continued borrowing 
of money  to  pay  current obligations was only to ensure repeated 
bankruptcy seemed complete. 
Annual Report, 1886. 
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After this new  "salvation,"  the  Erie  started  once more  on  its 
laborious attempt to pay interest on its outstanding bonds.  From 
1887  to 1892 the business increased somewhat, and despite a decrease 
in  the  average receipts per  ton mile '  a gain of  about $4,700,000 
in gross earnings was secured;  from which  is  to  be  deducted  an 
increase of $310,996 in fixed charges, and of  $4,076,111  in operating 
expenses. 
The prohibition  of  pooling in  1887  affected  the  company un- 
favorably.  Previous to the passage of  the Interstate Commerce Act 
the other lines had been  paying it an annual average of  $42,500 
on  west-bound  business  from  New  York  for  shortages  under 
the operation of the  trunk-line pool,  besides  about  $88,000  annu- 
ally on  east-bound dead freight and $19,770 on live stock.  These 
payments ceased when  the Act  was passed, although a differential 
on  west-bound  traffic was  subsequently allowed.'  But  the  leak- 
age which  was  most  apparent  lay in  the large rental  and heavy 
operating cost of  the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio.  It will be 
remembered  that  the  Erie had  leased  that  road  for 32  per cent 
of  the  gross  earnings when  earnings were  $6,000,000  or  under, 
and 50 per cent when  they  should  be  above that  figure.  In 1887 
this  was  amended  so  as to  provide  that  for  every  increase of 
$100,000  over $6,000,000 in the gross earnings the Erie should pay 
to  the  lessor  an  additional  one-tenth of  one  per  cent  of  such 
gross earnings until the gross  earnings should be  $7,250,000, and 
the rental  333 per  cent, after  which  the  percentage  was  not  to 
increase.'  Under  the  old  lease the  Erie had  guaranteed to carry 
over the line 50 per cent of  all its east-bound and 65 per cent of  all 
its west-bound through traffic -  under the new lease, these maxima 
were increased to 55 per cent and 70 per cent; but even this failed to 
make the branch  road  pay.  Its grades were  high,  its equipment 
and sidings were limited, its cost .of  operation was well above 68 per 
cent; and the increase in ionnage provided for emphasized each and 
every disadvantage.  Up to 1893 the results of  operations were as 
follows : 
'  From .662 in 1887 to .61o  in  1%~. 
Testimony of Messn. King and  Felton,  Senate  Committee on Transportation 
laterests of  the United States and Canada,  pp. 44 and 121-2. 
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Net loss,  11407,523 
It  thus appears that the terms of  the amended lease were in reality 
more  onerous  than  the contract which  they  succeeded,  and that 
whatever the value of  the branch as a feeder, its operation involved 
large and fairly regular deductions from the net income of  the parent 
line.  Emphasis on these facts was laid in the annual reports, and 
frequent demands were made that the New York, Pennsylvania  & 
Ohio bring its road up to the standard of  like connections of  through 
trunk lines.  Meanwhile improvements were imperative on the Erie's 
own  lines: new equipment was needed,  new rails  and new motive 
power, and at the same time surplus earnings were somewhat less. 
The directors adopted the expedient of  allowing current liabilities 
to accumulate, and put $8,496,572  into the road  from  October I, 
1884, to September 30,1892, of  which $3,351,977  represented surplus 
earnings, $2,375,400 increase in bonded indebtedness,  and the bal- 
ance floating debt.  In the matter of  traffic policy they paid partic- 
ular attention to the coal business, which, however, lost ground  as 
compared with  other  freight,  and to the local  business, which  it 
was the policy of  the management to encourage.  In 1890 the board 
declared that "the time had  amved when  extraordinary expend- 
iture for improvements and the necessities of  the property were no 
longer necessary." ' In 1891 3 per cent on the preferred stock was 
paid, the first dividend since 1884? 
From 1887 to 1893, with all its struggles, the Erie was con ti nu all^ 
Mott,  p. 272. 
a  In 1890 a traffic agreement was made with  the Cincinnati, Hamilton &Dayton* 
to take the place of that with the Big Four. R. R.  Gaz. 22 :  314,  1890. 
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on the verge of failure.  The capitalization in 1892 was at the enor- 
mous total of $163,607,485 on an operated mileage of 1698 miles, 
while  fixed charges  were  $4993  per  mile,  and the  available  net 
revenue but  $4830.'  Given,  with this condition, a  gross  floating 
debt which amounted in 1892 to $9,163,166,  and represented in a 
large measure the inability of  the company to make necessary re- 
pirs, no further explanation  is needed for the bankruptcy  which 
soon took place. 
Early in 1893 rumors were current that the Erie might be thrown 
into the hands of a receiver.  The reports were vigorously denied, 
but on July  25, nevertheless, on application of the company itself, 
Judge  Lacombe appointed  President  John  King and  Mr.  J.  G. 
McCullough as receivers of  the property.  The measure was taken 
to avoid the sacrifice of  collaterals deposited.  '(Within the last few 
weeks,"  said President King, "during the severe money stringency 
the floating debt of the Erie . . . became impossible of  renewal, 
and in order not to sacrifice the best interests of  the company it was 
decided to place the road in receivers' hands, and preserve the sys- 
tem intact, and preserve and develop the transportation business for 
the company."  The action occasioned no surprise, and there was 
even a disposition to praise the management for having preserved the 
solvency of  the company.  "The company  was  bankrupt  de facto 
when  it passed to its new control,"  says Mott, and  "that  the time 
when  it must become bankrupt  de  jure  was  held  off  so long was 
a striking demonstration  of  the tact and resourcefulness which the 
new r6gime had been able to bring to bear in the management of  the 
company's unpromising affairs, and in judicious shifting and mani- 
pulating of  the heavy burdens Erie bore upon its chafed and weary 
shoulders."  What a receivership meant was a new opportunity to 
Put the company upon a genuinely sound foundation, by providing 
new  capital to pay off  the floating debt and to allow for future addi- 
tions and improvements, and by getting fixed charges to a point well 
within the road's capacity to earn.  We shall see what use was made 
of  the chance. 
The matter of  reorganization was set about at once.  On Jan- 
uary I a plan appeared, prepared, at least nominally, by a special 
Figures for 18g1 were, fixed charges, $4298 per mile; net revenue, $4897 per mile. 
Chron.  57: 179,  1893.  Mott, p. 273. RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
committee chosen by the directors,'  and backed by  the well-known 
firms of  Drexel, Morgan & Co. of New York and J. S. Morgan & 
Co. of  L~ndon.~  By  its terms no mortgage  senior to the  second 
consolidated mortgage was to be disturbed save the first mortgage, 
which matured in  1897.  The bonds to be dealt with were thus re- 
duced to $41,481,0~8,  besides which provision had to be made for 
the  floating debt  and  for future capital requirements.  The plan 
proposed  to authorize a  blanket  mortgage of $70,000,00o at 5 per 
cent, of  which $33,597,000 were to exchange at par for the 6 per cent 
second consolidated bonds and funded coupons thereof, $4,031,400 
to exchange for the funded coupon bonds of  1885, and $508,008 for 
the income bonds.  Of  the balance, $6,512,800 were to be  reserved 
to settle with the old first lien and collateral trust bonds, $15,915,208 
to supply capital requirements in the future, and $9,915,208 to be 
offered for subscription in order to pay the floating debt.  The new 
management did not conceive that these last bonds could be sold to 
advantage in the general market, but imposed as a condition of  the 
exchanges as above that second consols, funded coupon, and income 
bonds should subscribe at go to the extent of  25  per cent of  their 
holdings; hoping that the grant of  the right of  immediate foreclosure 
upon default would induce the second consols to come in.  Both these 
consols and the funded coupon bonds of  1885, it may be remarked, 
were to be  kept alive and deposited with the trustee for the pro- 
tection of  the new bonds.  Stated in tabular form the distribution of 
securities was to be as follows: 
To acquire the existing second consols,  $335597,400 
To acquire the funded coupons of  1885,  4,031,400 
To acquire the  income bonds,  5c~%d 
For subscription as above,  9,915,208 
To acquire 'the old reorganization first  lien  and  collateral tmt 
bonds,  6,512,- 
To be expended for construction, equipment, etc., not  to exceed 
$~oo,ooo  in any year, except that $po,ooo might be used  to 
acquire existing car trusts,  15,435,184 
Total,  $70,-,000 
The new mortgage was to cover the property of  the New York, 
Lake Erie  & Western, including its leasehold of  the New  York, 
Pennsylvania & Ohio, and the capital stock of  the Chicago & Erie 
'  Chmn. 57: 938,  1893 ;  Ibid. 57: 1083, 1893.  '  Ry. Times, 65: 3,  1894. 
There was to be no assessment, no syndicate to raise 
money, and no voting trust. 
This plan  was  advanced  as adequate to restore  the  prosperity 
of  the  company.  Examination  will  show its weakness.  It com- 
prised two measures of  relief: first, reduction of  interest by one per 
cent on  the second consolidated bonds; second, the settlement of 
the floating  debt.  The first might be thought to have been the kernel 
of the plan, and the reduction in fixed charges the principal thing 
aimed at.  That it was not is shown by the fact that so liberal were 
the new bond issues that the total fixed charges after reorganization 
were  to be greater than those before.  The floating debt which re- 
mained had arisen from lack of funds with which to make current 
and necessary improvements and repairs.  This debt was  the im- 
mediate cause of  the failure of  the company, and its cancellation 
was  the real purpose  of  the  plan.  The method  proposed was  a 
forced levy upon bondholders, but the levy took, not the form of 
an  assessment, but that of  a subscription to new bonds on which 
payment  of  interest was to be  as obligatory as any other charge. 
The operation differed, therefore, from an ordinary sale of  secur- 
ities  in  the more favorable selling price  which  it assured.  It did 
little, however, to lighten the burden which had crushed the com- 
pany.  The only bright spot in the plan was the provision for future 
construction  and  improvement,  which,  though  involving  a  still 
further increase in  indebtedness,  was  justified  because  these  im- 
provements would serve not only to maintain but to make greater 
the  eding  powers of  the company.  Finally, it  was  the  peculiar 
effect of  this plan that it put the pressure imposed upon the wrong 
Parties: the second consolidated and other junior bondholders were 
to  be  forced to subscribe to the new  issue, when  in fact it was  the 
Stockholders who should have been turned to, and whom it was con- 
Sonant with no sound principle of  finance to spare.  Other matters 
come  out in the objections raised by bondholders. 
Opposition  to  the  plan  was  vigorously  headed  by  men  like 
Kubn, Loeb  & Co., E. H. Harriman, August Belmont, Hallgarten, 
Peabody,  Verrnilye, and others.'  In England a meeting of  dissent- 
ients was  held and a committee was elected; s in America the first 
R. R.  Gaz.  26: 18, 1894. 
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formal action was  the dispatch .of  a letter to the Erie managers by 
opposing bankers which is important enough to be quoted in full. 
"Consultations  and comparisons of  views  have  recently  taken 
place,"  said these gentlemen, "between  the  owners and represent. 
atives of  the second consolidated mortgage bonds and other bonds 
of  your company, to whom the proposition as detailed in  your cir- 
cular of  January 2 is not satisfactory. . . .  Your plan seems unjust, 
inasmuch as it demands a permanent reduction of  interest on the 
bonded indebtedness for which no adequate equivalent is offered, 
and it levies a forced contribution upon  the bondholders through 
the demand for a subscription to new bonds at a price considerably 
over  and above  the  market value  these  new bonds are  likely to 
command, while the fixed charges  proposed  to  be  created  appear 
to be considerably larger than, in the  light  of  past  earnings  and 
experience, the property of  the company can carry with safety. 
"Instead of  5 per cent bonds, as provided in the published plan, 
4 per  cent bonds,  in our opinion, should be  issued, while for the 
interest  to  be  surrendered  the  bondholders  should  receive  an 
equivalent in interminable  non-cumulative 4 per  cent  debentures, 
interest  payable  if  earned; the  holders of  the debentures to have 
sufficient representation  in  the management to protect them. 
"The  floating debt  should  be  liquidated  from the proceeds of 
an adequate amount of  new 4 per cent  bonds (and debentures if 
desirable),  which  shall  be offered to the shareholders and bond- 
holders at a  price  rather below  than  above the  probable market 
value of  the new securities, and under the guarantee of  an under- 
writing syndicate. 
"Provision  should also be made to obtain the conversion on fair 
terms of  the reorganization prior lien bonds into the new bonds, SO 
that it shall become practicable to secure the new 4 per cent bonds 
at once by a lien second only to the '  Erie first consolidated 7 per cent 
bonds' ;  the new 4 per cent bonds to be issued under a general mort- 
gage to  an amount sufficient to  provide  for future additions and 
improvements, and with adequate provision for the taking up of  the 
underlying bonds, and the issue of  4 per cent bonds in their stead- 
. . .  Any plan now adopted for the readjustment of the finances of 
your  company should seek, as its  first object, to reduce the per- 
manent charges so well &him  the earning capacity of  the property 
as to make another default in the future an improbability. . . . We 
trust this communication will  be received in  the spirit in which it 
is submitted." 
The directors  refused  to  modify  their  plan, and  the  bankers, 
therefore, notified them of  the election of a protective committee.= 
On March 6 a meeting of  stockholders approved the plan, and the 
same week  Messrs.  Drexel, Morgan & Co. gave notice that, having 
deposits of  a majority of  each  class of  bonds,  they had 
declared the plan operative as announ~ed.~ 
Defeated  in  their  appeal  to  the  securityholders, the opposition 
turned  to  the courts.  As  a preliminary, they obtained an opinion 
from the well-known firm of Messrs. Evarts, Choate  & Beaman, 
which held, hst, that the Erie could not legally pay interest on the 
new bonds proposed until it had paid the interest on every one of 
the old second mortgage bonds, regardless of  whether the latter was 
deposited  with  the  reorganization committee;  second,  that  if  the 
old  second  mortgage  bonds  which  were  deposited  as  security 
for the new issue should be kept alive as proposed,  the company 
would  be  increasing its obligations beyond the legal limit ; '  and 
third, that much of the stock voted at the special meeting at which 
the new mortgage had been authorized was not really owned by the 
persons who  had issued the proxies thereon as the law provided! 
Following  the  opinion, suit was commenced by Mr. Haniman in 
April for an injunction against the recording of the new mortgage, 
on  the ground that the Drexel  & Morgan proxies did not represent 
the actual stockholders, and in June by one John J. Emery to pre- 
vent the execution of  the mortgage.  Judge Ingraham in the Supreme 
Court  Chambers denied  an  injunction,  using in  his  opinion  the 
following language:  "While  it is clear,"  said he,  "that  there  are 
certain  obligations resting upon  the majority  to refrain from in- 
fringing the legal right of  the minority, and that a court of  equity 
Will  enforce and protect the rights of  the minority, still, when the 
holder of  a very small number of  bonds or shares of  stock seeks to 
'  Chron. 58: 264,  1894.  a  Ibid. 58: 383, 1894.  Ibid. 58: 430,  1894.  '  According to  the  law  of  1892  the  bonded indebtedness, including mortgages 
given as consideration for the purchase of  real estate and mortgages authorized by 
'Ontract  prior to May, 18g1, could not exceed the amount of  the paid up capital 
%a. 
'  Ry. Rev. 34: 181, 18gq. enjoin a very large majority from carrying out a plan such majority 
deem to be for their benefit, I think the court should not interfere 
unless it  plainly  appears that  some legal right of  the minority is 
endangered." ' 
What  could  not  be  accomplished  by  the  hostile bankers  was 
nevertheless to  happen  from  the  inherent  weakness of  the  plan 
itself.  It has been  said that the new scheme involved an increase 
instead of  a decrease in fixed  charges.  How this was to be  met 
was not demonstrated; and already in June, 1894, it was necessary 
to announce that the coupons then due would  not be  paid  for the 
present.  In December  matters  were  even  worse,  and a  circular 
from  Drexel, Morgan & Co. confessed the company's  inability to 
meet  the coupons maturing.  "Nevertheless,"  the firm continued, 
"it  seems to us  inexpedient to treat the inability of  the company 
to pay interest as an occasion for present foreclosure without giving 
a further chance to the company, especially as payment of bond- 
holders'  subscriptions to  the  new bonds has not  yet  been  called 
to  provide the company with money necessary to pay the floating 
debt.  It is, therefore, now  proposed that the new bonds be issued 
with the coupons of  June I, 1894, and December, 1894, attached, but 
stamped  as subject  to a  contract  with the company  which  shall 
provide that they shall be paid as soon as practical out of  the first 
net earnings over and above the railroad company's requirements to 
meet  interest and rentals accruing after December I, 1894~  except 
in case a default on later  coupons shall give  power of  foreclosure, 
in which event the stamped coupons shall retain all their original 
rights."  The modification was assented to,'  but  could not save the 
plan.  ReluctantIy the managers were forced to abandon  it, and to 
consent to more radical propositions. 
August 26,  1895, the new and final reorganization plan appeared. 
There were to be issud : 
$175,000,000  first  consolidated mortgage roo-year  gold bonds; 
30,000,000  first preferred 4 per cent non-cumulative stock ; 
16,000,ooo  second preferred 4 per cent  non-cumulative stock ; 
I~~,OOO,OOO  CoInlnon stock. 
The first consolidated mortgage bonds were to be  divided into 
prior lien bonds to  the amount of  $35,000,000, and general lien 
R. R. Gaz. 26:  472,  1894.  '  Ibid. 27: 554,  1895. 
bonds to the amount of $14o,ooo~ooo;  the former to have priority 
of lien over the latter for both principal and interest.  Both classes 
of bonds were to be secured by mortgage and pledge of  all railroads 
and  properties of  every  kind  embraced in  the  reorganization  as 
carried out  and vested  in  the  new  company,  and  also all  other 
which should be acquired thereafter by  issue of  any of 
the new bonds.  Both issues were to bear interest at 4 per cent, ex- 
cept  $29,435,000 of the general lien bonds, which were to bear 3 per 
cent for two years from July I, 1896, and 4 per cent thereafter.  The 
stock was to rank for dividends in the order given.  Provision was 
made that no additional mortgage could be  put upon the property 
to be acquired, and that no additional issue of  first preferred stock 
could be made except with the consent in each instance of  the holders 
of a majority of  the whole amount of  each class of  preferred stock, 
given at a meeting of  the stockholders called for that purpose; and 
with the consent of the stockholders of  a majority of  such part of 
the common stock as should be represented at such meeting, the 
holders of each class of  stock voting separately ;  also that the amount 
of  second preferred stock could not be increased except with like 
consent of the holders of a majority thereof, and a majority of  such 
part of  the common stock as should be represented at the meeting. 
All  classes of  stock were to be deposited in a voting trust until De- 
cember I, IF,  and until the expiration of such further period,  if 
any, as should elapse before the Erie should in one year have paid 
4 per cent cash dividends on the first preferred stock; though the 
voting  trustees  might  terminate  the  trust  earlier  at  their  dis 
cretion. 
Generally speaking, the prior lien bonds were relied on to pay the 
floating debt, to buy in the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio, and 
to retire certain prior liens of  the old company.  The general lien 
bonds were reserved for undisturbed bonds, and, with the first pre- 
ferred stock, exchanged for junior New York, Lake Erie & Western 
securities.  The second preferred stock went for old preferred stock 
and income bonds, and  the new common stock exchanged for old 
common. 
The distribution  was  as  follows:  The  old  New  York,  Lake 
Erie  & Western reorganization first lien and collateral bonds were 
Paid off  from the proceeds of  the new prior lien bonds; the second 68  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  ERIE 
consols received 75  per cent in new general lien bonds and 55 per 
cent in preferred stock; the funded coupon bonds of  1885 received 
100  per  cent in general lien bonds,  10  per cent in first preferred, 
and  10  per  cent  in  second  preferred  stock;  the  income  bonds 
40 per cent in general liens and 60  per cent in first preferred stock; 
the New York, Lake Erie  & Western preferred stock, on payment 
of  assessment, IW per cent in nex common.  For all other bonds 
included  in  the  plan  there  were  reserved  general  lien  bonds in 
amounts usually equal to the par of  the securities to be retired. 
The cash requiremints and the floating debt were as follows: 
Floating debt, receivers'  certificates, etc.,  $II,~~,C==' 
Collateral trust bonds  (Erie), at 110,  3,6781400 
Reorganization first lien bonds  (Erie),  2?5“%C==' 
Early construction and expenditures,  51337,288 
Car trusts for three years,  2,OOo,C==' 
$25,015,688 
The necessity for retirement of  the first lien and collateral bonds 
arose from the early maturity of  the former, and from the fact that 
stocks and bonds of  various Erie properties which it was desirous 
to consolidate with the new company were pledged  for the latter. 
The wisdom  of  allowing for  early  construction and  expenditure 
could not be denied; car trust payments were required to preserve 
the rolling stock, and the floating debt  and receivers' certificates 
called obviously for cash.  Provision was made, first, by  an assess- 
ment on the stock of  $8  on  preferred  and $12  on common, with 
higher payments in case of  delay, and estimated to yield $10,023,368; 
second, by a contribution from the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio 
of  $742,320; and third, by  the sale of  $15,ooo,m prior lien bonds 
as indicated above.  A syndicate of  $25,000,000 was formed to sub- 
scribe to the prior liens, and to take the place of  and succeed to all 
the rights of  stockholders who should not deposit their stock and 
pay the assessment thereon. 
With the settlement of  cash requirements, unification of  the Erie 
system was assured;  "subject  only to the undisturbed bonds and 
stock until retired by use of  the bonds reserved for that purpose or 
the  rentals  carresponding thereto."  "The new  bonds  and  stock 
will,''  said the plan, "represent  the  ownership (either in  fee or in 
possession of  securities) approximately of  : 
N.  Y.,  L. E. & W.  proper,  538 miles 
N. Y.,  P.  & o.,  600 
Chicago  & Erie,  250 
N. Y.,  L. E.  & W. Auxiliary  Companies,  550  - 
Total,  1938 miles ' 
,with  valuable terminal facilities at Jersey City, Weehawken, Buf- 
falo, etc., and also one-fifth ownership in the stock of  the Chicago & 
Western Indiana Railroad Company.  Also all the Erie coal proper- 
ties, . . . representing an aggregate of  10,000 acres of  anthracite, of 
which about gooo acres are held in fee, and 14,000 acres of  bitum- 
hous,  held under  mining  rights . . . also the Union  Steamboat 
Company, with its terminals and other properties in Buffalo, and its 
fleet of  five lake steamers on which the Erie mainly depends for the 
lake and railway traffic,"  etc. 
Fixed  charges  under  the  plan  were  estimated  at  $7,850,000. 
Fixed charges in 1894 had been $9,4~0,m.  For the first two years 
after reorganization, moreover, the charges were to be further re- 
duced by  $300,000 per annum, as the new general lien bonds  were 
to bear only 3 per cent interest during that period;  and an addi- 
tional saving of  $1,000,000  was looked  for  when  the  exchange of 
old bonds for new OE  the maturity of  its existing prior issues should 
have been eventually completed.  This sum of  $7,850,000 the com- 
pany  was expected to have no difficulty in earning in  view of  the 
immediate expenditure of  $5,337,208 for new  construction, addi- 
tions, and betterments, and the gradual distribution of  the proceeds 
of $17,000,000 of  general lien bonds to the same end.  The compen- 
sation to Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co. and Messrs. J. S.  Morgan & 
CO. for their services as depositaries, and in carrying out the plan 
was  put at $5~0,000  and expenses.  Foreclosure was finally to take 
place and a new company was to be organized. 
This plan differed from its abandoned  predecessors in  four im- 
Portant  particulars,  each of  which  was in its favor: 
(I) It employed bonds and stock instead of  bonds alone; 
(2)  It lowered instead of  increased  fixed  charges; 
(3) It procured  cash from stockholders instead  of  from second 
consolidated mortgage bondholders; and 
New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio voting trustees agreed to foreclose and deliver 
the New York, Pennsylvania  & Ohio property, subject only to the prior lien, equip 
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(4)  It absorbed  the New  York, Pennsylvania  & Ohio into the 
Erie system instead of continuing the lease thereof. 
In the employment of bonds and stock instead of  a simple issue 
of  bonds, the Erie managers adopted  what experience has shorn 
to be  the best  method  of  dealing with  the  complicated situation 
arising from a great railroad default.  The use of securities on which 
return  was optional side by  side with those on which return  was 
obligatory tended both to protect the railroad company when earn- 
ings were  low,  and to benefit  the recipients of  the new securities 
when  earnings were  high.  As  worked  out,  it  gave to  the second 
consols and funded coupons a less return  in  the one case, and an 
equal or greater  return  in  the  other,  than  did  the plan  of  189~) 
and to the income bonds, though it offered no chance of  equal gain, 
it  at  least  promised  a  minimum below  which  payments should 
not  fall.  It further made a  far nicer  recognition of  the  relative 
priorities of  different  classes of  old  bonds  possible,  and whereas 
the previous plan had made the same demands on, and had given 
the same return to the second consols,  the funded  coupon bonds 
of  1885, and  the income bonds, the new plan gave, as has been 
pointed out, to the first 75 per cent in general lien bonds and 55 per 
cent in first preferred stock; to the second, roo per cent in general 
lien bonds, 10 per cent in first preferred, and 10 per cent in second 
preferred ;  and to the third, 40 per cent in general liens and 60 per 
cent  in  first  preferred  stock.  Income,  coupon, and consolidated 
bonds benefited  alike from the assessment upon the stock, which 
laid  the  burden  of  raising  cash  upon  the  owners  of  the road, 
where it  most  properly fell.  No species of  security was given for 
the assessment, not even  common stock, with which the managers 
might well  have been generous; although  it  must be  remembered 
that the sale of  $rg,ooo,ooo  prior lien bonds for cash was part of 
the reorganization plan.  It may be remarked that since, on July  2, 
1895,  the  common  stock was  being offered at IO~,  with no sales, 
and the preferred at 223, and since the chance for dividends which 
the new stock was to enjoy was most remote, it was perhaps well 
that the syndicate guarantee of  the payment of  assessments had been 
obtained.  Fixed  charges by  the new plan were lower, as a result 
of  the liberal use  of  stock in the exchanges and the cancellation of 
floating debt as above; while the terms under which the outstanding 
New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio bonds were retired were the most 
drastic part of  the scheme.  In  all,  the total  mortgage indebted- 
ness  of  the  Erie  Company and  its  leased or controlled lines of 
$234,680,180  for January,  1896, was reduced  to $137,704,100  by 
June 30 of  that year.' 
A weak point in the plan was, nevertheless, the small reduction in 
bonded indebtedness which it occasioned.  Although, to repeat, the 
bonded indebtedness of  the system was reduced from $234,680,180 
to $137,704,100,  the shrinkage was more apparent than real, since 
it consisted chiefly in  the exchange of  stock for New York, Penn- 
sylvania & Ohio mortgage bonds, on which interest had not been 
paid by the Erie, and but  seldom by the New York, Pennsylvania, 
& Ohio itself.  These securities were slashed in most drastic fashion, 
particularly  such of  them  as were  inferior to the  first mortgage. 
The amount  of  the  reduction in the volume  outstanding  is indi- 
cated by  the fact  that for $5000 first  mortgage  New York, Penn- 
sylvania & Ohio bonds were given $1000 Erie prior lien bonds, $500 
Erie  first  preferred, $roo  Erie  second  preferred,  and  $750  Erie 
common stock; and for $500 second mortgage, or for $~ooo  third 
mortgage, were given $100 Erie common stock.  If, now, we exclude 
the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio bonds from our consideration 
of  the funded  debt,  we  find  the indebtedness of  the  Erie  system 
on January I, 1896, excluding  the non-assumed New York, Pennsyl- 
vania & Ohio bonds to have  been  $121,399,431 ; and on June 30, 
excluding the  new  prior  lien  bonds  used  to  exchange  for  these 
securities, to have been  $123,304,100;  or an increase through  the 
reorganization of  $1,904,669.'  Further, there was an accompanying 
increase in  the capital  stock of  the combined  compan.ies, which 
did not, of  course, involve an increase in fixed  charges, but which 
'  Chron. 61: 368,  1895; R. R. Gaz. 27:  583-4,  1895. 
"he  following was the rate of  exchange of  Erie securities for New York, Penn- 
sylvania & Ohio securities on payment by the latter of  $12 per new share: 
Old  securilGs  To  be exchanged for 
in amunts of  Prior  Lien Bonds  1st Pref.  2d  Prej.  Con. Stock 
1st mortgage,  $5,000  $1000  $500  $100  $750 
ad mortgage,  500 
3d  mortgage,  1,000 
Pref. Stock,  6,- 
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increased the volume of  securities outstanding.'  What the reduction 
in the capital of  the New York, Pennsylvania  & Ohio, joined with 
its amalgamation with  the Erie system, did do  was to lessen  the 
burdens of that line to the parent company.  For many years the 
Erie had engaged to operate the branch for 68 per cent and had paid 
32 per  cent of  its gross earnings to the New York, Pennsylvania & 
Ohio, to be  applied  to  payment or partial  payment  of interest on 
the excessive issues which were now retired.  It was probably to be 
long before an operating ratio of  68 per cent could  be successfully 
maintained;  but the Erie  after reorganization was obliged to turn 
over, not  32  per  cent  of  gross  earnings,  but  4  per  cent  on  the 
$14,400,000  prior  lien bonds which  had been given for New York, 
Pennsylvania & Ohio securities, or an amount of  $576,oc~;  which 
amounted to a reduction of  the minimum rental of  more than one- 
half, and of the sums actually paid of  almost three- quarter^.^ 
Turning again  to  fixed  charges,  we  find them  estimated, after 
the first two  years,  at  $7,850,000.  The average net  earnings for 
the period  1887-94  had been $9,331,250.  These earnings will not 
serve strictly as a basis for calculation, for from 1887 to 1892  they 
include an average of  perhaps $750,000 derived from Lehigh Val- 
ley trackage  payments  and other  sums now  discontinued.  With 
the deduction, therefore, of  this amount from the net earnings of  the 
period named, the average is reduced  to $8,768,750; or $918,750 
more  than  it  was  thought  fixed  charges would  be.  When  it is 
considered  that this $918,750  represented  the  sum  available  for 
dividends on $146,ooo,000 of  outstanding Erie stock, it is plain that 
the over-capitalization of  the company in 1895 was still very great. 
With these comments it is necessary to leave the plan.  It was far 
the best that had ever been applied to the rehabilitation of  Erie's 
Capital Stock - 
Before reorganization  Common  Preferred 
Erie,  $77,837,000  $8,536,600 




Erie,  $100,~,000  $46,m~~,000 
Nypano,  ZO,OOO,OOO 
$120,000,000  k6,000,000 
This  real  rental  was  increased somewhat by  the  assumption of  New Yo*, 
Pennsylvania & Ohio prior liens. 
affairs; it was  discriminating  in  its  nature,  and, thanks  to  the 
increasing prosperity of  the last eleven  years, it has been fortunate 
in its results.  In August, 1895, a decree of foreclosure was signed in 
the city of New York, and the following November the property was 
sold under the second consolidated mortgage, and purchased by the 
reorganization  committee for $2o,000,000.' 
Since 1895 the Erie has shared in the prosperity of  the country. 
Its ton mileage has increased from 3,939,679,175 in 1897 to 6,275,- 
629,877 in  1907; its gross earnings have grown  from  $31,497,031 
to $53,914,827; and its net earnings, which had hovered for so many 
years near or below the level of  fixed charges, have now soared away 
above.  Under these circumstances it is but natural that large sums 
should have been applied to improvements.  Between December I, 
1895, and  June 30, 1907, $12,732,486  were  spent in  the purchase 
of  land, in yards,  stations, and buildings,  in  reducing grades, re- 
locating tracks, and in other ways, and charged to capital ; $36,511,- 
046 were  spent for new  equipment,  and charged  to  capital; and 
$8,625,307 were  taken  from income  for equipment and improve- 
ments of  various sorts.  These expenditures have had a most gratify- 
ing  result.  The average  train  load  has grown  from  224.74  tons 
in  1895 to 471.67 in 1907, although coal now constitutes a smaller 
proportion  of  the freight; and the average revenue  per train mile 
has more than doubled, in face of  a revenue per ton mile which has 
only slightly increased.  In 1907 the Erie's ton mileage was 59 per 
cent greater than in 1897, and its passenger mileage was 73 per cent 
greater, but the expense of  conducting transportation had increased 
but 27.pe.r  cent.  Instead of  freight cars with an average capacity of 
223 tons the company now  uses cars which average 34 tons.  In- 
stead of  locomotives which on the average could exert a tractive force 
of only  24,500 pounds as late as 1901,  it has now  engines which 
average 31,000.  Freight train mileage is 2,600,000 less than it was 
in  1896, and passenger train mileage has only slightly increased. 
And yet, with all this prosperity, it cannot be said  that the Erie 
enjoys an assured position.  In 1907 it had to  pay out 89 per cent 
of the largest  income  which  it  had  ever  received  for operating 
expenses, fixed charges,  and taxes.  Of  its net  income of  about 
$~,OOO,OOO  the modest dividends of 4 per cent on its first and second 
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preferred stock absorb some $2,5oo,ooo,  and the widespread finan- 
cial difficulties of  1907 have led its management to declare the divi- 
dends for that year payable in scrip and not in cash.  And although 
the present period of  reaction dates back but a little way the company 
has been already obliged to the issue of  short term notes. 
In matters of  railroad policy the Erie has accordingly been con- 
servative.  In 1898 it acquired control of  the New  York,  Susque- 
hanna  & Western, from New  York City to Wilkesbarre in north- 
east Pennsylvania.  Three years later it bought the entire stock of 
the Pennsylvania Coal Company in order to protect its tonnage, and, 
as the directors expressed it, for other reasons which seemed good ; 
and in  1901  also it bought an interest in the Lehigh Valley.  The 
most sensational episode which has occurred has been the purchase 
and subsequent release of  the Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton.  It 
seems that in 1905 Mr. J. P.  Morgan bought a majority of  a syndi- 
cate's holdings in  Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton  stock, amount- 
ing to a majority of  the total issue; a purchase which carried control 
of  the Pere Marquette  and of  the  Chicago, Cincinnati & Louis- 
ville, or of  a total system of  3675 miles.  This stock Mr.  Morgan 
turned over to the Erie at a price reported to be $160 a share.  From 
a traffic point of  view the deal seemed likely to strengthen the Erie's 
position in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, while more than doubling 
the mileage of  its system.  Because of  the financial condition of  the 
new companies, however, the purchase was decidedly unwise ;  and, 
after an investigation, Mr.  Morgan's offer to take the road off  the 
Erie's hands was gladly accepted.  On December 4,1905, Mr. Judson 
Harmon  was  appointed receiver of  the  Cincinnati, Hamilton  & 
Dayton and of  the Pere Marquette, and the reorganization of  these 
properties is just being completed. 
At  present  the Erie is operating 2169  miles of  road  as against 
2166  in 1896.  Its earnings have greatly increased, its capitalization 
has grown in less proportiotl,' but it has not yet a sufficient margin 
of  surplus earnings to meet a decline in prosperity without serious 
misgivings.  Dividends on its fust preferred stock have been  paid 
since I~I,  and  on its second preferred since 1905.  The common 
stock cannot expect a dividend in any period which can be foreseen. 
a  Capital -  Stock  Bonds 
1896  $146,000,000  $137~704~100 
1907  176,271,300  209,633,9@3 
CHAPTER  I11 
PHILADELPHIA  & READING 
Early history -  Purchase of  coal lands -  Funding of  floating debt -  Failure - 
struggles between Gowen and his opponents -  Reorganization -  Second failure 
ad  reorganization. 
T~E  Philadelphia  & Reading Railroad has been peculiarly unfor- 
tunate.  Although serving a region of  abundant traffic, it failed three 
times between 1880 and 1895, and was in the hands of  receivers ten 
years.  It was reorganized after each failure, and each reorganization 
was marked by bitter struggles  between contending  parties, due in part 
to divergence in financial interests, and in part to personal rivalries. 
In 1833 the Philadelphia  & Reading Railroad was chartered by 
the Legislature of  Pennsylvania to build a road from Philadelphia 
to  Reading, a distance of  58 miles.  Its early history does not con- 
cern us.  In 1862 it leased, owned, and operated 437.4 miles of  track, 
equivalent, roughly, to 119.4  miles of  lime; and derived $2,879,419 
out  of  its gross earnings of  $3,911,830  from the carriage of  coal. 
Its capitalization was extremely high, roughly, $193,417  per mile of 
lie,'  and the necessary payments each year, not including dividends, 
took up $1,454,635.  At this time the road owned no coal lands, but, 
like the Lehigh Valley Railroad and the Schuylkill Canal, remained 
a common carrier, and relied upon the advantages of  its position in 
respect  to the Southern coal fields to secure the tonnage which it 
required. 
From  1862  to  1865 inclusive the Reading enjoyed a  period of 
extreme  prosperity.  The Navy Department,  during the  war,  re- 
quired large quantities of  fuel, and in the revival of  business after 
the  conclusion of  peace the Reading took its part.  Merchandise 
earnings increased from $523,416  in  1862  to $1,165,277 in  1865; 
coal  earnings from $2,879,419  to $8,627,292 ;  and though expenses 
Calculated.  Poor gives the figure of  340.3 miles of  track.  In 1867 the miles of 
track were reported as 418.1, and the miles of  line as 147, the latter being 35.1 per 
cent of  the former.  Supposing the proportion to have been the same in  1862, to 
340.3 miles of  track there would have been 119.4 miles of  line, which, divided into 
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also increased, yet net earnings grew from $2,375,247 to $5,236,655, 
and the balance of  earnings, after all charges had been paid, from 
$j20,612  to $2,632,566.  Dividends meanwhile ranged from 14 per 
cent on the preferred stock in  1862 to 10 per cent on both preferred 
and common in  1866, though the majority of  the distributions were 
made in stock.  On the whole, during the Civil War and for a whole 
year  afterwards, the Reading was  able to carry without difficulty 
the burden of  an enormous capitalization.  What increase in capital 
occurred at this time  was in  stock, and did not  add to the load, 
although the desire to pay dividends on the increased stock led to 
the piling up of  new issues. 
In 1869 an entirely new departure in  Reading policy occurred. 
Whereas the  road had  previously  owned no  coal lands, with the 
advent of  Mr. F. B.  Gowen to the presidency it began to purchase 
on an enormous scale.  "The repeated and serious interruptions of 
the  business  of  the company,"  said  the  annual report for 1871, 
"caused  by  strikers in the coal  regions during the last few years, 
and the many fluctuations in the coal trade, produced by alternate 
periods of  expansion and depression resulting therefrom, have at- 
tracted the attention  of  the managers of  the company to the neces- 
sity of  exercising some control over the production of  coal, so as to 
prevent a recurrence of  the difficulties heretofore experienced; and 
it was believed that the best way to accomplish this result, without 
injuriously affecting individual  interests, was  for  the  company to 
become the owner of  coal lands situate upon the line of  its several 
branches." ' Further, it was felt that some steps were necessary to 
retain for the Reading even the coal tonnage which it enjoyed.  In 
1871 every rival carrier had invested large sums in coal properties, 
and all the fields but the Schuylkill and Mahanoy (western middle) 
were  occupied, while  carriers  had  begun  to  enter  the  Mahanoy 
district,  and it  was reported  to be  their  intention  to  build  lines 
straight through to the Schuylkill fields. 
The anthracite  coal  regions of  Pennsylvania lie  in  four  mah 
districts: the  Northern  or Wyoming; the  Southern or  Schuylkill; 
and two smaller intermediate fields known respectively as the Eastern 
Middle or Lehigh region and the Western Middle or Mahanoy and 
Shamokin basins.  The Northern  field is the more easily worked, 
Annual Report,  1881, p. 63. 
md  the Southern field is the richer.'  Between  1869 and 1881 the 
~~ading  Railroad  and its  alter  ego, the  Coal  & Iron Company, 
formed for the purpose, spent $73,326,668 for lands in  the Schuyl- 
kill and Western Middle districts, securing 142  square miles, or 60 
per cent of  all the anthracite lands of  these districts, and 30 per cent 
of  all  in  Pennsylvania.  Of  the purchase money  $(j9,816,204 were 
supplied either by the Railroad  Company or by sale of  Coal & Iron 
Company bonds which  the  Railroad  Company guaranteed.  The 
Coal  & Iron Company incurred non-guaranteed liabilities for the 
rest.'  This gave ample resources for the permane& supply of  coal 
tonnage to the railroad, and was sufficient also to give a considerable 
measure of  control over production in the Southern district.  Inde- 
pendent operators did continue, however, and the Reading coal was 
subject to the competition of  coal from other fields.  More import- 
ant still, in attaining control, "  all kinds of  coal properties, good, bad, 
and indifferent, were  purchased  without  regard  to  original  cost, 
location, or revenue producing capacity."  In 1880 an engineer of 
reputation was  appointed to evaluate the Reading coal lands, and 
Industrial Commission, vol. 19, p. 445.  Area of  fields as given in Annual Report 
for  1881 was: Schuylkill, 146 sq. miles ;  Western Middle, 91 sq. miles ;  Lehigh, 37 sq. 
miles ;  Wyoming, 198 sq. miles. 
An  analysis of  the Coal & Imn Company's operations in 1881 (Annual Report, 
1881) showed that there had been expended: 
For  coal  and  timber lands and leasehold collieries,  and  for  dead 
work,  colliery  equipments and  improvements,  real  estate  and 
miners' houses, etc.,  $39,3852080 
For stocks and bonds and loans to secure the contml of tributary pro- 
perties,  5,672,394 
For iron ore lands, iron furnaces, mills, and other properties,  1,720,566 
For pmfit and loss account in working properties, including interest 
payments, etc.,  229454,500 
For supplies and miscellaneous accounts,  1,485,426 
For bids and accounts receivable, cash, etc.,  2,608,702 
873,326,668 
Of which amount there was furnished by the Railroad Company,  54,886,647 
hd  the  Coal  & Iron Company's obligations held  by  the  public, for 
which  the  Railroad Company became  responsible  as guarantor, 
amounted to  14,929,557 
Other direct liabilities of the Coal  & Iron Company  amounted to  3,510,464 
573,324668  '  Annual Report,  1881. RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  PHILADELPHIA  6"  READING  79 
recommended the surrender of five  properties that originally cost 
$5,207,167,  upon  which  there  were  encumbrances of $5,015,000. 
"But little weight," said he, "should be given to the fear that rivals 
will possess the surrendered property;  most of  it is not a tempting 
investment."  Exorbitant prices were paid for the lands purchased. 
By 1881, as noted, there had been expended in all by the two Read- 
ing companies $73,326,668.  This same report  said that, "assum- 
ing the profit on the future coal product to be 30 cents per ton of  coal 
shipped, that the company will be able to reduce the rate of  interest 
on the money needed to hold and develop the property from 7 per 
cent  to 6 per cent per annum, and that the development will be at 
the rate just  stated [outlined earlier in the report1 the whole estate 
has a value of  $32,394,799: the company's  interest in the estate is 
worth $30,630,648, and, including colliery improvements belonging 
to the company, but situate on  lands owned by  others, the whole 
of  the company's property is worth $31,197,484." ' 
It is unquestionable that the Reading did acquire an enormously 
valuable property in  the decade succeeding 1870.  It seems just as 
clear that it paid more for this than was necessary ;  but what is per- 
haps more to the point is the fact that the Reading paid more than 
it could afford.  Whatever the ultimate advantages to be gained by 
exclusive possession of  any considerable section of  the coal fields, 
the Reading was not large enough nor financially strong enough to 
make such vast  purchases within  so short a  space of  time.  The 
prosperity  of  the  Civil  War  had  disappeared,  net  profits  were 
fluctuating without  marked  tendency  to  increase,  the  figures for 
1870 being actually less than those of  1863, while the interest on 
bonds had more than doubled since 1867, and the sum required for 
dividends had increased.  To advance $54,886,647 to the Coal  82 
Iron Company under these conditions, and to become responsible 
as  guarantor for $14, 929,557 more,  would  have been  ill-advised 
even had the prices paid by the company been in strict accord with 
the commercial estimate of  the  time.  Under  the  best of  circum- 
stances returns from much of  the property acquired could not  be 
secured for  many years.  The parts of  the coal fields which were 
worked yielded an  income, though it was seldom that the collieries 
were allowed to run to their full capacity; but those districts which 
Part of  the difference was due to the inflation of  the currency before 1879. 
were  bought  for  the  sake of  controlling the  coal  situation, or in 
order to secure a future reserve, and which in many cases could not 
be  worked at existing prices, occasioned a drain upon the company 
to the amount of  interest on the purchase money, with no return of 
any kind.  Moreover, the purchase of  the coal lands put the Read- 
ing in  the anomalous position of  a railroad  corporation interested 
in industrial lines.  It could no longer be content with encouraging 
the transportation of  its main source of revenue (coal), but had to 
care as well for the price at which  this coal was  sold.  When  de- 
pression in the coal trade came, the Reading lost both as producer 
and as carrier, for less was transported, and that amount was sold 
at  a lower  price; but  when  good  times came,  from which  as  a 
simple carrier it might have profited largely, it struggled with con- 
ditions of over-production which should rightly have been none of 
its concern. There was, finally, a peculiar fatality in the time which 
the  Reading chose  for  its  expansion.  The year  1873 will always 
be remembered  as one of  the most disastrous in the history of  the 
United States. Commencing with the failure of  Messrs.  Jay Cooke 
& Co. on the 18th of  September, the panic spread with such rapidity 
as to lead to the closing of  the New York Stock Exchange on Sep 
tember 30.  All railroad securities were  exceedingly depressed, call 
loans were high, and it was nearly impossible to secure new capital. 
Business the next five years was very dull, and the Reading actually 
earned less gross in  1879 than in the year before the panic, and this 
at the very  time that its liabilities were  so largely extended.  The 
natural result was the financial difficulty which can be detected as 
early as 1876.  In June  it  appears that, owing "to  the continued 
depression in the iron and coal trades and the consequent falling off 
in  transportation," the road was obliged to reduce its working force. 
In July  the usual  dividend was  passed;  salaries were  lowered  in 
September, and still later a temporary loan was secured to tide over 
the floating debt, which then amounted to $8,272,359.  By the next 
Year  the matter had become serious enough to necessitate a formal 
proposition to creditors for the postponement of  interest payments 
and of  payments  on  the  floating  debt.  The company professed 
itself  able to carry out the following: 
(a) To pay the interest on prior liens in full. 
(b) To pay one-half  the interest on the general mortgage bonds 80  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  PHILADELPHIA  & READING  8  I 
and on the Perkiomen sterling mortgage bonds for three years in 
cash, and one-half in five-year interest-bearing scrip, with the option 
to the holder of receiving instead scrip for the three coupons first 
maturing and cash for the rest. 
(c)  To pay  for five years in scrip the interest on the debenture 
bonds of both  the Railroad and Coal & Iron Companies; the con- 
vertible bonds of  the Railroad  Company, the bonds due in  1885, 
1902, and 1918  of  the Tidewater  & Susquehanna Canal Company, 
and so much of  the rent due to the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
as was  applicable to the payment of  dividends to stockholders of 
the Company and to the interest upon its mortgage loan of  1895. 
(d) To suspend the drawings for the payments of sinking funds 
and of  the improvement and general mortgage bonds for a period 
not exceeding four years, if  so long a time should be required for 
the payment of  the floating debt.' 
"  The relief to be obtained from the above," said President Gowen, 
"will undoubtedly enable the managers, even with no improvement 
in traffic or increase of  rates, to meet the fixed charges on all obliga- 
tions of  both companies other than those above named, and to pay 
off  the entire floating debt within such time as will be satisfactory 
to the holders thereof."  Certain modifications were suggested by the 
London securityholders, providing for trustees with some power to 
protect the creditorsYa  and the plan went quietly into effect. 
From now on matters went from bad to worse.  The year  1878 
showed a falling off  in almost every source of  revenue, while ex- 
penses and charges remained very nearly the same.  Depression in 
the coal trade and connection with the Coal & Iron Company, gen- 
eral dulness of business after 1873, troubles with employees, over- 
capitalization, all had their share in pushing the company still fur- 
ther into the mire.  It became unable to keep its share of  the existing 
business, and the percentages of  the Schuylkill output carried by it 
steadily decreased from 83.49 in 1877 to 75.45  in 1881, while its per- 
centage of the aggregate output from all the anthracite region dimin- 
ished from 32.82 to 24.44.  "It appears, therefore,"  said the annual 
report for 1881, "that while other companies have steadily increased 
their capacity of  production by regular and judicious expenditures 
R. R. Gaz. g: 115, 1877;  Ibid. 9:  146,1877. 
'  Ibid. 9:  184, 1877. 
for new  openings,  breakers,  machinery,  and  other  facilities  for 
ding  and delivering coal, the Reading Company has apparently 
remained  stationary. . . .  For  this  policy  the  local  officers  in 
charge are not probably responsible, as it was undoubtedly forced 
upon them by  the  management, because of  the impoverished and 
embarrassed condition of  the company's hances." 
Throughout 1879 there was trouble over the payment of  wages, 
perhaps  as good  a  sign  of  financial  difficulty  as can  be  desired. 
Employees were paid in scrip, not cash, and even scrip wages were 
left overdue.  President Gowen went to Europe toward the middle of 
the year, but not at all, as he carefully explained, in order to place 
a new loan, or to transact any business except a little in relation to 
some railroads for the company ;  in fact, the condition of  the Reading 
was an open  secret, and new loans were  impossible to obtain.  In 
May, 1880, the New York and Philadelphia banks began to refuse 
further accommodations. At the same time the period during which, 
according to  the  agreement  of  1877,  cash  payment  of  general 
mortgage coupons was suspended, drew to a  close, and on May 21 
the  Philadelphia & Reading announced its inability to  meet  its 
obligations.  As was said at the time, the company did not fall with 
a crash because it had not far to fall. 
The failure occurred on May  21,  and on May 24  Messrs. F.  B. 
Gowen  (president of  the company), Edwin A.  Lewis, and Stephen 
A. Caldwell were appointed receivers.  Their resources were scanty 
and they had to do with them as best they could.  On the one hand 
they applied to the court for authority to borrow $~,ooo,ooo  to pay 
the wages of  employees and interest falling due July  I, and on the 
other they cut down expenses by reducing the working force in the 
repair shops, by putting the shops on short time, by discontinuing 
many of  the trains on different lines, and by ceasing all dead work 
at the collieries. 
Before any plan  could be proposed for the rehabilitation of  the 
company the  condition  of  its finances had to be  known, and this 
again  the  receivers took  in charge.  Their report  in  June,  1880, 
showed a sufficiently serious state of  affairs.  The floating debt of 
the  Railroad  Company had  mounted  up to  $10,254,766,  besides 
$1~~00~~82  more for the Coal  & Iron Company.  This represented 
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an  increase of  $3,604,000 as compared with November 30,1879, and 
an English bondholders' committee declared  that  only $2,930,~00 
of  it were represented by  value.'  The rest  had  apparently been 
incurred  in  desperate  attempts  to  preserve  the  solvency  of  the 
company.  The total  liabilities of  the  Railroad  and  Coal & Iron 
Companies, including mortgage, debenture debt, floating debt, and 
miscellaneous items,  but  excluding stock, were $152,436,8~0.  The 
deduction from these figures of  the Coal & Iron bonds held by the 
Railroad Company, which would have constituted a duplication of 
indebtedness, left a total of  $106,215,830. 
The stock of  the two companies amounted to $42,278,175,  and 
the stock in the hands of  the  public to $39,278,175.  The grand 
total of  liabilities was thus the enormous sum of $145,494,005.  The 
charges for  interest and sinking funds were  $7,542,094,  and  the 
annual  payment  of  $5,629,764,  due  on  $87,558,482  of  railroad 
bonded indebtedness, shows that the rate of interest upon the bonds 
was high.  The net revenue was $5,494,979, and there was therefore 
a deficit of  $2,047,115.  Meanwhile the Coal  & Iron Company had 
reported a regular deficit up to 1880, which, though not significant 
in itself, because of close relations with the Railroad Company and 
the impossibility of  determining how  much  the  Coal  Company's 
rightful  profits  were  reduced  by  exorbitant  transportation  rates, 
yet made it very  clear that from this source the Railroad Company 
could expect no aid toward the cancellation of  the railroad  deficit 
revealed. 
The combined companies were unable to earn their fixed charges: 
the continuation of  the struggle to do so was sure to mean, as it 
had in the past, merely a piling up of  the floating debt.  The  coupon- 
funding schemc of  1877  had  shown  the  inevitable result of  tem- 
porary measures of  relief; and though business in 1880 was rapidly 
improving, there  was  need  for a radical reduction in  the  burden 
resting upon  the company.  Pending action, a bill  for foreclosure 
was introduced under the general mortgage of  1874.'  A valuation 
of the Reading coal properties, to which reference has already been 
made, was started.  It was entrusted at first to Mr. S.  B. Whitney, 
1  Chron. 31 :  46, 1880,  Report  of  the  English Bondholders' Committee, June 18, 
1880. This committee was in the interests of  the Messrs. McCalmont. 
2  Ry. Age,  5: 365, 1880. 
def  engineer  of  the  Coal  & Iron  Company, and to Mr.  Frank 
Carver, the land agent; but was later given over to Mr.  Joseph  S. 
~~ris,  chief engineer of  the Lehigh Coal & Navigation  Company, 
in  order to have the opinion of  an unprejudiced expert.' 
The  fnst  suggestion  for  a  plan  of  reorganization  came  from 
England. The consolidated mortgage, prior to the general mortgage, 
was  to be foreclosed ;  general mortgage bonds were to be deprived 
their right to sue or to foreclose ;  all unsecured bonds and junior 
mortgages were  to  be  exchanged  for  preferred stock; and a  $15 
assessment was  to  be  levied  upon  the stock, for which  collateral 
trust 7 per cent bonds were to be given.  This assessment was relied 
on  to pay off the floating debt, and the new company was to start 
free, with but $33,564,&  of  mortgage indebtednes~.~ 
This plan  was  a  step in  the right  direction.  It recognized the 
validity  of prior liens, followed a sound principle in  providing for 
the  floating debt by  assessments upon the stock, and relieved  the 
company from the likelihood of  a future failure by  its treatment 
of  the general mortgage bonds; but it was weak in that it reduced 
the general mortgage to the anomalous position of  a bond entitled 
to  a  fixed  return  without  the  power  to  enforce it.  Stockholders, 
moreover, objected strenuously to the assessment, maintaining that 
business  conditions were  now  such  as to  make  milder measures 
sufficient. 
In October, 1880, Mr. J. W. Jones, formerly vice-president of  the 
Reading Company, urged that an assessment on the stock was not 
necessary, and proposed the following : 
(I) To convert  the  income,  debenture,  and convertible bonds 
and  scrip into second  preferred stock bearing  5 per  cent interest 
if earned ; 
(2)  To issue $15,000,000  of  first  preferred  stock, with  which to 
retire the floating debt ; 
(3) To scale  the Coal  Company mortgage bonds $200,000 per 
annum, which could possibly be done by  consent of holders, if  not, 
then  by foreclosure.3 
The main difference between this and the English scheme lay in 
the treatment of  the floating debt.  It is improbable, however, that 
'  R. R.  Gaz. 12:  363,  1880.  Ry. Age, 5:  351,  1880; R. R. Gaz.  12: 350, 1880. 
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the substitute which this plan offered would  have been  sufficient, 
and that the preferred stock could have brought $66,  at which  price 
alone it would  have  covered  the floating debt.  Reading common 
stock was selling in the middle of  the month at 16j; general man. 
gage 6s were  bringing only 744, while  debentures and  convertible 
7s were being quoted at 28 and 37  respectively. 
In October a representative of  the English bondholders arrived 
in  Philadelphia  for  the  purpose  of  examining into  the  condition 
of  the company, and the following month agreed with the board of 
managers upon  a  reorganization committee to  act in  the  United 
States.  "The probabilities are," said  this gentleman (Mr. Thomas 
Wilde Powell), "that it will be found that the bondholders in Lon- 
don will be willing to do as they  did in the case of  the Erie, that 
is, fund a reasonable number of  coupons. .  .  for the purpose of  set- 
ting at liberty a portion of  the revenue to pay unfunded claims." 
The next move in the reorganization of  the company came, however, 
not from this committee but from President Gowen, the man who 
had led the Reading into the purchase of  coal lands, and who still 
remained in office in spite of  the hostility shown toward him.  His 
scheme comprised  two  parts:  the first  an issue of  income bonds 
with which  to  pay off  the floating debt  (together with $5,000,000 
mortgage bonds) ;  the  second a  grand general mortgage  to retire 
existing indebtedness.  The plan in more detail was as follows: 
(I) The company  was  to  create  $34,300,000 deferred  income 
bonds, on which interest was to be deferred to a dividend of  6 per 
cent on the common stock.  After this amount had been  paid the 
bonds were to take all revenue up to 6 per cent and were then to 
rank pari  passu  with  the  common  shares for  further  dividends. 
The debentures were to be issued at 30 per cent of  their par value, 
or $15  per  bond; and before selling or disposing of  said bonds in 
the  market the option  of  taking  a pro  rata share was  to  be  first 
offered to the stockholders of  the ~ompany.~ 
(2)  A more permanent relief  for the company was to be obtained 
from the proposal to issue a new long time or perpetual 5 per cent 
funding mortgage of  $r~o,ooo,ooo,  divided into two classes, A and 
B, of  $75,000,000 each: class A having priority of lien and interest 
charge over class B.  With this issue it was proposed, by purchase 
R.  R.  Gaz.  12:  564, 1880.  a  Chron. 31: 536, 1880. 
or exchange, to retire all outstanding indebtedness, and to acquire 
by purchase the securities of the companies owning the leased lines. 
~t was estimated that $140,000,000 of the new issue would provide 
for all of this, the total interest on which would be $7,000,000, as 
against  fixed  charges for interest,  sinking funds, and rentals,  of 
$Io,657,~~6,  making an annual saving of $3,657,116.'  Mr. Gowen 
did not expect to secure so large an annual reduction, owing to the 
impossibility of  purchasing the higher securities and the probable 
appreciation in value of  the lower ones ;  but he did expect to realize 
in  all a saving of  some $2,700,000. 
In part  this  plan was commendable ;  in part it  was  inadequate, 
and in part it relied on a mere juggling with words.  The proposal to 
unify all classes of  indebtedness by a grand consolidated 5 per cent 
mortgage was a  good  one,  both  in  the  simplification of  accounts 
which was to be expected, and in the reduction in fixed charges so 
far as this  reduction went; but  on  the one hand  a  reduction of 
$2,7m,ooo in  charges was too little for a company which had re- 
ported for that very year a deficit of  $2,000,000,  and on the other 
hand  too  little allowance was  made  for  the  difficulty of  forcing 
securityholders without a foreclosure sale to submit to a definitive 
scaling down of  their holdings, with not even a preferred stock to 
show for the sacrifice.  In its handling of  the floating debt, the plan 
was a second edition of  Mr. Jones's  stock-selling scheme, with all 
the good points left out.  What justification there could have been 
for calling securities, such as the deferred incomes, "bonds,"  which 
were  to be issued for no definite time, ranked even after the com- 
mon  stock for dividends, and were of  such doubtful character that 
Mr.  Gowen  himself  proposed to  sell them  for one-third of  their 
face value, does not  appear; unless it  be  that  the lack of  voting 
Power,  itself  a disadvantage, entitled them  to the  more respected 
name.  The deferred income bonds were a device for saddling the 
holders  of  the  unsecured  debt  with  a  worthless certificate which 
they might be induced to accept because of  its name, and to which 
not even the Reading stockholders could object.  Furthermore, even 
if the creditors had been eager for this new issue, in itself it would 
not have been sufficient. The issue, if  taken up, would have yielded 
$~o,zm,ooo.  It was proposed besides to sell $S,OOO,-  of  unissued 
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general mortgage bonds,  which,  after  the success of  the deferred 
income bonds, it was presumed would sell at par.  Income bonds 
and general mortgage together  promised a total of $15,2oo,ooo, or 
more  than  $r,ooo,ooo over cash requirements  after  commissions 
had been paid.' 
However poor the prospect, there was no lack of syndicate guar- 
antee.  In November,  1880,  a London syndicate agreed to deposit 
with an American bank, to be named by the company, the sum of 
$2,058,000,  to be forfeited in case they failed to take at the issue 
price  all  deferred  income  bonds  not  taken  by  the  shareholders. 
This syndicate further agreed that the company might retain, up to 
$~,ooo,ooo,  out of  the deposit money, whatever might be necessary 
to make up a second  &stalment of  $4  on such neglected bonds.2 
Nothing was asked from the company in return except the chance 
to sell the bonds purchased at a premium.  "As long as the bond- 
and shareholders hd  the money,"  remarked  the London  Times, 
"there  is nothing to be  said.  In all  probability, however, these 
deferred bonds will  become a  medium for  the very worst kind of 
gambling, and their chances for a dividend appear to us to be very 
small." 
In  December Mr.  Gowen's  plan  received  the  approval  of  the 
American committee and of  the board of  managers of  the company. 
Bondholders were  in no way  injured  by  the worthlessness of  the 
deferred  income  bonds,  and  only  the  most  far-sighted  could  be 
expected  to  have  demanded  a  larger  reduction  in  their  claims. 
The same month  a  meeting of  London  bond- and shareholders 
passed unanimously a resolution expressing confidence in President 
Gowen,  and adopting  his  scheme.'  Opposition  came  from  the 
influential  London  banking  firm  of  McCalmont  Bros.,  and the 
struggle centred about the annual election set for January 10, 1881. 
The last of  November or first of  December President Gowen issued 
a circular in which  he  said: "As  I am about to visit Europe on 
business of  the company, and as it is possible that I may not return 
until the first week in January, I thhk it proper to call your atten- 
tion  to  the fact  that  it  is highly  important that  all  shareholders 
who can possibly do so should attend the annual meeting in Phil- 
R.  R.  Gaz.  12  :  609, 1880.  '  Ibid. 
Ibid. 13: 11,  1881.  '  Ibid. 12:  704, 1880. 
&lphia  on the second Monday in January.  An effort will undoubt- 
edly be made at the next election to control the management of the 
company in the interest of rival lines, and if  the effort is successful 
the future of  the Philadelphia  & Reading Railroad Company will 
be little, if  any, better than that of the Philadelphia  & Erie Railroad 
Company, or of  the Northern  Central Railroad  Company."  In 
Europe, or, more strictly speaking, in London, Gowen busied him- 
self  in  placing his deferred income bonds, with apparently a very 
considerable measure  of  success.  As  to  the result of  the coming 
election he professed absolute confidence.  It made little difference, 
said he, which way the McCalmonts decided to vote theif shares. He 
could be elected without any English votes at all, and with the back- 
ing of  the  English bondholders who had  resolved  to  support him, 
the matter was not at all in doubL2 On January 4, six days before 
the date set for the election, Gowen actually issued a prospectus for 
his new  income and mortgage loans, and cabled to Vice-President 
Keim  that  he was satisfied  that  he  could  dispose  of  the general 
mortgage A bonds at IIO and the general mortgage B bonds at par.j 
Meanwhile in  America both parties had recourse to the courts: 
the McCalmonts, to prevent the issue of  the deferred income bonds, 
and the friends of  Mr. Gowen to get the election postponed in order 
to  give the president time to return from Europe.  The latter suit 
was  the  first  decided.  Judge  McKennan, of  the  United  States 
Circuit  Court, refused  to  grant  an order, but  unofficially  advised 
postponement.  The board of  managers therefore withdrew the notice 
of  the  annual  meeting,  and on  January  12  voted  to  postpone it 
indefinitely.  Counsel for  the McCalmonts then  made application 
to the Court of  Common Pleas in Philadelphia for a mandamus to 
compel the  board to call  a meeting.  They obtained a peremptory 
mandamus on  January  24,  but accepted the date of  March  14 as 
satisfactory, and forbore further proceedings. 
The matter of  the deferred  income bonds  was  complicated by 
a full and complete authorization which Mr. Gowen had before ob- 
tained from the Circuit Court for the issue of  his bonds. The request 
of the McCalmonts was twofold :  the court was prayed to revoke the 
Previous decree, and to enjoin any further action in the negotiation 
or consummation of  the  said  scheme; or, failing this, to direct the 
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officers of  the company and the receivers to refrain from the issue 
of  the bonds until the form thereof should have been settled by the 
said court,  and  also until  deposit with  the receivers should have 
been made of  the $2,058,000 provided as a  guarantee.'  The first 
request sought a prohibition of  the issue ;  the second attempted to 
delay the negotiation of  the bonds until the annual election should 
have  passed  and  the  McCalmonts should have  had  a  chance to 
obtain control.  The immediate result was the transference to Phil- 
adelphia of  the $2,058,00o guaranteed, from its place of  deposit in 
London. In February the McCalmonts obtained a revocation of  the 
original grant of  authority for  the deferred income bonds, a con- 
tinuance of  the suit for a preliminary injunction, and an order re- 
straining the respondents from "  making any agreement or ordering 
any act by  which the Philadelphia  & Reading Railroad Company 
[might]  be  definitely bound  touching the  deferred bond  plan  or 
the proposed mortgage loan of  $15o,ooo,ooo." ' 
In January  the  Coal  & Iron Company quietly held its annual 
election, and chose Mr. Gowen president.  As the time for the post- 
poned  election of  the Railroad  Company came round, the activity 
of  both sides became intense.  Both Gowen, who was still in London, 
and the McCalmonts issued calls for proxies.  The former appealed 
to the shareholders to save the property from passing into the hands 
of  the Pennsylvania Central Railroad Company, which he said was 
believed to be the ruling power  behind the McCalmont litigation. 
The latter objected vigorously to this charge, and pointed out that 
the Reading managers held  only  16,500  shares of  the  company's 
stock, and that some of  them had barely enough to qualify them for 
the  positions  which  they  held.8  The McCalmonts,  furthermore, 
applied to the courts for an injunction to prevent Gowen from voting 
on  the  shares  pledged  as collateral for the  floating debt.  They 
maintained  with  some  justification  that  these  shares  could  not 
legally be voted,  and that  it was  particularly illegal  for  the  pre- 
sident to use them to elect himself.' 
On March  12 the Court of Common Pleas issued a decree regu- 
lating the conditions under which the election should be held, pro- 
viding for the separate count of  votes of  shares transferred three 
R. R.  Gaz.  13:  25, 1881. 
R. R. Giu. 13r43,  1881. 
'  Chron. 32:  206, 1881. 
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lnonth~  before  the election,  and for the  ultimate reference of  all 
disputed points to the Court.  By this time Mr. Gowen had become 
alarmed  at the  apparent  strength of  the  McCalmonts,  and had 
come to reaIize that a possible disenfranchisement of  a part of  his 
own holdings on the ground of  too recent transference might lessen 
his chances  of  retaining  control.  He recalled, however, that  the 
annual meeting had been postponed from January  10 to March 7, 
and finally to March 14.  This, it occurred to him, might transform 
it from a regular to a special meeting, and might, according to the 
terms of  the company's charter, make necessary the presence and 
vote of  a majority of  all the shares outstanding, instead of a simple 
majority of  all  the shares on hand.  If  this should be true a  dis- 
enfranchisement of  his holdings would  be  of  less importance;  for 
whether disenfranchised or not, these would form part of  the total 
shares outstanding,  of  which  an absolute  majority  would  be  re- 
quired. 
On March  12,  two days before the appointed date, Mr.  Gowen 
issued a letter to the shareholders.  "I hold,"  said he, "up to the 
present  time,  the  proxies  of  1921  shareholders of  the  company, 
owning 359,500 shares of  the capital stock, Wig  very considerably 
more  than  a  majority of  all  the shares. . . .  Of  the shares  for 
which I hold proxies, so large a proportion, however, may possibly 
be  disenfranchised by  failure to register, that if  the legal meeting 
of  the  stockholders is held  on  Monday next, and it  should sub- 
sequently be determined by the Court that three months'  prior reg- 
istry is essential to confer the  right  of  voting, it may be  possible 
that the wishes of the great majority of  bm  fide shareholders may 
be overruled by a minority. . . .  I have determined to abstain from 
attending the  meeting,  and I earnestly request  all  shareholders 
who  support the present management  to absent themselves from 
the meeting on Monday, and thus to give legal effect to their wishes 
by  making it impossible for the minority to secure the attendance 
of  a quorum. . . ." 
Mr.  Gowen's  friends,  English and American, followed his sug- 
gestion; and at the meeting on Monday but 21  1,095 out of  687,663 
registered  shares  appeared  to  vote.  The immediate  result  was 
the  almost  unanimous election of  Mr. Bond, the candidate of  the 
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McCalmonts, which was  followed  by  litigation on the part of  &. 
Gowen, disputing the legality of  the election.  By  the terms of  the 
decree under  which the  election had been  held, the matter  came 
first before the Court of  Common Pleas, which, on April 9, decided 
that the meeting had been a legal one, and that the officers  then Voted 
for by the McCalmonts had been duly elected.  With the above court 
ranged against him, Mr. Gowen took appeal to the Supreme Court 
of  the  state,  and meanwhile  declined  to  surrender  his  position, 
On April  11  the new  board  proceeded to the Reading offices in 
Philadelphia, made formal demand for admittance, and were  re-. 
fused.  On April  22 President  Bond  issued  formal notice of  his 
election.  An injunction was  asked against Mr.  Gowen, but  was 
held  back  until  the  Supreme  Court  should  have  taken  action. 
Meanwhile the old board of managers announced that if a decree 
supporting the decision of  the Court of  Common Pleas should be 
rendered they would make no further opposition ;  and the transfer 
agents of the company in Philadelphia and New York refused to 
transfer any stock until the dispute should have been settled.  On 
April I~'  an order of  the United States Court interfered with Mr. 
Gowen's  exclusive  possession,  and  compelled him  to  furnish  to 
Messrs.  Frank S. Bond, etc.,  suitable accommodations  in the offices 
of  the Philadelphia & Readiig Railroad Company, with free access 
to all books and papers.  In  May the Supreme Court rendered its 
decision, holding the meeting of  March 14 to have been  a regular 
meeting, and  a  majority of  all the stock outstanding not to have 
been required for a quorum.  Gowen asked for a rehearing, which 
was denied, and in June, nearly four months after the election, he 
grudgingly acknowledged Mr. Bond and his associates as the legally 
elected president and board of  managers. 
During  all  this time the deferred income bond  scheme had not 
remained untouched.  In April, 1881,  on application of  the McCal- 
monts, the United States Circuit Court at Philadelphia had granted 
a preliminary injunction against it.  "Whatever power the defendant 
has in the premises can only be  found in the general authority to 
borrow money,"  said Judge McKennan, and went on to state that the 
issue did not constitute a loan, because a loan implied reimburse- 
ment, and the income bonds were redeemable at no special time.' 
'  Chn.  32:  qqg, 1881. 
Mr.  Gowen  promptly proposed  to  make  them  redeemable,  and 
insisted that this made them still more desirable.  A week later the 
$~~O,OOO,OOO  general mortgage was also enjoined.' 
Once out of  the presidency Mr. Gowen endeavored to induce the 
McCalmonts to accept his plan.  If  they would  adopt the deferred 
income  bond  scheme, he  said  in  an address to  shareholders, he 
would  resign the receivership of  the road at once, give bonds never 
to stand for the presidency again, and further cooperate with them 
in  selecting a new board of  directors. As an alternative he offered to 
buy the McCalmont shares at $40 each, and threatened to beat that 
party at the next election if  it ref~sed.~  In September he assured 
the stockholders that he could without difficulty put the road upon 
its feet.  "If  Bond and his colleagues will  resign and reinstate the 
old  management,"  he  cabled from London,  "and  advise  me  by 
cable  of  the  change, I can,  before  sailing on  Saturday,  procure 
sufficient advances against  the'  proceeds  of  preferred  [deferred?] 
income bonds and new 5 per cent consols to pay the floating debt, 
receivers' certificates, and all arrears of  interest."  Finally, appealing 
to Mr. Bond direct, Gowen made formal application that the new 
board  should  adopt his  plan after  changing the form of  the pro- 
posed obligations by making them payable in 100 or 200  years.'  Bond 
refused.  He  pointed  out  that  the  deferred  income  bondholders 
would be in constant conflict with the management in their endeavor 
to secure dividends on their holdings, and would attempt to prevent 
proper and necessary expenditures upon the property from current 
net  revenues.  He  declared that  it was  questionable whether the 
company had authority to sell its unsecured obligations below par, 
and that in any case the process  would be enormously  expensive ;  and, 
further, that the language of  the obligation did not limit the pay- 
ment  of  interest to the source of  net revenue only, but  might  be 
construed to compel the declaration of  6 per  cent on  the income 
bonds whenever 6 per cent should be paid on the common stock.' 
Failing in his attempts to win over his opponents, Gowen turned his 
energies toward securing their defeat. 
Meanwhile President Bond brought forward a plan of  his own. 
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He had  grasped  three  points  of  weakness  in  Gowen's  scheme, 
namely, - 
(I) The issue of a mass of worthless obligations in the deferred 
income bonds ; 
(2)  The high level of  fixed charges which a $15o,ooo,ooo 5 per cent 
mortgage entailed ; 
(3) The lack of  any security which had a  right  to interest only 
when earned, and which might be given to the bondholders in return 
for sacrifices which they would otherwise refuse to make. 
He proposed, therefore, to create a general consolidated mortgage 
to cover all the property of  the Reading Railroad and Coal  & Iron 
Companies, together with the interest of  both companies in all other 
corporations and property, whether owned or controlled by lease or 
otherwise.  This mortgage was to be junior to the consolidated and 
to the improvement mortgages only, but was to contain a provision 
by which, as bonds under these senior mortgages should be retired, 
additional bonds might be issued under the new mortgage, which 
was eventually to become a hst  lien upon all the properties of  both 
companies.'  The total was to be $15o,ooo,ooo,  to be divided into 
two series: of  which series A,  for $go,ooo,ooo,  was to run for fifty 
years, and was to have a prior lien over series B upon the revenues 
for interest at the rate of  43 per cent, with a right to enforce foreclos- 
ure in case of  a twelve months' default ;  and series B was to run sixty 
years, and was to carry interest at 3 per cent, with a right to enforce 
foreclosure in case of  a three years' default.  In prosperous years se- 
ries B might receive more than 3 per cent :  thus the mortgage provided 
that from current net revenue applicable to dividends it should get 
13 per cent additional interest before any dividend should be paid 
on the stock of the company; after that 3 per cent might be paid on 
the capital stock, and then 13 per  cent  additional might  be  paid 
on series B ;  it being understood that the interest in excess of  3 per 
cent should not be cumulative, but was to be paid only from current 
net  revenues of  the company otherwise applicable to dividends. 
'These two issues of  unequal  worth were  to be  used  for different 
purposes.  Series A was to be  in part reserved to retire the senior 
obligations, and in part to be  sold to pay off  the general mortgage 
bonds, the general mortgage scrip, the income bonds, the floating 
Annual  Report, 1881,  pp. 50 ff.;  llee also Chron. 33  :  177,  1881. 
debt of  the Railroad and Coal  & Iron Companies secured by  col- 
lateral, the receivers' obligations, and the mortgages on real estate 
that could be paid off.  Series B was to be exchanged for the junior 
obligations, such as the debenture or convertible loans, or was to be 
held in  reserve for subsequent acquisition of  the guaranteed  stock 
or obligations of  affiliated corporations of  the Railroad and Coal  & 
Iron Companies. 
What this meant for the immediate future was that all prior liens 
were to remain untouched, while everything from the general mort- 
gage down was to be funded into the new obligations.  In some ways 
this resembled the earlier scheme of  Mr. Gowen, since in each case 
there was  to be a  $15o,ooo,ooo general mortgage in  two parts, of 
which one part was to have priority over the other, and in each case 
this grand mortgage was to be used ultimately to retire all previously 
existing indebtedness.  An  innovation was now made, however, in 
the  difference  introduced  between  the  two  series.  In  Gowen's 
scheme the amount of  each series was to be the same, and each was 
to fare alike, except for the priority of  series A; in that of  President 
Bond, series A was to be half  again as large as series B, and was 
to bear a hi&er  rate of  compulsory interest; although, a point of 
extreme importance, the  return upon series B was to run from a 
minimum of  3 per cent to a maximum of  6 per cent whenever the 
road  should earn it.  Thus President  Bond  gained two things: he 
reduced  the rate of  interest which his new  bonds could  claim in 
any year from 5 per cent (as under Gowen's scheme) to an average 
of  something under  4  per  cent,  which  would  yet,  in  prosperous 
times, net  them as much as the old bonds surrendered; and as a 
still further concession, he gave to the 3 per cent bonds a term of 
sixty instead of  fifty years,  raising their  value to that extent.  As 
the varioi~s  existing issues of  bonds had different market values, he 
thought it  proper to equalize these values in the exchange by  the 
grant of  a bonus in stock, for which the capital stock of the company 
was to be increased one-third.  Here were two of  Gowen's problems 
in  a fair way of  solution: the reduction of  fixed charges was accom- 
plished,  while some incentive was given to the junior bondholders 
to assent.  Scarcely less from the point of  view of  sound finance was 
the gain from the abandonment of  the anomalous deferred income 
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ities.  Instead, the floating debt, under President Bond's  plan, was 
to be cared for by the sale of series A bonds, not at one-third their 
face value, but as  near par as possible; by the best of  the company's 
new securities, in other words, and not by the worst.  And, finally, 
the acquisition of  the securities of  subsidiary roads was provided 
for rather  ingeniously  by  the conversion  into  series B bonds of 
$10,527,900  convertible 7 per cent bonds,  against which had per- 
force been reserved an equal amount of  stock.  Conversion released 
the stock, which became a free asset available for any uses to which 
the company saw fit to apply it. 
Yet while the advance which the plan of  President Bond marks 
over that of  President Gowen may be recognized, its defects must also 
be observed.  It was, in the first place, in common with all other 
schemes suggested,  too  mild,  too  little  drastic  in  its operations. 
The condition of  the Reading companies was desperate in the ex- 
treme.  By President Bond's own figures the previous five years had 
shown a deficit of  $11,479,217,  or an average loss per  annum of 
$2,295,853.  The net  earnings for  1881  by  the same computation 
had been $8,418,009,  and the fixed charges $11,265,666.'  What was 
needed was a radical scaling down of  indebtedness, to take effect 
not in the far distant future but at once.  President Gowen, face to 
face  with  a  similar  situation,  had  evolved  a  reduction  in  fixed 
charges from about $II,OOO,OOO  to about $7,000,000,  but had ex- 
plained that, owing to the impossibility of  retiring all of  the prior 
liens at once, the actual figures would be approximately $7,957,000. 
President  Bond,  less  optimistic,  or  more  honest,  stated  that  the 
ultimate  charge under  his  plan  would  be  about  $6,000,000;  but 
that  the  immediate reduction would be to about $8,339,000 only, 
scarcely more than $IOO,OOO  below the net earnings of  the current 
year.  Both estimates would  probably have been  under the mark; 
but  the  relief  which  President  Bond  proposed  was  utterly  in- 
adequate even on his own showing.  A margin of  surplus earnings 
which could be wiped out in a single month was no answer to the 
demand for a restoration of the Reading companies to solvency. In 
regard  to the floating debt, too, Bond's plan  left something to  be 
desired, in that it provided for no assessment, but cared for the float- 
ing obligations by the sale of  bonds.  The danger in relying upon 
'  Ry.  Age, 6:  486,  1881. 
&e sale of securities to supply the cash requirements of  a bankrupt 
road has been mentioned in connection with Mr. Gowen's scheme, 
as  indeed  at other  times  before.  At  best it is advisable only in 
prosperous times,  and when  the bonds offered are of  high grade; 
and though the series A bonds might perhaps have been considered 
high  grade, the  prosperity of  1880 was not  repeated in 1881, and 
a year of bankruptcy and litigation had not improved the Reading's 
credit.  That the plan failed, however, was due neither to its inade- 
quacy nor to its method of  dealing with the floating debt ;  but rather 
to the resolute and uncompromising opposition of  Mr. .Gowen and 
his friends, and to the determination of  the junior securityholders to 
stand out for better terms.  This twofold resistance caused a syn- 
dicate of  bankers, which  had  been  relied  upon to place  the  new 
loan, ultimately to reject it, and the plan fell through.' 
To  return now to Mr. Gowen.  This gentleman had been strength- 
ening his following in every possible way, and had secured one ally 
of  particular importance in the person of  Mr. Vanderbilt, who in 
October, 1881,  was reported to be  buying largely of  the company's 
stock.  Early in November  Mr.  Gowen  and President Bond  both 
issued addresses to the shareholders.  The former maintained that 
although the present management had been in power for over four 
months it had done nothing to extricate the company from its diffi- 
culties, and promised that if elected he would "retain the office long 
enough to place the company in a good financial condition, by com- 
pleting the issue of  deferred income bonds and by issuing and sell- 
ing the 5 per cent consolidated mortgage bonds, the result of  which 
will be the resumption of  dividends upon the company's shares." 
The business prospects of  the company were never better, he con- 
tinued, and the wisdom of  the purchase of  the great anthracite coal 
estate was being demonstrated.  Bond, on the other hand, alluded 
to  the failure of  Mr.  Gowen's  many promises, to the wasteful ex- 
penditure of  money, to the coal speculations in which the road had 
been  engaged, to the payment of  unearned dividends, and to other 
Points  of  Gowen's  policy,  actual or alleged;  and his statements 
Were  repeated by the McCalmonts in spite of  Mr. Gowen's vehement 
denials.' 
'  Chron. 33:  256, 1881.  '  Ry.  Age,  6:  628,1881. 
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The election  was  held  from  January  9 to  January  14,  188~. 
There were cast 493,601 votes, of  which Gowen received 270,984 and 
Bond 222,617; a result mainly due to the 72,000 Vanderbilt shares 
voted for Mr.  Gowen.  The same meeting approved by  resolution 
Gowen's financial plans, and called on the incoming board of  man- 
agers to carry them into effect.  To clear the way  a test suit was 
brought in the Supreme Court of  the state of  Pennsylvania, and a 
close decision obtained favoring the issue.'  Counsel for the McCal- 
mont  Bros.  petitioned in the Circuit Court for leave to withdraw 
their complaint, stating that the McCalmonts had disposed of  al- 
most all their holdings, and the Circuit Court vacated the injunction 
which it had previously granted.2 
Gowen's  plan was now triumphantly brought forward, with the 
few  alterations  which  time  had  suggested.  There  was  to be  as 
before a deferred income bond  issue of $34,3m,ooo, which was to 
retire the floating debt; the general mortgage was to be increased in 
amount  from  $15o,ooo,m  to  $160,000,om,  but  was  still to  be 
divided into two series, equal in amount, and differing in privileges 
only on the point of  priority of  lien ;  of  which series A was ultimately 
to exchange for the senior, series B for the junior  ob1;gation.s of 
the company.  $13,5w,ooo of the hst  series and $ro,ooo,qoo of  the 
second series were to be put out at once, and $4,ooo,ooo convertible 
adjustment scrip were to be issued to settle back coupons.  Time had 
apparently made more modest Mr. Gowen's estimate of  the saving 
to be secured ;  for instead of  not more than $7,om,ooo as before, he 
now hoped for fixed charges of  not more than $8,cm,ooo; but with 
undaunted  optimism he  made  up for. this  admission  by  glowing 
pictures  of  what  the company  in  the  future  was  going to  earn. 
"Net earnings last year " (1881)) said he, "were over $ro,ooo,ooo - 
in 1882 they may be expected to reach $11,ooo,ooo,  and they will 
before long be  over $~a,m,ooo.  With net earnings of  $12,000,000, 
and fixed charges of  $8,000,000, there will remain a dividend fund 
of $4,000,000, equal to 6 per cent on the share capital, and 6 per cent 
upon the par, or 20  per cent upon  the issue price, of  the deferred 
income bonds.  "In order to get the property out of  the hands of  the 
receivers an earnest effort was made to sell the $13,500,000 series A 
1 Chron.  34:  265,1882;  R.  R.  Gaz.  26: 156, 1882. 
1 Chron.  34:  409,  1882. 
bonds of  which mention has been made, but at the minimum price 
of 518 subscriptions for but $723,500 were received, and the company 
was  obliged to have recourse to the  $5,000,000  unissued  general 
mortgage 7 per cent bonds, which it fortunately had at its disposal. 
Even before this the management had been forced to abandon any 
immediate attempt to retire the old general mortgage bonds,'  and 
had been compelled to answer inquiries as to the reasons for a de- 
cline in  the price of  the deferred income bonds.  On February 28 
the receivers of the Railroad and Coal & Iron Companies formally 
surrendered the  control  of  the  property  to  the  officers  of  those 
corporations. 
One of  the first acts of the reconstructed company was the lease 
for 999  years of the Central Railroad  of  New  Jersey.  This road 
in many ways formed a natural complement to the Reading system. 
Like it, it was a coal road, carrying something less than half as great 
a tonnage as the Reading itself, and owning extensive coal lands in 
the Wyoming  region ;  while  in  location it supplied the necessary 
connection between the Reading lines and New York.  At a later 
date Mr. Joseph S. Harris testified that all the business of  the Read- 
ing coming from the South or Southwest went to New York over the 
Central ;  while, on the other hand, business from the Northwest was 
carried by the Jersey Central from Scranton, where its lines began, 
to Bethlehem, and was there handed to the Reading for transporta- 
tion to Philadel~hia.~  The  advantages of  the Central to the Reading 
were thus enumerated by  General Traffic Manager  Bell  in 1885: 
"The joint  traffic with  the Central Railroad,  outside of  coal, and 
outside of  passengers,  adds $1,5oo,ooo  to the revenue of  the old 
Reading system.  By means of the Lehigh  & Susquehanna division 
of  the  Central Road we  extend from Phillipsburg to  Scranton or 
Green Ridge through the entire Lehigh Valley; that system feeds 
our North Pennsylvania line ;  it is our connection for the Catawissa 
system by way of  Tamanend and Tamaqua ;  it is the connecting link 
h the cross line or Allentown system; it creates the shortest line from 
hterior  Pennsylvania, and  from Northwest  Pennsylvania to New 
York waters.  Through the operations of  the lease we reach the larg- 
est slate territory in Pennsylvania, and the largest iron producing 
furnaces anywhere in  this  country,  with  the  exception of  Pitts- 
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burg." ' In  1883  the  Central was  bankrupt with  no  immediate 
prospect  of  recovering from its difficulties,  and had therefore an 
incentive to accept any arrangement by which interest on its obliga- 
tions should be paid ;  while Mr. Gowen, with misplaced cobfidence 
in his scheme of  reorganization, was ready to put fresh burdens on 
his road in the hope of  future gain. 
Rumors of a lease were abroad in 1882, and after the termination 
of  the Reading receivership the operation was pushed to a speedy 
conclusion.  The Reading undertook to assume all the obligations 
of  the Central, and to pay 6 per cent on its capital stock then out- 
standing, as well as $18,000  annually for maintaining the corporate 
organization of  the lessor.  In case anyqof the Central bonds should 
be retired, or rentals or interest reduced, the rental to be paid by the 
Reading was likewise to be reduced.  The roadbed and rolling stock 
of  the Central was to be maintained undiminished, but if the Read- 
ing should make any additions or improvements, or if from its own 
funds it should pay off  any of  the Central's obligations, it was to re- 
ceive equivalent bonds with interest not exceeding 6 per cent from 
the Central Company.  The lease was terminable on 60 days' notice 
in case the lessee should fail at any time to carry out its  provision^.^ 
This involved something more than a nominal obligation.  The net 
earnings of  the Jersey  Central in 1882 had been $5,091,072,  while 
the  sum due for rentals, interest, 6 per  cent  dividends, etc., had 
mounted up to $5,898,087, not including payments on car trusts or 
certain contingent obligations.  Broadly speaking, the Reading pro- 
posed to guarantee 6 per cent on the stock of  a road which had failed 
because unable to meet its fixed charges;  and  however  great the 
ultimate advantages, it is apparent that the prospect of  a drain upon 
the Reading Company was real.  In order to get the road out of 
receivers' hands, the Reading had further to take care of a floating 
debt of  $2,062,000,  and  to compromise with  certain  creditors by 
settling back interest on their bonds.  This was done, and on May 29, 
1883,  possession  formally  passed  over.  The same day was  con- 
cluded another arrangement, whereby the Central of  New  Jersey 
leased  the  coal  and railroad  companies comprised in the Lehigh 
Coal  & Navigation Company for one-third of  their gross receipts, 
and the Philadelphia & Reading  Railroad became liable for the 
Ry. Age, 10: 218,  1885.  '  Annual Report,  1883, pp.  1x1  ff. 
faithful execution of  the contract.  The Reading agreed  that the 
 high coal lands should be developed pari  Fssu with its own, so 
&at the product of the two estates should be constantly as 28 to 72 
until  the  Lehigh  production  should  reach  3,000,000  tons.  The 
rental of  the road was not in any year to be  less than $1,414,400, 
nor more than a sum rising from $1,728,700 before 1887 to $1,885,800 
from 1887  to 1892, and $2,043,000  after 1892, plus certain minor 
payments; and there was provision for arbitration of  any disputes 
which might arise.' 
The year 1883 now seemed to find the Readiig imbued with new 
life.  Earnings increased, both gross and net, fixed charges as re- 
ported rose less rapidly, and the net profits for the year, or balance 
on  all operations, showed a threefold increase.  "The company," 
said Mr.  Gowen, "has  now surmounted the difficulties of  the last 
four eventful years."  a The annual meeting in January was a genuine 
love-feast, marked by the presentation of  resolutions highly flattering 
to Mr.  Gowen.  "We  trust,"  said one, "we  thankfully appreciate 
your  herculean  efforts in  our behalf, in the face of  unparalleled 
difficulties  and obstacles, in rescuing our property from bankruptcy 
against the  malignant and determined efforts of  its enemies and 
conspirators to foreclose and wreck it."  "As citizens of  this great 
commonwealth," said  another, "we  beg to add our gratitude and 
admiration  for  your  untiring,  brave,  honest,  and  able  devotion, 
which has preserved the Philadelphia  & Reading Company intact, 
and has fairly started it on a broader career of  usefulness."  Not 
less extraordinary was the further action of  this harmonious meeting. 
In  the first  place, it authorized the  creation of  a  collateral trust 
loan of  $12,000,000 for the purpose of paying the floating debt, the 
balance due upon  the purchase of Central Railroad  Company of 
New  Jersey  stock, and the retirement of  the outstanding income 
mortgage bonds. What, may be inquired, had become of the deferred 
income bonds of which  Mr.  Gowen had been  so proud, and the 
$5,000,000  additional  first  series  consols which  with  them  were 
to  cover  the  floating debt, if  a new collateral  loan was  needed 
for the purpose for which they had been considered ample ?  As for 
the purchase of  Jersey  Central shares, an account would  require 
Annual Report, 1883, pp. 139 ff.  ' h.  37: 563, 1883. 
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a chapter in itself.  The intent had been  to secure more complete 
control of  this subsidiary road.  The purchase had been  made on 
margin in  May.  By  January,  1884,  more funds were  necessary 
to cany the stock; and as the business depression grew acute, the 
Reading was obliged to seek a time loan from Mr. Vanderbilt, and 
to pledge the purchased securities as collateral therefor.  When the 
loan matured Reading was no better off  than it had been before, and 
Vanderbilt, who seldom mixed philanthropy with business, sold the 
stock.  The original purchase had been at 78; the prices obtained 
when  the stock was thrown on the market  ranged from 57  to 50, 
and the Reading lost the difference, besides those advantages which 
it had expected to gain. 
In the second place, the meeting proposed a dividend of  21  per 
cent on the preferred stock, representing arrears due, and of  3 per 
cent on the common ;  both cash, and to be paid in case the collateral 
loan should succeed.'  In order to give shareholders time to consider, 
an adjournment was taken for two weeks, after which the dividend 
on the preferred stock was approved, though that on the common 
was not.  It seems almost  superfluous to  insist upon  the folly of 
this dividend.  The Reading had  not, in reality, "surmounted  the 
difficulties of  the last  four eventful years."  Scarcely any of  the 
benefits promised by Mr. Gowen's plan of  reorganization had been 
secured; fixed charges had not been  reduced, because it had been 
found impossible to get creditors to take new securities in exchange 
for the old, and equally impossible to sell any considerable amount 
of  the new securities for cash.  While old charges had remained un- 
abated, new charges had been added through the lease of  the Jersey 
Central, new car trusts, and the like, and the very gain in earnings 
which might have been construed as favorable was due to increased 
mileage, and was not proportional to the growth of  the system?  A 
fitting sequel to Mr. Gowen's words and acts was the scrip payment 
for  labor  and  supplies which  took  place  in  May, 1884, and  the 
accompanying fall  in  the prices of  the  company's  securities. On 
June  2 the company again passed into receivers' hands.  The same 
judges were applied to as in 1880, and the same receivers were ap- 
Annual Report, 1883.  The proposition was made by Mr. Gowen. 
'  From  November 30,  1883, to  January  a,  1884,  reliable  figures subsequently 
showed a deficit of  $2,000,000. 
except that Mr. Gowen, who had given up the presidency of 
the company, was replaced by Mr. George de Keim, his successor.' 
The various creditors had now to do what should have been done 
before, snd,  by  lightening  the  charges upon  the road,  to  put  it 
in a position where its solvency could be maintained.  The chances 
for obtaking radical action from the bondholders were somewhat 
brighter, since even the most obstinate were being forced to realize 
that no halfway measures would  avail; and a reasonable solution 
was  even thus early hinted  at in the suggestion that some of  the 
bonds under which the road was staggering should be replaced by 
stock.  Nevertheless,  we  shall  find  in  this  reorganization  a  slow 
working out of  the requirements for a plan, and a slow process of  at 
least partial reconcilement to the inevitable. 
The receivers' report was issued in October, but contained little 
not  known  or  suspected  before.  From  November  30,  1883,  to 
June 2, 1884, there had beer a net loss in operation for the Railroad 
Company of  $2,322,282,  and  for  the  Coal  & Iron  Company of 
$1,049,702,  showing conclusively the condition of  the companies. 
The total bonded indebtedness was $94,613,042 ;  a total to be com- 
pared with the $78,101,894 of  four years previous.  The total floating 
debt was  $16,549,~68  as compared with $10,254,766 at the begin- 
ning  of  the  previous receivership.  Including  the  Central  of  New 
Jersey, the total fixed  charges for the  Railroad  and  Coal  & Iron 
Companies were $18,241,051 ;  a sum which certain off sets, however, 
reduced to $16,584,732.~ 
The first suggestion for a reorganization came from a committee 
primarily representing the  general mortgage bondholders, though 
including other interests as well.  The chairman was Mr. Townsend 
Whelen, and  the committee may  be taken to represent the views 
of the management.  "The present fixed charges of  the company," 
said  Mr.  Whelen, "are  in  round  numbers  $16,650,000, while the 
earnings of  the  past  fiscal  year  are, in  round  numbers  and after 
Proper deductions, $12,9oo,ooo.  The objects sought to be accom- 
plished by  the committee are: 
<L (I) To reduce fixed charges to the limit of  last year's earnings; 
(6 (2)  To preserve the  proper order of  priorities of  each class of 
securities, so that no income applicable to any senior security that 
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remains unpaid  can by  any possibility be diverted to paying the 
interest on a junior security; 
"  (3) To provide a method of  paying the floating debt." 
The plan was, roughly, to leave the prior liens untouched, to fund 
one-half the coupons upon the general mortgage for three years, and 
to convert all of  the other obligations into income bonds.  Preferred 
stock was to be changed from cumulative to non-cumulative ;  rents 
of leased  lines, including the  Central of  New  Jersey,  were  to be 
reduced to the amounts which the properties had earned ;  the canal 
leases were to be reduced ;  the interest on some of  the divisional coal 
land mortgages was to be reduced, and on some was to be paid in 
full.  In regard to the floating debt the committee decided to post- 
pone any attempt to raise money for its extinction.  If  the bond- 
holders should accept the scaling down of  their indebtedness, the 
company might have no difficulty in procuring cash by a collateral 
loan ;  if  this should prove impossible, the duty of  providing funds 
would devolve upon the junior securities.'  The committee found it 
impossible to prepare within the short time at their disposal a com- 
plete plan of  reorganization with exact figures of  present and pro- 
posed fixed charges; and it is therefore impossible to ascertain how 
great was the saving which they expected to secure. 
The plan  marks sufficiently  well  the  advance which had  been 
made since the reorganization of  1880-3.  The best that could then 
be imagined had been the creation of  a grand general mortgage for 
which the old bondholders might, but mostly did not, exchange their 
holdings; while now the very first suggestion endeavored to retain 
for all  bondholders a  chance for the same return as before, and 
found the salvation of  the company in the transformance of  certain 
bonds from mortgage to debenture obligations.  The general criti- 
cisms which may  be made are three: first, that  it was  unwise to 
defer all provision for the floating debt ;  second, that the new income 
bonds might better have been replaced by stock ;  and third, that the 
probable reduction in fixed charges would  have  been  insufficient. 
So  far as the committee suggested any action in relation to the float- 
ing debt, it favored a funding of  it.  This funding might have been 
either into mortgage or into income bonds: if  the former, the fixed 
charges of  the company would have been increased,  or else the other 
'  Annual Report, 1884,  pp. 21-8. 
mortgage bondholders would have been compelled to accept a lower 
rate of  interest ;  if  the latter, the volume of  securities of  slight value 
would have been increased, or the junior securities would have had 
to take less for their holdings. The action take11 would have gone far 
to determine what classes of  securities would assent, while in the 
absence of  dehite declaration it was on the whole likely that all 
classes would hold off.  As for the income bonds, it is in general true 
that they are an unsatisfactory sort of  security, and likely to hinder 
the legitimate increase of  capital.  Most important was the question 
of fixed charges. It will be remembered that of  the first and second 
series 5s  of  the previous reorganization only $23,500,000 had been 
intended for immediate sale, and that of  these but a portion had been 
disposed of; and yet these consols were the only securities the nature 
of  which was really changed by the Whelen plan.  Interest had been 
optional before on the income bonds, the convertible bonds, the con- 
vertible adjustment  scrip, debenture and deferred income bonds; 
interest was not  made optional on  the  general mortgage or prior 
liens.  The result would not have been, in spite of  the reduction in 
rents and the scaling of  the divisional coal mortgages, any sufficient 
lessening of  the fixed requirements.  This fact was, moreover, per- 
ceived.  The board of  managers, to whom the scheme was reported, 
concluded a favorable opinion with the declaration, "to conclude, 
we  are satisfied that the large economies already in operation, with 
those which are still being introduced, should be regarded as a mar- 
gin to meet adverse contingencies. . . .  That the revenue we reckon 
on, though reasonably certain under such reorganization, will surely 
not be realized in case the property should be tom asunder by fore- 
closure sale." ' In other words they relied,  much as Mr.  Gowen 
had done two years before, on a subsequent increase in earnings 
to ensure the solvency of  the company.  A final objection made at 
the time was that the plan asked too little of  the junior  securities. 
The Whelen  plan  was reported to the general managers'  com- 
mittee, and was approved by them.  Some slight modification~  were 
made, and a large number  of signatures was secured.  Opposition 
was not slow to spring up.  In February a meeting of  general mort- 
gage bondholders elected a committee, known as the Bart01 Com- 
mittee, to prepare a plan more suited to their interests. This body 
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conferred with the Whelen Committee, and two members from each 
were selected to  construct a new reorganization  plan.'  In March 
it reported  to its constituents that  it  had  made all the concessions 
which were possible without sacrificing the interests of the general 
mortgage bondholders,  and that in  spite of  this, the negotiations 
had not proved su~cessful.~ 
In April, ten months after the beginning of the receivership, the 
Reading managers evolved a plan for dealing with the floating debt. 
Holders were to agree to accept renewals at intervals of three months 
for three years, with interest at the rate of  6 per cent, paid at the 
time of  each renewal, and to hold the collateral pledged as security 
until the whole of  the debt should have been discharged.  In case the 
Philadelphia  & Reading should fail at any time punctually to' pay' 
the interest on any of  the obligations agreed to be renewed; or should 
fail to cause the same to be renewed, or in case nine-tenths of  the 
floating-debt holders should not assent  to the  plan, or in  case an 
adverse judicial sale should bemade, the obligation to accept further 
renewals  should  immediately cease.!'  The scheme deservedly fell 
through.  Creditors were asked to tie up their assets for three years, 
with no concession in return except the payment of  interest quarterly 
in  advance; while  the unofficial suggestion that  the Reading pay 
$ per cent commission on each renewal was felt to be too expensive 
for the company to entertain. 
The following  month the Whelen and Bartol committees came 
out with  a  new  edition  of  the Whelen  plan, which  introduced an 
assessment on the junior bonds and stock, but preserved the same 
method of  dealing with the old securities as before.'  Assent to the 
plan  was to  be  on  the condition that sufficient  money  should be 
raised to pay off  the floating debt.  Interest on such debt was not 
to have priority of  payment  over interest on the general mortgage 
for longer than three years; and during those three years the prefer- 
ence was to be limited to that part of  the floating debt secured by 
collateral yielding income to cover interest, or important for other 
reasons  to  be  retained.  There  were  to  be  seven  reorganization 
trustees to receive the assents of  parties in interest, and to receive 
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'  Collateral bonds were to be  given for the assessment. 
and hold the securities and assessments thereon  pending reorgan- 
ization,  and  when  accomplished  to  return  such  securities duly 
stamped to their respective owners.'  The trustees were further to 
decide whether the assents to the plan in  question should be con- 
sidered adequate, and if  they should conclude on or before May I, 
1886,  by  a vote of  six of  their number, that the assents were not 
sufficient, they were to call into a council the managers of  the Phil- 
adelphia & Reading Railroad Company, the receivers of that com- 
pany,  and  the  committees of  the general mortgage  (Bartol)  and 
income mortgage bondholders; and this council, by  a vote of  four 
of  the five interests therein represented, was to formulate a plan of 
reorganization adapted to the circumstances, and involving no larger 
contribution in money to be paid than under the plan as then modi- 
fied; and under  such power  the trustees were  to  proceed  to fore- 
close under  such mortgage or mortgages as they might deem ad- 
visable?  The plan was obviously a compromise whereby the \.%elen 
Committee clung to the main limes of  its previous proposition, and 
the  Bartol  Committee  secured  modifications  which  benefited  the 
general inortgage at the expense of  the junior securities.  Criticisms 
which applied to the earlier plan largely apply to this also ;  but it is 
to be noticed that at last the idea of  funding the floating debt was 
abandoned for the sounder scheme of  paying it off  in cash.  The 
reorganization trustees were an innovation, but were destined to be 
a useful one.  On the whole the compromise was a step forward ;  and 
yet it was not more successful in obtaining assents than the scheme 
which had preceded it.  Although the directors approved it, as was 
to have been expected, the bulk of  the bondholders held off. 
Matters now went  on in  much the same old way.  The seven re- 
organization trustees, representing the principal interests concerned, 
held  meeting after meeting with  no  apparent result.  The courts 
became impatient ;  bondholders clamored for their interest ;  but after 
the failure of  the earlier plan the way out seemed harder and harder 
to find.  In September, 1885, Mr. E. Dunbar Lockwood addressed 
Chron.  40:  569, 1885.  The trustees were to be  appointed as follows:  One by 
foreign creditors,  two by  the  general  mortgage bondholders,  one  by  the  income 
mortgage bondholders, one by holdera d  securities junior  to  the income mortgage, 
and  by the shareholders. 
Ry. Age,  10:  314, 188s. RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  PHILADELPHIA  & READING  1°7 
an open letter to Mr. John B. Garrett, one of the trustees, in which 
the following points were made : 
(I) "The trustees should recognize promptly and unequivocally 
that the Reading Railroad is bankrupt, and has not sufficient avail. 
able assets to meet its obligations. 
(2)  "  Two dollars of  obligations cannot be paid with one dollar and 
a half  of  assets, and the sooner all persons interested . . .  recognize 
this fact, and agree to scale both principal and interest sufficient to 
meet the obligations of  the company and put it upon a strong financial 
basis, with  sufficient working  capital  to  enable  it  to  conduct  its 
future business economically, the better it will be for all concerned. 
(3) "  The trustees should look only at the facts as they exist . . . 
and while  endeavoring to rehabilitate the road, also bring it into 
harmonious relations with its adversaries. 
(4) "  The trustees should consider the problem . . . precisely as 
business men consider the matter of  the settlement of a bankrupt 
firm.  The question at once presents itself, is it best that the com- 
pany should continue in business, or should it be wound up? " ' 
In  his reply Mr. Garrett pointed out  the difficulties to  be over- 
come, and concluded by  saying that  in his judgment  no reorgan- 
ization .would be final that did not ensure the establishment of  credit, 
the entrusting of  the management to an interest having an actual 
equity in the property, and just expectation of pecuniary return from 
it, and harmony with competing lines, coupled with due regard for 
the rights of  the public? 
The reorganization trustees by  this time appeared discouraged, 
and the following month called a conference of creditors at which 
a resolution was passed looking toward  foreclosure.  In November 
a suit was actually begun, supplementary to a similar suit instituted 
a year before.  It was during the pendency of  these proceedings that 
the  plan  of reorganization devised  by  the reorganization  trustees 
themselves came out, and marked a third effort to rehabilitate the 
road.  The fist plan  proposed,  it  will  be  remembered, had  sug- 
gested  the  conversion  of  all  of  the  junior  securities into  income 
bonds, plus a funding of one-half the general mortgage coupons for 
three years; and the second had introduced an assessment on the 
junior  bonds  and  stock.  This thud  plan, while  preserving  the 
R. R. Gaz. r 7: 607, 1885.  '  Chmn.  41  :  307,  1885. 
assessment, and making it more severe, added a provision  for the 
conversion of  general mortgage liens into  3 per  cent  bonds, and 
of junior liens into preferred stock.  For the ultimate retirement of 
the  prior  liens a  new  fifty-year 5 per  cent  mortgage  was  to  be 
created ;  for both the prior and general mortgage liens the difference 
between the return from the old bonds and that from the new was 
to  be  adjusted  by  the use  of  5 per  cent  preferred stock, so that 
bondholders in prosperous times would not hd  their incomes dimin- 
ished.  Preferred stock was to be of  two kinds, of  which the first was 
to  go to satisfy the general mortgage bondholders and for assess- 
ments,  while  the second was to exchange at varying rates for the 
junior  securities above  the  second  series  5s.  Everything  below 
the second series 5s was to receive common stock instead.  Under the 
scheme  the  company's  obligations  would  have  been  reduced  to 
$60,731,000,  of  which $33,400,000 prior liens and $24,686,000 new 
3 per cents; while its stock would have been increased to the very 
considerable figure  of  $96,5~6,282. The total cash assessments, if 
all paid, would  have  amounted  to  $13,506,620;  and, joined  with 
the balance of  stock, were expected to be  sufficient to cover the 
floating debt.  The new fixed charges were to be $7,064,830.' 
Various points in the plan  deserve mention.  For the  first time 
since the failure of  1880 it was proposed to use two kinds of  secur- 
ities, of which interest on  one  should be  fixed, and interest on the 
other optional.  For the retirement of  senior bonds President Bond 
had suggested a bond on which half the interest should be fixed and 
the other half  variable, but his plan had been inferior in flexibility 
to the one now proposed.  The junior  securities received less favor- 
able treatment than before ;  but the general mortgage itself did not 
escape, and was required to accept 3 per cent plus preferred stock 
instead of a mere funding of  its coupons.  The increase in the amount 
of  stock was very great, and naturally so, in view of the new uses 
to which it was put.'  Assessments were made heavier, and for the 
&st  time the management frankly excluded from their calculations 
the Central of  New Jersey, foreshadowing the abandonment of  the 
lease. To repeat, the  first two plans described had developed the 
idea of  an assessment and the conversion of  the junior  bonds into 
'  Chron.  41 :  654, 1885. 
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income obligations.  To this the reorganization trustees added the 
use  of  preferred stock, and, more important still, the combination 
of  two  securities, respectively with  obligatory and optional liens, 
which were to be  given for the general mortgage bonds.  In prin- 
ciple the result was excellent, in practice the degree of reduction was 
somewhat too slight  from the point  of  view  of  the company, a]- 
though it  seemed more than  the creditors were  willing to  accept, 
The general mortgage bondholders in particular were loud in their 
protest.  "The truth of  the matter is this,"  said one of them, "while 
the plan of the trustees has much to commend it, and is based on 
an  excellent theory, it  fails to  cover  the whole  ground,  and falls 
terribly short of  meeting our reasonable demands."  Thus, although 
the Bart01 and Whelen committees accepted the plan, matters again 
stood still for a while, while the financial powers talked and wrote 
and threshed the question out. 
In February,  1886, the reorganization trustees received a letter 
signed by  J. Pierpont  Morgan and John  Lowber Welsh, which is 
important enough to be quoted in full. 
"A syndicate has  been  formed,"  said  these gentlemen,  "com- 
posed  of  leading bankers  and capitalists here  and in  Europe,  to- 
gether with corporations or their representatives controlling  large 
transportation  and coal  producing interests,  who  have  agreed to 
subscribe in the aggregate $~g,ooo,ooo  for the purpose of  aiding in 
the reorganization of  the Philadelphia  & Reading Railroad  Com- 
pany and its affiliated lines.  The syndicate has no commitment of 
any kind with any other railroads or corporations upon this subject 
beyond securing a management in harmony with the principle that 
capital invested  in  internal  improvements  should  be  so managed 
'as  to result  in  a fair return in  the way  of  interest  and dividends. 
Their object and purpose is to secure the reorganization on business 
principles for the Philadelphia &Reading bondholders, stockholders, 
and creditors without  prejudice to the relative  position  of  either, 
and in their interest only. 
"To do this effectually there must be suitable arrangements made 
with the Pennsylvania Railroad and other kindred coal interests for 
harmonious relations, in order that suitable prices may  be obtained 
for coal  produced and shipped.  These objects we  shall  endeavor 
to secure, and  we  now  enclose  you a copy of  a  correspondence 
with Mr. Roberts, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, on these 
which seems to us sufficient to warrant the syndicate in 
placing reliance upon  the assurance given by  that  company. 
"As the reorganization shall  proceed our effort and expectation 
will be to bring about satisfactory arrangements with all the anthra- 
cite coal roads, and also the trunk lines, which  shall secure to the 
philadelphia  & Reading Railroad Company, when reorganized, its 
just  share of  the business at remunerative rates. 
"The syndicate have believed  that your plan was,  in  the main, 
&table  for  the  purpose  of  reorganization,  and  that  your  board 
was composed of gentlemen who would command the confidence of 
all parties in interest. 
"They  therefore prefer to make an arrangement  with  you  and 
to aid you in working out a plan. 
"But  they also think that there should be certain  modifications 
as to your organization, and also as to your plan, as follows : 
"(I)  The syndicate would  wish two  persons,  to  be  named  by 
them, added to your board. 
"  (2)  Your plan should be made so flexible that it could be modified 
hereafter in such respects as may be  found necessary to success. 
"(3) There  should  be  an executive committee of  five  to  take 
charge of  the foreclosure proceedings, the purchase of  the property, 
the organization of  the new company, and generally of  whatever 
may properly appertain  to reconstruction  under  the  plan.  There 
should be  five voting trustees who should vote on the stock when 
deposited under the plan, and to whom the power of  voting on the 
stock in the reorganized company should be confided for five years 
after reorganization.  These two committees should be  composed 
of  parties satisfactory to the syndicate and the trustees, and shall 
fill their  own  vacancies.  But in  case the syndicate and trustees 
cannot  agree upon  the five, then, and in  that case, three shall be 
named  by the syndicate  and two by  the trustees, and each class 
shall fill any vacancy occurring in its own number. 
"(4)  The compensation to be allowed to the syndicate shall be 
5 per cent on the amount of  the syndicate capital. 
"  (5) The syndicate to be allowed interest at the rate of  6 per cent 
upon any amount they may advance the company in the course of 
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"(6)  Proper provision must be  made for securing to the syndi- 
cate the refunding of  the money they may advance on account of 
interest not exceeding 4 per cent per annum on the general mortgage 
bonds during reconstruction, and also for  the  substitution of  the 
syndicate in the place of  any creditor or stockholder who may 
don his holding and refuse to pay his assessment, it being the pur- 
pose of the syndicate to pay 4 per cent per annum interest on the 
general  mortgage  bonds  during reconstruction,  and  also  to  pay 
the assessments of  such parties as may abandon their holdings or 
right to take the securities to which they may be entitled under the 
plan." ' 
The correspondence with Mr. Roberts referred to contained the 
assurance that  the  Pennsylvania  Company would  not  hold  aloof 
from an  understanding with  the Reading either in respect to the 
coal  or transportation  business, and would, moreover, "cordially 
unite in the arbitration of all differences."  a  This could not, of  course, 
force distasteful terms upon the Reading bondholders, but it could 
and did supply sufficient capital to ensure the success of  any plan 
adopted, and it infused confidence and vigor into the  action of  the 
nearly discouraged reorganization trustees.  The executive  com- 
mittee which  they were to name was perhaps a useful  tool, but the 
suggestion of  a voting trust was a genuine contribution, and aided 
powerfully in securing necessary backing for future schemes. 
It is to be remarked that the syndicate appeared with no panacea, 
was without a plan of  its own, and at first merely adopted that of  the 
trustees, with a few modifications which it thought advisable; but 
that by  March,  1886, it had so worked over the proposals of  the 
reorganization trustees as to make in many respects a new  plan; 
which retained the assessments, likewise the combination of  fixed 
and optional charges and the use of  preferred stock, but reserved 
4 per cent bonds against prior liens, gave 4 per cent bonds with pre- 
ferred stock in exchange for the general mortgage instead of 3 per 
cents, and created four classes of  stock instead of  three.  Somewhat 
more in detail this plan was as follows: The Reading was to issue 
a new 4 per cent general mortgage for $~oo,ooo,ooo,  and four kinds 
of  stock: a  preferred, income, consolidated, and common.  Of  the 
general mortgage $9,792,-  were to be  for future use in the im- 
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pavement of  the railway; of  the remainder $38,422,000 were to be 
reserved against prior liens; $24,686,000  were to exchange for the 
general mortgage if  such should not be paid off  in cash; $I ~,OOO,OOO 
were to  take up shares or bonds of leased  lines, and  $~o,ooo,ooo 
were to exchange for or to redeem Coal & Iron Company divisional 
mortgages.  The total  amount issued was  to be  $90,208,000,  and 
no mortgage in  addition was to be placed on the Reading proper- 
ties for five years after the reorganization without the consent of a 
majority of  the preferred stockholders.  Of  the different classes of 
new stock the preferred was to be given dividends up to 5 per cent 
non-cumulative, and then the income and coqsolidated stock$' were 
to have up to  5 per cent non-cumulative.  Generally speaking, the 
preferred stock was to go  for assessments; the income stock for the 
income mortgage and convertible adjustment scrip ;  the consolidated 
stock for the first series 5s and one-quarter of  the principal of  the 
second series 5s; the common stock for the rest of  the second series 
gs, for the convertible debentures, deferred income bonds, and for 
old preferred and common stock.  New fixed charges were estimated 
at $6,971,687, which dividends on the preferred stock would raise 
to $8,198,636.  There was to be a voting trust for five years, consist- 
ing of  J. Lowber Welsh, J. P. Morgan, Henry Lewis,  George F. 
Baer, and Robert H. Sayre ;  and a syndicate was to advance neces- 
sary  expenditures and  disbursements pending reorganization, in- 
cluding unpaid  assessments.  The syndicate compensation was to 
be 6 per cent on its advances, plus a commission of  5 per cent upon 
its $I~,ooo,~  of  subscribed capital.  The property was to be sold 
at foreclosure sale, and a new company was to be organized.' 
A comparison of  this with the plan of  the reorganization trustees 
at first announced will show the changes made.  Nothing of  value 
which previous reorganizations had worked out was cast aside.  The 
fixed interest allowed the general mortgage bondholders was raised 
in the hope that they might support the plan, and more care was 
taken to follow the order of  priority in the advantages offered to the 
various classes of  junior  securityholders; an end to which the four 
classes of  stock were  admirably adapted.  The voting  trust  was 
altogether new, and was doubtless intended to ensure a policy in 
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accord with the syndicate's wishes for a series of years, and to pre. 
vent a renewal of  the vagaries of Mr.  Gowen's administration.  The 
provision for foreclosure was to be expected in view of  the extreme 
difficulty of  obtaining the assents of  so many conflicting interests; 
but with a net revenue of  $12,026,309 (both companies) and fixed 
charges of  $6,971,687, the task of  maintaining the solvency of  the 
companies in future did not seem an impossible one. 
In opposition to  the  plan  the Lockwood Committee urged  that 
the scheme was unjust to certain classes of bonds; that it was cum. 
bersome, expensive, conferred power on the trustees which should 
have been reserved for the direction of the new company, and that 
the reserved powers to change any part of  the plan, and the uncer- 
tainties connected with the settlements under it, involved risks which 
creditors should not accept.'  The objections were not weighty.  If 
the Lockwood  or  any  other  committee had  proved  itself  able to 
formulate and carry through a plan, or if  the syndicate arrangement 
had been proposed at the very beginning of  the receivership, bond- 
holders might fairly have criticised its expense.  In point of  fact nu- 
merous attempts to reconcile divergent interests had failed, and what 
with Messrs. Lockwood, Bartol, Whelen, Gowen, and their respective 
followings, the future offered no more promising result.  Meanwhile 
bondholders were going without their interest, and costs of  the re- 
ceivership were mounting up; so that a greater expense than that of 
which Mr. Lockwood complained was being incurred by delay.  As 
for the general mortgage bondholders, they were given a chance at 
their old interest whenever the road should earn it, and could fairly 
ask no  more; while that  it was inequitable to  ask  income bond- 
holders  to accept a  reduction to $50  in  their  annual  interest, or 
holders of  the first series 5s to wait for their interest until liens before 
theirs had  been  satisfied, are conclusions to which few will  agree. 
In April Messrs. Whelen and William H. Kemble, representing the 
Reading consolidated mortgage bondholders, announced that they 
had determined not to accept the syndicate plan.  Even before this 
Mr. Gowen announced that he was organizing a syndicate and would 
soon be able to pay off  overdue coupons on the general mortgage 
bonds, and to prevent any foreclosure under that m~rtgage.~  It is 
scarcely necessary to say that he had a plan of  his own.  He proposed 
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to issue $~oo,ooo,ooo  4 per cent 70-year consolidated mortgage bonds 
much as did the syndicate, part of  which should go to redeem the 
gneral mortgage and the floating debt; but second to this he sug- 
gested a cumulative 4 per cent first preferred income bond, to take 
the place of  the income and consolidated stock under the syndicate 
plan,  and to be  exchanged for the first series 5.9,  a portion of  the 
second series gs, and some of  the leased canal securities; while fin- 
ally he  planned a second  preferred cumulative 4 per cent  income 
bond, to  be  exchanged  for  those  securities down  to  the deferred 
income bo~ds,  which under the syndicate scheme were toreceive com- 
mon  stock.  The surplus of  income ollered by the old general mort- 
gage was to be made good by first preference bonds.  The existing 
preferred and  common  stocks were  to  remain  as they were, and 
the deferred income obligations were to remain untouched.  Finally, 
the NewJersey Central was to be retained in friendly alliance, either 
under a modified  lease at a rental  equal to earnings, or  under a 
special traffic contract. 
A comparison of  this with  the syndicate plan  shows  that Mr. 
Gowen gave up the idea of  an assessment ;  provided for the floating 
debt through first preference bonds; swept away three of  the four 
classes of  stock, replacing them by two kids  of  income bonds ;  and 
retained the deferred income bonds which  the syndicate proposed 
to retire.  His plan  was to be carried through without foreclosure, 
but outside of  this its advantages are rather difficult to ascertain. 
The abandonment of  the assessment was distinctly bad ;  the retention 
of  the  deferred  income issue was  also  bad;  the reduction in  the 
number of  kinds of  securities tended towards simplicity, but made 
impossible the nice distinction of  priority on which the syndicate had 
relied ;  while even the replacement of  stock by income bonds must 
be  condemned,  substituting  as it  did  an obligation without  any 
very  distinct character  of  its own  for  a  stock which  represented 
frankly only a share in  the profits of  the enterprise. These things 
were realized, and the plan received no serious support ;  but as every 
plan so far proposed contributed something to the final product, so 
Mr. Gowen's income bonds and his aversion to foreclosure were not 
without influence upon the scheme which ultimately attained success. 
The next few months saw active hostilities between Mr. Gowen 
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never  consent  to  foreclosure, nor  to  the  placing of  the property 
for five years under the management of a board of trustees named 
by  his adversaries.'  To Mr.  Garrett, chairman of the reconstruc- 
tion trustees, he  wrote suggesting that the board should substitute 
his  plan  for that  of  the  syndicate, and  that seven reconstruction 
trustees should be appointed by  the managers of  the company to 
carry it through.  "Upon  this being done,"  said he, "I will engage 
that  the plan  shall be  underwritten  by  an association  of  capital 
sufficient for  the  purpose  of  paying  off all  the  general mortgage 
bonds which  do not yoluntarily accept the new securities provided 
by  the  plan,  and I will  agree that the financial responsibility  of 
these subscribers  to this fund shall be determined by the presidents 
of  the Bank of  North America, the Farmers' & Mechanics' National 
Bank, the Pennsylvania Company for Insurance of  Lives, etc., and 
the Union Trust Company. . . ." a  Mr. Garrett naturally refused. 
As  in  many cases before,  the struggle ended  in a compromise. 
The new agreement was as follows:  The syndicate was  to  be  en- 
larged by $4,000,000 additional subscriptions, and the reconstruction 
trustees increased to thirteen  by the addition of  certain friends of 
Mr. Gowen,  one of  whom  was  also  to  be  given  place  upon  the 
executive committee.  The syndicate plan was to be carried through 
without foreclosure, providing sufficient assents could be obtained, 
and was to be modified by the substitution of  first, second, and third 
4 per cent  income bonds  for preferred, income, and  consolidated 
5 per cent stock.  Dividends on the bonds, like those on the stock, 
were to be payable from net earnings only; but net earnings were 
defined as the profits derived from all sources after paying operating 
expenses, taxes, and existing rentals, guarantees and interest charges, 
but not fixed  charges of  the same sort  subsequently created.  All third 
preference bonds issued for convertible bonds were to have the right 
to be converted into common stock; and the company was to have 
the privilege of  increasing the issue, subject for five years to the ap 
proval of the voting trustees.  As finally worked out, the first prefer- 
ence bonds were to be given for assessments; the seccnd preference 
for all securities which had  been  promised income or consolidated 
stock; and the third preference for the second series gs, convertible 
and debenture bonds, and  preferred stock to which common stock 
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had before been allotted.  Somewhat more emphasis was laid on the 
possibility of  paying off  the general mortgage.  It was proposed to 
the  aggregate  of  rentals and guarantees  (exclusive of  the 
Central of  New  Jersey,  the Schuylkill Navigation Company, and 
be  Susquehanna Canal Company) to an annual charge of  less than 
$2,350,000  by  direct negotiation with the companies affected. And 
to  deal directly with the three  companies above named  upon the 
basis of  a continuance of  their respective leases at rentals involving 
no fixed liability beyond the earning power of  the leased line, or on 
the basis of  a surrender of  the said leases, and the cancellation of 
the traffic agreement with  the Schuylkill Navigation Company for 
a consideration. The voting trust was to be composed of  three repre- 
sentatives of  the syndicate and one friend of  Mr. Gowen, which four 
should elect a ath  who should be satisfactory both to the syndicate 
and to the reconstruction trustees.  A united effort was to be  made 
by  the company, the reconstruction trustees, and  the syndicate to 
secure  the  immediate  appointment of  Mr.  Austin  Corbin as an 
additional receiver; and, if  Mr. Corbin would take the position and 
legally qualify himself  to iil1 it, it was understood that the presidency 
of  the company would  be offered  to him.  The other  provisions of 
the syndicate plan were to remain unchanged.' 
The total capital and charges under the plan were to be as follows : 
Est'd Capital  Fixed Charges 
Prior mortgage liens,  $85,807,920  $4,233,055 
Annual rental of  leased lines not  to exceed  2,350,- 
$6,583,055 
First preference income mortgage,  24,410,822  1,2209542 
$110,218,742  $7,803,597 
Second preference income mortgage,  26,140,518  1,307,026 
$136,359,260  $9,110,623 
Third preference income mortgage,  14,956,016  747,800 
$151,315,276  $9,858,423 
Common  stock,  38,369,076 
Deferred incomes, $z0,751,ogo at issue price,  6,225,327 
$195,909,679 
We have now the reorganization in its final shape, and it will be 
interesting to review  briefly the gradual  way  in which this shape 
was  fashioned.  With the company plunged  anew into bankruptcy 
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after a reorganization insufficient to afford any genuine relief, the 
proposal was made to fund one-half the general mortgage coupons 
for three years and to convert all junior claims into liens on income. 
This scheme failed because plainly inadequate  to meet  the needs 
of  the  situation, and a  modified  version  was  presented  providing 
for an assessment with which to pay the floating debt.  The assess- 
ment was approved, but not the plan, and an ensuing scheme sup- 
plied  an altogether new method of  treatment,  whereby on  the one 
hand  the  assessment  was  made  more  heavy,  and  on  the  other 
two  classes of  preferred  stock were  proposed,  with  one  issue of 
bonds at 3 per cent.  This plan failed, not so much because of  its 
inadequacy, although it was inadequate, but  because general mort- 
gage bondholders felt that a  3 per  cent  bond was less than  they 
could reasonably expect for their holdings, and insisted on a secur- 
ity with a higher  obligatory rate of  interest.  The next  plan took 
note of  these objections :  it raised the interest on the bonds which it 
proposed from 3 to 4 per cent; and in the endeavor to please the 
junior  bondholders as well, created four classes of  preferred stock, 
by means of  which the relative priority of  different issues was care- 
fully and completely recognized.  Assessments were retained,  and 
a guarantee by  a syndicate and a voting  trust for five  years was 
suggested.  In the discussion that  followed, a new scheme was in- 
troduced, which  replaced  the  preferred  stock  by  two  classes of 
income bonds, and forced the managers to realize the desire of  the 
old bondholders for some new  security with at least the name of 
bond.  As  a result, the syndicate which had fathered the previous 
plan consented to substitute for three of  their classes of  stock first, 
second, and third  preference bonds.  Meanwhile the fixed charges 
estimated  for  the  successive  plans  steadily decreased.  The first 
looked  for  $I~,~II,OOO,  or  $14,266,051  as  variously  reckoned; 
the second for $14,143,384,  or, deducting the Jersey  Central, for 
$8,223,177; the  third  for  $7,064,830; the  fourth  for  $6,971,687; 
and the sixth for $6,583,055.  Thus each plan took over what was 
most satisfactory in its predecessor; and there was on the one hand 
a steady decrease in the fixed charges proposed, and on the other 
a  continuous effort  to  discover some  plan  which  might  be  satis- 
factory to all concerned. 
That the compromise plan last mentioned succeeded was in part 
due to the feeling of  all contending parties that concessions must be 
made; it was due also to endorsement by  the leaders of  the more 
important interests; and, finally, to an appreciation that the plan 
was after all a good one, reducing largely the fixed charges which 
the company would have to pay, while depriving no one of  a return 
which,  under the circumstances, he could fairly expect to receive. 
Mr.  Corbin proved  willing  to  undertake  the new  responsibilities 
put  upon  him.  He was  therefore appointed  receiver in  October, 
and elected president in the January following. 
Nevertheless, it would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the plan 
was unanimously accepted from the  start.  The Lockwood Com- 
mittee  of  general  mortgage  bondholders  were  prompt  in  their 
disapproval,  pronouncing  it  "unjust,  uncertain,  and  indefinite" ; 
saying  that  reorganization  under  it  would  be  unduly  expensive, 
and  that  it  was  more  objectionable than  the  plans  which  had 
preceded  it.'  Equally  decided  was  a  small  group  of  capitalists 
which held a majority of  the first series 5s outstanding, the members 
of which were said to have agreed to hold their bonds and to abide 
the res~lt.~  The original time limit for deposits expired on March I, 
1887; it was then extended to March 15,  and again to March 31, 
and deposits of  $110,409,464  out of  a total of  $117,972,859  were 
secured.  By  October certain other bondholders had been induced 
to come in, and the trustees declared the plan operative.  Holders of 
$3,348,000 of  first series 5s stayed out, and forced an arrangement 
by  which they were  practically  paid  off  in  cash.3  Arrangements 
were made with some of  the subsidiary Reading lines, but the lease 
of  the  Central  of  New  Jersey  was  not  renewed.  Only odds and 
ends now  remained to  be cleared up, and all  through  the rest of 
the year the managers were busy paying off  receivers' certificates, 
floating debt,  overdue  interest, etc.  On January  I, 1888, without 
formalities, the Reading passed  out  of  receivers'  hands and into 
the control of  the stockholders. 
R.  R.  Gaz. 18:  897,  1886. 
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tion of  their own, which it is not worth while going into. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
PHILADELPHIA  & READING 
Difficulties of  ihe  Coal & Iron  Company -  McLeod's policy  of  extension-  Col- 
lapse of  this  policy -  Failure of  company -  Summary  of  subsequent history. 
WITH the year  1888 a new  period in the history of  the Reading 
began.  The long struggle to bring the company back to solvency 
was fairly over, and for the fnst time in seven years the road saw 
before it a chance for genuine prosperity.  Unlike the reorganization 
of  188~-3, that of  1884-7  succeeded in  accomplishing the greater 
part of  the saving expected of  it.  According to the plan,  interest 
charges were  to be  reduced  to  $4,233,055; -in  1888  they  were 
$4,516,433,  and  in  1889  $4,058,13~; rentals  were  not  to  exceed 
$2,350,000; --in 1888 they were $2,882,582, and in  1889 $2,842,- 
319.  Other payments, it is true, the necessity for which was passed 
over by  the advocates of  the plan, raised the total which the road 
was obliged to meet,  but  did not  prevent  a  comfortable balance 
of  over $2,cno,000 for the Railroad Company in 1888, and one of 
$~,qqq,ooo for  both  Railroad  and  Coal  Companies  combined. 
During the next few years large sums were spent in improving the 
permanent way.  By January,  1889, almost the entire line between 
New York and Philadelphia had been relaid with 85 and 90 pound 
rails; grades had been smoothed, bridges strengthened, and culverts 
strengthened or rebuilt. 
Less  satisfactory than  the  results  for  the  Railroad  Company, 
however, were those for the Coal  & Iron Company.  In this case 
profits of $654,21 I for 1887 turned into a loss of  $806,222 for 1888, 
and in the following year a weak demand for coal, combined with a 
high cost of  mining, increased the loss to $974,373.  President Corbin 
felt  called  upon  to  explain  that  prior  to  1886 the deficits of  the 
Coal  Company had been  habitually  met  by  inflating the  capital 
account of  the Railroad Company; so that with allowance for this 
fact the showing of  the companies under his management had been 
relatively good.'  In November, 1889, a letter of  Mr. Gowen's Was 
issued, hopeful as ever, criticising the management for their refusal 
R.  R.  Gaz. 22: 370,  18go. 
or  to give authoritative  information about actual eamings, 
but pointing to the large expense for new coal cars, barges, and col- 
lieries, and explaining the benefit which these would confer.' 
The weakened position of its allied company pulled the Reading 
down, and  prevented  it from attaining the secure position  which 
had seemed in sight.  The payment of  dividends only increased the 
general dissatisfaction.  In February,  1889,  holders of  a consider- 
able amount of second preference bonds circulated a petition object- 
ing  to  the  official statement  of  net  earnings applicable to  these 
securities,  and  demanded  an  examination  of  the  books.  After 
an investigation their expert declared that  a  7$  per cent dividend 
had  been  earned, but the bondholders could not induce the com- 
pany to increase its distribution.  The next year preference bnd- 
holders fared even worse.  The managers declared that the surplus 
over all fixed  charges for the year  was  barely  $~oo,ooo,  and  that 
no  dividends at all upon  their holdings could be  paid.  Again  an 
investigation  was  demanded  and  accorded,  and  Mr.  Howard 
Lewis,  the  expert  appointed,  reported  that  there  was  applicable 
to the payment of  interest upon first  preference bonds the sum of 
$90,101,  or  of one per cent; a sum which the company promptly 
agreed  to  pay.  Meanwhile even  the  stockholders were  becoming 
restless.  In  June,  1889,  a  suit  was  commenced  in  Philadelphia, 
praying  that  the  company's  voting  trustees  and  the  trust  under 
which they acted should be set aside, on the ground that the trust 
was to be  exercised by  five voting trustees, whereas only four had 
ever been appointed.  Later on the matter was taken up by London 
stockholders, and became serious enough to force a concession of 
two  seats in the board of  managers of  the company. 
There was no question but that  the trouble was caused by  de- 
Pression in the anthracite coal business, for in the camage of  both 
Passengers  and  freight  the Reading  in  these years  made steady 
and substantial gains.  In the three years following 1887 the number 
of  passengers transported increased by  2,400,000 and the eamings 
from  them  by  $470,~~;  while  the  freight  tons  moved  gained 
1~500,ooo  and  the freight earnings $1,000,000.  Only in  coal was 
there a decrease, which appeared  for the  Coal  & Iron Company  "  the figures for sales and gross and net receipts, and for the Rail- 
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road  Company in the earnings from anthracite transported.  The 
result was an attempt to improve the situation: first, by a combina- 
tion  among coal  producing roads which  should raise  the  selling 
price of  that commodity ;  and second, by  extension of  the railroad 
into  new  markets,  whereby  an outlet  for  increased  production 
should be obtained.  At  the instigation of  Mr. Gowen a syndicate 
was  formed  to purchase  a  majority  of  the  stock of  the  Reading 
Company,' which bought much more than 50 per cent, even though 
Mr. Gowen, the prime mover, died in the mean time.  The existing 
managers showed no desire to combat the movement, although the 
voting power lay entirely in their hands.  In June,  1890, President 
Corbii resigned, and Mr. A. A.  McLeod was elected in his place. 
Mr. McLeod now began  a vigorous policy of  consolidation and 
expansion with the lease for the second time of  the Central of  New 
Jersey.  He evaded a New Jersey law which forbade the lease of  a 
domestic to a foreign corporation by incorporating the Port Reading 
Railroad  Company and then  executing a lease of  the  Central to 
this minor corporati~n.~  The Port Reading promised 7 per cent on 
the Central stock  or 999  years, plus one-half the surplus earnings 
above the dividend up to 10  per  cent, and secured a guarantee of 
the fulfilment of  these promises from the Reading Railroad proper. 
Finally,  Mr.  McLeod  leased  the  Lehigh  Valley  to  the  Reading 
direct, on a guarantee of 5 per cent on the stock until May 31,  1892; 
6 per cent from that time until November 30, and 7 per cent there- 
after for the rest of  the 999 years.  So far as control over the coal 
supply  was  concerned this put  the  Reading  in  a  very  favorable 
position.  The Lehigh Valley tapped the northern  Wyoming field, 
and the Central of New Jersey the Mahanoy and Shamokin deposits, 
and  both  had  access  to  New  York  through  New  Jersey.  The 
Lehigh, moreover, extended to Buffalo; and with a line of  steamers 
to Duluth, Milwaukee, and Chicago, promised to command a large 
proportion of  east-bound traffic in other things than coal.  Figures 
for the coal industry show that the Reading, Central, and Lehigh 
shipped in  1891  53.3 per cent of  the total production of 40,448,0o0 
tons ;  in 1890 55.5  per cent ;  and in 1889 57.75 per cent.  In addition, 
control of  the Delaware, Lackawanna  & Western was said to have 
Chron. 53:  408, 18g1. 
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been  acquired by  the purchase of  a  majority of  its stock, which 
added  15.1 per cent more ;  '  making a total of  68.1  per cent for the 
year  1891,  or sufficient to give a  considerable measure of  control 
over prices.  But the terms were severe ;  quite as severe as in the case 
of the leases earlier put through; and though the Reading was in 
better shape than it had  been five  years before, full interest on its 
bonds was not being paid, and so long as this continued 
no  outside  payments  could  properly  be  made.  The subsidiary 
companies,  on  the  other  hand,  were  not  earning  the  dividends 
promised  on their  stock by  nearly one-third of  a million  dollars; 
and it seemed unlikely that sufficient economies could be secured 
to cover  permanently the deficit.  The question could fairly have 
been  asked whether the Reading had not bought a chance to con- 
tribute  an  annual sum to the Lehigh Valley  and  Jersey  Central 
stockholders ;  and whether these roads had not deliberately entered 
into a contract which was little likely to be  carried out.  The justi- 
fication of  the arrangement lay in the control of coal prices which it 
made possible, and in the advantages of  close traffic arrangements 
and connection with both Philadelphia and New York.  "The main 
reason why  the combiiation failed,"  said  Mr.  I. L.  Rice before 
the Industrial Commission, "was that there was not an understand- 
ing of  the first principles of an operation of  that kind, i. e.  that it 
must  reduce  prices  and  not  increase them.  The anthracite coal 
combiiation was killed because prices were immediately put up. . . . 
"Q. Mr.  McLeod has testified  before  this commission  that  it 
was his intention to effect  such economies as should be reflected 
in lower prices.  Do we  understand that you criticise the policy in 
that it did not so reduce the prices? 
g6 A.  He did not do it, no matter what his intention was."  a 
The situation was, however, as clearly understood by  the public 
as  by the managers themselves.  Even before  the combination had 
tq carry out its policy, outcry was made, and as prices went 
UP  the agitation became intense.  In New Jersey an act to legalize 
the combination which passed both houses was vetoed by Governor 
Abbot on the ground of  the effect upon the price of  anthracite coal 
ad  in  June  the Attomey-General applied  for an  injunction  to 
R-  R. Gaz.  24: 138, 1892.  '  Industrial commission, vol. 9, p. 738. 
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dissolve the lease of  the New  Jersey Central to the Philadelphia 8, 
Reading,  alleging  that  the  tripartite  agreement  between  these 
companies and the Philadelphia  & Reading was illegal.  The court 
granted a temporary injunction,'  which it continued in August to 
a final hearing, with conditions to make it more effective. 
Prices did not go down, and in October Attorney-General Stockton 
of  New  Jersey  again  appeared  before  Chancellor  McGill.  He 
now  charged the Philadelphia  & Reading,  the Central, and  the 
Port Reading with having conspired to advance the price of  coal in 
defiance of  the order of  the court, and asked for the appointment 
of  a receiver to enforce the former decree, and to restrain the com- 
pany from further using the New  Jersey railroads for carrying any 
coal until the advanced price should have been reduced?  The  officers 
denied the allegations, but the Chancellor sustained the Attorney- 
General on every point; and only the official announcement of  the 
abrogation of  the lease prevented the granting of  the order.s  The 
lease of  the Lehigh Valley fared better.  In a suit brought by  M. H. 
hot,  a stockholder in the Lehigh Valley,  Judge  Metzger of  the 
Court of  Common Pleas held that the Reading and Lehigh Valley 
were  not  parallel  and competing lines in the sense contemplated 
by the raw; and that mere incidental competition between branches 
or spurs of  two systems would not prevent the consolidation of  their 
main limes.'  So  much then of  the original programme was allowed 
to stand. 
Meanwhile, in  the  search for  new  markets,  the  Reading had 
stretched into New  England,  having chosen that territory  in  the 
hope of  increasing its tonnage without a desperate struggle with its 
neighbors:  The most available subject for control was the Boston & 
Maine, which reached from Northampton and Boston, Massachu- 
setts, to Portland, Maine, was independent of  the large trunk lines, 
and had a profitable local business of its own.  Purchases of  this rail- 
road's stock were quietly made; and in October, 1892, the public was 
surprised by the election of  Mr. McLeod to the presidency, although, 
as it subsequently transpired, an actual majority of  Boston & Maine 
stock was not secured?  It was obvious that nothing could be gained 
I  R.  R.  Gaz. 24: 420,  1892.  '  Chron.  55: 680, 1892. 
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from the new arrangement unless the gap between the Reading and 
the Boston  & Maine should be filled; and so, even before the pur- 
chase of stock in the latter was begun, the lease of  the Poughkeepsie 
Bridge  across  the  Hudson  was  put  through,'  and  a  controlling 
interest was bought in the stock of  the Central, New  England  & 
Western.  The last-named road extended  from Hartford,  Connec- 
ticut across the Poughkeepsie Bridge to Campbell Hall, 1454 miles, 
and connected at this point with the Pennsylvania, Poughkeepsie & 
Boston, a road controlled in the interest of  the Reading.  This com- 
pleted  a through route from Philadelphia to Hartford.  Later the 
Central, New  England  & Western  Railroad  Company and  the 
Poughkeepsie Bridge  Railroad  Company were  consolidated  into 
the Philadelphia, Reading  & New England, with Mr. McLeod as 
president;  and a  controlling interest was  purchased  in  the New 
York  & New England Railroad, which ran from Poughkeepsie via 
Hartford and Providence to Bost~n,~  and afforded another entrance 
into New  England.  All this involved a very great extension of  the 
Reading system. The lease of  the Lehigh Valley had connected it 
with  Buffalo; the subsequent consolidations brought it into every 
New  England state, and gave it a total mileage of, roughly, 5000 
miles. 
Danger lay in two directions. Fist, it was possible that even the 
union of the Lehigh, Jersey Central, and the Reading might fail to 
secure a profit for the mining end of  the business, and second, the 
hancing of the New  England deals might be so conducted as to 
put the parent road into a very di5cult situation. 
Both these contingencies occurred.  The early termination of  the 
Jersey  Central  lease weakened  the control  of  the  Reading  over 
prices,  while the severity of  the winter of 1893,  though assisting to 
maintain prices,  so increased the expense of  operating the mines 
that earnings fell below fixed charges for the three months eiijing 
28,  1893, by  the amounts of  $933,443 for the Railroad 
Company and  $468,362  for the Coal  & Iron Company.  More- 
Over,  losses of  $616,351  accrued during the same time  under  the 
khigh  Valley  lease, and were  met  by  the  Reading,  contrary to 
expfftation, and contrary to the express provisions of  the mortgage 
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the New England extensions shares were bought on margin by Pre- 
sident McLeod personally with collateral in part supplied by himself, 
in part taken from the treasury of  the company, and consisting  of 
general mortgage, collateral trust, and income bonds.  "  On or about 
September  22,"  said  Mr. I. L. Rice, a representative of  the bond- 
holders, who had been examining the books, "Mr.  McLeod entered 
into certain individual stock transactions which resulted in the pur- 
chase of  24,036 shares of  the stock of  the Boston  & Maine Railroad 
Company and 32,000 shares of  the stock of  the New York  & New 
England Railroad Company.  On October IS, 1892, he withdrew from 
the control of  the company, without having previously obtained the 
authority of  the  board of  managers therefor, and without express- 
ing the purpose for which  he intended to use the securities, 30,000 
general  mortgage  bonds  of  the  company,  which  as  afterwards 
appeared  were  used  at  that  time  as margins in  the  transaction. 
He subsequently withdrew from the control of the company in the 
same manner and for the same purpose, between  October 28  and 
December I, 1892, $713,000 of  collateral trust bonds, and $99,- 
third  preference bonds.  No  reference  whatever  is made to these 
stock transactions on the books of  the company except the mention 
of  the withdrawal of  securities against the personal receipt  of  the 
president, nor are they referred to on the minutes of  the board of 
managers prior to December 24, 1892.  On the latter date the board 
of  managers in a resolution approved the transaction, calling for the 
use of  $613,~~  of  the company's collateral, and indemnifying Mr. 
McLeod for advances made for the same purpose to the extent of 
$403,000.  On January  17, 1893, Mr.  McLeod deposited $250,000 
additional  collateral  trust  bonds  as  margin,  making  a  total  of 
$963,000.  On February 15  Mr. McLeod directed that the account 
be transferred from his individual name to that of  the company's." ' 
Leaving  aside  the  matter  of  the  propriety  of  Mr.  McLeod's 
action,  it  is  plain  that  the  method  which  he  employed  was  an 
extremely expensive one,  in  that  it  raised the necessary  cash by 
temporary loans at high rates from brokers in New York and Phil- 
adelphia instead of  by the sale of stocks or bonds, or by the use of 
funds which the company might have had on hand.  According to 
President Harris,  the average charges paid on the floating debt in 
R. R. Gaz.  25: 386, 1893. 
1892, a large portion of  which had been accumulated in these opera- 
tions, was g per cent.  If  the control over the corporations acquired 
had been  desired for temporary reasons the operation would have 
been a stock speculation pure and simple, and the Reading would 
have trusted to the possible rise in price of  the securities purchased 
to cancel the expense of  advances to the  brokers who did the buy- 
ing; but  in  this case the  control was  designed  to  be  permanent, 
not temporary, and Mr. McLeod expected  results which  could  be 
obtained only after a series of  years. 
This brings us to the beginning of  1893.  Mr. McLeod had suc- 
ceeded in carrying out his plans for a combination of  coal producing 
roads and  for  the  extension  of  the  Reading  into  New  England, 
but  had  seen  his  hst project  bitterly  attacked,  and  his  second 
scheme become a burden because of  the insufficient funds behind it. 
Matters came to a head in February with an attempt to borrow on 
$~o,ooo,ooo  collateral trust bonds.  Speyer  & Co. accepted the issue, 
but  the  Drexels refused to handle it, and began  to  sell  the com- 
pany's securities at any price.'  Quotations dropped from 462 to 409 
on  February  17, and continued  to  fall  the  two  succeeding days, 
reaching 28 on February 20.  On this last day application was made 
to  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  in  Philadelphia,  and  Messrs. 
McLeod, Wilbur, and Paxon were appointed receivers.  "I  am very 
sorry," said President McLeod, "that we  were driven to the neces- 
sity for a receivership, but it was the only thing to do.  Our credit 
was attacked in a way which made it impossible for us to meet our 
obligations,  and  we  had  the  receivership established  before  the 
property was further injured. . . .  The trouble was brought about 
by  the fact that we  were  doing an enormous business on  a small 
capital, and when  this attack was made . . .  it hurt our credit so 
that we could not borrow money."'  Lack of  capital was the repeated 
C'Y  of the management.  At  a later date Mr. McLeod again said, 
"When I leased the Lehigh Valley and the Jersey Central and took 
over  their  coal  operations . . . I found that  I had  $rg,ooo,ooo 
invested in coal and in  carrying the customers of  the companies. 
The Reading did not have that much capital, and I had to borrow 
@,~,eocl  of that $13,000,000.  Then the panic of  1893 came on. 
I had arranged to fund that $8,mo,mo  of  floating debt by  selling 
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securities,  etc.,  giving me  a  working  capital  of  $17,5oo,ooo,  but 
the parties who were to furnish the money had six months in which 
to do it, and on account of  that panic coming on before I could get 
the money, there was nothing in  the world  for me to do except to 
put the Reading in the hands of  the receivers to save its securities.vl 
The statements concerning the lack of  capital were a true explanation 
though not an excuse.  Money had been tied up in unsalable coal, 
acquired not only by the leases of the Lehigh and Central, but also 
by purchases from independent operators  and by production during 
the  current  year;  while  whatever  spare funds the  Reading had 
been able to provide had been put into New England securities at 
high prices to carry out  the road's  ambitious plans.  In the mean 
time the  large  purchases  on  margin made  a  fall in  the  price  of 
Reading securities of  especial moment; and, as Mr.  McLeod ex- 
plained,  it  proved  impossible to liquidate the floating debt.  The 
failure of  1893, then, was  caused less by  a continued inability to 
meet fixed charges than by an undue expansion of  operations such 
as has ruined many a solvent iirm.  Reading's venture in  the coal 
fields had not proved a success, but the loss had not been sufficient 
to ruin it within a year ;  its New England extensions had not brought 
all the results desired, but they had not had a fair trial; the true 
cause for the failure was the attempt to accomplish by  means of 
stock speculation and temporary loans at high rates more than the 
road could do out of  its legitimate resources, with the intent on the 
one hand to raise the price of  coal and on the other to secure fresh 
markets for the sale thereof. 
After  the  failure the  &st  impulse of  the  bondholders was  to 
denounce  Mr.  McLeod.  A  meeting  of  European  creditors  in 
London chose a committee to represent them and solicited McLeod's 
removal from the receivership on  the  "serious  ground"  that  the 
administration of  their  property should not  any  longer  be  jeop- 
ardized  by  remaining under  the  control  of  a.n  official who  had 
already brought it into its existing difficulties.  A New York general 
mortgage bondholders' committee decided to act in a similar direc- 
tion, and Mr.  Drexel represented to the president that  he should 
resign for the sake of  the future of  the company.*  Mr.  MCL~O~ 
1 Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p.  573.  '  Ibid. 
a  Ry. Times. 63:  265, 1893.  Ry.  Age, 18:  314,  1893. 
unwillingly gave way.  For successor the board of  managers chose 
Mr. Joseph S. Harris, a man of  long experience in railroad affairs. 
Mr.  Harris  had  been  for many years  connected  with  the Lehigh 
Valley system, and was the same man who, it will be remembered, 
had  evaluated  the  Reading  coal  properties in  1880.  Following 
his election as president he was appointed receiver  in the place of 
Mr. McLeod. 
The receivers' statement came out in  March and announced a 
floating debt  of  $18,472,828,  against  which  were  held  reported 
assets to  the amount of $15,779,784;  but of  these last $4,985,276 
were  in  the  shape of  coal,  and $8,861,065  consisted of  the items 
"due for freight,"  "tolls due from connecting roads,"  "bills receiv- 
able,"  "cash,"  etc.,  a  large  part  of  which was  probably  of  little 
worth.  Both the current liabilities and the current assets are in- 
structive, and  show  that  on  the  one hand  Mr.  McLeod's  stock 
 pera at ions had involved the company in  heavy  obligations to his 
brokers,  and  that  on  the  other  losses  in  the  coal  business  had 
necessitated  current  advances to branch  lines from which  it  was 
impossible to get return.  It appears, for instance, that the Coal  & 
Iron  Company had  been  unable to pay  the sums charged  it for 
freight, and while the full amounts had been nevertheless included 
in reported earnings, the actual result had been a swelling of  bills 
receivable by debts which the Railroad Company was quite unable 
to co1lect.l 
The general lines of the policy to be pursued were now sufficiently 
clear; the  more  pressing  claims were  to be  met  by  the issue of 
receivers'  certificates,  expenses  were  to  be  cut  down,  payments 
under leases were to be amicably reduced where possible, holdings 
of Bostou  & Maine stock were to be sold, and on the side of  the 
bondholders the various interests were to agree on  some scheme 
for raising  cash  and  for  improving the  general condition of  the 
Property.  There was need for some reduction of fixed charges, but 
not  for such radical cuts as in 1880 or in  1884. 
The receivers and managers carried out their part  of  the work 
kg-  Application was made in March, and again in  June, for per- 
mission to issue certificates in settlement of  the most urgent claims. 
In May Mr. McLeod resigned the presidency of  the Boston & Maine 
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after a large part of  the Reading's holdings had been sold, and the 
same month President Harris inaugurated a policy of  retrenchment 
by  the retirement of  four out of  the five  vice-presidents which the 
Reading had been  accustomed to maintain.  In July the receivers 
obtained  permission  to  dissolve the  agreement with  the  Pennsyl- 
vania, Poughkeepsie & Boston Railroad, and in August the appoint- 
ment  of  a  separate  receiver  for  the  Philadelphia,  Reading  & 
New  England marked, except for the minor matter of  the Pough- 
keepsie Bridge, the final abandonment of New England  extension. 
Meanwhile an arrangement had been made with the Lehigh Valley, 
whereby the payments under the lease were reduced for two years 
from 7 per cent to 5 per cent, on condition that the Reading should 
make extra payments at the end of  that time if  the Lehigh proved 
to have earned more than 10  per cent in the interval ;  and permission 
had been obtained from the Circuit Court to surrender the possession 
and operation of  the Eastern  & Amboy Railroad and the Lehigh 
Valley  Terminal  Railroad,  both  lines  belonging  to  the  Lehigh 
Valley in the state of  New Jersey.  The Lehigh lease, even as modi- 
fied,  aroused  much  opposition  from  bondholders,  who  rightly 
maintained that payments under it constituted a diversion of  funds 
which  should have  gone  to  the  creditors of  the  Reading  proper. 
Suit was begun before the Circuit Court, and on August 8,  1893, 
a  formal abrogation  was  obtained.  This incidentally caused  the 
resignation of  Mr.  Wilbur,  president of  the  Lehigh Valley, from 
his  position  as receiver  of  the  Reading,  and the  appointment  of 
Mr. J. Lowber Welsh in his place. 
The more complicated task of  the bondholders was at first under- 
taken by two committees :  one for the general mortgage bondholders, 
of  which  Mr. J.  Edward  Simmons was chairman; and one for the 
income bondholders, led by  Mr. George Coppell.  Three demands 
were at once made :  first, that Mr. McLeod retire from the receiver- 
ship; second, that  the  lease  of  the  Lehigh  Valley  be  abrogated; 
and third, that the books of  the company be examined by a railroad 
accountant.  The first and second points were complied with, though 
not altogether because of the insistence of  the committees, and in 
the end the third was also granted, and Mr. Stephen Little was set 
to work.' 
Chron. 57: 105, 1893;  Ibid. 57:  423,  1893. 
On  May  27,  1893, the managers of  the company brought  for- 
ward a reorganization  plan,  which  estimated the floating debt at 
$19,991,94~,  and proposed to cover it by  the issue of  $22,m,ooo 
collateral trust  bonds at 95.  These bonds were  to be redeemable 
any  time before maturity  at 110,  and the trustee was authorized 
"to  apply the surplus income or the proceeds of  sales .  .  .  of  acy 
of  the  securities  pledged  until  1898,  and thereafter  so  much  as 
might be determined from time to time by the Railroad Company, 
to the purchase of the said bonds at the best price obtainable, or, 
if  necessary,  to  draw the  same for redemption."  General  mort- 
gage  and  first,  second,  and  third  preference  bonds  were  to  be 
entitled to subscribe to the amount of 10  per cent of  their holdings; 
deferred income bonds to 4 per  cent; and stockholders to  24  per 
cent; while  besides  the  $22,m,ooo  mentioned, $a,ooo,ooo  addi- 
tional bonds were to be issued each year for working capital and 
for the acquisition of  real and personal property.  General mortgage 
bondholders were to fund their coupons to and including January I, 
1898, and to receive an equivalent amount of  coupon trust certifi- 
cates.  The rental under the Lehigh Valley lease was to be reduced, 
and the Reading stock was to be transferred for seven years to a 
voting  trust composed of  Joseph S. Harris, E. P. Wilbur, Thomas 
McKean, and two others to be afterwards named.'  Assents of  go 
per  cent of the general mortgage bondholders and of  60 per  cent 
of the stockholders were required by the 21st  of June to make the 
plan effective,  and a syndicate was pledged to carry out the provi- 
sions if such assents should be obtained? 
An  issue of collateral bonds,  a reduction in  the Lehigh rental, 
a funding of  coupons, and a voting trust :  these were the propositions 
which  President Harris and his associates presented  for the con- 
sideration of  the bondholders.  There was to be  no disturbance of 
existing securities, no  assessment, not  even  a  reduction  of  fixed 
charges except  as these were  lightened by  the lowering of  rentals 
and by the payment of  the floating debt.  It is to be presumed that 
'he  attempt to extend the Reading into New England was not to be 
for no provision was made for the purchase of  the shares 
the New  England roads hitherto held  on  margin, and in  fact 
large sales of  Boston  & Maine stock had already taken place; but 
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no formal mention of  the deal was made.  The lease of  the Lehigh 
Valley was to be  continued in the hope of better times, while the 
reduction  of  rental  which  the  plan  required  had  already  taken 
place.  Under  ordinary circumstances any plan  such  as  the one 
outlined would have been quite futile.  Where the failure of  a road 
is due  to  deep-seated causes  the  remedy must  be fundamental; 
and when  a  piling up of  indebtedness is due to inability to pay 
fixed charges the  situation must  be met  by a reduction of  those 
charges even though a foreclosure sale be a necessary preliminary. 
In the present case matters were somewhat different: bankruptcy 
had come, not from a long-continued drain, but from a rapid diffu- 
sion of  resources in an attempt to accomplish more than the finances 
of  the road would  permit; and a  change of  policy was  the thing 
most urgently required.  But this again was not a question with which 
a reorganization plan had to deal, except in so far as such a plan 
might smooth the difficulties  which lay in the way ;  and any scheme 
which should restore to the company the collateral imperilled in 
its rash campaign, fund the floating debt at a reasonable rate of 
interest,  and  give  the management  a  chance to start  again, was 
worthy  of  serious consideration.  It may  be  observed, however, 
that granting all of  the above, the plan  before us did not  go  far 
enough.  The extensions due to  President McLeod  had  been  in 
the heart of  the coal regions, as well as in New England, and one 
of  the most important of  these, the Lehigh Valley, the managers 
proposed  to  retain.  This  policy,  it  may  be  said,  was  of  very 
doubtful wisdom.  The attempt to monopolize the production of 
anthracite coal had already been fruitful of  disaster, and the pos- 
session of  the Lehigh would have constituted a continual temptation 
to future purchases; while it was far from certain that  even under 
the reduced rental the road could have been made to pay.  What the 
Reading needed was a period of  quiet attention to its own business, 
undisturbed by meddling in the business of  other people ;  an atten- 
tion  which  would  be  sure to result in  increased economies,  and 
was the true remedy for the lack of  prosperity in the coal industry 
which  had driven  Mr.  McLeod on his wild  career.  It is to this 
latter judgment  that  we  must  in  the end  conform.  The plan  of 
President Hams was not so inadequate as might at kst appear; 
it accomplished much that needed to be accomplished, and it gave 
an opportunity to the  management  of  the  road  to retrace  many 
of  the steps of the previous two years; but on  the other hand,  it 
did wt  embrace the chance to free the Reading from all its mistaken 
and  passed  by  an  occasion  which  could  only  again 
occur after much saering and loss. 
 isc cuss ion  turned,  however,  on  other  features.  In a  circular 
to securityholders in  June,  President Hanis said :  "  My deliberate 
opinion is that the assistance asked for by the proposed plan . . .  is 
none too great, and that there is a  good  probability  that  if  it is 
dorded and the plan  is carried out prudent and careful manage- 
ment  may  prevent the recurrence of  such a crisis.  My judgment 
is that the securityholders will make a very serious mistake if  they 
do not accept the relief offered them, for I see no probability that 
the  necessary  assistance  can  hereafter  be  obtained  except upon 
much more onerous terms.  I strongly advise that the plan shall be 
promptly accepted." ' "We cannot but regard these terms as very 
easy,"  said the Financial Chronicle. "To be sure a new collateral 
trust mortgage for  $~O,OOO,OOO,  bearing 6 per  cent, is to  be  cre- 
ated, but the greater part of  this goes to take up floating debt and 
other  existing obligations, and  will  involve  ilo  increase  in  fixed 
charges. .  . .  "  a  On the other hand, it was objected that the plan was 
formed entirely in the interest of  the floating debt holders, income 
bondholders, and stockholders; and  that  the  management  under 
the arrangement would  have the power to pay dividends upon the 
income bonds, while at the same time the coupons on the 4 per cent 
mortgage bonds were beiig funded?  In an editorial urging fore- 
closure proceedings the hdon  Standard said : "  That [foreclosure] 
will  prevent holders of  pledged collaterals from getting a  market 
for their securities, and, at the same time, bring a good many doubt- 
ful matters connected  with  the finances of  the company into the 
light of  day.  It should also tend to make the 'floating debt' swindle 
less  popular  with  eminent  American  financiers.  At  present they 
pile these debts up in the full assurance that they can easily arrange 
matters so as to put them, when funded, before existing mortgages. 
fi  is for the Reading general mortgage bondholders to act promptly 
for their own interests." '  Finally, it was objected that the plan 
'  RY.  Age,  18:  501,  1893.  ' Chron. 56:  905, 1893.  '  RY.  Times,  63:  751, 1893.  * Ry.  Times,  63 :  783, 1893. 132  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATZON  PHILADELPHIA  & READING  '33 
was in the interest of  the McLeod management, and that the voting 
trust was to be a McLeod organization, which would either white- 
wash  the  ex-president's operations,  or  by  keeping  them  in  the 
background would virtually outlaw them. 
The plan  failed because  the time allowed  for deposits was too 
short.  In spite of  the objections raised  31,356  general mortgage 
bonds and 411,218  shares of  stock were deposited in  twenty-five 
days, and it was maintained that additional securities would surely 
be obtained to make up the percentages required.  The managers 
alleged, however, that extension was impracticable, and announced 
that the scheme could not go through.' 
The year following this attempt at rehabilitation was full of the 
struggles of  different interests, each jealous  of  any concession and 
working devotedly for its own  hand.  Prominent at this time was 
Mr. I. L. Rice, the same gentleman who has before been  quoted 
in  connection  with  Mr.  McLeod7s ope~ations  in  New  England 
stocks.  Mr. Rice had  been a member of  the syndicate which had 
put  Mr.  McLeod into the  presidency, and had  served  as foreign 
representative of  the  company during  his  rdgime.  He had  been 
instrumental  in  forming the  anthracite  coal combination, and at 
the time of the Reading failure had been in England raising money 
to finance the coal holdings then a~quired.~  Returning from Europe 
upon the appointment of  receivers, he examined the Reading books 
with the results which have been noticed, and now appeared as the 
active enemy of  everything connected with  Mr. McLeod, even  to 
the receivers who had succeeded him.  In May, 1893, he resigned the 
seat which he had held on the Reading board, on the ground that 
the management had condoned the use by Mr. McLeod of  the com- 
pany's securities in carrying on his private and personal specula- 
tions;  in  September  he  resigned  from  the  income  bondholders' 
committee,  and  attacked  in  a  circular  the  McLeod  regime  and 
the succeeding receivership; hnd  in December he applied for the 
removal of  the receivers, alleging that they had  grossly neglected 
their duties to the stockholders, and had ignored the financial trans- 
actions of  Mr. McLeod prior  to their appointment.' 
R. R. Gaz. 25: 496, 1893. The  deposits  required  were:  general  mortgage, 
$41,828,000;  stock,  480,424  shares. 
3  Industrial Commission, vol. 9, p.  737,  testimony of  I.  L. Rice. 
Ry. Times, 64: 369, 1893.  Ry. Age,  18: 897, 1893- 
In spite of  his hostility to the existing rdgime, Mr.  Rice hoped 
to rehabilitate the company without foreclosure or, indeed, formal 
The action of  others was  inspired  by  a less  opti- 
mistic view.  The original suit on which receivers had been appointed 
had  been brought by one Thomas C. Platt; but as early as March 
Alfred Sully and A. B.  Rand of  New  York, and John  Lowrie of 
London,  holders  of  first  and  second  preference  income  bonds, 
petitioned to intervene.  In July Judge Dallas dismissed the Lowrie 
suit, but the petition was renewed in September, alleging that Mr. 
Platt "did not file his bill in good faith on his own behalf, and on 
behalf of  all other holders of  bonds, but at the request and for the 
benefit and protection of  the men  who were then managers of  the 
Philadelphia  & Reading  Railroad Company and the Philadelphia 
& Reading Coal  & Iron Company, and that the suit was not being 
pressed with due diligence." 
All  this time the receivers had been busy on a plan, which they 
presented in January, 1894.  By  leaving out of  consideration some 
$5,000,000 of  car  trusts they arrived at the  figure  of  $12,5oo,ooo 
for the floating debt.  This they proposed  to cover by  the issue of 
$6,000,000  in 6 per  cent  ten-year  trust  certificates, based  on  the 
stock of  coal on hand,  and by  $~o,ooo,ooo  in 5  per cent collateral 
trust bonds then in  the treasury of  the Reading Company.  They 
hoped  that  a  balance of  $~,~OO,OOO  would  then  remain  available 
for working capital or other purposes.  General mortgage coupons 
were  to be  funded for five years,  although  the  receivers planned 
to have a syndicate formed to purchase at par for cash the coupons 
as they matured, giving to the bondholders in each case the choice 
between receiving money or coupon trust certificates for the interest 
due.  There was to be no formal reorganization, no cuts in charges, 
nothing but a provision for the floating debt and for a temporary 
funding of  interest payments ;  and this was the more feasible because 
the Lehigh Valley lease had been  by  this time abrogated and  the 
New  England extensions definitely aband~ned.~  It will  be remem- 
bered that to the plan of  May, 1893, it had been objected that the 
Provisions contrived to bring  in the floating debt  ahead of  previ- 
ously existing liens, and were a premium on a kind of  financial jug- 
ding too common among American railroads.  This plan, therefore, 
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avoided  a new  issue of  bonds,  and used  only  what  the treasury 
already possessed.  The coal notes were obviously unobjectionable, 
and served at the same time to utilize the unsalable stock which the 
management had earlier accumulated.  If  their value should prove 
small the loss would fall on the holders of  the floating debt and not 
on the owners of  the general mortgage bonds; while the return to 
the  company  was  assured  by  arrangement  with  Drexel  & Co., 
Brown  Bros.  & Co.,  and J. Lowber Welsh on the one hand, and 
the  Finance  Company  of  Pennsylvania  on  the  other.  On  the 
whole this plan was gentle even to tenderness with the creditors of 
the road, and  its  failure  revealed  clearly  the  bondholders'  state 
of  mind.  The holders  of  the  general  mortgage  refused  to  fund 
their  coupons for  five  years, they refused  to fund  them for two 
years,  and  they insisted  that  foreclosure  proceedings  should  be 
instituted unless they  should receive immediate  payment  of  their 
interest.  "In  view of  this,"  the receivers were forced to remark, 
"it  would  be  idle for [us]  to continue  the efforts to readjust  the 
affairs of  the  company. . . ."  The trouble  with  the  receivers' 
scheme was not that it demanded large concessions, -  much larger 
had  been asked and granted in  1887, -but  that the general mort- 
gage  bondholders  felt  that  on  the  one hand  the road  was  very 
nearly earning fixed charges, so that in  the contingency of  a fore- 
closure sale their interests would  be  reasonably  safe; and on  the 
other that a demand for concessions so soon after a complete reor- 
ganization of  the  property  was  an imtant which  might  well  be 
resented even at the risk of some pecuniary loss.  Fortunately the 
assent of  the bondholders was not necessary to the issue of  the coal 
trust  notes, and  the receivers executed them under  the authority 
of  the court, practically as proposed. 
In April, 1894, Mr. Simmons, chairman of the old general mort- 
gage bondholders'  committee, resigned his position, and Mr. Fitz- 
gerald, president of the Mercantile Trust Company, was chosen to 
succeed him.  The committee presently issued a notice which, after 
reviewing its early activity, went on to say that it had believed it 
prudent to give the receivers every opportunity to familiarize them- 
selves with  the affairs of  the company, but  that  in its judgment 
the time had come for action to enforce the rights of  the bondholders 
Chron. 58:  774,  1894. 
uIlder the mortgage.'  In May,  1894, a new general mortgage com- 
mittee was organized, with Mr. I?.  P.  Olcott as chairman, designed 
directly to oppose the Fitzgerald Committee, but to hasten the re- 
habilitation of  the property.  The committee prepared a bondholders' 
calling for the deposit of  general mortgage bonds, and 
in  a statement of  their  position said: "Difficulties  in  the way of 
a foreclosure and reorganization thereafter are exaggerated ;  if any 
danger is wrought  by  such foreclosure it will  fall upon the junior 
=curities and not upon us."  Lastly, at this time, there was a com- 
mittee headed by  Mr. Earle, president of  the Finance Company of 
pennsylvania. 
The Grst  matured  suggestion after the failure of  the receivers' 
plan appeared in what was known as the Olcott-Earle Agreement, 
published on September 25,1894, which seems to have been in many 
respects a revival of  that scheme.  It proposed to cover the floating 
debt  by  the sale to  securityholders of  $~o,ooo,m  collateral trust 
bonds,  heretofore held in the treasury, and to fund coupons on the 
general  mortgage 4  for five years.  A syndicate agreed  to advance 
$g,ooo,ooo, or as  much thereof as might be needed, to buy the coupons 
as they should mature.  The stock was to be held and voted by the 
reorganization committee until all the money advanced by the syn- 
dicate should have been  repaid; that is, till  June,  1898; a second 
syndicate guaranteed the sale of  the collateral bonds at 70; and the 
preferred bondholders were asked to forego any claims for interest 
until all the general mortgage coupons should have been retired and 
cancelled.  Certain other details are of  interest.  The collateral bond 
issue was to be taken  up by  the preferred bondholders and stock- 
holders, each individual subscribing to 10  per cent of  the par value 
of his holdings; but the bondholder might, if he preferred, pay 3 per 
cent of the par value of  the securities he owned and receive nothing, 
instead of  paying  10 per  cent and getting a collateral bond.  Se- 
curityholders were given 60 days in which to assent, and if  at the 
end of that time the number of  assents did not amount to practically 
all the interests involved, the committee proposed to reorganize by 
foreclosure for the benefit only of  those who had assented to the 
'  Ry. Times, 65: 623, 1894.  See also the report of  the company's comptder to 
the receivers in Annual Report,  1893. 
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plan; while  for the future the committee was to provide by agree- 
ment with the railroad company that the latter should call an annual 
meeting of  general  and income  mortgage  bondholders  and stock- 
holders, at which  bondholders as well  as stockholders should vote 
in proportion to the par value of  their holdings.' 
It will  be observed that the source of  relief sought by  this plan 
was precisely that of the receivers' plan earlier described.  Certain 
changes,  however,  of  considerable  importance  were  introduced. 
The subscriptions to the collateral issue were made distinctly ob. 
ligatory,  and  an  alternate assessment  was  provided;  greater  use 
was made of  syndicate assistance ;  some voting power was given to 
the bonds; and a voting trust was added to ensure permanency  of 
control to the designers of  the reorganization  till their work should 
be  complete.  On the  whole  there  were  still  few  concessions to 
creditors, and indeed  could be few.  Ten coupons  of  the general 
mortgage were to be funded, though it was made easy for the bond- 
holder  to  get  cash  if  he  preferred  it; the  provisions  concerning 
subscriptions to the collateral  bonds were rather more burdensome 
than before ;  and the voting trust, while redounding to the ultimate 
advantage  of  creditors,  was  only  indirectly  a  concession  to  their 
demands.  The grant of  voting power to the bondholders would have 
been  a great concession, but the wording of  the clause was vague 
and probably  little  practical effect would have  ensued.  As  in  the 
previous plans, no particular attention was paid to the reduction of 
fixed charges. 
So much for the provisions of  the plan.  It was a hopeful innova- 
tion for the suggestions it contained to come from holders of  general 
mortgage bonds, and seemed to give some evidence of  a change of 
heart; especially since the Olcott Committee did secure the assent 
of a larger proportion of the issue than had accepted either of the 
propositions  before  brought  forward.  The Fitzgerald  Committee 
strenuously  protested,  still  insisting  on  the  advisability  of  fore- 
closure; and further objections came from Mr. Rice and from the 
Hartshorne  Committee.  Nevertheless, the  general  mortgage  as a 
whole gave its consent, and ultimate shipwreck was due only to the 
Chron.  59: 515,  1894; Ry.  Age,  19:  557,  1894; Ry Rev. 34: 561,  1894; RY. 
Ties,  66: 571, 1894. 
abstention of  the income mortgage bonds.'  It is not smprising that 
the income bondholders should have felt that the plan had little in 
it for them.  They had been given no voice in its making, -  their 
wishes had  at no time been regarded.  During  the whole  reorgan- 
ization the question  had  been  of  the terms to which the general 
mortgage bondholders would consent, and the only sign of  the exist- 
ence of junior  liens had been  an occasional fearful inquiry  as to 
what would become of them under foreclosure ;  until now the com- 
bination  of  a voting  trust with the expenses of  a syndicate reorgan- 
ization, and an assessment upon them and upon the stock, touched 
the limit  which they would  stand.  There was,  moreover,  at this 
time no question  of the wiping out of  the value of  their  holdings. 
The preamble to the Olcott-EarIe plan stated that the annual charges 
were  $10,477,560  and that  the net  earnings  for  1891  had  been 
$10,~77,398;  thus showing that something  was left for the junior 
securities even after the payment of  interest on all prior and general 
mortgage liens.  It seemed also barely  possible that the difficulties 
of a foreclosure, with the danger under the laws of  Pennsylvania of 
'losing the coal properties of  the company, might secure better terms 
for the holders of junior  obligations in  case they should  withhold 
their assent. 
Early in Jahuary,  1895, the following official notice was issued: 
"The plan of  readjustment,  dated October I, 1894, has not  been 
assented to by a sufficient number of  income bondholders and stock- 
holders to make the same effective.  The committee now hold over 
a majority of  the general mortgage bonds, and have, in accordance 
with the bondholders'  agreement of  May 7,  1894, and their circular 
of October I, 1894, notified the trustees of the general mortgage to 
bring suit for the foreclosure thereof . . .  as expeditiously as pos- 
sible."  Suit for foreclosure was brought  March  2 in accordance 
with the announcement, and the Junior Securities Protective Com- 
mittee, an organization with  purposes  indicated by  its name, was 
dowed to intervene. 
Deposits of  bonds were up to the last of  January (R. R. Gaz. 27: 78,  1895): 
Tolal Issue  Deposits 
General Mortgage  $44,663,ooo  $33@99F+3 
1st preferred  23,948,133  12,182,300 
ad preferred  14176,326  6,261,600 
3d  preferred  18,591,099  8,631,400 
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Meanwhile the  Fitzgerald and Olcott committees together pre- 
pared  and brought forward the final reorganization scheme.  ~h, 
conditions now  differed from those with which any previous plan 
had been confronted, in that it was no longer necessary to seek for 
as little change as possible, and a broader, more radical reorgan- 
ization was in point.  "Unless,"  began the scheme, "the managers 
shall decide to proceed without foreclosure or sale, the properties 
of the existing Reading companies will be sold and successor com- 
panies will  be organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, and the 
stock and securities of  these successor companies will be vested in 
a new company formed, or to be formed, under the laws of  Penn- 
sylvania or of  some other state." 
There were to be issued: 
General mortgage 100-year 4 per cent gold bonds,  $I 14,000,000 
Non-cumulative, 4 per cent first preferred stock (subject to an 
increase of  $21,ooo,ooo),  28,ooo,ooo 
Non-cumulative 4 per  cent second preferred stock,  42,000,000 
Common stock  (subject to an  increase of  $z~,ooo,ooo),  70,-~000 
If at any time dividends of  4 per cent should have been paid on 
the  first  preferred  stock  for  two  successive years  the  company 
might convert the second preferred stock at par, one-half into first 
preferred and one-half into common stock.  These new issues were 
ultimately to retire all outstanding securities, to provide for expenses 
of reorganization, and to go for new construction, additions, better- 
ments,  etc.,  in  the  succeeding years.  Since, however,  it  was  ob- 
viously impossible to cancel prior liens before  maturity, sufficient 
general mortgage bonds ($44,550,000) were reserved from immediate 
issue to retire these when they should  fall due.  This left new gen- 
eral mortgage bonds with four classes of  stock against old general 
mortgage  bonds with  three  classes  of  preferred  bonds, common 
stock, and deferred incomes ;  and, as might be expected, new general 
mortgage qs were given for the old general mortgage, second pre- 
ferred  and  common  stock  went  for  preference  bonds,  and  new 
common stock  for old common stock and  deferred income bonds. 
Certain cash payments  were made on  the general mortgage,  and 
$4,000,000  of  the  new issue were sold  to a syndicate ; but on  the 
whole we  may say that  the prior liens and general mortgage bond- 
holders occupied the same position in the new company which they 
had occupied in  the old ; that the income bondholders exchanged  ,, bond with a lien on income for a stock with a right to dividends; 
asld  that the floating debt, syndicate, and other expenses were given 
equal  with the general mortgage. 
N~  mortgage was to be  put  upon  the  property, nor 
was the amount of  the hst preferred stock to be increased, except 
with the consent, in each instance, of  the holders of  a majority of 
the whole amount of  each class of  preferred stock, given at a meeting 
of the stockholders called for that purpose, and with the consent of 
the holders of  a  majority of  such part  of  the  common  stock as 
be represented at such meeting, the holders of  each class of 
stock voting  separately;  neither  was  the  amount  of  the  second 
preferred stock to be  increased,  except  in  a  similar  way.  These 
careful clauses made some provision for future capital requirements 
necessary which should be independent of  the consent of  the stock- 
holders at any time ;  and $20,000,000 general mortgage bonds were 
accordingly  set  aside,  to  be  issued  in  amounts not  greater  than 
$1,500,000 in any one year for future construction, equipment, and 
the like.  Additional general mortgage bonds were provided to retire 
Philadelphia  & Reading  Terminal  and  Coal  & Iron  Company 
bonds up to the sum of $21,000,000. 
The floating debt,  estimated at  $25,150,000,  was  provided for 
in  part by  assessment, and in part by  the sale of  securities to the 
syndicate for cash; 20 per  cent  being levied  on  first, second, and 
third preference income bonds, 20 per cent on the stock, and 4 per 
cent on  the deferred incomes; while the syndicate agreed to take 
$4,000,000  of  the new general mortgage bonds and $8,000,000 of 
the new first preferred stock.  The assessment was expected to yield 
$20,862,2851, and  the  syndicate  to contribute in  cash $7,300,000; 
leaving an estimated cash balance of  $3,000,000.  In addition, the 
syndicate (Messrs. J. P.  Morgan  & Co., J.  Kennedy Tod  & Co., 
Hallgarten  & Co.,  and  A. Iselin  & Co.)  undertook to  underwrite 
the payment of  the assessments on  the income  bonds and stock, 
ad  to  guarantee  the  extension or payment of  the improvement 
and Coal & Iron Company bonds, most of  which were to 
in  the  following two  years.  No  great  reduction  of  fixed 
charges  was  of  course to be  expected.  The cancellation of  the 
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for the future were estimated at $g,goo,ooo as against net earnings of 
$9,839,971 in  1894; while the refunding or extension of  maturing 
bonds was looked to for a reduction of  $5w,m.' 
It is  plain  that  this  plan  favored  the  general mortgage  bond- 
holders to the last  degree, and admitted  them to the reorganized 
company with absolutely no sacrifice save that of  the addition of 
$4,000,000  to the  total  general  mortgage issue.  They funded  no 
coupons, they suffered no diminution of  interest  and no  shaving 
of  principal ; they  paid no assessment; and as an additional pro- 
tection to them, the provision was inserted that all classes of  stock 
of  the new company, except such number as might  be disposed of 
to qualify directors, were  to be voted by  three voting  trustees, of 
whom J. P.  Morgan  and F. P. Olcott were  designated in the plan. 
It has seldom happened  in  any  reorganization that  a  mortgage 
similar to the general mortgage in  this case  has been able to take 
and hold so strong a position.= The secret lay in the fact that the road 
had been earning the interest on the general mortgage bonds; and 
that under  these  circumstances no interest or combination of  in- 
terests could force the holders to accept  less than payment in full 
of  all their claims.  The situation could never  have arisen in  the 
earlier reorganization; it  could  never  have occurred where  a  re- 
duction in  annual payments was required for the salvation of  the 
property, or even where the amount of  cash to be raised  to pay the 
floating debt was so  large that  junior  securityholders would  have 
relinquished  their  holdings  rather  than  pay  the  necessary assess- 
ments.  In this  case none of  these conditions existed, and all the 
burden was thrown on  the  holders of  junior  mortgages and stock. 
It must  be  remembered, also,  that  though  in  ordinary  cases the 
difference between  the income bonds which the old iirst and second 
preference bondholders surrendered and the  preferred stock which 
they  received  would  not  have  been  very  great,  yet  here the  pro- 
visions of  the old  income mortgage, which forbade the deduction 
from net earnings of  any interest on bonds subsequently created until 
its interest should have been paid, rendered the loss more serious. 
To sum up, the holders of  junior  securities and stock paid  the 
expenses of  reorganization, paid the floating  debt, lost  what right 
they had to interest before the settlement of  interest on s~bse~uentl~ 
Ry.  Times,  68:  802,  1895;  Chron. 61:  1109,1895.  a  Ry.  Age,  20: 625, 1895. 
created  claims, and  got  only stock, and for the  most  part  second 
preferred or common stock at that.  The general mortgage bond- 
holders got new 4 per cent bonds, plus 12  per cent, or 2 per cent in 
cash, had no greater interest charges ahead of  them, and without 
paying any assessment or making any concession, except to  allow 
the immediate increase of  the amount of their issue  by  $4,ooo,om, 
and thereafter by $1,5m,m per  year, secured a lien on  the assets 
of  the company; a privilege which was, moreover, extended to un- 
deposited as well  as to deposited bonds.  The company itself was 
dissolved, but the new corporation which  took over its assets en- 
joyed,  with slightly decreased charges, freedom from  the old float- 
ing  debt  and  from  the  extensions  and  combinations which  had 
caused the floating debt of  the old management, and seemed besides 
a strong financial backing. 
In May, 1896, Judge Atchison of Philadelphia signed the decree 
for the foreclosure and sale of  the  property of both the Railroad 
and  the Coal  & Iron  Companies,  and  on  September 23  the sale 
took  place,  C.  H.  Coster, of  J. P.  Morgan  & Co.,  and  Francis 
Lynde  Stetson  paying  an  aggregate of  $20,500,000 for  the whole 
estate.'  The sale ended the life of  the old Reading charter ;  and in 
view  of  the constitution adopted  for the state of  Pennsylvania in 
1871,  which  forbade any railroad owning more  than  30,000 acres 
of coal land, some device had to be sought whereby the Philadelphia 
& Reading Railroad and the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron 
Companies could hold together.  Diligent search revealed the exist- 
ence of the "National  Company,"  a corporation chartered in 1871 
by  special  act  of  the  legislature of  Pennsylvania at  the very  time 
when the new constitution was under consideration.  This company, 
odginally the Excelsior Enterprise Company, had power  "to  pur- 
chase, improve, use, and dispose of  property to contractors and others 
and for other purposes,"  with privileges fully as broad, it was said, 
as those enjoyed by the Reading before foreclo~ure.~  The National 
Company now  changed its name to the Reading Company, called 
a special meeting, increased  its stock to  the  amount  required  by 
the plan of reorganization, and, jointly with the Coal & Iron 6m- 
Pany, authorized a mortgage to secure bonds up to a possible amount 
$13~,mo,ooo  ;  to be secured on the property of  both companies. 
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including the  stock and bonds of  the Railway Company.  Mean- 
while the  Philadelphia  & Reading  Railway Company had  been 
organized to succeed to the property and franchises of  the old Phil- 
adelphia  & Reading  Railroad  Company,' with  a  capital  stock  of 
$~O,~OO,OOO  in $50 shares.  The charter of  the Coal  & Iron Corn- 
pany was preserved in spite of  the foreclosure sale.2 The next step 
was for the Reading Company to exchange its bonds and stock for 
the general mortgage bonds and stock of  the two minor companies 
in the proportions already agreed upon, and to deposit the securities 
so obtained in its treasury ;  leaving the prior liens the only direct ob- 
ligations of  either company in the hands of  the public.  This meant, 
of  course, absolute control of  both companies by the Reading Com- 
pany; and in the future, when the prior liens should mature, it was 
to mean  the replacement of  all outstanding obligations by the ob- 
ligations of  the holding company.  Both the Railway and the Coal & 
Iron Companies retained their separate organizations ;  the belief  was 
that there was no merger which might be attacked before the courts; 
that it only happened that one corporate individual had invested in 
both Railroad and Coal Company shares and proposed to vote this 
stock, as was lawful, to further the policies of  which it appr~ved.~ 
Chron. 63: 923, 1896. 
Vee  testimony of  Mr. Baer before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1904, 
"Synopsis of  Stenographers'  Minutes, etc., in the case of  W. R. Hearst against the 
Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company," p. 55.  The managers wished to take no 
chances. 
Organization and scope of the three Reading Companies.  The Reading Com- 
pany owns practically the whole of  the capital stock of  the Philadelphia  & Reading 
Railway  Company and the Philadelphia  & Reading Coal  & Iron  Company, and 
all of  the other stocks and securities which were acquired  by  the purchases under 
the sale  made  by  the Trustees  and the Receivers.  It also owns the  $ZO,OOO,OO~ 
purchase  money mortgage bonds issued  by the Philadelphia  & Reading  Railway 
Company,  the locomotives, cars, steam collieries, tugs, and barges constituting the 
railway  and marine equipment, and all  the real estate of  the old  Philadelphia  & 
Reading Railroad Company which was not appurtenant to the railroad itself.  This, 
of  course,  does  not  include  the  depots,  rights of  way, etc.,  which belong to the 
Railway Company.  The Philadelphia  & Reading Railway  Company owns all the 
roads formerly belonging  to the Philadelphia  & Reading Railroad Company, and 
it controls the roads hitherto leased to that company, either by transfer of the old 
leases or by new leases made since November 30,  1896.  It leases from the Reading 
Company  the  railway  and marine equipment  which it uses  in  the conduct of  Its 
business and a number of  wharves and warehouses on the Delaware River.  Annua1 
Report, 1898. 
~~~resentatives  of the reorganization managers laid an elaborate 
defence of  the legality of these operations before Attorney-General 
Mccormick of  Pennsylvania, and on  January  2 secured an opinion 
confirming the  validity of  the charter of  the Reading  Company. 
"After  due  consideration,"  said  Mr.  McCormick, "I reach  the 
conclusion, most  reluctantly, that  the  Commonwealth of  Pennsyl- 
vania  cannot  now  successfully attack  the  chartered rights of  the 
Reading Company. . . . My  view of the whole matter is that the 
charter of  the company authorized it to do the kind of  business in 
which it engaged prior to January I, 1874, which business was of  the 
same general character as that in which it  proposes to engage for 
the purpose of  controlling the stocks of  the Railway Company and 
the Coal  & Iron Company." ' 
Like the Baltimore & Ohio and the Erie, the Reading has bene- 
fited largely  from  the  favorable business  conditions of  the  last 
decade.  The combined income of  the three Reading compahies has 
grown from $48,422,971 in  1898 to $95,715,088 in 1907.'  Earnings 
on the Philadelphia  & Reading Railway alone are now nearly as 
great as the combined income of  the three companies at the earlier 
date.  Net  receipts were  $13,586,710 in  1898  and  $29,190,316  in 
1907 ; and the surplus over  all  payments rose from $1,376,420 to 
$8,74r,454 between those years.  It is important to notice that this 
showing  does not  depend  primarily upon  the anthracite business. 
Not  only has the carriage of  general merchandise increased  untiI 
it affords  to the railway a return almost equal to the earnings on coal, 
but in the coal business itself  bituminous has assumed an import- 
ance nearly as great as that of  its harder  rival.  The Coal & Iron 
Company still concerns itself  almost entirely with  anthracite,  and 
has accordingly been  more afFected  by  special causes.  The strike 
of the miners in September and October, 1900, and again from May 
to October,  1902, checked the growth in production for a time; but 
the increased demand for domestic consumption has made possible 
increase ih output from 4,849,002  tons  in  1897 to  10,034,713  "  1907.  Increasing business has stimulated improvements.  Over 
$15,3m,mo have been withdrawn from income by  the Philadelphia 
Chron. 64: 84, 1897. 
a  There are certain duplications in both of these figures, but the same duplications 
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& Reading Railway Company for this purpose between  18516 and 
1907 ; and over  $~o,ooo,ooo  have been  invested from earnings by 
the  Coal  & Iron Company during the  same time in colliery im- 
provements alone.  Maintenance charges have been ample.  Whereas 
$1300 to $1500 per mile of  single main track are sufficient  for normal 
repairs upon a trunk line, the Philadelphia  & Reading Railway has 
spent over $2600 per mile of line for the last seven years, and over 
$1700 for the three years preceding.  As much as $73 has been spent 
in a single year  for average maintenance per  freight car, $60~  in 
maintenance per passenger car, and $3244 in maintenance per loco- 
motive.  In consequence of  these repairs and of  renewals  upon  a 
considerable scale, the average value of  all locomotives has increased 
between December I, 1896, and June 30,1906, from $4906 to $8393; 
the average value of  freight cars producing revenue from $383 to 
$622; the average value of  steam colliers and tugs from $41,~~~  to 
$55,451 ; and the average value of  barges from $75130 to $21,074. 
The average freight train load was  194 tons in 1897 and 403 tons 
in 1907.  Ton-mileage has increased during the period 159 per cent 
and freight train mileage only 27  per cent. 
It is true that no great sums have been spent from capital account. 
$5,137,825  in  car  trust  certificates were outstanding  on  June 30, 
1907, and $5,608,~~  in general mortgage bonds have been sold and 
the proceeds invested principally in new equipment, but this is all. 
Improvements have  been  made mainly  from earnings, and fixed 
charges have not had to be  increased.  In fact, the voting trustees 
stated at the expiration of their trusteeship in  1904 that, eliminating 
the fixed charges created since December I, 1896, on account of the 
acquisition of  additional properties and interest upon the additional 
mortgage  bonds issued for the purchase of  equipment, the fixed 
charges of  the Reading system were  $1,018,065  less for the fiscal 
year ended June 30,1904, than they were for the fiscal year ended 
November 30,  1896.' 
It thus comes about that the hances  of the Reading, while not as 
secure as could  be desired, are yet in better  shape than they have 
been for thirty years.  Fixed charges, taxes, and operating expenses ' 
took 86  per cent of  gross income in  1907,  but a decline of  nearly 
$12,000,000  in  net earnings must precede a default on any bonds 
To this  margin  should  be  added  the  considerable 
amount  by  which  maintenance  expenses  now  surpass  normal 
figures.  An initial dividend was declared on the Reading Company 
first preferred stock in August, 1900; on its second preferred in Octo- 
ber,  1903; and on its common in  February, 1905.  Four per cent is 
now being paid upon all classes of  stock. 
Large  amounts of  Reading  stock are held  by  the  Baltimore & 
Ohio and by the Lake Shore.  The Reading has again bought control 
of  the Central of  New  Jersey,  and owns besides a steamship line 
and something under 500 miles in other subsidiary roads.  Its large 
earnings, its troubles with its mine employees, its influence over the 
supply of  a necessity  of  life, and the possibility of  discrimination 
which its control of both railroad and coal properties affords, have 
made it a target for legislative attack from state and national gov- 
ernments.  Action was begun by the Department of  Justice in I907 
to dissolve the merger between the Reading and the Central of  New 
Jersey.  In June  of  the  previous  year  the  so-called "commodity 
clause"  of  the  Hepburn  Act  forbade  any  railroad  company  to 
transport in interstate commerce any article except timber and the 
manufactured products thereof  which it should have produced, or 
in which it should have any interest, except those products necessary 
and intended for its own use in its business as common carrier.  The 
legality of  the Reading's position in these matters is yet to be decided 
by  the  courts.  The student  may  well  doubt  whether  legislative 
action  will  ever  succeed  in  preventing  the common ownership of 
the Reading railroad and mining interests.  What is more probable 
is  that  a  strict  governmental control will  come  to  be  imposed. 
Against this proper development  no appeal  to legal  technicalities 
will  avail. 
Chron. 79: 2087,  1904. 
'  See the nineteenth volume of the Industrial Commission's report for a brief de- 
scription of  the renewed attempt at consdidation in the anthracite coal fields; also 
testimony in the case of  W. R. Hearst against the Philadelphia  & Reading Railway 
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CHAPTER  V 
THE SOUTHERN 
Richmond  & Danville -  East Tennessee, Virginia  & Georgia -  Formation of  the 
Southern  Railway  Security  Company -  Growth  and  Combinations -  Failure 
and reorganization  of  the  East  Tennessee -Reversal  of  position  between the 
Richmond & Danville and the Richmond & West  Point Terminal -  Acquisition 
of the Central of  Georgia -  Failure and reorganization of  the whole system - 
Subsequent development. 
AT the present time there are in  the South five great railway sys- 
tems :  the Atlantic Coast Lie  ;  the Seaboard Air  Line ; the South- 
em Railway; the Louisville  & Nashville Railroad; and the Illinois 
Central Railroad,  which  cover, in  the order  named,  the territory 
between  the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi River. 
The backbone of  the  Southern Railway  is formed by  the  old 
Richmond  & Danville  and  East  Tennessee, Virginia  & Georgia 
companies :  of  which the first formerly stretched with its subsidiary 
lines from  Washington  and Richmond on  the  north  to  Atlanta, 
Georgia, and Greenville, Mississippi, on the south and west; and 
the second reached from Bristol, Tennessee, in a great half  circle 
to the ocean at Brunswick, Georgia, and by  means of  the Mobile 
& Birmingham straight to the Gulf  at Mobile. 
The Richmond & Danville was opened  in  1856  between  Rich- 
mond  and Danville,  Virginia.  It was  largely  aided  by  the  state 
of  Virginia.  Three-fifths of  its  stock were  owned by  the state in 
1867, there was a  state loan of  $400,m, and a state guarantee of 
$2oo,ooo  besides.'  In natural consequence  the state elected three 
of  the six directors.  It was not  long, however, before the state was 
able to relieve itself  of  a large part of  its investment.  On the 31~t 
of  August,  1871,  all  of  the state  shares were  taken  over  by  the 
The Virginia state bonds were redeemable  in 34 years from April 8,  1853,  to 
September 30, 1854,  by the payment of an annuity of  7 per cent.  Of  this rate 6 per 
cent covered the interest  and I per cent, by continuous reinvestment  at 6 per cent, 
was expected to yield the principal sum in the 34  years agreed upon.  Annual Repod, 
1867. Like  most  new  companies, the  Richmond  &  Danville  found  difficulty at 
first in meeting its obligations, and was obliged to issue bonds to provide for overdue 
interest to the state and to keep its floating debt within bounds.  R. R. Gaz. 5: 4991 
1873, and Ibid. 5: 507, 1873. 
pennsylvania Railroad  Company.'  The money sunk in the com- 
pany's bonds still remained.  From Danville the Richmond & Dan- 
ville steadily pushed  south  iu  the  years following 1856.  Under 
the leadership of the Pennsylvania it became its ambition to open 
direct  rail  communication from the  great  Northern  cities to  the 
heart  of  North  and  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  To obtain  a 
ninety-mile extension to  Charlotte the company leased  the North 
Carolina Railroad, 223  miles in length.'  To get into Atlanta it allied 
itself  with the Atlanta  & Richmond Air Line Company, projected 
to  construct  a  line  between  Atlanta  and  Charl~tte.~  In  1878 it 
bought  a  controlling interest  in  the  Charlotte,  Columbia  & Au- 
gusta Railroad and secured entrance to the latter city.3 The Penn- 
sylvania  aided  the  new  enterprise  by  advances  from  time  to 
time,  and when the current  liabilities became  unmanageable took 
$~,ooo,ooo  of  a new refunding mortgage.' 
Meanwhile  the  East  Tennessee, Virginia  & Georgia  Railroad 
had  been  established to  the  west  of  the  Richmond  & Danville, 
in  the heart  of  the southern Appalachians.'  This company was a 
consolidation in  1869 of  the East Tennessee  & Virginia Railroad, 
from  Bristol,  on  the  boundary  between  Virginia  and Tennessee, 
to Knoxville, Tennessee ; and  the East Tennessee & Georgia Rail- 
road, from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Dalton,  Georgia.  Both roads 
were  aided by  the state of  Tennessee.  In 1870, however, the new 
company extinguished  its  debt  to  the  state  by  the  payment  of 
$4,1 I 7,761 in state bonds.  Not long after the completion of  its line 
from Bristol to  Dalton, the  East  Tennessee fell under the control 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, which already dominated its neighbor 
R. R. Gaz.  3: 279, 1871. This road stretched from Goldsboro in the eastern 
part  of  North  Carolina to Charlotte in the southwestern  part, via Greensboro.  It 
was  principally owned  by  the state of  North Carolina.  By the terms of  the lease 
the Richmond  & Danville agreed to pay $260,000 per annum for thirty years. 
The whole  road was opened for traffic in September,  1873. It went  into the 
hands of a receiver in 1874,  and was sold in foreclosure in 1876;  but the Pennsylvania 
Pailroad relieved the Richmond & Danville from all collateral liabilities incurred on 
Its account.  The reorganized line was leased by the Richmond  & Danville in 1881. 
Chron. 32: ;07,  1881. 
'  Annu-d  R  :J  ..t,  1878. 
'  Ibid.  18;4. 
Ulrich B. Phillips,  A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to 
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to the east.  To facilitate the control and to unify the interests of 
the  Pennsylvania south of  Washington a  "Southern  Railway Se- 
curity Company"  was formed, with a capital of $~,wo,wo.  This 
company was entrusted with  a majority of the stock of the Rich- 
mond  & Danville and of  the East  Tennessee.  It also controlled 
the Coast  Line  railroads from Richmond to  Charleston, and the 
Memphis  &  Charleston  from  Chattanooga  to  Memphis.'  Un- 
fortunately  the  financial  results  of  the  combination  were  disap- 
pointing.  Of  the subsidiary roads the East Tennessee managed to 
pay at least 3 per  cent on its capital stock from 1872 to 1876; but 
the Richmond & Danville paid  nothing, the Coast Lines nothing, 
and  the  Memphis  & Charleston barely  earned  the  3  per  cent 
guaranteed  under its lease.  In 1873, therefore, a special meeting 
was held  at the office of  the Southern Railway Security Company 
to consider the propriety of  making sale of  certain properties of  the 
~ompany.~  In 1874 the lease of  the  Memphis  & Charleston was 
~urrendered,~  and in  1876 the bulk of  the securities held, outside 
of  the Richmond  & Danville stock, were disposed of.4 
The  retirement  of  the  Southern  Railway  Security  Company 
marked the beginning of  the withdrawal of  the Pennsylvania from 
investment in  the  South.  For the rest, it  left  the  lines north  of 
South Carolina in  three main competing groups.  There were  the 
Coast  Lines  from  Richmond  south, the  Richmond  & Danville, 
and  the  East  Tennessee,  Virginia  &  Georgia  properties.  And 
stretching  from  west  to  east  was  the  Memphis  &  Charleston, 
which was already in  financial difficulties of  a serious nature.  All 
three of  these groups were now thrown upon their own resources; 
and two of  them,  at  least, took vigorous  measures in  self-protec- 
tion.  The policy of  the East Tennessee was the most  aggressive. 
Shut  up in  the narrow  valley between  the Clinch  and the  Great 
Smoky Mountains, and flanked by  hostile roads, it conceived it  to 
be necessary for it to acquire connections to the south, to the east, 
and to the west.  Accordingly, it  leased the Memphis & Charleston 
in  1877  and obtained  an  outlet upon  the  Mississippi ~iver.' In 
Including 37  miles of  running rights over the N., C.  & St. L. 
R. R. Gaz.  5: 475,  1873.  Ibid. 6: 178,  1874.  4  Ibid.  8: 540, 1876. 
The Memphis & Charleston  stockholders  agreed  to the  lease in order to avoid 
bankruptcy.  At  a meeting in May,  1877, it was pointed  out to them that the net 
it  bought  the  Georgia Southern  and the  Selma,  Rome  & 
Dalton and provided itself with a line as far south as the Flint River 
in  Alabama.'  In 1881 it  bought the Alabama Central, extending 
some 96 miles west from Selma.  The same year it secured control 
of  the  Macon  & Brunswick in  Georgia,  and began  construction 
from Macon to Rome to complete a line to the South Atlantic coast.2 
In  the north  it  made an  alliance with  the  Norfolk  & Western, 
which  opened  that company's line from Bristol  to  Norfolk13  and 
arranged with the Louisville  & Nashville and the Kentucky Cen- 
tral  for construction to  a connection  at the  Kentucky-Tennessee 
state line which should open to it the business of  the Central West.' 
The Richmond  & Danville  fell under  the  control  of  a  group 
of  capitalists who  already controlled the Atlantic Coast lines and 
held  an interest in  the East  Tennessee, and who now  bought the 
24,000  shares  of  Danville  stock  still  held  by  the  Pennsylvania 
Railr~ad.~  Like its rival, it  enlarged its system.  It leased the At- 
lanta  & Charlotte Air  Line in  1881,'  with certain minor roads in 
the  Carolinas and in  Georgia.  In 1882,  under the charter of  the 
Georgia Pacific, it  began  construction westward from Atlanta to 
the Mississippi.  It did not stretch out, as did the East Tennessee, 
but  it  secured  a  very  complete  control  of  the  territory  between 
earnings of  the road had not been enough to pay the interest on its bonds, and that 
a large amount was due to the state of  Tennessee which the company had no present 
means of  paying.  Either an assessment on the stock or a lease to the East Tennessee 
was declared to be necessary.  Accordingly, a lease was concluded.  The East Ten- 
nessee  agreed so to discharge the principal  of  the company's  indebtedness to the 
state as to reduce the annual interest account from $360,000 to $310,000 as a maxi- 
mum, and upon  the fulfilment of  this and of  certain other minor conditions  took 
over the operation of  the road.  Two years later the lease was extended for twenty 
Years at a definite rental amounting to 7 per cent on $4,225,000 or a yearly payment 
of $295,750.  See R. R. Gaz. 9: 421,  1877, and Ibid. 11: 672, 1879. 
The Selma, Rome & Dalton was bought from the purchasers at foreclosure sale 
for $2,6oo,ooo.  The Georgia  Southern  cost  $367,369  Outstanding  debts  were 
assumed.  To  provide for these and other outlays $ro,mo,ooo  new 5 per cent bonds 
were authorized.  R. R. Gaz.  12: 622,  1880. 
This line was completed in  1882.  Chron.  35: 430,  1882; R. R. Gaz. 13: 420, 
1881. 
\'  Chron. 33: 357,  1881. 
'  R. R.  Gaz.  13: 420,  1881. 
Prominent among them were Messrs. Clyde, of  the Coast Line railroads, Wilson 
and McGhee of  the East Tennessee, Stewart, Plant, Logan, and others. 
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Richmond  in  the north  and Augusta,  Savannah,  and Atlanta in 
the south.  In 1881,  also, the  Richmond  & Danville took a step 
destined  to  have  important  consequences.  Since  it  desired  to 
acquire certain railroads, and since its charter  allowed it to hold 
stock in none  but  connecting lines, it  caused  to  be  incorporated 
a so-called Richmond  & West  Point Terminal Railway  & Ware- 
house  Company,  with  authority  to  acquire  stocks and bonds of 
railroad companies in North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and other states.  This 
company  increased  its  stock  by  October,  1881,  to  $3,000,000; 
of  which the Richmond  & Danville then owned $1,510,000.  The 
most  important  acquisition  which  it  made  at  the  time  was  the 
Virginia  Midland  Railway,  from Alexandria,  Virginia,  to  Dan- 
ville; but other additions were to follow. 
The independent action of  the Danville and East Tennessee corn- 
panies was followed by a new consolidation which reunited most of 
the lines dominated by the old Security Company.  In response to 
queries in August, 1883, Mr. Calvin S. Brice admitted that a syndi- 
cate in which he was interested had bought control of  the Richmond 
& Danville. 
"We have secured," said he, "about 28,000 of  the 50,000 shares of 
stock issued by the Richmond & Danville Company. Our syndicate 
controls, besides our new purchase, the East Tennessee, Virginia & 
Georgia Railway and the Chesapeake & York River line of  steamers 
that ply  between  West  Point,  on  the Chesapeake, and Baltimore, 
and has close traffic arrangements with the Clyde steamers, which 
run between New York and Philadelphia and all Southern points. 
Our purpose is to confine all our railroad and steamship lines under 
one management, and to equip and operate the system in  the best 
possible manner." ' 
It appears from this statement that the capitalists who controlled 
the East Tennessee now again consolidated with the leading inter- 
ests of  the Richmond  & Danville and lines east, albeit changes in 
personnel  and transfers of  holdings occurred.  Return  to  the old 
combination was made desirable by  the more intimate connection 
of  the two groups of  roads.  The Western North Carolina had been 
opened across the mountains of  North  Carolina in 1882. This bad 
1 Chmn. 37: 128, 1883. 
practicable the  diversion  of  the western  traffic of  the East 
Tennessee from the Norfolk  & Western to the Richmond & Dan- 
ville ;  a traffic which the northern connections of  the East Tennessee 
promised  largely  to  increase.  Consolidation  was  doubtless  also 
prompted by  the desire to  save the East  Tennessee from serious 
financial difficulty which  threatened  it.  It had  become  apparent 
that this company, at least, had severely taxed its strength in the 
rapid extension of  mileage which had  followed 1876.  Before that 
time its position had been secure.  It had possessed a monopoly of 
the somewhat limited local traffic between Chattanooga and Bristol, 
and had formed part of  the most direct route between New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and towns in Tennessee, 
Northern Alabama, and  Mississippi.  Its extensions had  changed 
the situation.  They had brought it into touch with the Mississippi 
River and the Atlantic Ocean, and had increased its fighting power; 
but they had also endowed it at large cost with a group of  poorly 
equipped, unprofitable lines located in a keenly competitive territory. 
The Selma, Rome  & Dalton had been purchased just  after a fore- 
closure sale.  The Macon  & Brunswick had never been able to earn 
much more than working expenses.  The Alabama Central had not 
seen fit to publish its hancial figures after 1878, while the Memphis 
& Charleston, as we  have seen, had turned to the East Tennessee 
only to escape bankruptcy. 
The East Tennessee had hoped to make profitable the lines which 
it had so rapidly acquired.  Unfortunately the company was poorly 
equipped for  such a  task.  Its finance had  been  extravagant.  In 
1875, on 269 miles of  lines there had been $7317  in stock and $15,- 
620 in  bonds per mile.  In 1883 the mortgage bonds and car trusts 
outstanding per mile owned amounted to $23,444, the income bonds 
to $15,404, and the capital stock to $41,079.  A grand total of $79,927 
as compared with the $2~,~37  of  eight years earlier, and an average 
of  almost  $~w,ooo  in  securities  per  mile  of  new  line acquired! 
Ninety-nine per cent of  net income was being absorbed in  paying 
interest on all classes of  securities, although maintenance figures were 
kept as low  as $630  per  mile of  line.  This large volume of  stocks 
and bonds made improvement from earnings impossible,  and pre- 
vented conservative management by  taking from the stockholders 
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stock to less than $5  per share.  And though in some respects the 
location of  the system was good, the route which it offered to much 
of  its business was indirect, the competition which it had to meet 
was severe, and its Atlantic terminal, Brunswick, was of small im- 
portance compared with the thriving cities of  Savannah and Norfolk. 
The result was a failure to secure the gains from consolidation which 
had been expected.  Surplus earnings were continuously small, and 
current bills were left to run; until  by 1883 the floating debt  had 
become so large that  an  issue  of  $r,noo,ooo  in  debenture  bonds 
was required to take care of  it. 
The failure of  the East Tennessee to weld  its connections into an 
efficient transportation  system left  it helpless in  face of the  panic 
of  1884.  Earnings fell off  in that  year, a directors' committee was 
appointed,'  and  the resulting report revealed a  plain inability on 
the part of  the company to meet its charges. 
"The interest charges proper for the calendar year 1885  are," said 
the committee,  $1,476,505.85 
"To  this must be  added the principal due on  car trusts and 
debentures in 1885,  280,954.11 
"Or  a total of  $1,757,459.9~ 
"The  payments on similar account will be - 
in 1886,  $1,7391'196.28 
in 1887,  1,720,932.60 
gradually decreasing until the debentures and car trusts 
being paid off  in 1894, the total fixed charges for the year 
1895 will be  $1,295,970.~ 
"The  net revenue for the year 1883-4  was  1,699,925.~4 
"The net revenue for 1885 and 1886, allowing for the decrease 
in earnings following the panic, and supposing the road to be 
operated for 60 per cent, may be estimated at  $1,4m,0@'.O0 
"This  will  leave,"  said  the  committee,  "an  annual  deficit  of 
$350,000, to which  must  be  added  a total of  $~,m,ooo  required 
by  the  general  manager  for  steel  rails,  iron  bridges,  and  other 
needed improvements. 
"The sums for covering these expenses should not be raised by 
temporary loans, as this would not relieve the company of  its embar- 
rassments nor  place its finances  upon a sound footing.  It cannot 
be raised by  an additional mortgage, on account of the provisions 
of the  mortgage securing the income bonds.  It must and can be 
Chron. 39: 733,  1884. 
raised  from a funding of coupons which shall leave the earnings of 
the company sufficiently free to meet the demands upon them.  The 
committee therefore recommends : 
(I) "That the holders of  the consolidated  5 per  cent bonds be 
asked  to  fund  four coupons,  being  those  maturing  January  and 
~uly  I, 1885,  and  January  and  July  I,  1886,  by  depositing said 
four coupons with  the  Central  Trust Company of  New  York, as 
trustee, and receiving instead  the company's funded  coupon  bond 
dated July I, 1885, and bearing 6 per cent interest per annum from 
that date, . . .  which bond  shall run ten  years from its date and 
be redeemable at the pleasure of  the company at par and accrued 
interest after three years, on three months' notice ;  such funded cou- 
pon  bond  to  be  secured by  the coupons so  deposited, the lien  of 
which will be in all respects preserved. 
"The total extensions under this clause would be $1,467,400. 
(2)  "That  the  holders of  the  $2,ooo,ooo  of  the  Cincinnati  & 
Georgia Division first mortgage 6 per cent  bonds be asked to fund 
four coupons, . . .  being those maturing March and September I, 
1885, and  March  and  September I, 1886, . . . and accepting in 
lieu thereof  a funded coupon  bond . . .  dated  September I, 1885. 
"The total amount extended under this clause would be $240,000. 
(3)  "That the holders of  the debentures be asked to extend for 
ten years such of  the debentures as fall due during the years 1885 
and 1886, and to accept similar debentures running from five to ten 
years, for the interest. . . . 
"The total amount extended under this clause would be $373,200. 
(4)  "That an arrangement be made with the holders of  the car 
trust certificates of  the company, series A, for an extension for ten 
years of all the payments of principal falIing due in 1885 and 1886, 
being $~oo,ooo  in each year. 
"The  total  amount  extended  under  this  clause  would  be 
$200,000." 
The committee had an apology to offer for the state itl which the 
company was placed.  "The actual cost of the 1g0 miles of  the new 
roads constructed by the company has largely exceeded,"  said they, 
('the estjmated cost.  The physical condition of  the roads purchased 
by the company necessitated the expenditure of  large sums in the 
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improvement of  roadway and track ;  the construction  and reconstruc- 
tion of  bridge masonry and bridge superstructure.  The facilities for 
the conduct  of  the  company's  business were  entirely inadequate 
to the requirements of  its increasing traffic and had to be enlarged. 
Unfortunately the company did not fully provide for these expend- 
itures, and the shrinkage of  the value of  its securities greatly aggra- 
vated the evil."  This much was very true.  In its criticism of  existing 
facilities the committee was on sure ground.  In  its suggestions for 
relief it was less well advised.  It seems to have felt that the East 
Tennessee's  difficulties were  due to a temporary  inability to raise 
cash for the improvement of  its roadbed and equipment, and that 
the suspension of  certain charges for a few years would allow the 
expenditure of  liberal sums from income, ensure the improvement 
of the road, and bring about a condition of  permanent prosperity. 
The truth was that the East Tennessee was in too bad a shape to be 
reBtablished by such means.  The heavily burdened and physically 
defective lines which made up the system were past being restored 
from income even with the aid of  a funding of  a few years' coupons. 
They required a dehitive surrender of  portions of  the claims against 
them, extensive new charges to capital account, and a correspond- 
ingly complete reconstruction of  their whole operating plant.'  The 
practical service which the committee rendered was not in  suggest- 
ing an adequate remedy for existing troubles, but in making plain 
how  serious these troubles were.  So imminent, in  fact, did they 
show collapse to be,  that the management determined  to forestall 
hostile action by themselves asking for the appointment of  a receiver ; 
and on  January  7 the Circuit Court appointed Henry Fink to that 
p~sition.~  The committee's  funding scheme fell of  its own weight. 
The committee overestimated the net earnings of  the next few years.  Instead 
of  $1,400,000  each year these proved to be  $1,288,343 in 1885  and $1,382,749 in 
1886. 
a  Chron.  40:  60,  1885.  There was some dispute as to the  jurisdiction of  the 
different court. in this connection.  The Circuit Court appointed Mr.  Fink receiver 
for the whole line on January 7.  The next day a state court appointed R. T. DorseY 
and E.  P.  Alexander receivers for the lines in  Georgia under  another  mortgage. 
This iuit was removed to the Federal Court and Dorsey, who had meantime been 
appointed sole  receiver in Georgia, was  displaced.  Subsequently the Georgia Su- 
preme  Court held that the transfer was illegal, and Dorsey vainly endeavored to 
mgain his position.  The  dispute was ended by the withdrawal of  the suit upon which 
the Georgia application was based. 
The decrease in the earnings of  the company, a truer appreciation 
of its condition, and, it may be surmised, the influence of  New York 
banking houses,  forced  it  to  make room for  a thorough plan  of 
kancial reconstruction. 
Action  looking  toward  reorganization  of  the  East  Tennessee, 
virginia  & Georgia began with the  year  1886.  In  January  Mr. 
Nelson  Robinson,'  who  had  held  proxies  for a  controlling stock 
interest at  the previous election, returned  from Europe; and after 
a conference with  certain Iarge  bondholders agreed with  them to ' 
draft a plan  for the reorganization of  the property.  A reorganiza- 
tion committee was chosen from members of  large banking firms,' 
meetings were held, and in the first part of  February, 1886, a scheme 
was put forth.  This plan comprised the following points: 
(I) Reduction of  fixed  charges ; 
(2)  Exchange of  new bonds and preferred stock for old bonds; 
(3) Assessment on the junior  securities; 
(4)  Foreclosure. 
Foreclosure was to take place under the consolidated mortgage. 
A  new  5  per  cent  seventy-year  consolidated  mortgage was then 
to be created.  Enough of  the bonds under this mortgage were to 
be  reserved  to  retire  the  liens  prior  to  the  existing consolidated 
mortgage as they should mature, and the balance was to be  used 
for taking  up the outstanding consolidated mortgage  bonds,  the 
Cincinnati & Georgia division bonds, and the ten-year debentures. 
It was estimated that the exchanges wouId reduce the annual interest 
charge from $I, 757,460 to $994,737.  This necessitated consider- 
able demands upon old securityholders.  Thus the old consolidated 
mortgage bonds  bearing  5  per cent received  only 60  per  cent of 
their face value in new consolidated bonds with  the same rate of 
interest;  and  the  old  6 per  cent  Cincinnati  &  Georgia division 
Son-in-law of  George Seney. 
This committcr was chosen by  the consolidated bondholders.  Its membership 
consisted of Robert Fleming, a representative of  the foreign holders ;  Charles McGhee, 
President of  the  Memphis & Charleston; G. W. Smith, of  Kountze Bros.; Frederic 
D.  Tappan, president of  the GaUatin National Bank;  E. W  Corlies, vice-president 
the Bank of  America; and Frederick P.  Olcott, president of  the  Central Trust 
which was trustee of  the mortgages of  the company.  Chmn. 41:  155,1886. 
'  As might have been expected, this estimate was  too optimistic.  The actual re- 
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bonds  received  only  48  per  cent  in  consols,  besides  suffering  a 
decrease in  interest rate from 6 to  5  per cent.  The difference was 
made up by the allowance of  preferred  stock, to which, moreover, 
was given the right for five years to elect a majority of  the board 
of directors, unless before that time the new company should have 
paid out of  its net earnings 5 per cent dividends on such preferred 
stock for two full successive years.  To the Cincinnati  & Georgia 
division bonds were given 62 per cent in new first preferred besides 
the 48 per cent in bonds, -  a total of IIO  per cent; upon which the 
yield  in  prosperous  times  might  exactly  equal  the  yield  on  the 
securities which they surrendered.  To  the consolidated bonds were 
given  50  per  cent in new  first  preferred,  making possible a  total 
return  greater  than  that  which  they  had  formerly  enjoyed.  For 
the debentures was made the same provision as for the divisional 
bonds.  In order that net earnings might go first of  all to the prior 
liens and to the above securities, new second preferred and common 
stock was issued for the benefit of  the old income bonds and stock. 
Of these  the income  bonds .received 100  per  cent  in new  second 
preferred; while the old  preferred received  100  per  cent  and the 
old common stock 40 per cent in new common.  Only in return for 
their assessments did the income bonds receive first preferred stock, 
and  even  for  their  assessment  the  common  stock  took  second 
preferred.  Cash assessments were  5  per cent on the income mort- 
gage and 6 per cent on the new common stock.  This was expected 
to yield $2,475,000, which, with a surplus of  new securities in the 
treasury  of  $1,534,000,  was  thought  sufficient  to  liquidate  out- 
standing car trusts and to provide the company with a fund avail- 
able  for  future  use.' 
The plan may be criticised  in  some respects.  It made no ade- 
quate provision for future capital requirements.  TWO  millions and 
a half of  cash and two millions of  securities were considerable sums 
in hand, but of  these over half  a million was in the form of stock* 
and from the rest had to be deducted at least a million and a half 
for the liquidation of  car trusts.  This left,  it is true, enough for 
existing  needs,2 but  it  did  not  allow  for  constantly  recurring 
Chron. 42:  1867, 1886.  See also Poor's Manual for 1886. 
The reader will remember that that same year the general manager had estimated 
the sum required for steel rails, iron bridges, and other improvements at $1,000,~' 
legitimate demands for improvements out of  capital in future 
years.  Moreover,  the  securities  given  for  the  consolidated,  the 
cincinnati  & Georgia division, and the debenture bonds exceeded 
by  10 per  cent the nominal  value  of  the bonds retired  by  them. 
~ut  on the whole the reorganization plan was an excellent attempt 
to  solve a  difficult problem.  It proceeded  on a  sound  principle, 
it  laid  the burden on the proper  parties, it  avoided a  funding of 
current liabilities,  and even in respect  to the volume of  securities 
outstanding it  accomplished  a much needed  reform by wiping out 
60  per  cent  of  the almost  worthless  common  stock.'  It was  ac- 
cordingly  accepted  by  the  securityholders.  On  March  18,  the 
reorganization  ccmmittee obtained a  decree  of  sale.2  By  May I, 
practically  all  the consolidated  and income  bonds, with  a  major- 
ity  of  the  preferred stock, had  assented;  and  on  May 25,  1886, 
the  East  Tennessee,  Virginia  & Georgia  Railroad  was  sold  for 
$IO,~~O,OOO  to  a  representative  of  the reorganization  committee. 
Previous to this the opposition committee, which had been formed 
by  the minority stockholders, had di~banded.~  The final step was 
the organization of the East Tennessee,  Virginia  & Georgia Rail- 
It is true that the severity of  the treatment of  the junior securities caused sharp 
protest.  A number of  the stockholders met in New York February 23, and appointed 
a committee to prepare a plan of  assessment and to oppose foreclosure.  Under the 
auspices of  this committee,  Messrs. William  H.  Sistare and Harold  Clemens  filed 
a suit against  the  reorganization committee of  the East  Tennessee  Company.  The 
capitalization  of  the  company, said  they,  had  been  fraudulently  inflated  by  the 
members of  the Thompson-Seney-Brice syndicate.  By false reports these financiers 
had  unloaded  upon  the  public  securities  which  they  had  previously  distributed 
among themselves, and then had entered upon a scheme for wrecking the property. 
The suits made specific charges of irregularity, and prayed for relief.  Ry. Age,  11: 
192, 1886. 
Chron. 42: 364,  1886.  Ibid. 42: 575, 1886.  '  Ibid.  42:  663,  1886.  In a  circular  to their  constituents this  committee  said: 
''That  after a full and satisfactory presentation  of  the case by very able counsel it 
that the committee had been  misinformed as to the material facts upon 
which their case was predicated.  It especially appeared to the Court that there was 
ground for the charge of  fraud against the directors of  the Company or the Central 
Ti%f  Company.  It further appeared that the litigation must be a protracted one, 
without substantial benefit to either party.  Your committee were not willing to assume 
!he.reSPon~ibility  of such a contest, in view of  the expressed willingness of the ma- 
lonty to give to the minority the same terms which they had accepted for themselves. 
It was deemed wise to harmonize all interests, and join hands to promote the future 
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way,  which on  July  I took over the  title to the East Tennessee, 
Virginia  & Georgia Railroad and branches, a  controlling interest 
in  the  stock of  the  Knoxville  &  Ohio,  and  a  controlling inter- 
est in the stock of  the Memphis & Charleston Railroad company.' 
During this time the Richmond  & Danville had not been stand- 
ing still.  It will  be  remembered that  in  1883 the capitalists who 
dominated  the  East  Tennessee  and  the  Coast  Lines  had  pur- 
chased  a  controlling interest  in  this company, with  the  purpose, 
according to Mr.  Brice, of  confining all their railroad and steam- 
ship lines under one management and of  operating the system in the 
best  possible manner.  These gentlemen had  found  the  earnings 
of  the  Richmond  & Danville sufficiently unsatisfactory and the 
need for improvements sufficiently great to lead them to pass the 
interest on  its debenture bonds in  October,  1883.  The net  earn- 
ings for  1882,  out of  which this dividend would have been paid, 
they found had been fully taken up by  the fixed charges and the 
expenses for new  equipment  and  betterments.  The net  earnings 
for 1883 they believed sure to show large gains, but still not likely 
to be equal to necessary expenditures.'  Strict economy was to be 
the  order of  the  day.  In the  three  previous  years  the  company 
had accumulated a large floating debt.  This the new management 
reduced  more than one-half by  the end of  1885.  The funded debt 
it allowed to increase largely, but the earnings it managed somewhat 
to improve.  In general, however, it secured no very striking gains. 
Union  in  interest  with  the  East  Tennessee and the  Coast Lines 
modified the severity of competition, but the panic of  1884 checked 
business, and the real saving in operating cost was very  c light.^ 
In their search for means to reduce expenses the owners of the 
Richmond  & Danville came across the Richmond  & West  Point 
Terminal Company.  By  1884 this company was in peaceful  p~s- 
Annual Report,  East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia,  1887. 
a  Chron. 37:  344, 1883. The debentures were cumulative  income bonds entitled 
to 6 per cent out of  earnings after payment of  interest, rentals, and operating expenses, 
including expenditures made for the  repair,  renewal,  and improvement of  existing 
property  and equipment  necessary for the  proper  conduct of  the  business of  the 
railroad.  Certain provisions of  the mortgage  protected  them against the insertion 
of  new mortgage bonds before them.  Chron.  37:  373,  1883. 
Curiously enough the chief saving seems to have been in maintenance of cars, an 
expenditure which one would expect to be least affected by the syndicate control. 
session  of  1815.8 miles of railroad, which included all the import- 
ant  branches  of  the  Richmond  &  Dandle except  the  North 
carolina Railroad,  from Goldsboro to Charlotte, and the Atlanta 
& Charlotte  Air  Line,  from Charlotte to  Atlanta.  It had been 
obliged to issue notes to retire its floating debt in  1883,'  but had 
no  earnings apart from dividends on the stock which  it held, and 
no  expenses other than its cost of  administration and the interest 
on  the  notes  above  mentioned  and  on  its  floating  debt.  There 
was  a  possibility, nevertheless, that  the maintenance of  the com- 
pany  involved  the Richmond  & Danville in  unnecessary outlay, 
and caused a certain loss of efficiency through indirectness of  con- 
trol.  The Termind Company had originally been  necessary be- 
cause the Richmond  & Danville could by  its charter hold  stock 
in  none but  connecting lines.  By  1885  this prohibition had been 
removed,  and  there  was  open  an opportunity  to  consolidate the 
system. 
Early  in  1886 the directors  of  the  Richmond  & Danville  ap- 
pointed a committee to report a plan of  union with the Richmond 
&  West  Point  Terminal.'  Apparently  this  committee  recom- 
mended  the  elimination of  the Terminal Company; for in  April 
it was  known  that the Richmond  & Danville was  trying to buy 
from  the  Terminal  the  stock of  certain  of  the  more  important 
branches  which  it  had formerly c~ntrolled.~  In that  month  the 
Richmond  &  Danville  leased  the  Virginia  Midland  Raiialay4 
and the Western North Carolina; in May it took over the Charlotte, 
Columbia  & Augusta  and  the  Columbia  & Greenville; in  June 
the  Northeastern  of  Georgia;  and  in  October  the  Washington, 
Ohio & Western, or a total of  1483 miles out  of  the 1839 held  by 
the central corp~ration.~  At  the same time the Richmond & Dan- 
ville  transferred  into its own  treasury $13,617,400  ih  stock  and 
bonds of  subsidiary companies, giving in return 25,000 shares of 
the Terminal's  own stock, and a guarantee of  the  Virginia Mid- 
land's general mortgage bonds.  This done, the Dandle Railroad 
threw the rest of  its holdings of  Terminal stock upon the market; 
Chron. 36: 56, 1883.  R. R.  Gaz. 18:  138,  1886.  '  Chron. 42: 575,  1886.  '  The  Richmond & Danville guaranteed interest on some Srz,5oo,ooo  of  Virginia 
Midland bonds. 
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where  they  were  bought  by  investors  who  knew  nothing  of  the 
above  transactions.  The operation  left  the  Terminal  high  and 
dry.  It was of  no  further use  to  the  Richmond  & Danville, for 
that company had made arrangements with its branch lines direct ; 
and it  could not  launch upon  an independent  existence, because 
the greater part of  its mileage was in its rival's hands. 
Fortunately for the small Terminal holders it so happened that 
men  of  large  wealth  and  resourcefulness  were  interested  with 
them.  Under  the  leadership  of  these  capitalists  the  Terminal 
Company  began  in  its turn  the  purchase  of  Danville  stock.  It 
may have been that the East Tennessee group who had acquired 
a majority  in  1883 had  meantime parted  with  their holdings, or 
members of  that syndicate may have sold in  1886 to take advant- 
age of  a favorable price.'  At  any rate, 25,000 shares were rapidly 
acquired,  and the  control of  the  company obtained.  This done 
the  new  Terminal  interests  turned  to  the  East  Tennessee,  Vir- 
ginia  & Georgia.  Negotiations were  at once  begun,  and culmi- 
nated in an agreement in 1887 by  which the Brice-Thomas group 
sold 65,000 shares of East Tennessee first preferred for $4,m,000 
in  cash  and  50,000  shares of  new  Terminal  common.  Since the 
Tennessee  first  preferred elected  a  majority  of  the  directors this 
ensured  control.  At  the same time the Richmond Terminal pro- 
vided for its floating debt, and for the purchase of  the balance of 
the Richmond  & Danville shares out~tanding.~ 
The very high average price of  $200 per share was reported to have been paid. 
R. R. Gaz. 18: 825,1886;  6.  R. R. Gaz. 19: 162-3,  1887.  The Terminal Company 
issued $~,ooo,o~  new preferred  and $g,ooo,ooo common stock.  Of  this it sold the 
preferred and $7,500,000  of  the common, giving to every holder of  loo of  its shares 
the right to subscribe to the extent of  one-third of  the par value of  his stock, and to 
receive for his subscription 334 shares of  the new  preferred  and 50  shares of  corn- 
mon.  Then to the $5,000,000  cash  thus secured the Terminal Company added the 
$I,SOO,OOO  common stock left from its %,ooo,m issue, and turned the whole over 
to the Richmond  & Danville in payment for the securities which it had purchased.  -- .- 
R.  R. Gaz. 18: 825, 1886. 
a  The floating  debt  amounted to $3,161,325 when Mr. Sully assumed the presi- 
dency, and Ji.708.700 of  it matured January I.  Chmn. 44: 401, 1887.  To  ~rovide 
for it,  and for the Richmond  & Danville  shares,  $5,joo,ooo  6 per  cent  collaterd 
trust bonds were  issued, secured by  East Tennessee first preferred,  ~ichmond  & 
Danville stock, Columbia & Greenville stock, Virginia Midland stock, and Western 
North Carolina bonds; and also $16,om,m common stock.  The bonds were sold 
for cash and the returns applied to the East Tennessee  purchase and to the floating 
mus was  the  Richmond  & West  Point  Terminal  Company 
saved, and the  principal railroads east  and west  of  the southern 
Appalachians still kept  under  common  control.  The new  group- 
ing was  weaker than the old, however,  in that it  did not include 
the Coast Line railroads.  It was also imperfect as regards the nature 
of the control possessed over the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia. 
~t has beell  said that the Richmond Terminal held a majority of 
the first  preferred stock of  this latter r0ad.l  By  the terms of  the 
Tennessee reorganization of  1886 this stock was to have the right 
for five years to  elect  a  majority  of  the  directors,  unless  before 
that  time  it  should have  received  5  per  cent  dividends for  two 
successive years.  This gave  control  to  the  Terminal  Company; 
but it plainly made a control  precarious which rested, as this did, 
on  ownership of  &-st preferred  alone.  In 1887 4 per  cent  was 
paid  in  dividends, and in  1888  5  per cent.  In  1888, accordingly, 
a !ease  was  drawn  up,  and the  Richmond  & Danville took  the 
operation of  the road for ninety nine years.  For four years it agreed 
to pay over  33+ per cent of  the gross earnings; for five years more 
35  per cent; and so on until 37  per cent should be  reached.  And, 
further, it guaranteed that the  percentage allowed should be  suf- 
ficient  to  pay  all  the  East  Tennessee's  fixed  charges,  including 
5 per cent annually on the first preferred shares out~tanding.~ 
It cannot be denied that the ethics of  the Tennessee's lease were 
questionable.  The  East  Tennessee  reorganization  had  invested 
the first  preferred  stock of  that company with temporary author- 
ity.  To use this to bind the property for years to come was neither 
fair to  the  other  stockholders, nor  in  accordance with  the  spirit 
of  the reorganization plan.  We  need  not,  therefore, be  surprised 
at the prompt application for  an injunction  and  for the appoint- 
ment  of  a receiver which  occ~rred.~  In a  circular  to  the  second 
preferred and junior stockholders the opponents of  the lease urged 
that its consummation would constitute an abuse of  power on the 
debt; $~,ooo,ooo  of  the stock went for East Tennessee first preferred,  and the rest  for Richmond  &  Danville  common,  Washington,  Ohio  &  Western  stock  and 
'"come  bonds, and for other purposes.  Chron. 44: 149, 1887.  Also Poor's  Manual, 
1890. 
It was reported that the East  Tennessee  first preferred stock had been offered 
the Norfolk  & Western  before the Richmond Terminal acquired it. 
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part of  the  existing board; that it was  entirely in the interests of 
the  first  preferred  stockholders;  that  under  no  circumstances 
could  the  junior  stockholders derive  any income from the  lease; 
that it failed to provide other safeguards and was in many respects 
improvident  and  imperfect.  In one suit  before State  Chancellor 
Gibson at Knoxville, Tennessee, emphasis was laid on the statutory 
prohibition  of  the  consolidation of  competing lines.  In another, 
petition was even made that the holders of  the kst  preferred  stock 
be enjoined from electing a majority of the board of  directors at 
the approaching meeting.'  Chancellor  Gibson handed  down  two 
vigorous  opinions.  He  refused  to enjoin the voting  of  the  first 
preferred stock, on the ground that the plaintiffs had been in pos- 
session for two years of  stock certificates which bore on their face 
the conditions and agreements under which they were issued, and 
that the complaint was not justified, either in law or eq~ity.~  But 
he held that the  East  Tennessee had no power under  its charter 
to lease its road as it had done; that the combination of  the East 
Tennessee and the  Richmond  & Danville was forbidden by  the 
law  of  Tennessee against  the  consolidation of  competing lines; 
and that similar prohibitions in the laws and constitution of  Georgia 
were  so  stringent  as to  imperil  the  East Tennessee's  charter in 
case the lease should be carried thro~gh.~  This effectually checked 
the lease.  After  Chancellor Gibson's  first  opinion the  East Ten- 
nessee election had been held and the arrangement with the Rich- 
mond  & Danville approved.'  After his second the lease was can- 
celled, and the management of the East Tennessee restored to its 
own  officer^.^  The Richmond  Terminal was  still left  in  control 
of  the property.  It was forced, however, to secure a  majority of 
all  the East Tennessee stock outstanding if it wished to make its 
control  permanent,  and  it  was  prevented  from  using  the  power 
temporarily given  a section of  the stock to bring  about a ninety- 
nine-year arrangement distasteful to the majority. 
Master of  the Richmond  & Danville, the East Tennessee, and 
their allied lines, the Richmond Terminal now took one step fur- 
ther; it  acquired the  Central  Railroad  & Banking  Company of 
'  Chron. 47: 532, 1888;  Ry. Rev. 28: 663,1888; R. R.  Gaz. 20: 778,1888. 
'  Chron. 47: 625,  1888.  Chron. 47: 663,  1888. 
Ry. Rev. 98:  679,1888.  Ry. Age, 13:  788,1888. 
Georgia.  The importance of  this  was  very  great.  The  Central 
Company owned the most considerable of  the lines in  Georgia and 
Eastern  Alabama.  It stretched from  Savannah and  Port  Royal 
on the Atlantic coast to Spartanburg, South ~arolina,  on the north; 
to Atlanta,  Birmingham, and  Montgomery on  the  west; and  to 
Albany,  Georgia, and  to Columbia on the south.  Its system had 
been  formed by  a consolidatioh in  1872  of  the Central  Railroad 
from Savannah to Macon with the Macon & Western from Maron 
to Atlanta,' and was compact, ably managed, and phfitable.  rre- 
vious to June,  1847, the Central Railroad Company had paid seven 
dividends aggregating 10.68  per cent.  From June,  1847, to June, 
1889,  the Central Railroad and the Central Railroad  & Banking 
Company  which  succeeded  it,  had  paid  seventy-five  dividends 
aggregating 337.5  per cent,'  besides stock dividends of  8 per  cent 
in 1854 and 12 per cent in  1861,  and a dividend of  40 per cent in 
certificates of  indebtedness in  1881.  It was paying 8 per  cent in 
1888 when the Richmond  & Danville was paying 5,  and the East 
Tennessee was congratulating itself on the 5 per cent which it was 
able to turn over to its fkst preferred stock.3 
So fruitful a piece of  railroad property was naturally looked on 
as desirable, especially since its acquisition  was to free the  East 
Tennessee from one of  its most  dangerous competitors.  From a 
traffic point of  view,  nevertheless, the advantages of  a consolida- 
tion were  doubtful.  The local business of  the  Central was likely 
to  be little increased by  a merger.  The through business was in 
danger of  being decreased.  The Central lines ran  on  the whole 
east and west.  It was to their interest to cany freight from Georgia, 
Alabama,  and the West to Savannah, and thence to send it north 
by  way of  the  Ocean Steamship Company which  they controlled, 
and from which they obtained in 1889 one-fifth of  their total net 
earnings;  while  the  Richmond  Terminal's  interest was  to  send 
Cf. Central Railroad Company vs. Georgia, 2 Otto, 665.  The Central Railroad 
Was  granted certain exemptions from taxation, and the question came up in  1874 
whether the  right to these exemptions was surrendered by  consolidation with the 
Macon  & Western, and whether, if  not, they extended to the Macon  & Westtern as 
well as to the original companv.  - - 
Including 67 &r  cent *id  in Confederate notes during the war. 
a  See Ulrich  B.  Phillips, op. d.,  chap. vi, for  the  early history of the *d 
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this traffic north by land so as to secure for its own railroads the 
long haul.  The advantages to the Terminal of  a union  depended 
on the price at which the Central Railroad could be acquired.  The 
purchase was made, and the price was a high one.  And this price 
was  paid,  it  was  freely charged,  not  in  pursuance  of  an  honest 
though  mistaken judgment, but  in order to allow a  large  personal 
gain to individual  capitalists who were interested  in both  the Cen- 
tral and the Terminal Companies. 
Among the most prominent owners of  Central of  Georgia stock at 
this time were members of  the Logan-Rice group of  financiers, who 
had begun to accumulate holdings at least as early as 1886.  The av- 
erage price which these parties paid was later estimated  at 130, and 
their  holdings  were  apparently secured with  a view  to resale at a 
higher figure.  At any rate, when 40,000 shares had been purchased, 
a double operation was put through.  The shares bought were turned 
over, with $400,000 cash, to a newly formed "Georgia  Company," 
and for them $4,000,000 in 5  per cent trust bonds and $12,m,ooo 
in Georgia Company stock were received in exchange.  And, second, 
a  vigorous campaign  was  entered  upon  to  secure control  of  the 
Richmond  Terminal.  Sully  resigned  the Terminal  presidency  in 
April.  For his vacant place the Logan-Rice people offered General 
Alexander of  the Central of  Georgia, and the Terminal management 
supported John H. Inman.  The struggle which ensued was most ex- 
traordinary.  The existing  board  of  directors charged the Central 
group  with  trying to unload  their Georgia Company's stock upon 
the Terminal system ;  and the Logan-Rice party insinuated that the 
purchase  of  the  East  Tennessee  Railroad  had been the occasion 
of  fraudulcnt profits to the Terminal directors.' 
The following is representative from a pamphlet issued by the Rice Committee: 
"The matter of  the purchase  of  sixty-five thousand shares of  the first preferred 
stock of  the East  Tennessee Railroad  Company and  the circumstances  attendant 
thereon. 
"  1st. Why did the directors of  the Terminal Company purchase sixty-five thousand 
shares of that stock at par, when fifty-five thousand and one shares would have been 
sufficient to have given the Terminal Company a majority of  that stock, the minority 
stock at that time selling at about eighty? 
"  2d.  Why was the minority stock of  the Danville Railroad Company purchased 
at the same time  at a  price  which then  amounted to about two hundred dollars 
per share, being a premium of  one hundred per cent? 
"  gd.  Is it true that the majority of  the committee appointed for the purpose of 
"We  understand,"  declared  the directors,  "that  a  majority of 
the names thus far proposed  by the parties soliciting proxies to be 
cast  for directors  and  president  of  this  company  are  gentlemen 
who are well known to be the owners of a majority of the stock of 
the Georgia Company,  which  owns railroads  whose  business  and 
interests  are at all  points of  our system  in  competition with  and 
to the busirless  and interests of  this  Company; any 
diversion of  traffic, or  exercise of  influence favorable to the Georgia 
Company  at  the  numerous  competitive  points  would  work incal- 
culable  injury  to  your  prosperity.  . . . If  on  the other  hand  the 
preponderance of  the Georgia Company's interest in this Company 
should result  in  a  sale to  and purchase by  your  Company of  the 
Georgia Company stock owned by these gentlemen, it would neces- 
sitate the issue of many millions of  your  common stock, or some 
kind  of  obligation  taking  precedence of  that  stock,  the effect  of 
which upon  the value of your property you are fully competent  to 
judge."  I 
The general election of  the Terminal was held on May 31,  and 
Mr. Inman was  elected  president  for the remainder  of  the unex- 
pired term.2  The Rice  party was apparently overwhelmingly de- 
feated.  In reality  its activity and the presence of  its friends in the 
councils of  the victors resulted in the successful sale of  the Georgia 
Company securities.  In October, 1888, little over five months after 
the directors' circular of  April 6, the Richmond Terminal took over 
the Georgia Company stock at $35 a share and allowed its owners 
to  withdraw  successfully  from  their  speculation.  Subsequently it 
also took the Georgia Company bonds from the bankers who had 
purchased  them.s  This left Inman, Hollins, and the rest a profit of 
$60 a share on their original investment.  It meant for the Richmond 
Terminal a direct annual loss which there was very little prospect 
negotiating the purchase  of  the stock of  the East Tennessee Company consisted of 
directors of  the Terminal Company largely interested in the  minority stock of  the 
Danville Company?"  Chron. 46: 579,  1888. 
Chron. 46: 449,  1888.  The opposition ~amphlet  is reprinted in Chron. 46: 579, 
'888.  It contained  thirteen heads,  each of  which charged or insinuated fraud on 
the Part of the existing board of  directors. 
Chron. 46: 6g9, 1888. The vote  was  298,006 to 94,645.  For resolutions  con- 
demning the action of  the minority see  Ry. Rev. 28: 332,  1888. 
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of  making good.  To provide for the $4,000,000  in bonds and the 
120,000 shares of  stock  acquired, this latter issued approximately 
$8,200,000 of  5 per cent collateral bonds bearing an annual interest 
charge  of  $410,000.  Now both  the  stock  and the  $4,000,000  of 
bonds were a lien on 40,000 shares of  Central of  Georgia stock and 
depended altogether upon  the dividends declared on these by  the 
Central Company.  The Central never paid over 8 per cent, or a total 
of  $320,000  on  40,000  shares.  The difference  between  this  and 
$410,000,  or $9o,ooo,  constituted a direct loss which the Terminal 
pledged itself to meet each year.  If  the victory of  the friends of  the 
company in  May is to be considered a  genuine one, one wonders 
what price the owners of  the Georgia Company would have charged 
had the election gone the other way. 
With the Central of  Georgia, the East Tennessee, and the Rich- 
mond  & Danville under its control the Richmond Terminal could 
look for still further extension.  In 1890 it acquired control of  the 
Erlanger group of  roads from Cincinnati in thenorth to Chattanooga, 
thence to  Meridian,  Mississippi, thence to Vicksburg, Mississippi, 
and to Shreveport, Louisiana.  At the same time it took in the Louis- 
ville Southern, which  joined  Louisville with  the Cincinnati  lines.' 
In 1888 the  Richmond & Danville had  concluded a close alliance 
with the Atlantic Coast Line,2  and arrangements had been made for 
terminal facilities at N~rfolk.~  In 1889 it leased the Georgia Pacific, 
and  two  years  later, when  this  road  reached  Arkansas  City,  it 
executed a traffic agreement with the Missouri Pacific.'  In 1891 the 
Georgia Pacific leased the Central Railroad  & Banking Company 
'  The  Erlanger or  Queen  & Crescent  system  comprised the  following roads: 
Cincinnati Southern  (336 miles); Vicksburg  & Meridian (142 miles);  Vicksburg, 
Shreveport  & Pacific (189 miles); New Orleans & Northwestern (195 miles); Ala- 
bama Great Southern (295 miles).  Total mileage, 1157. The road actually acquired 
was that of  the Cincinnati Southern and Alabama Great Southern between Cincin- 
nati and Meridian (about 631  miles) ; a close working contract being concluded with 
the rest.  Ry. Age, 15: 230,  1890.  The East Tennessee made  payment by the issue 
of  $6,000,000  5  per  cent  collateral trust  bonds, put  out jointly by the  East Ten- 
nessee and Richmond & Danville Companies and secured by deposit of  the shares 
purchased.  Chron. 50: 560,  18go.  For a monograph  on  the Cincinnati Southem 
Railway the reader is referred to a study by J. H. Hollander in the Johns Hopkins 
University Studies for January-February,  1894. 
'  Chron. 46: 828, 1888.  Ry. Rev.  28: 386, 1888; Ibid. 397,  1888. 
Ry. Age,  16: 76,  18g1. 
of Georgia for ninety-tline years at 7 per cent on its capital stock.' 
This immensely improved  the connection of  the East  Tennessee 
with the North and West, did away with the competition of  a parallel 
line, and afforded another outlet upon the Mississippi. 
Here, then, was the Richmond Terminal system in 1890.  Three 
great north and south lines: one from Cincinnati through Birming- 
ham to York, over the Erlanger system; one from Bristol through 
Rome  to  Selma, over  the  East  Tennessee, Virginia  &  Georgia; 
and one from Alexandria and West Point through Danville, Char- 
lotte, and Atlanta to Montgomery.  One of  these took business from 
Indiana, Illinois, and the North and Central West; one from Balti- 
more, Philadelphia, and the East; one from both West  and East; 
and all three opened upon the Gulf over the Mobile  & Birmingham 
to Mobile.  In addition,  three  parallel  east  and  west  lines: from 
Chattanooga to Memphis, from Birmingham to Arkansas City, and 
from Meridian to Shreveport in Alabama;  outlets on the Atlantic 
coast  at  Charleston,  Port  Royal, Savannah,  and Brunswick;  and 
dominance of  the local traffic of  the whole territory east of  Alabama, 
south of  Kentucky and Tennessee, and north of  Florida.  It was by 
all odds the leading system in the South.  It had a mileage of  8558.5 
as compared with the  2383.4  of  the  Louisville  & Nashville,  and 
gross earnings, exclusive of  the Erlanger lines, of  $41,361,095,  or 
more than twice those of  its greatest competitor. 
And yet, for all its size, the Terminal group was perilously near 
collapse.  Its physical condition was poor and much of  its mileage 
was  unprofitable ; its capitalization  was  tainted  with  dishonesty ; 
and the legality of  its recent combinations had not been tested in the 
courts.  Let us quote from the results of  an examination made by 
a well-known banking firm three years later. 
"While in a general way the main lines of  the Richmond  & Dan- 
ville [West Point and Alexandria to Atlanta],"  said this firm in  its 
report,  "are  in  fair  condition -better  than  those  of  the  East 
Tennessee, excepting parts of  its main  line between  Bristol  and 
Chattanooga, the Cincinnati, New  Orleans & Texas Pacific, and 
the Alabama Great Southern -  nearly all the rail in both systems 
is too light (50 to 60 lbs. while on the main lines it should be 70 to 75 
lbs.), many of  the trestles need renewing, and a large number of  the 
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bridges,  principally  on the East  Tennessee  system, are not  suffi- 
ciently strong to warrant the use of  heavy engines, which are essen- 
tial to hauling long trains and operating with economy.  To a very 
large extent ballast is altogether lacking or insufficient in quantity. 
Excepting that portion of  the equipment represented  by equipment 
bonds or notes, the engines and cars are generally small and weak 
and unsuitable  for  main-line  service, and  are  also insufficient  in 
quantity for any considerable  enlargement of  business.  Other ap- 
pointments, such as shops, yards, etc., are, with but few exceptions, 
crude and uneconomical. 
"On  the branches  and secondary  lines,  especially those  of  the 
Richmond & Danville system, the condition is even worse, little or 
no effort having  been  made to maintain them at proper standard, 
even for a moderate traffic.  About  700 miles of  the Richmond  & 
Danville  secondary lines and branches  (including about  200 miles 
of  narrow-gauge lines) are still laid with  iron rails.  On July   st, 
1892, there were 72  miles of  iron rails in the main lines of  the East 
Tennessee.  " 
"An  expenditure of  several  million  dollars should  be  promptly 
made on these properties for equipment alone, but it is no use to do 
so, even if  it were possible, unless additional track and yard facil- 
ities are also provided, nor unless such enlargements of  engine and 
car shops be  made as will  permit  of  the equipment being kept in 
order.'' 
This verdict was only reinforced by the characterization in detail 
of  a number of  the subsidiary lines.  Thus the Columbia  & Green- 
ville was termed "a collection of  weak lines of  constantly decreasing 
value" ;  the Mobile  & Birmingham "of  no value whatever to the 
East Tennessee" ;  and the Memphis  & Charleston "valuable,  but 
in a condition totally unsuited  to modem requirements."  How the 
capitalization of  the system was tainted with fraud has already been 
pointed out.  The legality of  the recent combinations had not been 
tested in the courts.  In January, 1889, counsel for certain unnamed 
parties had  a  plea  for  a  quo  warranto  presented  to the Attorney- 
General of  Virginia.2  The petition alleged that the purchase of the 
From the reorganization plan prepared by Drexel, Morgan & Co., dated May I* 
1893.  Chron. 56: 874 ff.,  1893. 
Ry. Age,  14: 78,  1889. 
control of  the East Tennessee, Virginia  & Georgia Railway and of 
the Virginia Midland was an abuse of  the powers of  the Richmond 
& West  Point  Terminal . . . a violation of  public policy, and an 
usurpation  to the great damage and prejudice of  the constitution 
and laws of Virginia.  This petition the Attorney-General dismissed 
on technical grounds.  The  legality of  the various mergers was soon, 
however,  to be  attacked again, and in  1889 the question  was de- 
cidedly unsettled.' 
The storm broke in  August, 1891.  On the eighth of  that month 
the New  York  Herald  published  a  vigorous onslaught  upon  the 
company.  It maintained  that  the Richmond  & Danville  system 
had failed to earn its fixed charges by $526,560 in the year ending 
1890; that this fact had been concealed by deceptive or false entries 
on the books which made a fictitious profit emerge by covering up 
the losses on auxiliary lines;  that the 8 per cent dividends which 
had been paid on the Central of  Georgia had not of  late years been 
earned, and that the price  paid for the Georgia  Central stock had 
been  grossly excessive;  that  the East Tennessee  was  just  about 
paying its way ;  and, finally, that the other recent acquisitions were 
either just  paying their way or were showing annual deficik2 Color 
was given to the charges by the trouble caused by the floating debt. 
Though  denied  by the officials of  the company, the sale of  2000 
shares of  Baltimore  & Ohio stock held in the Terminal treasury; 
the negotiation of  a short time loan at 6 per cent and 24 per cent 
commission for the Central of  Georgia and the extension of  another 
The failure of  this initial suit encouraged the Richmond Terminal to take steps 
to make its position more  secure.  In February,  1889, a  collateral  trust  mortgage 
of  $~4,3oo,ooo  was announced,  intended not only to pay off  the floating debt and 
several classes of  bands, but also to purchase the balance of  common stock of  the 
Central of  Georgia and Richmond  & Danville and of  the first preferred stock of 
East  Tennessee outstanding.  See Poor's  Manual  for  1890; also Chron.  48: 764, 
~889.  Subsequently the company issued common shares of its own instead of  bonds 
in exchange for the East Tennessee first preferred, and succeeded in securing nearly 
$2,ooo,ooo of  the outstanding  issue.  Chron. 49: 374,  1889.  The rate of  exchange 
was 3$ to I. The Richmond & Danville shares were retired by new collateral bonds 
at 85, plus $26 per share in cash, and in connection with the operation more stock 
and $5,7oo,ooo collateral  bonds  were sold  on favorable terms to stockholders  to 
Provide for the floating debt. 
For replies by Alexander and Inman, see  New York Herd, August  10,  1891, 
and Chron. 53: 224,  1891. 
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loan ;  the placing of  $5oo,ooo  at 6 per cent for the Richmond  & 
Danville; and the active financial support which General Thomas 
felt obliged to render the East Tennessee showed the anxiety which 
it occasioned. 
On  November  25 the  directors held  a  meeting and  appointed 
Messrs. Eckstein Norton, late president of  the Louisville  & Nash- 
ville; Wm.  Solomon, of  Speyer  & Co.; Jacob H.  Schiff,  of  Kuhn, 
Loeb & Co. ;  Chas. S. Fairchild, president of  the New York Security 
& Trust Company; and Louis Fitzgerald, president of the Mercan- 
tile Trust Company, a committee to carefully inquire into and ex- 
amine the condition of  the Terminal properties and to aid the com- 
pany in perfecting a plan of  readjustment.  Owing to the financial 
depression, they explained,  "the  company has been unable to sell 
securities based upon engagements they had made prior to the period 
of  depression and to pay for necessary equipment and improvements. 
A large floating debt has in this way been accumulated, but each of 
our  important  railroad  systems  is  solvent. . . .  After  maturely 
considering the whole situation, we felt it wise to invite the gentle- 
men whose names appear . . .  to aid us in perfecting the best plan 
for a permanent adjustment of  our affairs." 
The committee reported provisionally  on  December 8.  It  then 
stated that it was essential to the proposed  plan of  relief  that the 
elections of  all the subordinate companies in the Richmond Term- 
inal system should be postponed till after the Richmond Terminal 
affairs were settled, and requested that financial provision be made 
for the employment of  an expert or experts in the examination of  the 
properties and accounts.  It was understood that the committee's 
plan was to make a considerable assessment on the stockholders. 
The board of  directors refused to respond and the committee there- 
fore withdrew.  ¶ 
'  Chron. 53: 674,  18g1. 
a  R.  R.  Gaz. 23: 870, 18g1.  The composition of  this committee was severely criti- 
cised, partly on the ground of  the relations of  Norton and Schiff to the ~ouhville 
& Nashville and to the Norfolk & Western respectively, and partly on the ground 
that the other members were creditors only and had no interest other than the =Pay- 
ment of their loans.  It would seem, however, that the property was likely to have 
fared better in the hands of reputable New York bankers than in the hands in which 
it had formerly reposed. 
Chron. 53: gza, 1891. 
The next day the stockholders selected  Mr.  F. P.  Olcott to ap- 
point  a new  committee to take up the work.'  They were not in 
favor of radical action, and Mr. Olcott expressed  the opinion that 
there was no necessity for measures so stringent as those which the 
schiff-Norton  Committee had had in mind.  It was but natural that 
at this point there should have been some delay.  Meetings were held, 
for raising cash discussed, and a reorganization plan was 
whipped  into shape.  It was not, tklerefore, until March 
19,  1892,  that the public were  hformed what  Mr.  Olcott and his 
backers did consider that the situation required.  The main points 
of the elaborate scheme which was  then proposed were as follows: 
First, a consolidation of  the Richmond Terminal, Richmond  & 
Danville, and  East Tennessee properties.  The Central of  Georgia 
and the Erlanger systems were not to be included in the reorganiza- 
tion,  but  the  interest  of  the  Richmond  Terminal  and  the  East 
Tennessee in their stock was to be made subject to a new mortgage. 
Second, a reduction in &xed  charges. 
Thiid, the sale of  securities to pay off  the floating debt. 
Cohsolidation  of  properties  was  found  advisable  for  several 
reasons.  "  While some of  the companies show a surplus of  earnings," 
said the committee, "in  many instances it has been  impossible to 
apply such surplus earnings to make up  deficiencies arising from 
the operations of  other companies.  The committee hds  that  the 
various systems have not been operated throughout for the common 
benefit  of  the  controlling interest,  but  that  they  have  competed 
among themselves for business, each system maintaining separate 
organizations for obtaining business.  . . .  In the judgment  of  the 
committee the only adequate remedy which  can be  adopted is to 
mite the  several corporations, as far as practicable, in  one system 
under one management, and to consolidate their obligatidns." 
In order to unify the system the  committee proposed three great 
issues of new securities as follows: 
$170,ooo,ooo  four per cent first  mortgage  35-year gold bonds, to 
be issued by a new corporation representing the consolidation of  the 
Chmn. 53: 969, 1891. The members were: F. P. Olcott; Col. Oliver H. Payne; 
F. D.  Tappan, president of  the Gallatin National Bank;  W. H. Perkins, p resident 
the  Bank  of  America;  and  Henry  Budge, of  Hallgarten & Co.  These  gen- 
tlemen  appointed Messrs.  Olcott, Budge, and Perkins a sub-committee to prepare 
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Richmond  & Danville  Railroad Company  and the Richmond  & 
West  Point  Terminal Railway  & Warehouse Company. 
$~O,OOO,OOO  five per cent non-cumulative preferred  stock. 
$I 10,m,m  common stock. 
In general, the new bonds were to exchange for old bonds and the 
new common stock for  dd  common  and preferred,  while the hew 
preferred  stock was to be joined in varying proportions  with each 
of  the other issues to make the exchanges look attractive.  Thus, 
for the Richmond  & Danville consolidated 6s were offered 120 per 
cent in new bonds and 45 per cent in new preferred; for the East 
Tennessee first mortgage  7s  120 per cent in new bonds and 45 per 
cent  in new preferred  stock; for the Richmond Terminal common 
stock IOO per cent in new common and 50 per cent in new preferred. 
This arrangement was not rigidly adhered to.  Some of  the poorer 
of  the  outstanding  stocks  received  new  common  only,  and  the 
Richmond Terminal preferred was given par in new bonds besides 
a bonus in preferred.  These were, however, exceptions.  The prin- 
ciple which determined the various ratios of  exchange is more diffi- 
cult to discover.  It was not that of  equivalence of  return.  The plan 
did not attempt to allow to each holder a chance at the same receipts 
which he had formerly enjoyed  while reducing the amount which 
he could demand, but gave sometimes more than this and sometimes 
less.  And  the variations from what might be called a normal  ratio 
did not  always  correspond  with  the relative  security of  different 
issues as indicated by  their  market  quotations.  For instance,  the 
East Tennessee first  7s sold in December,  1891,  at 1133  and the 
Richmond  Terminal collateral  6s at 83;  yet  the former  received 
120  per cent and 35 per cent and the latter 120 per cent and 40  per 
cent  in new  bonds  and  preferred  stock  respectively.  Again,  the 
Atlanta  & Charlotte  lirst  7s  sold  in  October, 1891,  at  1183  and  . 
received  under the plan  120 per cent in bonds and 40 per  cent in 
preferred  stock;  the Richmond  & Danville  consolidated 6s sold 
at 109 and received 120 per cent and 45 per cent.  It is clear that the 
committee desired to reduce the interest which  the various classes 
of  bonds should have  a right  to demand, and that it expected to 
make compensation  by  means of  preferred  stock  on  which  pay- 
ments should be made if  earned.  So much of  its scheme was corn- 
mendable.  On the other hand, the rates of  exchange of  old secur- 
ities  for  new  were  in  many cases  ill-advised.  The reduction  in 
fixed charges was to be $1,819,837,  although by the exchanges alone 
the capitalization  was to  be  increased  by  over  $50,000,000.  The 
charges on the system had amounted  in  1891 to $9,474,837.1  Net 
had been $8,744,736.  Fixed charges under the plan were 
to  amount  to  $7,666,000.  As  a  matter  of  fact  they  would  have 
been  greater than this,  for some of  the old bonds would  have re- 
mained outstanding,  and the estimate did not  include interest on 
any bonds issued for improvements.  The floating debt was to be 
retired by the sale of  new securities, namely, $18,235,800 new first 
mortgage  bonds  and $6,382,530  preferred  stock.  These were  to 
net  $14,588,640,  or sufficient  to  cancel  a debt of  $6,31o,m and 
car trusts of $2,369,564 and to provide a balance for miscellaneous 
uses.  A syndicate guaranteed  the sale, but  holders of  stock or of 
collateral  trust  5 per  cent  bonds  were to  be  allowed to  subscribe 
up to 16 per cent of  their holdings at the rate of  $800 for one new 
mortgage bond and $350 in new stock.  New bonds to a maximum 
of  $10,000,000 were to be issued only for the acquisition of  additional 
property, while beyond this the vote of  a majority of  preferred stock 
was to be  required to authorize  any additional  mortgage on pro- 
perty covered by the first rn~rtgage.~ 
Such  was  the  plan  laid  before  securityholders.  It proposed  a 
considerable reduction in fixed charges, though probably not enough 
to put the company out of  danger, and a  large increase  in new se- 
curities.  It failed because it imposed losses upon the wrong parties. 
As  between the various classes of  bonds its terms were frequently 
inequitable.  As  between  the  bonds  and the  stock  it  altogether 
favored the latter.  It levied no assessment,  it  compelled no sub- 
scription to new securities, and in three cases only did it announce 
an intention  of  reducing  the  nominal  value  of  the  stockholders' 
holdings.$  The original time limit for deposits was set at April 14, 
This excluded the  Central of  Georgia and the  Alabama  Great Southern.  The 
figure was  based on existing bonded  debt, floating debt, and rentals.  It  included 
car tn~st  payments, but excluded taxes, which were included in operating expenses, 
and excluded also  the  interest  on securities owned  by the  system or  the  various 
CoWrations composing the system. 
The plan in full is reprinted in Chron. 54:  487,  1892. 
a  Consider for instance the treatment of  the Richmond Terminal preferred stock. 
This was quoted in December, 1891,  as low as 45.  The plan accorded it  100 per I74  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  THE SOUTHERN  I75 
18~2.  This was subsequently extended, but without effect, and on 
May 16 the Olcott Committee announced that the plan had failed.' 
The collapse of  this attempt at readjustment was a blow to those 
who had  hoped  for a speedy and amicable reorganization of the 
Richmond  Terminal system.  On the  same day that failure was 
confessed the stockholders met and appointed Messrs. W. E. Strong, 
Samuel Thomas, and W. P.  Clyde a committee to confer with the 
Olcott Committee to ascertain what had best be done.  A week later 
General  Thomas  reported  a  plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the 
Richmond  & Danville alone.  The Richmond Terminal Company, 
he said, should be wound up and be  succeeded by a new company 
with $43,ooo,ooo of  preferred  stock and $70,000,000 of  common. 
The present 6 per cent bonds should be given 170 in new preferred 
stock; the present  5 per cent bonds and preferred stock par in new 
preferred stock; and the present common should receive par in new 
common and  be  compelled  to  subscribe for $8,000,000  collateral 
trust two-year 6 per cent notes at 92ie2  This amounted to an assess- 
ment of  10  per cent upon the common.  It was not proposed to pay 
off  the floating debt with  the  proceeds of  this assessment, but  to 
buy the claims held  by  bankers, and, if  necessary, foreclose these 
claims and take possession for the stockholders.  If  the full amount 
should not  be  subscribed by  the stockholders the preferred stock 
was to have the right to make subscription for the balance, and to 
take the securities that would have gone to the non-paying common 
stock; and the common stock not subscribing was to have no rights 
to the common stock of  the new company.' 
That this scheme was much more radical as well as more limited 
than the Olcott plan appears upon its face.  No serious attempt was 
cent in new bonds and 20 per cent in new preferred stock. Per contra, the Richmond 
& Danville consolidated 5s  were  quoted  the same months at 75 and received 100 
per cent in new  bonds and 40  per cent in new  preferred.  Was it any wonder that 
the holders of  prior liens refused to come in? 
Chron. 54: 846, 1892. 
These notes were to be  secured by  the same securities that were then pledged 
to secure the floating debt and were  to be  exchanged  for $170  in new  preferred 
stock if the plan should prove successful. 
Ry. Age,  17: 414,  1892.  It was  not proposed to retain control of  the central 
of  Georgia, but instead certificates d  aliquot parts in the holdings of  the Geoq 
stocks were  to be  issued to each stockholder, making him the actual owner of  hls 
proportionate share. 
to carry it into effect. On suggestion of  General Thomas the 
stockholders' meeting voted that a consulting committee of  fifteen 
be appointed by the chair to confer with the committee of  three, and 
then  adjourned  subject  to call.'  The enlarged committee found 
that application had been already made to Messrs Drexel, Morgan 
& Co. by  a number  of  prominent  banking hms, asking that they 
enter upon  the work  of  reorganization.  It therefore dropped the 
Thomas plan  and  joined  in  the petition.  Drexel, Morgan & Co. 
on their part agreed to undertake an examination of  the Terminal 
property,a but four weeks  later  replied  that while in their opinion 
a reorganization was feasible, the lack of  assurance of  support from 
Mr. Clyde made them unwilling to undertake the task.3 
At this point efforts at reorganization were checked.  One plah had 
failed, one had  been formulated but not pushed forward, and the 
task of  creating a third had been refused by the banking firm which 
was apparently best able to carry a plan to a successful conclusion. 
For a time now the field was left to the disputes between members 
of  the Richmond Terminal family, which made up in bitterness for 
what they lacked in the matter of  valuable result.  Mention will be 
made only of the wrangles between the Central of  Georgia and the 
other parts of  the system. 
The Central of  Georgia had been placed under a receiver of  its 
This committee was subsequently enlarged and became known as the "Inde- 
pendent  Committee  of  Seventeen." 
'  Chron. 54: 888, 1892. 
'  Ibid. 55: 23,  1892.  On July 6, Chairman Strong, of  the Advisory Committee 
of  Seventeen, appointed Messrs.  George  I?.  Stone, J. C. Maben, and W.  E. Strong 
a subcommittee to further consider reorganization.  Chron. 55: 59,  1892.  Sub%- 
quently  Mr.  Strong appointed Messrs.  Coppell, Manson, and Plant  a  committee 
to look  after the Terminal gs, and Messrs. Bull, Goadby, and Cyrus J.  Lawrence 
a committee to look after the 6s.  Mr. Strong, as chairman of  the Advisory  Com- 
mittee, was ex-officio  member of each.  The first of  August Messrs. Thompson Dean, 
Albert  B.  Boardman, and Charles P. Huntington were appointed a committee by 
the holders of  between  50,-  and  60,000 shares of  stock and other securities of 
the Richmond Terminal system, "for the purpose of  removing the obstacles which 
now stand in  the way  of  a fair and equitable reorganization of  the Richmond  & 
West point  Terminal  Railway  & Warehouse  Company and its constituent cor- 
porations, and to this end to employ attorneys and to take all necessary steps to 
Secure the appointment of  permanent receivers, who will be  in the interest of  no 
0,  faction in said companies."  Chron.  55: 216,  18y. See in this connection 
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own some two weeks before the publication of  the Olcott plan.  Some 
months later this receivership was made permanent, and the Rich- 
mond  Terminal was  enjoined  from voting  the 42,200 shares of 
Central stock which it held.  It can scarcely be said that the with- 
drawal of  the  Central of  Georgia from the  Terminal system was 
unwelcome to  the latter.  Already the Richmond  & Danville had 
refused to carry out its guarantee on the  Central's stock unless that 
company should deposit bonds to cover an alleged sum due from it,l 
and President Oakman had hastened to inform General Alexahder, 
the  temporary  Central  receiver,  that  the  Richmond  & Danville 
would not operate the Central of  Georgia after the end of  the tem- 
porary receivership.'  When, however, the Central not only insisted 
on  withdrawal, but  asked  Judge  Speer,  of  the  District  Court  of 
Macon, Georgia, to appoint a receiver for the Richmond & Danville 
Railroad on  the  ground that that company was insolvent and was 
indebted to  the Central  in  the  sum of  $2,459,670,~  prompt action 
was made necessary.  Application was made to Judge Bond of  the 
Circuit Court for the Eastern  District of  Virginia, and on June  16 
this magistrate appointed Messrs. F.  W.  Huidekoper and Reuben 
Foster receivers of  the Danville road.' 
"This  appointment of  receivers by  Judge Bond,"  explained the 
parties resp~nsible,~  "  is not only not inimical to nor in opposition 
to any plan for the financial reorganization and rehabilitation of the 
Danville system, but will  be found to greatly facilitate and aid any 
plan of  reorganization, while if  the Georgia court had obtained pos- 
session of  and jurisdiction over the Danville system this would have 
been  rendered practically impossible. . . .  The necessity for such 
action,"  they continued, with a touch of  pathos,  "will  be  further 
appreciated when it is known that for some weeks past the ~ichmond 
& Danville Company has not been  able to keep either a dollar in 
bank or in its safes within the state of  Georgia, because every such 
dollar has been  attached  or  garnished by  parties  alleging claims 
R.  R.  Gaz. 24: 33,  1892.  The deposit was made and the dividend paid. 
'  Ibid. 24: 237,  1892.  Chron. 54: 965, 1892. 
It will  be  observed  that although the minority stockho!ders  of  the  central of 
Georgia  objected  to the Terminal's stock  control they were not  averse  to having 
the precise terms of the lease to the Georgia Pacific carried out: that is, to being 
guaranteed 7 per cent upon their stock. 
W.  P. Clyde, etc. 
against the company, and even the money sent by express for the 
liquidation of  pay-rolls has been attached in the hands of  the express 
company, and in every instance enormous bonds have been required 
to release such moneys. . . ." ' 
The temporary securing of  their  position by the receivership al- 
lowed the  Danville people to hit back at the Central in its weakest 
point -the  details of the sale to the Terminal of  the Georgia Cen- 
tral Company.  On August 19 the Advisory Committee of  Seventeen 
of the Terminal  securityholders declared that the  investigations of 
their sub-committee showed that certain trustees of  the company, 
with their friends, had profited to the extent of  between three and 
four million dollars in this operation.= Toward the end of  the year 
tender of  the Georgia Company stock and bonds was made back to 
the original vendors and was refu~ed.~  In December suit was begun 
to set aside the purchase on the ground that there had been no rati- 
fication sufficient in law or equity to bar the stockholders from can- 
celling the transaction.  The plaintiff  charged that  "the said com- 
bination and plan so formed by and between its president and divers 
of  its directors [referring to  the  purchase of  the  Georgia  stock], 
confederating with the other syndicate defendants for the purpose of 
selling their unsalable and discredited securities to the plaintiff  at 
such  prices  as  yielded  them  an enormous profit  and  necessarily 
imposed on plaintiff a heavy yearly loss, was contrary to equity and 
good conscience, and that the pretended contract dated October 26, 
1888, . . .  and all the acts done in pretended purchase of  the stocks 
and bonds of  said Georgia Company . . .  and the taking from the 
assets and money of  the plaintiff of  over $7,ow,ooo cash . . .  to put 
into the pockets of  the said faithless directors, the syndicate defend- 
ants, and  their confederates, were all  acts  planned . . . and  per- 
Chron.  54: 1010,  1892.  Messrs.  Huidekoper  and  Foster  were  also appointed 
receivers by courts in  Virginia, North  Carolina, and  South Carolina.  For reply by 
President and Receiver Comer, of  the Central, to Clyde's statement, see Chron. 55 : 
22,  1892. 
'  Ry.  Rev.  32: 549,  1892.  The committee also stated  that  the Terminal Com- 
pany had been made to ~urchase  $1,8oo,oca  Georgia state bonds at par and inter- 
est, which paid only 34  per cent  a year, although the company was unable to bar- 
mw  mney  at less than 6 per cent; that the drafts of the directors to a large amount 
were paid  by  the company,  and that  no vouchers were on file to show how this 
was expended. 
a  Chron. 55: 938, 1892. RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  THE SOUTHERN 
formed by  said Inman, or under his direction, in the execution of 
such original fraudulent  scheme,  combination, purpose,  and con- 
federacy. . . ." And so the plaintiff prayed the court to decree the 
contract of  purchase void.' 
These accusations and counter-accusations, justified though many 
of them were,  had  little direct bearing on reorganization.  In this 
progress had  completely ceased.  At  the same time some  progress 
was urgently required.  The Richmond Terminal, the Richmond  & 
Danville, and the Central of  Georgia were in the hands each of  a 
different set of  receivers, unpaid interest was piling up, and the year 
1893  was  to  show a  marked  decline  in  earnings.  Necessity  and 
mutual distrust dictated a second appeal to Drexel, Morgan & Co. 
to  undertake the rehabilitation of  the  property.  On  February 2, 
1893,  the  following letter was  addressed to the  firm in question: 
Messrs. Drexel, Morgan & Co., 
Gentlemen : Since the time you were previously requested to take 
up the reorganization of  the Richmond Terminal system much time 
and thought have been devoted to its affairs, and we  realize that 
adverse financial conditions and  also the present  general  distrust 
of all plans for the restoration of  this system require that, to be suc- 
cessful, its reorganization must be undertaken by parties possessing 
the confidence of  both the securityholders and the public, and also 
the financial strength sufficient for its accomplishment.  We there- 
fore ask you to take up this reorganization of  the Richmond Ter- 
minal and its allied properties, each pledging you our personal sup 
port and aid in full confidence that the securityholders will support 
;s  in this request. 
We  appreciate the labor and responsibility connected with this 
undertaking, and are therefore willing to do all in our power to give 
you full control of  the reorganization, as suggested in  your  letter 
of  June  28,= and  to  advise our  friends and  the  securityholders 
generally to deposit their securities, without requiring the assurances 
customary in  such cases. 
Very respectfully, 
WM. P.  CLYDE, 
GEO. F.  STONE, 
WM. E.  STRONG, 
J.  C.  MABEN, 
THOMAS  F. RYAN. 
'  Chron.  55: 1078, 1892. For replies of  defendants  see  Chron.  56: 4x4, 1893~ 
and Ibid. 972,  1893. 
'  This was  the  letter finally  declining to undertake the reorganization in  '89' 
because of lack of assurances of  support. 
This letter was accompanied by a letter from F.  P. Olcott, pre- 
sident of  the Central Trust Company, pledging his  support.  Inas- 
as lack of  the assurances contained in this correspondence 
had alone prevented Drexel, Morgan  & Co. from undertaking the 
tSk  proposed  the previous year, their prompt  though conditional 
acceptance was not surprising. A definitive engagement to attempt 
the work followed on April 12.'  The enlistment of  Drexel, Morgan 
&  CO.  in  the  reorganization  provoked  general  satisfaction.  Mr. 
~~Uins,  of  the Central of  Georgia  reorganization committee,  ex- 
pressed  his pleasure in having responsible parties to deal with not 
connected with any past  difference^.^ The directors of  the Richmond 
Terminal  urged  all  classes of  securityholders to  deposit, and the 
Clyde  Committee was  emphatic  in  its  recommendation.  It was 
recognized that  the situation was the most  favorable which could 
be  hoped  for.  No  group of  Southern railroad  financiers seemed 
capable of  producing a fair reorganization plan,  and it  was also 
probable  that  no  plan  from such  a  source, however  fair,  would 
have  received  a  sympathetic welcome.  Drexel, Morgan & Co.,  on 
the other hand, were both capable and sure of  a hearing. 
There was remarkably little delay in making public the Drexel- 
Morgan plan.  Less than three weeks after their final  acceptance 
of  responsibility, though about three months after the correspond- 
ence of  February 2, the firm published a comprehensive plan, to the 
examination of  which  the  next  few  pages  may  be  devoted.  The 
principles of  this plan of  May I, 1893, were simple, and were clearly 
and  convincingly set  forth.  The property  to  be  considered  was 
to be  that of  the Richmond Terminal, the Richmond  & Danville, 
and the East Tennessee.  The Central of Georgia was to be omitted. 
The imperative needs of  these properties the plan  declared to be 
two : 
First, the provision of  a large sum for the physical improvement 
of the system; 
Second, the reduction of  fixed charges to an amount which  the 
companies could earn.' 
The correspondence appears in full in Chron. 56: 207,  1&3,  and Ibid. 56: 622, 
1893. 
a  RY.  Rev. 33: 95, 1893. 
'  These needs had already been emphasized by the Olcott plan. I 80  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  THE SOUTHERN  181 
The physical condition of  the above roads in 1893 was extremely 
bad.  "One  obvious  trouble . . . is, " said  the  plan,  "that  their 
maintenance  and  repairs  have  been  neglected.  Another  is  that, 
while nearly  all the lines in the United  States have been  steadily 
substituting  solid  roadbeds,  heavy  equipment, and other  modem 
facilities for  the light  and ineffective appliances  formerly  in use, 
these lines, because of  the constant drain to which they were subject 
for the obligations assumed, and from the necessities of  the Terminal 
Company for the payment  to it, as dividends,  of  every available 
dollar with which to meet its own obligations,  have not  been in a 
financial condition to keep up to the times in this respect, and now 
they find themselves so far behind as to be, to a considerable extent, 
unqualified  to handle  business with  economy, or  to  compete  suc- 
cessfully with  other  lines."  The hancial  condition  was  little 
better.  The absolute  fixed  charges  of  the  Richmond  Terminal, 
the Richmond  & Danville,  and the East Tennessee  systems, viz., 
interest on bonds held by the public, rentals, equipment notes, and 
sinking funds, and interest on floating debts, receivers' certificates, 
etc., the plan declared to amount annually to about $g,goo,ooo. The 
entire net  earnings for  the  fiscal year  ending June 30,  1893, were 
estimated at  $7,000,000.  The result  was a deficit  for the year  of 
about  $2,900,000.  This state of  affairs required  serious sacrifices 
from somebody.  The Olcott plan had illustrated the folly of  laying 
the burden largely on well-secured senior bonds.  The Drexel plan 
proposed  to  demand  the  necessary  concessions  from  the  junior 
bonds and from the stock.  "About  $74,000,000 of  the bonds and 
guaranteed  stocks  of  the  Richmond  &  Danville  and  the  East 
Tennessee  systems  held  by  the  public,"  it  continued,  "  are on 
Lack of  space forbids a full statement of  the criticisms which the Drexel plan 
had to make upon the physical  condition and financial  practice of the Richmond 
Terminal properties.  The following is from the plan,  section  9: "As  an example 
of  the manner in which accounts have been kept, it may be  mentioned that in the 
operating expenses  of  the entire  Richmond  & Danville system only $zo,ooo  were 
charged for renewal of  rails in the fiscal year ending June 30,  1890, and not a dol- 
lar in the fiscal years ending June 30,  1891 and 1892, respectively.  In seven months 
under  the receivership  (July,  1892,  to January,  1893, inclusive) about $600  were 
charged.  Since that date, it is understood, about $18,000 have been charged.  With 
these  exceptions  all renewals  of  rails were  charged to construction accounts.  Re- 
newals,  properly to be  included in operating expenses,  would  be at least  $100,000 
to $150,000  per annum."  Other instances, almost as bad, could be stated. 
properties  which are believed for the most part to afford adequate 
security, and for this or other reasons this plan  has not sought to 
disturb them.  About $50,000,000  (mostly recent issues) are junior 
liens, inadequately secured, or else are on new or branch lines of 
uncertain  earning  capacity,  and  the  holders,  in  self-preservation, 
must make such reasonable concessions as the situation necessitates, 
taking  compensation  therefor  in  preferred  or  common  stock  of 
the  new  company.  . . ." 
The tools  of  the reorganization  were  to  be  the following new 
issues : 
$140,000,000  first  consolidated  mortgage  and  collateral  trust 
100-year  5  per cent bonds,  secured  by  mortgage  and pledge of  all 
the property of the new company.  This total might be subsequently 
increased  to  acquire  the  whole  or  part  of  the  Georgia  Central 
system,  or  to  acquire the ownership  of  the Cincinnati  Southern 
Railway or any other line as a substitute therefor. 
$75,000,000 5 per cent non-cumulative preferred  stock. 
$160,000,000 common stock. 
"The general theory of  adjustment of  disturbed bonds,"  said the 
plan,  "is to substitute for them the new 5 per cent bonds to such 
an extent as is warranted by earnings and situtation of  the proper- 
ties covered by the present mortgages, and the new preferred stock 
for the remainder of the principal.  In some cases, where the bonds 
are on properties of  no actual and little prospective earning capacity, 
a more severe reduction  is necessary.  In several instances,  where 
the bonds are on properties which are likely to improve more rapidly 
than other disturbed parts of  the system, this fact is recognized, and 
an extra allowance is made in  compensation.  Finally,  in one or 
two cases, where the bonds are on properties the loss of  which would 
adversely affect the rest of the system, a proper recognition is made 
of this fact."  In practice not only bonds and preferred stock, but 
preferred  and  common  stock,  or even  common  stock  alone were 
exchanged for old securities of  little value. 
This provided  for old  securities but  not  for cash requirements, 
To raise cash three devices were resorted to,  all of  which bore en- 
tirely  on  the junior  securityholders  or on  the  stock.  The most 
direct was the levying of  an assessment.  Terminal  common  stock 
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second preferred $6,  and common stock $9;  new preferred stock 
being in each case given in return.  This distribution was based on 
the idea that thc stockholders of  each railroad  should provide for 
its floating debt.  The floating debt of  the Richmond  & Danville 
was about $7,000,000, that of  the East Tennessee about $3,000,000, 
and that of  the Richmond Terminal about $100,000.  But since the 
last named held practically all of  the Richmond stock and a consid- 
erable proportion of  the East Tennessee, its stockholders were sad- 
dled with a total of  $8,300,000 or an equivalent of  $12.50  per share, 
while the East Tennessee was taxed proportionately. The rest of  the 
cash requirements were covered by the sale of  $8,000,-  new bonds 
at 85, and $33,333,000 new common stock at 15.  Depositors of  all 
classes of  Terminal securities and of  all classes of  readjusted secur- 
ities of  the other systems were  allowed  to subscribe to  the  extent 
of  $1000  in a  new bond  and $4000  in new stock trust certificates 
for each $22,000 par value of  stocks or bonds deposited.  The bal- 
ance of the issues was looked after by an underwriting syndicate.' 
Future  capital  requirements were  provided  for  mainly by  new 
bonds.  $35,383,000 in  new  5 per  cents were  set  aside to be  used 
only for new  construction, betterments, purchase of  rolling stock, 
and extensions and additions to the system.  Not over $~,~o,ooo 
of  these were to be used in any one calendar year; except that, in 
addition to this annual appropriation, a total of  $3,000,000 in bonds 
might be  specifically appropriated  with the unanimous consent of 
the stock trustees, for the  building of  branches or extensions,  if 
undertaken within three years after the creation of  the new mort- 
gage.  All  property  acquired with these bonds was to be  brought 
under the lien of  the new mortgage.  $8,ooo,ooo of  the cash raised 
by  assessment and sale of securities, moreover, were to be available 
Total cash requirements, as estimated, were: 
Floating debt, including equipment notes  $12,900,- 
New construction and equipment during two years  8,000,000 
Expenses of  reorganization and contingencies  2,350,00° 
$23,250~00 
To  be  provided from: 
Assessments on Terminal stock  @,7509- 
Assessments on East Tennessee stocks  z,.]00,000 
Sale of  $33,333,0"  new common stock  5,000,~~ 
Sale of  $8,ooo,ooo  new bonds  6,800,000_ 
$23,250100~ 
for new construction and  equipment on the Richmond & Danville 
and the East Tennessee.  And, finally, there was provision for the 
limitation of  new bond issues, for a voting trust and for the consolida- 
tion of the Terminal system. 
((The ultimate  object  of  the  reorganization,"  said  the  plan 
("excluding the Georgia Central Company from consideration), is to 
have the new company acquire, so far as practicable, the ownership 
of the Richmond & Danville and East Tennessee systems, including 
the various securities now owned by the Terminal Company . . . 
and the securities pledged for the Richmond  & Danville and East 
Tennessee floating debt. . . . 
"Both classes of  stock of  the new company . . . are to be issued 
to three Stock Trustees, who shall be appointed, on or before com- 
pletion of  reorganization, by  Messrs. Drexel, Morgan  & Co.  The 
stock  shall  be  held  by  the  Stock  Trustees and  their  successors, 
jointly, for five years, and for  such further period  (if  any) as shall 
elapse  before the preferred stock  shall  have paid  5 per cent cash 
dividend in one year, although the Stock Trustees may, in their dis- 
cretion, deliver the stock at an earlier date. . . . 
"No  additional  mortgage shall be  put  upon the property to be 
acquired hereunder by  the new company, nor shall the authorized 
amount of  the preferred stock be increased without the consent in 
each case of  the majority in amount of  the preferred  stockholder^."^ 
The result of all these provisions was to be a cancellation of  the 
floating debt, a reduction in fixed charges, and a decrease in mort- 
gage bonds ;  though inevitably also an increase in stock outstandig. 
The plan proposed to disturb $49,117,900  of outstanding bonds, or, 
including the Richmond Terminal 5s and 6s, a total of  $65,617,900. 
But  the  new  bonds  which  it  offered  in  exchange amounted  to 
$19,806,700 only.  On the other hand it took $111,819,550  in stock 
from the hands of  the public, and offered $165,559,514 new stock in 
the course of  the  exchange^.^  This was very conservative, since the 
increase  in  total capitalization  through  these  exchanges was  less 
than 43 per cent ;  and less too than the cash assessment for which 
Preferred stock was allowed. Somewhat greater increase in securities 
The new company reserved the right at any time to redeem its preferred stock 
in cash at par. 
Of  which $10~~~0~~8~4  for stock and the rest for bonds outstanding. 184  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  THE SOUTHERN  I *5 
appears if  we  consider, not  only the exchanges, but the provisions 
of  the plan as a whole; for here we  must include $33,300,000 new 
common stock and $8,000,000 new bonds issued to retire in part the 
$12,~w,ooo  of  floating debt and for other purposes.  Even so the 
net increase was only 6 per cent.'  The natural result was a consider- 
able reduction in fixed charges.  The absolute fixed charges of  the 
system in 1893 the plan stated to be $g,gw,m.  The fixed charges 
under the plan were to be $6,789,wo.  This was certainly a step in 
the right direction.  It was the point, nevertheless, at which the plan 
was weakest.  The clauses which have been outlined made abundant 
and  conservative  provision  for  cash  requirements;  and the  sums 
which they allowed for future development were not on their face 
inadequate ;  but the reduction in fixed charges was less than should 
have been  ensured.  The net earnings for the year ending June 30, 
1892, were $7,725,000,  and those for  1893 were  estimated by  the 
plan itself as not likely to exceed $7,000,000.  This would have left 
$936,000 over the proposed  fixed charges in 1892 and $211,000 in 
1893: -or  a surplus of  some 3 per cent in the latter year.  This was 
altogether insufficient.  It not only put out of  the question dividends 
on the $zw,ooo,ooo of  stock, but it precluded the partial improve- 
ment of  the road from earnings, and left the system at the mercy of 
the slightest decrease in the annual returns.  Compared with previ- 
ous fixed  charges the plan  proposed noteworthy reductions; com- 
pared with the earnings of  the lines involved it did not go far eno~gh.~ 
The reception  of  the  Drexel-Morgan  plan  was,  nevertheless, 
satisfactory.  Certain  concessions were  made to various classes of 
bonds, and by  June 17,  over 95  per cent of  the securityholders had 
given their a~sent.~  Unfortunately the earnings of  the property now 
steadily decreased.  The gross receipts of  the Richmond  & Danville 
proper were  I j per cent less in  1893 than in  1892; and Terminal 
system lines which had earned $6,1w,m in 1892 earned $j13w,o00 
in 1893, and promised to earn some $4,250,000 only in 18~4.  This 
decrease was common to the country at large.  It was of  peculiar 
1 The reorganization plan  estimated the  capitalization  under its provisions at 
about $20,000 per mile of  road owned and controlled; about $10,000  referred stock 
per mile cwned and controlled; about $25,000  common  stock per mile owned and 
controlled. 
The plan is published in full in Chron. 56: 874, 1893. 
'  Ry. Rev. 33: 388, 1893. 
importance, however, in emphasizing the weak point in the Drexel 
plan.  From January I  to July I, 1893, the Terminal  floating  debt, 
exclusive  of  car trusts, increased $2,600,000.  From July I to March I 
it increased at least a million more.  The reorganization plan had 
been Prepared ''on  the assumption that, during reorganization, the 
receivers of  the various properties  could  provide  for  the interest 
,-barges  on the undisturbed securities, as well  as accumulate a sum 
sufficient for the interest accruing on the 'disturbed  securities'  as 
readjusted."  As it turned out, the receivers were obliged to make 
many defaults among the undisturbed securities, and saved nothing 
for the  disturbed.  Some  modification  of  the published plan  had 
perforce to be  arranged. 
These modifications were detailed  in  a  pamphlet  dated  Febru- 
ary 20,  1894.  They comprised three proposals : 
(I) To exclude from the reorganization certain unprofitable pro- 
perties which had previously been included.  Certain alterations had 
already been  made toward this end in the exclusion of  the Erlanger 
line, the  Memphis  & Charleston, and the Mobile & Birmingham. 
Further  modification was to exclude the Northeastern Railroad of 
Georgia, the Macon  & Northern, and five other subsidiary lines. 
(2)  To fund for a year or two the coupons on new bonds given 
for certain  securities, and to provide in  other cases that the  new 
bonds should not bear interest till 1895 or 1896. 
(3)  To lighten the assessment on Richmond Termhal and East 
Tennessee common  stock, and to allow  to all  assessed  securities 
one-quarter  of  their  assessment  in  bonds  and  three-quarters  in 
preferred stock instead of  all in preferred stock. 
At the same time a few other modifications allowed to some bonds 
a more liberal grant  of  new securities thah they had  obtained  in 
May.  It was hoped  by  these means to raise the average earning 
ability of the system, while reducing the new securities to be iss~ed.~ 
Modified  reorganization plan.  Chron.  58: 385,  1Sg4.  Some information con- 
cerning traffic conditions in the South in 1@4 is to be found in the Eighth Annual 
Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, pp. 20-24. 
From  $14o,ooo,ooo 5 per cent bonds, S75,ooo,ooo preferred and $~b,ooo,ooo 
common  stock  to  S~zo,ooo,ooo  bonds,  $6o,ooo,ooo  preferred  and  $125,ooo,ooo 
common  stock.  Since, however, some of  the poorer properties were cut off and the 
terms granted to  others were  made  more liberal,  the smaller absolute amount of 
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The temporary funding of  coupons further lightened fixed charges 
until business should have had time to revive.  "Under  the plan as 
now modified,"  stated Drexel, Morgan & Co., "and  assuming that 
one-half of  the new bonds to be sold are used in 1894 and the other 
half  in 1895, the fixed charges are estimated at about 
"The depression in the South began in 18-1.  There would 
appear to be no reason  why  in  a  comparatively short time these 
properties should not very easily earn, gross, as much as and more 
than they earned  in that fiscal year, viz.,  over $21,000,000.  Oper- 
ated  at  70  per  cent . . . there would  remain, say $6,600,000  net 
against an interest  charge of  $5,400,000." ' 
The reduction in assessments was made possible by the decrease 
in mileage.  Although  the floating  debt had increased $2,600,000 
from January I, 1893, and the equipment notes recorded were greater 
by  $1,048,000,~ yet  the debt  to be  provided  for by  the modified 
plan of  1894 was estimated at only $12,200,000.  Besides  this the 
cash to be  reserved  for  new  construction was reduced $3,000,000, 
and the surplus for expenses and contingencies $1,380,000.  Assess- 
ments  were  therefore  set  at $10  a  share  on Richmond  Terminal 
common instead  of  $I 2.50 ;  $7.20  on  East  Tennessee common in- 
stead  of  $9;  and $3  and $6  on  East Tennessee  first and second 
preferred as before.  The new securities to be sold were reduced cor- 
respondingly to $8,ooo,ooo of  bonds  and $25,000,000  of  common 
stock.  Finally, the bonds  to provide for new  construction, better- 
ments,  and  additions  were  reduced  from  $35,383,000  to  about 
$~g,ooo,m,  of  which  not  over  $2,000,000  (instead  of  $2,500,000) 
were  to  be  used  in  any calendar  year.  Other provisions  of  the 
earlier plan were to remain unchanged. 
It was this modified plan which was carried to a successful con- 
clusion.  In principle it did not mend the weak spot in its predeces- 
The actual charges in 1895 were  &+,~gg,ooo. 
'  "The increase  in car  trusts is due to the existence of  about $I,~OO,OOO  of such 
obligations on the Richmond  & Danville system, which, up to the date of  the Pbn 
of reorganization, had  not  been enkred on  the kdgcr of  either the Railway ComPanY 
w  Receivers, dlwugh, as iC appurrs, they we  wd  &mum."  ~odiiied  reorgan- 
ization plan. 
sor of May.  That plan had contemplated a surplus of  $211,m  over 
fixed charges for  1893.  This estimated charges  at $4,100,000  for 
g94 and net earnings at $4,250,000 on a somewhat reduced mileage. 
There was not to be more left for dividends and improvements than 
there had been before, while the cash and bond  provisions for im- 
provements were notably reduced.  The  concession of  bonds to stock- 
holders for one-quarter of  their assessments was unsound  hancier- 
ing,  as was,  on  the whole,  the funding of  coupons  on  the  new 
mortgage bonds.  The success which the modification had, never- 
theless, in  restoring the company to  solvency, was  due to the im- 
provement in earnings which soon took place.  The  original plan had 
based  its calculations on the first year of  depression ;  the amended 
plan kept  charges down till three years had elapsed.  By that time 
business had begun to mend, and all danger of  bankruptcy was past. 
Other points in either plan leave little to criticise. 
The modifications to the original plan were issued on February 20, 
1894.  Over 7  j per cent of  the system bonds had assented by March 
24.  At  one foreclosure sale after another the reorganization  com- 
mittee now bought in the portions of  the old system covered by the 
plan.  Suits against the Richmond Terminal had been brought under 
the two collateral mortgages, and on July  13, 1893, the reorganiza- 
tion committee bid in the pledged securities.  On February 6,  1894, 
it  bought  the  remaining  assets  of  the  Terminal  Company;  on 
June 15 it bought the Richmond  & Danville, and on July 7 the East 
Tennessee, Virginia  & Georgia.  Two trustees'  sales, one receivers' 
sale, ten foreclosure sales, and six conveyances without foreclosure 
had occurred  by  September,  1894, and more minor  sales were in 
pr0gress.l On June  15 the Southern Railway  Company was organ- 
ized with a charter from the state of  Virginia, and took over in suc- 
cession properties to the extent of  4607 miles.2 Samuel Spencer was 
elected  president.  Some thirty corporations were  swept away and 
thirty boards of  directors abolished ;  for the Southern Railway was an 
operating company, and, unlike  the Richmond  Terminal  and  the 
Richmond  & Danville, controlled but an inappreciable fration of 
R. R. Gaz. 26: 613, 1894. 
a  Statement compiled by the reorganization committee. Chron. 59:  515,1894. The 
mileage  controlled  by  the  Richmond  Terminal  system  on  November  30,  raga, 
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its mileage through the ownership of  stock.  The new securities were 
issued at the proper times, and according to the plan the common 
and preferred stock was turned over to three voting trustees,l who 
issued trust certificates in their stead. 
- 
This completed  the  reorganization of  the  Richmond  Terminal 
Company so far as the principal part of its mileage was concerned. 
The portions of  the system excluded from the plan  have been  to 
some extent  bought back in  later years.  Control of  the Alabama 
Great  Southern was bought in  1895; the Memphis  & Charleston 
was  acquired in  1898; the  Richmond  & Mecklenburg was leased 
in  1898 and the Mobile  & Birmingham in  1899; and the North- 
eastern of  Georgia was  bought  in  1899.  The system has not yet, 
however, fully regained  its old position.  The most  important loss 
has undoubtedly been that of  the Central of  Georgia.  We  left  this 
company engaged in active disputes with the Terminal management. 
During  1892  and  1893  efforts to  reorganize it  were  made  under 
the leadership of  Hollins  & Co.  The principal difficulties were 
the large  floating debt  and  the  money  required  to  put  the  pro- 
perty into good  physical c~ndition.~  A plan was actually prepared 
at  the beginning of  1893  and  submitted  to  securityholders, but 
failed because of  that same decline in  earnings which  had caused 
the  modification of  the  Terminal  reorganization  plan.  A second 
plan,  prepared  in  1894, had  a  better fate,3 and in modified form 
was  put into effect. The Railroad was sold  at auction in  1895, the 
Central of  Georgia Railway was organized to take its place,'  and 
the  corporation  entered  upon  a  new  career  which  we  have  not 
space to 
As for the Southern Railway, the years from 1895 to 1907 have 
brought  it  prosperity.  It has extended considerably in  mileage. 
Besides reacquiring  lines  which formerly were  part of  the Rich- 
'  J. P. Morgan, Charles Lanier, and George F. Baker.  See Chron. 59: 836, 18941 
and Ibid. 880, 1894. 
a  See statement by Receiver Comer.  Chron. 55:  805, 1892. 
Chron. 60:  1008, 1895. 
With a charter from the state of  Georgia. 
The capital stock of  the Central of  Georgia Railway was held by the ~ichmond 
Terminal Reorganization  Committee until  the  spring of  1907.  It  was  then  sold 
to Oakleigh Thome, president of  the  Trust Company of  America,  and  Maden 
J. Peny.  Later the same year these gentlemen resold this stock to E. H. Harrimm 
and his associates. 
rnond  Terminal  system,  it  has  grown  south to  Jacksonville  and 
Palatka, east to  Charleston and to a more  direct connection with 
Norfolk, and west from Louisville to East St. Louis.  It has further 
joined  its Louisville-East St.  Louis line to  Chicago by  acquiring 
a half-interest in the Monon, and to the rest of  its system by a half- 
interest in  the Cincinnati, New  Orleans  & Texas Pacific; and it 
has bought control of  the Mobile  & Ohio, which stretches through 
four states from East  St. Louis to  Mobile.  Instead of  4392  miles 
as operated on  June 30,  1895, it now reports  7546.  The earnings 
of  the system have increased  more  rapidly than its mileage.  The 
revival of  business after  1897  occurred with  singular force in  the 
South, and  seems to  have  introduced  there  a new  industrial  era. 
As  a result, the Southern's gross earnings have trebled and its net 
earnings have been  multiplied by  two.  Passenger receipts, which 
were $4,329,499 in 1895, have become $14,683,006 in 1907.  Freight 
receipts have increased from $10,816,024  to $37,368,095. 
It has been  this increase in earnings which  has at  last  allowed 
some of  that  margin  for  improvements which  the  reorganization 
plans weakly  attempted  to  secure.  And  accordingly,  large  sums 
have been  expended.  Maintenance of  way  charges are now  over 
$1000  per mile instead of  $630.  Expenses per locomotive mile have 
increased from 4.19  cents in  1895 to  7.54  cents in  1907; expenses 
per  passenger car mile  from .83 to  1.03 cents;  and  expenses per 
freight car mile from .47  to 2.18  cents.  It is true that locomotives 
and cars are larger to-day and that rails are heavier, but this fact 
is far from accounting for the difference.  Not only has the existing 
plant  been  kept  in  good  repair  from earnings alone, but  distinct 
improvements have been made.  New rail has been laid, additional 
ballast put in, wooden trestles filled or replaced with steel.  It was es- 
timated in  1906 that $5,m,m  had been spent in betterments and 
charged against income up to that  time, besides some  $I~,OOO,OOO 
more paid for equipment out of  earnings.  Meanwhile considerable 
sums had been spent from capital account.  The reorganization plan 
allowed for some $1~,000,000  of  new bonds to be  sold at the rate of 
$2,ooo,ooa per year.'  Of  these the  company had sold  $I~,OOO,OOO 
for improvement of  the property by February I, 1906, besides  dis- 
posing of some $23,000,000  of  equipment obligations. 
'  The original estimate was  $19,000,000.  The amount available seems to have 
been finally $20,000,000. THE SOUTHERN  I9I  1  I  go  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
The appreciation of  the need for still more liberal expenditure 
led in 1906  to a comprehensive plan for  the issue of  new capital. 
Under  date of  February  I, the company submitted to  its voting 
trustees '  a scheme for a $200,000,000 mortgage, of  which $I 5,000,- 
ooo  were  to be  issued  at once and the rest  were  to be  reserved. 
Of  the immediate  issue $4,962,774  were  to refund  payments for 
equipment hitherto made and charged to capital; $3,501,000 were 
to refund investments in securities of, and advances to, subordinate 
companies, as well  as to be  used  for the  acquisition of  property 
not heretofore funded; and $6,536,226  were  for double track, re- 
vision of  grades, new yards, shops, etc.  Of  the securities reserved, 
$65,164,000  were for  refunding purposes: $20,000,000  for  certain 
subsidiary lines: and $99,834,000 to go,  first, for betterments and 
improvements on  the  entire  system  and  for  new  equipment  in 
amounts not  exceeding  $5,000,000  in  each  year; and second,  in 
exchange for  first  mortgage  bonds not  exceeding in  amount  the 
actual cost  of  railroads  and terminals hereafter  to  be  acquired. 
In  other words, about one-half of  the total issue is to go,  sooner or 
later, for improvements, and the rest for refundings and for new 
 acquisition^.^  It was believed that the Southern could readily pay 
the interest on the increased immediate issue without endangering 
dividends on its preferred stock, and that the subsequent increases 
in  earnings would  more  than  provide  for  whatever  additions  to 
charges  might  occur.  Negotiations for  the  placing  of  the  new 
securities were  concluded with  J. P.  Morgan  & Co.  at  a reported 
price of  964. 
The results  of  the  expenditures for  improvements have  been 
remarkable.  In 1895 the Southern Railway had in use 623 loco- 
motives; in  1907  the number was  1536.  In the former year there 
were 487 passenger cars and 18,924 freight cars; in the latter there 
were  respectively  995  and  ~6,225.~  Only  370  miles  of  track  in 
1895 were over  65  pounds in  weight  per  yard; more  than  3100 
The voting trust was extended in  ~goz,  in respect to a majority of  the stock, 
for a period of five years.  See Chron. 75: 442, 1902,  and R. R. Gaz. 34: 826, 1901. 
'  Annual Report, 1906. 
'  The narrow-gauge equipment included in these figures is as follows: 
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surpassed that  limit in  1907.  It is nevertheless in its inability to 
handle  the  business  offered  it  that  the  Southern  has  provoked 
sharpest criticism.  Over  3600  miles of  its system  still have rails 
weighing 62  pounds or less to the yard; -that  is,  rails incapable 
of meeting modem operating conditions.  Only 206 miles of  double 
and  1981 of  side track exist.  Equipment appears to be still inad- 
equate.  Signals are imperfect, and speed and  promptness  seem- 
ingly impossible to attain.  The late tragic death of  Mr.  Spencer 
was a forcible illustration of  the deficiencies of  the road which  he 
had done so much to improve. 
The earning power of  the system cannot yet, therefore, be  said 
to be secure.  Moreover, the capitalization of  almost  $72,000  per 
as well  as the less dense railroad business in  the South, the 
slight  construction of  many  of  the  Southern Railway  lines,  the 
lack of  adequate facilities which compels an operating ratio of  76 
per  cent, and the absorption of  minor  roads less prosperous than 
the main stem, -  all these factors have kept down the net  surplus 
$om  operation.  On the other hand, the management is making an 
earnest attempt to raise  the standard of  the  property.  Bonds and 
notes to the par value of  over $32,000,cco  have been  sold to pro- 
vide for additions and  improvements during the past  year, and a 
very great change for the better has taken place.  Dividends on the 
preferred  stock  have  been  paid  since  1897.  As  the  country de- 
velops, and as the sums spent upon improvements come more and 
more to have their effects, a dividend upon the common stock will 
be paid.  The near future is  more  likely  to witness the  cessation 
of  dividends upon the preferred. 
"It will hardly be  claimed," said the Interstate Commerce Commission, of  the 
Southern Railway in  goo (8 I. C. C. Rep. 583), "that the cost of  reproducing that 
Property in  its present state would equal &o,ooo  a mile." 
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CHAPTER VI 
ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA  FE 
Charter -  Strategic  extensions -  Competitive  extensions -  Effect  on finances - 
Raise  in  rate  of  dividend -  Reorganization  of  1889 -  Acquisition  of  the St. 
Louis & San Francisco and of  the Colorado Midland-  Income bond  conversion 
-  Receivership -  English  reorganization  plan -  Mr.  Little's  report-  Final 
reorganization  plan -  Sale -  Subsequent history. 
THE  Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad has been reorganized 
twice, in 1889 and in 1893-5 ; the first time without, but the second 
time after a foreclosure sale.  The keynote of  its history has been 
extension.  It was the enterprise of  the men  in control before 188~ 
which gave it  the  position and power  it holds to-day, but  it  was 
also  that  enterprise which  necessitated  its  first  reorganization by 
imposing upon it heavier burdens than it could bear. 
Chartered  in  Kansas  in 1863, the Atchison spread west, south- 
west,  south,  and  northeast.  It received  some aid  from the  state 
of  Kansas in the shape of  a grant of  lands, but depended primarily 
on the investment of  private capital.  Kansas itself was not, in 1870, 
a very encouraging field for railroad building.  It had been admitted 
as a state only in 1861, and could boast for the most part of  less than 
two  inhabitants  to  the  square  mile; -  although  settlement  was 
pushing westward with considerable rapidity, and stores of  mineral 
wealth had been discovered in Colorado. The railroad in those days 
had to  create its own  traffic, bd  population followed the means 
of  transportation.  The peculiarity of  Kansas was a central position, 
which  lent  itself  to  schemes of  the  most  far-reaching nature.  A 
railroad reaching from one end of  the state to the other might almost 
equally well have been extended to California,  to Chicago, or to the 
Gulf; and could be sure in time, if  it survived, of  the carriage of a 
vast volume of  traffic out in every direction from the Central West. 
The Atchison  managers  saw  this opportunity,  and  courageously 
and persistently endeavored to realize it ; -  part of the project they 
announced, and part they kept back till the fitting time should come. 
The systematic extension of  the Atchison Railroad may be divided 
into four parts: 
(I) The construction through  Kansas to  Colorado, to save the 
charter, then down the valley of  the Rio Grande to Albuquerque. 
(z) The securing of  a connection with the Pacific Coast by con- 
struction, lease, or traffic agreement. 
(3)  The connection with the Gulf. 
(4)  The connection with Chicago. 
As  the system neared completion,  and its territory came to be 
invaded by  other roads, there were added to this systematic exten- 
sion what  may be called competitive extensions, consisting largely 
in the construction of  branch lines, and multiplied beyond anything 
which the country could need for ye'ars to come.  This sort of  build- 
ing was most prominent from 1884 to 1888 and will be considered 
in  its place. 
The iirst  stretch of  road was built with few difficulties or com- 
plications.  It was commenced in  1869, and, after numerous delays, 
it reached the western border of  the state of  Kansas on December 
~8 of the same year;  from this point  it went  on more  leisurely, 
first west and then  southwest, to Albuquerque.'  These  early miles 
were paid for from the proceeds of  both stocks and bonds.  From 
Albuquerque a variety of  routes presented themselves.  The South- 
ern Pacific had by that time built to El Paso, and it was feasible to 
extend the Atchison to that point and to rely on a traffic agreement 
for the handling of  the western  business.  Or, building to Deming 
near El Paso, Atchison might have extended its line down the river 
valleys in the northwestern part of  Mexico to Guaymas on the Gulf 
.of California.  Or, Atchison  might  have  built  directly west  from 
Albuquerque.  All  three of  these  routes were  considered,  atld  all 
three were eventually carried out.= 
The connection with the Southern Pacific was  not a very difficult 
one to make, and the Atchison reached  Deming in  March,  1881. 
By  the traffic agreement then concluded the Atchison secured the 
use of the Southern Pacific tracks from Deming to Benson, Arizona, 
and  arranged to  build  south into Mexico  from this  point;  while 
the Southern Pacific was  allotted 51  per  cent of  the through rate 
On  traffic pass&g  over  Southern  Pacific  lines.3 This formed the 
Second through route from the  East,  and  in  September,  1881,  it 
This route followed roughly the old Santa Fe  Trail. 
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took one-quarter as much business as the Central Pacific.  It was 
also the first of  Atchison's  projected routes to be completed.  The 
line  to  Guaymas was  added  by  purchase.  Instead  of  building, 
Atchison exchanged its stock for the stock of  the already existhg 
Sonora Railroad in  the proportion of  one to two,  and guaranteed 
the interest on the Sonora first mortgage 7 per cent bonds.'  This 
made up for the lack of  an independent line to the coast further 
north. The  total of  Sonorastock  was $5,400,000,  requiring$2,700,000 
Atchison  stock in  exchange.  The total  kst mortgage  7 per  cent 
bond  issue was  $4,050,000.  With the railroad  came a  subsidy of 
$2,608,200  (American gold),' equal to $11,270  (Mexican) per  mile. 
This subsidy kept  cropping up in Atchison finance for some time, 
and was  finally  adjusted in  1896 by  the  transfer  to the  company 
of  $1,159,800 in 3 per cent bonds of  the Mexican Interior Consoli- 
dated Debt. 
For  the  direct route  President  Strong sought the  help  of  the 
St. Louis & San Francisco, and the use of  the charter of  the Atlantic 
& Pacific which it owned.  The Atlantic  & Pacific was a  road in- 
corporated in 1886, with a charter to build from St. Louis to Cali- 
fornia.  In spite both  of its charter and of  its name it had never 
gone  further  west  than Vinita,  in the northeast  comer of  Indian 
Territ~ry.~  President  Strong and the  Frisco now  agreed to  con- 
tinue construction under the name of  the Atlantic  & Pacific, both 
from Vinita and from Albuquerque.  The Atchison was to be  given 
a half-interest in  the charter, directors were to be  chosen equally 
from the two companies, and the cost was to be met by a $25,ooo,ooo 
loan, which the Atchison and the Frisco were to guarantee jointly 
but not se~erally.~  Before the new construction neared completion, 
however,  the  St.  Louis  & San  Francisco fell under  the  control 
of  Messrs.  Gould and Huntington,  who,  as owners of  the Texas 
& Pacific and  the  Southern  Pacific  respectively,  naturally  dis- 
approved of  the plan  to extend the Atlantic & Pacific to the coast- 
The Atchison,  therefore, agreed to build no further west than the 
Colorado River.  At  that point the Southern Pacific was to meet it 
with a line from Mojave.  The Southern Pacific gave to the Atlantic 
Chron.  34:  315, 1882,  Circular  of  Sonora Railroad Company to stockholders 
a  Chron. 29: 630, 1879. Statement by Vice-President Baker. 
Ibid. 29: 630, 1879. 
& Pacific aa interest guarantee on its bonds to the extent of  25 per 
cent of the gross earnings derived from Atlantic  & Pacific through 
business,  and the latter road  retained  all its rights for  a  line in 
California.'  This proved  unprofitable, for  the  Southern  Pacific 
persistently diverted  traffic  to  Ogden  and El Paso,  and in  1884 
still another arrahgement was made.  By this - 
(a) The Atlantic & Pacific bought the Southern Pacific division 
between the Needles (the Colorado River) and Mojave, 242  miles, 
for $30,000 per mile, and, until such time as title could be given by 
the discharge of the mortgage upon it, took a lease at an annual 
rental of  6 per cent on the purchase price. 
(b) The Atlantic  & Pacific secured trackage  and  traffic rights 
and facilities between Mojave and Oakland and San Francisco, as 
well as the use of terminals at the latter point. 
(c)  The Atchison  (and the St. Louis  & San Francisco likewise) 
agreed  to  buy  from the Pacific Improvement Company first mort- 
gage bonds and other securities of the Atlantic & Pacific of  the par 
value  of  $3,096,768,  at the actual cost  to the Improvement Com- 
pany, to wit, $1,524,356. 
To complete the connection to the coast the Atchison built from 
Waterman, some seventy miles east of Mojave on the Atlantic  81 
Pacific, to Colton on the Southern Pacific, and secured control of 
the California Southern from Colton to San Diego.= In 1885 entrance 
was obtained to Los Angeles by lease of  the Southern Pacific track 
between  Colton and that city.= 
The money for this rapid  progress was obtained by  the sale of 
both stocks and bonds, but on the whole stock predominated.  The 
directors  rightly  considered  it  much  more  conservative  to  issue 
stock and sell it at par than to load  the road down with a heavy 
debt in the shape of bonds;  and what is more, they were able to 
make good their word,  and to sell stock at or near par in spite of 
the risk incident to operations such as the Atchison was conducting 
and the frequent bonuses or stock dividends declared. 
By  1884, then, Atchison had reached the Pacific coast.  The next 
great steps were the extensions to Galveston and to Chicago.  The 
'  Chon. 34: 243, 1882.  a  Chron. 41  :  444, 1885. 
Annual  Report,  1885,  contains a discussion of  the  Atlantic  & Pacific and of 
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year  of  entrance  to  Los  Angeles  the  Atchison did  not  cross the 
southern  boundary of  Kansas.  Certain of  its stockholders were, 
however, unofficially interested in the Gulf, Colorado  & Santa Fe, 
which ran  from Galveston on the south to the Indian Territory on 
the north, roughly 200 miles.  In 1884 a charter was  obtained for 
the Southern  Kansas  Railway Company, a corporation organized 
solely to build south from Arkansas City.  The same year the Gulf, 
Colorado  & Santa Fe ~biained  permission to stretch north.  The 
two roads met at Purcell in the summer of  1887.'  In 1886 the Gulf, 
Colorado  & Santa Fe was formally brought in.  Gulf  stock then 
amounted to  $4,560,000  and bonds had  been  issued to  a limit of 
$17,000 per mile.  For the entire capital stock, subject to the above 
encumbrance, Atchison  agreed  to  pay  $8000  a mile  in  Atchison 
stock, par value2 The final move was to get  into Chicago.  "  The 
Atchison Company has been much too conservative during the last 
few years,"  said the Chrorzicle, "and thus has allowed its territory 
to be  invaded."  The first intent was to build direct.  There were 
incorporated, in Illinois the Chicago, Santa Fe  & California Rail- 
way Company, and  in  Iowa the  Chicago, Santa Fe  & California 
Railway Company of  Iowa.  In 1887 the Atchison was able to pur- 
chase  the  Chicago  & St.  Louis Railroad,  between  Chicago and 
Streator, with  a branch to  Pekin,3 and  to save itself  construction 
between these points.  The whole line was opened for traffic in May, 
1888.' 
This completed  Atchison's  systematic  extensions before  1889. 
From a local road in Kansas it had become a through route, taking 
freight over  its own  rails from  Chicago to  Galveston  and to  the 
Pacific coast.  But especially in the latter eighties competition had 
become keen; and to its strategic extensions Atchison was obliged 
to add  competitive building on  an  enormous scale.  Of  the  7000 
miles in  1888, over  2700  had  been added since January,  1886, and 
had been built, not to tap new sources of  traffic, but to defend what 
was thought to be Atchison's rightful territory by means of  a desper- 
ate war of  rates.  "About three or four years ago," said a competent 
observer,  "a  mania  seized  three  great  corporations  (Atchison, 
Missouri Pacific, and Rock Island) to gridiron Kansas with railroad 
Chron. 42:  462, 1886;  Annual Report, 1887.  Ibid. 42:  518, 1886. 
a  Annual Reports,  1886 and 1887.  Annual Report,  1888. 
iron, and each tried hard to see which could cover the most ground, 
regard to the character of  the ground, the result [being that] 
were built where they would not be required for ten years 
to come." ' Such roads could not be  expected to  pay, and in fact 
did  not.  Even in  the case of  better planned extensions, the lines 
had to be built in an unopened territory, the traffic of  which had yet 
to be  developed.  In  Indian  Territory,  Oklahoma,  and  Arizona, 
the bulk  of  the country had  less  than  two  inhabitants  to  the 
square  mile;  in  New  Mexico  and  Lower  California  only  one- 
half of  the  area was more thickly settled ;  and it was largely from 
this southwestern comer  that  local  traffic for the Atchison had to 
be built  up. 
The method of  financiering these competitive extensions varied: 
sometimes the parent company guaranteed the principal and interest 
of the brabch-line bonds;  sometimes it took these into its treasury 
and issued collateral bonds against them ;  sometimes, perhaps more 
frequently still, it  leased new roads for a rental  equivalent to the 
annual interest on their bonds.  If  the branches could have earned 
their fixed  charges the burden  on  the  Atchison would  have been 
nominal, but as in large part they could not it was real and serious. 
In 1888 there were actually paid in rentals, interest on Sonora Rail- 
way bonds, and on sundry railway bonds, $2,361,300.  Large sums 
were carried to capital account.  In 1888 there was an accumulated 
account of  "due from sundry leased, controlled, and auxiliary roads 
in construction and general account"  (net) $13,558,678, including 
various  cash  current  construction  and  other  charges,  which  was 
carried as an asset, but which in reality consisted of  advances from 
which there was little or no hope of  return.  Besides the claims for 
interest the parent company had in  practice other claims to meet. 
Where  a branch  failed to  earn  operating expenses, as often hap- 
pened, sums had to be advanced to keep the road and rolling stock 
in  repair.  Thus the item  "due  from  auxiliary  roads in  current 
traffic and  operation  accounts"  amounted  in  1888 to  $1,008,554. 
Bills  and  accounts payable the  same year  were  $6,553,775,  and 
accrued interest, taxes, and  sinking funds totalled $915,337.  The 
following table  shows vividly  the  effect upon  the  system  of  the 
lapid extension of  the years 1884 to 1888: 







Net earnings from operation 
Net profits, excluding dividends 
Net profits, including payments for dividends and 
interest on floating debt 
Whatever  may be  said  as to  the  necessity of  extension, it  is 
evident that the position of  the system by  1888 had  changed  for 
the worse.  This last-named year  was  a  bad  one, it  is  true, but 
certain  evils  of  which  the  directors  then  complained were  per- 
manent,  and  should  have  been  permanently  allowed  for.  Some 
realization of  the fact  that  the Atchison might be  going too fast 
appeared in the financial journals of  the time.  "Were these under- 
takings less solidly backed,'' said the Railway Age, "  there might be 
apprehension that  enterprise  was  being  pushed  too  far  and too 
fast."'  But on the whole  the rapid  growth  and  ehormous extent 
of  the system seem to dazzle beholders.  "The career  of  this com- 
pany," said the Railway Age again, "has been one of  the marvels of 
railway enterprise, and it would be  unsafe now to attempt to fix a 
limit to its extension or to the ambition of  its Napoleonic president 
and its bold  and enterprising directors." 
In 1887 the directors increased the rate of  dividend from 6 to  7 
per  cent.3  The action was thoroughly unjustifiable, and the rate 
Ry. Age,  12: 107,  1887.  Ibid.  12: 325, 1887. 
This increase in dividend  gave rise to sharp and well-merited criticism.  The 
directors defended their action as follows: 
"In forming a just opinion of  this matter,"  said they, "it is necessary to recall 
to the stockholders  the statement  made  in the  circular of  July  30,  1887. . . .  It 
was stated in the circular referred to that for the six months ending July  I, 1887, 
the net  earnings exceeded by  more  than $I,ZW,OOO  the  net  earnings for the first 
six months of  the  year  1886, that the earnings were still  increasing, and what  has 
always been true in the past may be expected this year also; namely, that the revenue 
of  the second six months of  the year will be considerably in excess of  that of  the first 
six months. . .  .  It will . . .  be  seen that . .  .  the year  1887 formed a remark- 
able exception to what had hitherto been the regular course of  Atchison's earnings; 
the second half of  that year showing an increase over the first half of  only $z78,@ 
gross, and  $ao4,144 net. .  . .  Drouths,  failure  of  crops,  excessive  competition, 
was speedily again reduced.  By the end of  1888 the main company 
was liable to be called on any year to the extent of  $8,625,365, which 
was the amount of  interest on auxiliary roads either guaranteed or 
payable  as  rentals.  In  four  years  the  mileage  of  the  Atchison 
system had increased 150 per cent; its bonded indebtedness 239 per 
cent; its fixed charges 216  per cent; and its gross earnings only 69 
per  cent; while the deficits on its branch  lines were obviously not 
matters of  bookkeeping, and the value of  interchanged business was 
not  equal  to  the  increased  burdens  which  the  subsidiary  lines 
imposed.  The floating debt mounted up,  as is usual  in times of 
trouble. From a total of $3,317,446 in 1884 it increased to $8,076,059 
in  1888.  To offset it the directors secured in  October, 1888,  sub- 
scriptions to  a  $ro,ooo,ooo issue of  "guarantee  fund,"  three-year 
notes.  Not all of  the amount authorized was to be sold at once, but 
from time to time Atchison was to call on subscribers to  take part 
of  their subscription, and the notes were to bear 6 per cent from the 
time they were put forth.'  For the rest, the directors economized as 
much  as possible.  Salaries were cut  10  per  cent  in  every branch 
of  the service, beginning with the president, and the unlucky 7 per 
cent rate  of  dividend  was reduced to 6  per cent,  to 2  per cent, 
and then to nothing at  all in  successive  quarters.  None of  these 
expedients proved  sufficient. In fact, the  situation was so critical 
that nothing short of a general reorganization could probably have 
secured the radical  reduction in fixed charges which  the company 
required. 
In September,  1889,  accordingly, Messrs.  Libby,  Abbott,  Pea- 
continually  decreasing  rates,  unwise  legislation, strikes, and other calamities  have 
befallen us as they have other Western  roads; but your directors could not know in 
advance that any of  these unfavorable conditions would have to be met, much less 
that they would all have to be met at one and the same time."  Annual Report, 1888. 
This defence  was  altogether unsatisfactory.  An  increase  in  the  dividend rate 
is too important to be justified  by anything  but earnings  actually in hand.  More- 
over, the conditions which the directors held responsible for the decline in Atchison 
earnings were  either well known  at the time when  the dividend  was declared, or 
could  easily have been anticipated.  It was even alleged  that the decrease in  busi- 
ness which  the  annual report  for  1888 disclosed was  due to lessened  carriage of 
company material to the West for construction of  new track, and not to crop failure 
Or  other decline in general business.  See R. R. Gaz. 21: 327,  1889. 
'  Chron.  47: 472,  1888.  The use  of  $j,ooo,ooo  of  the  notes  was  specifically 
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body, and Baring were appointed a committee to consider the broad 
question  of  financial  and general reorganization,'  and in October 
a plan for the complete rehabilitation of  the company was brought 
forward.  The obligations with which the plan had to deal are indi- 
cated in the following table: 
Obligations of  the Aithison Company in 1889 
Principal  Interest 
Bonds, guarantee fund notes  $160,786,000  $9,203,620.00 
Contingent issue of  additional bonds  775,000  38,750.00 
Car trusts  1,445,660  86,739.60 
$163,006,660  $9,329,109.60 
Less interest on bonds and guarantee fund notes 





Of  the bonds outstanding $56,498,000 were direct loans upon the 
Atchison's main lines, bearing anywhere from 44 to 7 per cent, and 
$104,288,000  were  bonds  upon  some of  the thirty-two  subsidiary 
corporations for whose obligations the Atchison was responsible. 
The dealing of  the Libby Committee with  this situation was in- 
telligent  and comprehensive.  It proposed  an increase  and simpli- 
fication of  securities, a decrease in fixed charges, and a cancellation 
of  the floating debt.  In place of  the  forty-one  classes of  bonds 
outstanding it  suggested  that  two  grand  issues be  put  forth, one 
of  4 per cent general mortgage bonds to the amount of  $150,000,000, 
and one  of  5  per  cent  income  bonds  to  a  total of  $80,000,000. 
From these issues $13,750,000 should be used to provide for cash 
 requirement^,^  and  the  remainder  should  be  employed  in  direct 
Ry. Age,  14: 644, 1889. 
a  Cash requirements were (Circular No.  63,  Oct.  15, 1889) : 
To  retire outstanding lease warrants  $1,445966 
To expend on incomplete construction of  existing lines, and for 
new equipment as required  5,000,ooo 
To  pay floating debt  3,554~34~ 
$10,000,000 
And the provision for cash subscription was 
General mortgage  4s  $I 2,500,000 
Income  5s  1,250,000 
$13,750,000 
retirement  of  old obligations.  The exchange of  some $216,000,000 
of  new bonds for $163,000,000  of old was to mean  an increase in 
securities outstanding, but  since interest on only part  of  the new 
bonds was to be obligatory fixed charges were to be less than they 
had been before.  The managers figured on what the property could 
earn, good times or bad,  and capitalized  this sum into 4 per cent 
general mortgage  bonds.  They then  calculated the difference be- 
tween this and the former return  to bondholders,  and capitalized 
the difference  into  income  bonds.'  Each  individual  bondholder; 
therefore,  was offered a  chance to receive the same return  which 
he had previously enjoyed, although his right to demand an annual 
payment was limited to an amount which the road could earn. 
A few points deserve to be specially noticed.  The reduction in 
interest was sufficient to have transformed the deficit for the whole 
Atchison system for 1888 into a respectable surplus, providing that 
no dividends had been paid; but this reduction was dependent on 
the retention of  the income bonds as optional obligations.  There 
was no cash assessment.  Had the reorganization  taken place in a 
time  of  general  depression,  the sale of  securities  for  cash  would 
probably have been impossible, but the days of  depression had not 
yet  arrived.  The stockholder  suffered in  the introduction  of  the 
principal  of  some  $67,000,000  additional  indebtedness  between 
him and his  property,  although he was not  called  upon  directly; 
but  it should not be  forgotten that for a long while the Atchison 
stockholders had received very liberal dividends, both in stock and 
in  cash,  and could  not  well  complain  of  the moderate  loss now 
necessary.  There was no voting trust, although one was proposed, 
ad  the bonds were not even temporarily given voting power.  The 
situation  seems to have  been  that  the securityholders  thought  it 
more to their  advantage to reduce voluntarily  the rate of  interest 
than to force  a  foreclosure  sale and take their  chances; for  the 
directors, in submitting the plan, said that they felt it necessary "to 
state in  the strongest  terms that the non-success of  this proposal 
will inevitably result  in foreclosure, with  all its attendant misfor- 
tunes."  a 
The income bond certscate is printed in  full in W.  A. Wood,  Modem  Business 
Corporations, pp.  237-9. 
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By  the end of  November, although the plan had not been  pro- 
mulgated until well  into October, more than one-half  of  the out- 
standing bonds  had  assented, and the  directors were  enabled to 
announce success.  Certain changes in the management had already 
taken place.  President Strong had resigned in September, and had 
been succeeded by  Mr. Allen Manville, general manager of  the St. 
Paul,  Miieapolis  &  Manitoba  Railway.'  Mr.  Reinhart  was 
credited with a large part in the construction of  the new  plan  of 
1889, and his later promotion may have been connected therewith. 
After the reorganization Atchison resumed  its policy  of  expan- 
sion, its new directors being apparently as "bold and enterprising" 
as the old.  In 1890 it took in the St. Louis & San Francisco, a road 
running from St. Louis west  and southwest through Missouri, Kan- 
sas, Arkansas, and Indian Temtory, connecting at Paris, Texas, with 
the Gulf, Colorado  & Santa Fe, and through half-ownership  of  the 
Atlantic & Pacific  connecting Albuquerque in New  Mexico with 
Barstow in  Southern California.  The total  length of  the  Frisco 
system, exclusive of  jointly owned roads, was 1329 miles,  and this 
constituted the  largest  single  acquisition  that  the  Atchison  had 
ever  made,  The terms of  the purchase were  highly favorable to 
the Frisco shareholders, but the benefits to the Atchison were less 
than  was  expected.  Although  the  consolidation removed  certain 
difficulties experienced  from  the  joint  ownership of  the Atlantic 
& Pacific, and although the united roads were in a better position 
to compete for transcontinental and Gulf traffic than either of  them 
had been  before,  the Atchison directors were forced to announce 
in 1891 that, "with  every opportunity given it to work with advant- 
age, the  property  (Frisco) has  failed  to demonstrate its ability to 
carry itself financially and to liquidate its debts; nor could it hope 
to obtain such results without the provision of  New  Capital. . . . 
This is due largely to the absence of  complete and proper facilities 
and machinery with which to conduct operations in the nature of 
Round Houses, Machine Shops, Stations and other buildings, im- 
proved  Bridges and Equipment."=  A bond issue was needed, and 
was in fact put forth, -the  Atchison taking a goodly share. 
Annual  Report, 1890.  Economies were  secured at this time th&ugh consoli- 
dation of  branch lines with the main stem and in other ways. 
'  Annual Report, 1891. 
Less  important  than  this  was  the  purchase,  in  1890,  of 
the Colorado Midland, a road 346 miles long in Colorado, valued 
,-hiefly for its ore traffic.  In August, 1890, the Mexican Government 
resumed  payment  of  the  Sonora subsidy, on  which  nothing  had 
been paid for eight years.'  It does not seem as if  at any time after 
1889  the  Atchison enjoyed  unalloyed  prosperity.  The year  1890 
showed an increase in net earnings of  48 per  cent according to the 
figures given,  and the directors were  unhappy  until they had in- 
creased the fixed charges to match, but the year  1891 recorded a 
falling off,  and  1892  showed a comparatively slight gain over the 
figures of  1891.  There was obviously nothing in the reported figures 
to cause alarm, but there was nothing which justified the payment 
of more than 29 per cent any year on the income bonds, or of  any 
dividends on the stock. 
Toward the end of  1891 the guarantee fund notes fell due.  They 
had been issued, it'will  be remembered, to protect the property in 
1888, and  were secured by  an equal amount of  general mortgage 
qs; but now the directors, disliking to put these qs on the market 
at 83$, decided to extend the notes for two years at par with a cash 
commission of  one per cent.= 
Extension of  the guarantee fund notes did not increase the fixed 
obligations, it  merely  postponed  a  reduction;  but  the  conversion 
of  the income bonds of  1889 acted as a  positive increase.  There 
were $8o,m,m  of  these incomes, and it was in the optional charac- 
ter of  payments upon them that  the saving of  fixed charges by the 
reorganization of  1889 had consisted.  They had been issued instead 
of  preferred stock probably because more acceptable to the bond- 
holders; but it was early found that their use involved difficulties 
which  had  not  been  sufficiently regarded.  By  the  conditions of 
their indenture no bonds could be  inserted between them and the 
general mortgage qs;  they held a second lien for all time.  But sim- 
ilarly it was difficult to put bonds after them.  Their lien  was on 
hcome, -interest  was  payable  only  when  earned; any  regular 
mortgage would of  necessity have taken precedence.  The hindrance 
to new  issues was real and serious, and although some check on 
an aggressive management  was salutary, yet  the system required 
additions and improvements from time  to time  which  could not 
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be  supplied from current income.  Under these circumstances the 
Atchison directors decided within three  years to  sacrifice the re- 
duction in  fixed  charges secured in  1889  in  order  to  obtain  new 
capital with greater ease.  "It is the opinion of  the Management," 
said  the  annual report  for  1892, "that  the  time  has now arrived 
when  all  the  obligations of  the  Company  can  be  returned  to  a 
Fixed Basis, sufficient funds provided to take care of  all Improve- 
ments . . . required for at least four years, and at the same time 
the junior  Bonds and Capital Stock be restored to a  more per- 
manent market value with assured returns on the first, and probable 
balances  for  the  latter."'  "The  Atchison  plan  of  conversion," 
said  Mr. Reinhart, ". . .  is the completion of  the reorganization 
plan put in effect  October 18,  1889, and returns the obligations of 
the company . . .  to a fixed and stable basis. . . ."2 
The plan so cordially referred to provided for the issue of  a new, 
second mortgage, 4 per cent bond, and the exchange of  this secur- 
ity for the outstanding  income bonds.  The second  mortgage was 
to be issued in two classes: 
(a)  $80,000,000.  These  were  to  exchange  for  income  gs,  par 
for par,  and bore a rate of interest which  increased from 23 per 
cent in 1892 to 4 per cent in 1896, and then remained at 4 per cent 
until  maturity. 
(b) $~o,m,ooo.  These bore 4 per  cent and were  to be  issued 
in no greater sum in any year than $5,000,000 for specific improve- 
ments on the Atchison exclusive of  the Colorado Midland  or the 
St. Louis  & San Francisco.  There was reserved to the company 
the right, when all the above should have been exhausted, to issue 
more bonds of  the same sort as in class B for the same purposes 
and on the same mileage, up to a limit of  $50,ooo,m.~ 
The conversion  plan  was  approved  at the  annual  meeting  in 
1892,  and was  put  into effect.  The result was most  unfortunate. 
The annual burden on the company was increased at the very time 
when the panic of 1893 was about to reduce railroad earnings, while 
the advantages of freer issues of  new bonds were of  little account 
in a year when the sale of new securities was practically impossible. 
Moreover, a new light was soon to be thrown on the whole opera- 
Annual Report, 1892.  Ry. Age,  17: 413,  189% 
qnnual  Report, 1892. 
tion  by  disclosures of  dishonest  manipulation  of  figures  in  the 
Atchison reports. 
In 1892 and  1893 rumors of  trouble were  afloat, and were  re- 
peatedly and vigorously denied by  Mr. Reinhart, president of  the 
Atchison Company.  Thus in June,  1893, this officer declared that 
"the  Atchison,  Topeka  & Santa  Fe Railroad  Company,  strictly 
speaking, has no floating debt.  Its current liabilities are more than 
equalled by its current  cash assets."  In December Mr. Reinhart 
said again : "The interest on the General Mortgage Bonds of  the 
Atchison Company, due January  I, will  be  paid.  It seems hardly 
necessary to make this statement, because doubts as to its payment 
have,  in  my  judgment,  been  created  solely  by  speculators  who 
have no substantial interest in the property."  These official denials 
did not carry conviction, but opinions varied as to the seriousness 
of  the situation.  The Boston  News  Bureau  cheerily insisted that 
all the Atchison needed  was  "days  of  grace"  during the existing 
depres~ion,~  while in England it was thought that the rumors of  a 
receivership were at most but premat~re.~ 
At the end of  the year President Reinhart went to Europe to float 
a loan.  On his return,  after  a failure to  obtain  subscriptions, a 
receivership was applied for and granted.  It had  been  hoped  up 
to the very last  moment that the January  interest could be met; 
but  the  refusal  of  English  bondholders  to  subscribe  additional 
capital, the failure to  place  a third  mortgage loan in  the United 
States, and the death of  Director Magoun,  one of  the strong in- 
fluences  in  Atchison's  affairs,  made  a  crash  inevitable.  Current 
obligations had  mounted  to over  $~o,m,ooo,  credit  had  disap- 
peared,  and  the  railroad  necessarily  succumbed.  The Atlantic 
& Pacific, the Colorado Midland, the Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe, 
and the Southern California lines were not included in the Atchison 
receivership, though the Atchison  receivers were  given  like office 
in respect to the Atlantic  & Pacific.'  The Gulf, Colorado  & Santa 
Fe announced that it would  continue to operate its own line, and 
was prepared to pay its current obligations as before.' 
Chron. 56: 1014,  1893;  Ibid. 57: 1038, 1893.  1 Ry. Rev. 34: 68,  1894. 
Ry. Times, 64: 533, 1893. 
'  See Chron. 58:  42,  1894, for an official statement of  the reasons for the appli- 
cation to the courts. 
Ibid.  57: 1121, 1893. Some informationconcerning subsequent  railroad com- 
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No  sooner  was  failure  announced  than  committees  of  bond- 
holders sprang up.  In Boston  a committee was formed  with  six 
members, including J. L. Thorndike and H. L. Higginson.  In New 
York the Union Trust Company, the Mercantile Trust Company, 
the New York  Life Insurance Company,  Baring, Magoun  & Co., 
and Giddes & Smith got  together  in a committee,  with  Edward 
King  as chairman.  A  second  New  York  committee,  R.  Somers 
Hayes,  chairman, was  formed  by  express  invitation  of  the road. 
A directors'  committee was organized, of  which E. B. Cheney, Jr., 
was chairman.  The London holders of  the second mortgage class A 
bonds  themselves  formed  a  committee.  Even  before  1888  Eng- 
lishmen  had  invested  heavily  in  Atchison,  attracted  perhaps  by 
glowing stories of  the business to spring up across the western plains. 
It was said that not only had they been influential  in  shaping the 
reorganization of  1889, but that from that date to 1893 the manage- 
ment had been controlled by a board elected by  proxies entrusted 
to representatives  of  English  interest.  In  particular  Englishmen 
had become interested in the second mortgage bonds of  1892, suc- 
cessors to the income bonds of  1889, holding about one-half of  the 
total issue, and they now fought for the protection  of  this issue as 
against the stock. 
A  plan  of  reorganization  was  early matured  after  the English 
influence substantially as follows:  Either the general  mortgage or 
the second mortgage bonds were to be foreclcsed and a new company 
was  to be  formed.  If  the foreclosure should be under the general 
mortgage,  overdue interest  on that mortgage was not to be  paid, 
and new securities, similar to the existing bonds, were to be issued, 
bond for bond.  If  the foreclosure should be under the second mort- 
gage, the company was to provide for past  due interest,  and was 
to assume  the payment  of  principal  and interest  on  the general 
mortgage bonds.  The capital stock was to remain as before.  There 
was to be a new income mortgage to the amount of  $115,000,000,  of 
which  $84,000,000 were  to go for the existing second mortgage A 
bonds,  and $5,600,000 for the existing B bonds; the surplus to be 
given for assessments, or for the securities of  such auxiliary corn- 
panies as it should be thought advisable to acquire.  These income 
bonds  were  to  bear  5  per  cent and were  to  have voting  power. 
There  was  to  be  a  second  mortgage,  to  amount  e,ventually  to 
$35,~00,000;  of  which $5,000,000 were to be used  at once to retire 
the floating debt and for other purposes, and $3,000,000  were to be 
used  each year  for improvements.  The new stock was to be  held 
in trust until  5 per cent  per annum should have been paid in cash 
on the new income bonds for three consecutive years.  Finally there 
was to be  an assessment of  $12  per  share upon the stockholders, 
the proceeds of  which were to go as far as necessary to pay the debts 
of  the old  company,  including interest  on the general  mortgage.' 
On the whole, the scheme was  to put  the Atchison back to the 
condition of  1889, and to regain  the margin of  safety afforded  by 
the income bonds.  So far it was  acceptable enough.  Conservative 
officers had looked askance at the income bond conversion in 1892, 
and this was  a  simple  acknowledgment  of  the mistake.  The old 
difficulty as to future capital  requirements, moreover, was evaded 
by a provision for an annual increment of  second mortgage bonds 
to take precedence of  the incomes.  The notable part of  the scheme 
was  the  anxious  care  of  the  bondholders  to  protect  themselves. 
Since their bonds had been converted from income bonds less than 
two years  before  they  could  not  claim  a  large  allowance for  the 
reconversion;  but as a condition of  their assent to this and to the 
introduction of  a second mortgage for $35,000,000  before their lien 
they demanded not only a bonus of  5 per cent in the new incomes 
for  their  holdings,  but  the grant  of  voting  power  to the income 
bonds,  a stock assessment of  $12  per  share, and the interposition 
of  an additional  $5,m,m  of  bonds  between  the stock and the 
property  of  which  it  was  nominally  the possessor.  "It is true," 
said the Railway Review,  "that the scheme contemplates the issue 
of  income bonds which shall be given  to assenting stockholders at 
par in return for the cash assessment, but it is a little difficult to see 
wherein such bonds are of  very  much  more  value than the stock 
of  the company except that they are not  subject to assessment." 
The reception  of  the plan  was  what  might  have  been  expected. 
On July  30, in London,  the London bondholders'  committee met 
and passed  a  resolution  in  its favor.  Having now  secured, they 
said in substance, the substantial features for which they had con- 
tended, and although the plan was not altogether what they could 
have  desired,  they  considered,  after very  prolonged  and  anxious 
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negotiations,  that a  plan  had  been  arrived  at which was the best 
obtainable  in  the interests of bondholders.'  Meanwhile  meetings 
of  stockholders were held in New York in protest.  Resolutions were 
adopted condemning the plan,  and a stockholders'  committee was 
cho~en.~ 
Debate was stopped by the publication in August  of  the report 
of  an expert  who had been  selected to  examine  the books of  the 
Atchison Company.  Few more disgraceful instances of  the juggling 
of  figures have  been  brought  to  light  in  the history  of  American 
railroad finance.  Whereas the reports of the company had shown net 
earnings steadily increasing from $7,600,000 in 1890 to $12,100,000 
in  1893,  being  ample  to  meet  existing  charges  and  to  pay  from 
2  to 22 per cent on the income bonds besides to the time of  their 
conversion,  Mr. Little, the expert,  reported  that the net  earnings 
had  never  exceeded  $8,085,608;  and maintained  that  an annual 
deficit had occurred  each year  from 1894, which reached  the por- 
tentous amount of  $3,000,000 for 1891 alone.  The condition of  the 
company was far worse than had been imagined, and all plans had 
to be thorougl~ly  recast.  The following is an abstract of  the report 
in question: 
"I have  already  advised  you  verbally,"  said  Mr.  Little,  "that 
income  was,  in  my  judgment,  overstated  in  these  several  years 
(since '89), to the extent of $7,000,000 or more, and I now confirm 
this specifically.  These overstatements may be classified as follows : 
"  (I) Rebates.  For the four years ending June 30, 1894, the debits 
for rebates to shippers on the Atchison system aggregated $3,700,776, 
and on the St. Louis  & San Francisco system $205,879,  or a total 
of $3,906,656. 
"This sum was charged, not to the earnings from whence it came, 
as it  should have been, but  to an account entitled, 'Auditor's  SUS- 
pended  Account-Special,' and was  reported  from year  to  year  as 
a good and available asset, while in fact it had no value whatsoever. 
('  (2)  Additions to Earnings and Deductions from Expenses.  Next 
in order of  importance to the rebate account comes an aggregate of 
$2,791,000, which, on instructions from the East, was credited from 
time to time to the earnings and expenses respectively, but  which 
credit has no foundation in fact.  Of  this aggregate $a,oro,ooo was 
Ry. Times, 65: 817,  1894.  Ry. Rev. 342379, 1894. 
dded  to earnings and $781,000 deducted from operating expenses, 
the sum of the two being debited to 'Auditor's Suspended Account.' 
6'  (3) Improvements.  The sum of  $488,000  was in the period under 
consideration transferred, improperly as I contend, from Operating 
Expenses  to  Improvements  or  Capital  Account,  these  Improve- 
ments being finally closed into the account of  Franchises and Pro- 
perty, which represents the cost of  the road and property. 
"  (4)  Trafjic Balances.  It further appears that a traffic agreement 
for a division of  business was  formed  in November, 1890 (running 
to JU~Y,  1891)~  between the Atchison  Company and certain other 
companies,  whereby  such  other  companies  were  charged  with  a 
balance of  $305,843,  which the Atchison Company was unable to 
collect,  and  which  is  absolutely  .uncollectable,  and  should  have 
been  heretofore written off,  though it  still stands as an asset, and 
hence must be written to the debit of  profit and loss." 
Two facts appear from these charges on which emphasis was laid 
from different points of view:  (I) That for four years the Atchison 
had been persistently violating the law by the granting of  rebates. 
(2) That to conceal these rebates, and for other purposes, the books 
had been so systematically falsified as to defy detection, and to de- 
ceive not  only the investing  public but  the whole railroad  world. 
The report  was handed  to Mr. Reinhart,  and an answer  was re- 
quested by the following day.  The answer was made, and proved 
inadequate ; for though Mr. Reinhart pointed out some half-dozen 
items which  he argued that Mr.  Little had wrongly excluded, he 
explained  no  one  of  the  charges  directly  brought  against  him? 
There is no doubt at the present time that Mr. Reinhart was guilty, 
though perhaps because of  the difficulty of fixing legal responsibility 
he was never prosecuted for falsification of  the books.  He resigned, 
of course, and Major Aldace F. Walker was appointed receiver in 
his stead.  Two months later he was indicted with other officers of 
the company  and certain  shippers,  not  for  falsifying the  books, 
but  for the illegal  granting of  rebates.  His defence was  that he 
had  been,  at  the  time  the rebates  were  given,  only  the general 
auditor at Boston, and had had no part in the fiscal or executive 
Report of  Mr. Stephen Little to the New York, London, and Amsterdam Com- 
mittees of Reorganization, 1894. 
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business of  the road.'  The Government failed to prove connection, 
and the case fell through. 
All  this completely altered the requirements to be  met  by  a re- 
organization plan.  A more  sweeping reduction in  charges, and a 
more  general  distribution  of  losses  was  needed  than  before  had 
been the case.  Old proposals were laid aside once and for all, and 
a new  scheme was  built  up from the  beginning.  The mortgage 
indebtedness of  the Atchison in  1895 was  $233,595,247,  of which 
the first and second mortgage bonds comprised $21 7,258,276.  The 
reorganization of  1889 had done its work in one respect  at least, 
and  the  reorganization  managers  were  able  to  concentrate their 
attention  on  two  issues.  The annual net  earnings,  according to 
the company's reports had been I 
but as corrected in Mr. Little's report were : 
Inasmuch as Mr. Little had discovered annual deficits of 
it was very evident that a reduction in interest charges was called 
for.  As  in  1889 the salvation of  the company was  sought in the 
substitution of  securities on which payment was optional for secur- 
ities bearing an obligatory charge. 
Soon  after  Mr.  Little's  final report  in  November  three  of  the 
existing  committees,  namely,  the  General  Reorganization Com- 
mittee, the  London  Committee, and  Messrs. Hope  & Co. of  Am- 
sterdam, joined  in  a Joint  Executive  Reorganization  Committee, 
with Edward King as chairman.'  With these now worked  a com- 
mittee chosen  by  the directors themselves.  The result  was  a re- 
Ry.  Times, 66: 543, 1894.  '  Chmn. 59: 878,  1894; Ibid.59: 919, 1894. 
orgmizati~n  plan  under  date of  March  14,  1895.  The purposes 
were : 
(0) To reduce fixed charges to a safe limit; 
(b) To make adequate provision for future capital requirements, 
subject to proper restrictions as to issue of bonds for this purpose ; 
(6) To liquidate  the floating debt,  and  to make adequate  pro- 
vision for existing prior lien indebtedness shortly to mature ; 
(d) To reinstate existing securities upon equitable terms in their 
order of priority; 
(e)  To consolidate  and  unify the system  (so far as practicable) 
and thus to save large annual expense. 
It was proposed to foreclose the Atchison general mortgage . . . 
and to vest in a railway company the bonds, stocks, and other pro- 
perties of  the  existing  company, acquired  at  foreclosure  sale  or 
otherwise.  The new company was to issue: 
(a)  Common Stock  $102,000,000 
(b)  Five per cent non-cumulative preferred stock  111,486,- 
(c)  General mortgage 4  per cent bonds  96,990,582 
(d)  Adjustment 4  per cent bonds  51,728,310~ 
Of the above the interest on only the general mortgage bonds was 
to be a fixed charge ; -  the stock obviously got a return only when 
earned, and the  adjustment  bonds were  income bonds in  fact  if 
not in name.  Additional issues to a comparatively small aggregate 
were  provided for, but  no mortgage, other  than the general and 
adjustment  mortgages,  was to  be  executed  by  the company, nor 
was the amount of  preferred stock to be increased, unless the exe- 
cution of  such mortgage, or such increase of preferred stock, should 
have received the consent of  the holders of  a majority of  the whole 
amount of  preferred stock at the time outstanding, given at a meet- 
ing of  the  stockholders called  for that  purpose,  and  the consent 
of the holders of  a majority of  such part of the common stock as 
should be  represented  at  said meeting.  The securities mentioned 
were  to retire  all  previously  existing issues.  Old  common stock- 
holders were to receive share for share in the common stock of  the 
In addition, prior lien bonds were authorized to a maximum of $17,CKJO,mo, of 
which  $~z,om,ooo  might be used if desirable in place of general mortgage bonds in 
the retirement of  guarantee fund notes, equipment bonds, etc., and  S~,m,m  for 
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new  company.  They were  to be  assessed $10  per  share, and to 
receive for the assessment $10  in new preferred stock, while a syn- 
dicate  guaranteed  payment  of  assessments  by  engaging  to take 
the place  of  non-assenting  or defaulting  stockholders.  The gen- 
eral mortgage  bondholders were  to get  75 per cent of  their  hold- 
ings in new general mortgage 4s and 40  per cent in adjustment 4s. 
The second mortgage and income bondholders were to be assessed 
4  per cent  and were to  get  new preferred  stock.'  The prior  lien 
bondholders were dealt with separately, and were to be  paid either 
in  general  mortgage  qs of  the  additional  issues  (over  the  $96,- 
990,582) mentioned, or in the new prior lien bonds.  If  in the latter, 
the  general  mortgage  bonds  which  would  otherwise  have  been 
issued were to be held  for the ultimate retirement of  these bonds. 
Provision  was made for  future construction  and additions by the 
allowance of  $3,000,000 general mortgage bonds, to be issued each 
year  to  a limit of  $30,000,000,  and then of  $z,ow,m adjustment 
bonds, to be issued each year to a limit of  $20,000,000.  Additional 
new general  mortgage  bonds,  up to $20,000,000,  might  be  issued 
and used  in  such  amounts  respectively  and in  such  proportions 
as the Joint  Executive Committee  might  determine, for the acqui- 
sition of  the Atlantic  & Pacific, the St. Louis  & San Francisco, 
and  the  Colorado  Midland;  and  for  like  purposes  $20,000,000 
preferred stock.  The lien of  the new general mortgage was to cover 
all  properties which  should  be  vested  in the new  company,  and 
also any other property which might be  acquired by use of  any of 
the new  bonds, but  the  Joint  Executive  Committee  might, in its 
discretion, except  from the new general  mortgage  the stocks and 
bonds deposited  under the existing general  mortgage, representing 
branch  lines,  the operation  of  which  should  be  found  to  be  un- 
profitable  and  an  unnecessary  burden  to the  system.  A  voting 
trust  was  considered, but  was rejected  as unsatisfactory;  and the 
Second mortgage A bonds received 113 per cent in new preferred stock.  Second 
mortgage B bonds received 118 per cent.  "After  careful  consideration,"  said the 
plan, "it  was decided  to be  best  for the  interest of  those  [the second  mortgage] 
securities that  they should now  be  converted  into 5 per  cent preferred stock, pas- 
sessing full voting powers and preferential rights as to principal as well as interest, 
rather than revert to their original form of 'Income Bonds.'  It was not thought that 
a greater assessment  than  $10  could  be  raised from the stock, and  the remainder 
had to come from the junior bonds." 
committee confined its efforts to the securing of  the best  possible 
management. 
The proposed fixed charges amounted to  $4,528,547 
Net earnings according to Mr. Little had been in 1891  5,204,880 
1892  7,853,173 
1893  8,085,608 
1894  5,95676'5 
Thus the new charges appeared well  within  the earning power of 
the road.  The plan made the following provision for cash require- 
ments : 
Assessment on Atchison stock at $10  per share  $IO,OOO,OOO 
Assessment on second mortgage and on income bonds at 4 per cent  3,567,644 
$13,567,644 
The estimated cash requirements were : 
For receiver's debt, preferred or secured floating debt of the Atchison 
Company,  estimated as of January I, 1895  $7,793,875 
Leaving for receivers and floating debt, accrued interest and undis- 
turbed securities, etc.,  5,773,769 
$13,567,644 ' 
This reorganization had certain interesting features.  As  before 
remarked, it  sought,  as did the reorganization  of  1889, to replace 
securities, the interest  on which was  a  fixed charge,  by  securities 
on  which  payment  of  interest  or  dividends  should  be  optional. 
But  whereas  the  earlier  reorganization  had  depended  on  income 
bonds, this plan  included  both income bonds and preferred  stock. 
There are several reasons why  preferred  stock is preferable  to in- 
come bonds,  and it  will  be  remembered that  a  peculiar  difficulty 
experienced from the income  bonds of  1889 had  arisen  from the 
impossibility of  putting other  mortgages ahead of  them; yet  that 
this was not the chief  obstacle sought to be  avoided by the use of 
preferred  stock  at  this  later  date  appears  from  the  current  use 
of  adjustment  bonds.  Provision  for  future  capital  requirements 
was in  fact made in another way, and the question  was not here 
involved.  So far as the acceptability of  the income bonds and the 
preferred stock respectively to the old bondholders was concerned, 
it  should be noted that the men  who received the greater  part of 
the new issue were the holders of  the old income and second mort- 
'  The  plan  of  reorganization was  published  separately, but  was  reprinted in 
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gage  bonds;  that  is,  Englishmen  who  had  already  shown  their 
preference for income bonds as opposed to stock.  The chief reason 
for the new  expedient seems to have been the desire to retain for 
the general mortgage holders a priority of  lien, while reducing part 
of  their holdings to the level of an optional obligation.  If  income 
bonds or preferred  stock alone had  been used, these would neces- 
sarily have  been  given  to  the owners both of  general mortgage 
and of  second  mortgage or old income bonds; so  that the former 
might have received a larger amount, but not any lien different in 
kind.  By  the scheme proposed,  all  possible interest on  the secur- 
ities given for old mortgage qs was to be  met  before  anything was 
to be paid on the equivalent of  issues which had been inferior before 
the reorganization took place.  Abundant provision  was made for 
future capital requirements.  That lesson  had  been  learned once 
for all.  Cash requirements were met by  an assessment.  In speak- 
ing of  the reorganization of  1889 the rule was laid down that the 
disposal of  securities for cash is impossible except at  an enormous 
sacrifice in  a time  of  general  depression.  There was  widespread 
depression  in 1895, and  the reorganization  managers wisely made 
no  attempt  to  negotiate a  sale.  The amount  of  the  assessment 
on  the  common  stock  was  very  considerably  above the  quoted 
price of  the shares, but  it  was  correctly figured  that the hope of 
future increase in  value would be sufficient to induce stockholders 
to furnish the sums required.  Not to tax them too heavily call was 
made  also  on  the  junior  securities.  On the  whole,  the  decrease 
of  $5,m,ooo in  fixed charges more than compensated the stock- 
holders for the additional obligations put between them and their 
property ;  their claim on the road itself was made more remote, but 
their  chances for  dividends were  improved.  Examination of  the 
plan  shows clearly that  nothing was  taken  from either bonds or 
stock which those securities had a right to retain.  The bondholders 
could not,  in  any case, have received  more  than the  earnings of 
the road; and an amount equal to the return previously due them 
was assured, whenever the road should earn it, by  the new  com- 
bination of  mortgage and income bonds  and preferred stock.  As 
it was, in  return for an assessment they retained the Gght to par- 
ticipate in any future prosperity, a right which has proved of ex- 
treme value. 
The  plm was  underwritten  by  Messrs.  Baring  Bros.  &  Co. 
and other strong foreign and American bankers, who assumed the 
liability of  paying the  assessment  and of  taking the stock.'  The 
comment  at  the  time  was  favorable.  "On  the  whole,"  said  the 
Railway Age,  "we do not believe that any one who is acquainted 
with the properties could have expected a more satisfactory plan 
than that which the committee has evolved."  a  The London bond- 
holders promptly accepted the plan.  "  We  are disposed,"  said the 
Railway Tim  of  London, "to regard the latest of  Atchison reor- 
ganization schemes as a  praiseworthy  attempt  to grapple with  a 
very  thorny problem."  Such opposition as there was came from 
a minority of  the stockholders, and was directed at two points: the 
prevention of  foreclosure, and the inauguration of  an entirely new 
administration.  It was  asserted that  certain old  members of  the 
board of  directors who had been forced to resign by the earlier dis- 
closures, had nevertheless secured the election of  successors to per- 
petuate their policy and to protect their interest.  With a directory 
so constituted, it was maintained that the stockholders would have 
no guarantee of  important changes in the executive offices, hancial 
policies, or business methods of  the company.'  Sharp criticism was 
directed to a statement of  the existing board which referred to the 
"mistakes and misfortunes of  the previous management."  "Only 
those who  believe,"  said  the  Stockholders'  Protective  Committee, 
"that  gross irregularities, if  not worse, have been  perpetrated . . . 
may  be relied upon to probe to the bottom the acts of  the former 
officers of  the Atchison." ' On the other hand, the accusations of 
the committee were  asserted by  the directors to be unqualifiedly 
false.'  It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  opposition  could  not 
muster enough votks to control an election, and although their fight 
had been begun in August, they had proxies by November for only 
250,000  out of  the 1,020,m shares of  stock.  Recourse was had to 
the courts, and an attempt was made to secure at least a minority 
representation on the coming board by the enforcement of  a provi- 
sion for cumulative voting embodied in a Kansas law of  1879.  This 
failed in November, 1894, and no further obstacle to reorgabization 
Was  encountered. 
'  Ry. Rev. 35: 208-9,  1895.  a  Ry. Age, 20: 199,  1895. 
Ry. Times, 67:  482, 1895.  R. R.  Gaz. 26: 675, 1894 
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Practically all of  the assessments were paid in by September 21. 
On November 25 Mr. E. P. Ripley was elected president, and in the 
first week  of  December, 1895, Mr. Aldace F. Walker was elected 
chairman of  the board of  directors of  the new company.  On Decem- 
ber 10, 1895, the property and franchises of  the Atchison were sold 
at foreclosure, and were purchased for $6o,ooo,ooo by Edward King, 
Charles C. Beaman, and  Victor  Morawetz, representing the reor- 
ganization committee.'  The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad 
Company was then organized by the purchasers pursuant to the laws 
of  Kansas, under a certificate of incorporation dated December 12, 
1895.  A board of  directors was elected, and by-laws were adopted. 
The entire estate embraced in the foreclosure sale was duly conveyed 
by  deed of  the same date as the incorporation of  the company, in 
consideration  of  which  the  company executed  a  delivery to  the 
Joint  Executive  Reorganization  Committee  of  the  securities  ac- 
quired under the plan of  reorganization.  Certain subsidiary roads 
were  subsequently foreclosed  and  bought  in, notably the Atlantic 
& Pacific and the Chicago, Santa Fe & California.  The St. Louis & 
San Francisco was not so bought in.  "The  question of  retaining 
the St.  Louis & San Francisco as a part of  the Atchison system," 
said the  annual report of  1896,  "received  very  careful considera- 
tion  from  the Directors. . . . A  series  of  conferences was  held, 
which resulted in the matter ultimately presenting the alternative of 
the sale of  our existing interest upon favorable terms, or the purchase 
by  us  of  all  other outstanding  interests upon  terms involving the 
outlay of  a very large amount of  both cash and securities. While the 
future control of  that road was  regarded as important, the financial 
considerations affecting  the  situation  prevailed,  and the sale was 
decided  on  the  whole  to  be  more  prudent  than  the  purchase." 
"With the acquisition of the Frisco," said Mr. Fleming of  the Joint 
Executive Committee, "the  fixed charges on  the  Atchison  system 
of  7780 miles would have been increased from $7000  to $9000 per 
mile.  Atchison is financially much stronger without Frisco." 
This ends that part of the history of the Atchison Company which 
can be connected with either of  its reorganizations.  From 1895 to 
the present time the Atchison has enjoyed a rapidly hcreasing Pro- 
sperity, due in part to the lightening of the charges upon it, in part 
1 Chron. 61 : 1064,  1895. 
to able management, and in part to the great increase in volume of 
business which has been  a characteristic of  the time.  One or two 
things may be noted.  A final settlement has been made of  the rela- 
tions between the Southern Pacific and the Atchison in the South- 
west.  It will be remembered that the hal  result of  the negotiations 
in 1882 had been the purchase of  the former Mojave division from 
the Needles to Mojave, but that since title could not be acquired until 
the maturity of  the outstanding mortgages, Atchison had leased this 
track at an annual rental of  6 per cent on the purchase price.  In 
1897 this rental  was  cancelled.  The Southern  Pacific could not 
even  then  give  a clear title,  but  exchanged  a long  time  lease  of 
the Mojave division against a similar lease of  the Sonora Railway, 
the Atchison branch which reached from Deming to Guaymas.  The 
cancelled each other, and the actual transfer is eventually to 
take place.'  The arrangement is mutually advantageous.  On the 
one hand the Mojave division formed a spur of  the Southern Pacific, 
and on the other the Sonora Railway was totally disconnected  from the 
Atchison, so that the latter company was obliged to use the Southern 
Pacific's  tracks to  reach the property  at  all.  In  1898 Chairman 
Walker of  the Executive Committee was able to announce the sub- 
stantial completion of  negotiations for the purchase of  the San Fran- 
cisco  & San Joaquin Valley Railroad, running from Bakersfield to 
Stockton, California; the former town being sixty-eight miles from 
Mojave and the latter something less than that from San Francisco.' 
Atchison at once began building at the Stockton end, and reached 
San Francisco the following year.  The Santa Fe Terminal Company 
was then incorporated with a capital stock of  $~,ooo,ooo,  Atchison 
secured a traffic contract with the Southern  Pacific,  and  through 
freight trains were run from Chicago to San Francisco on May I, 
1900, through passenger trains followkg two months later.  Besides 
this  there  have  been  important  extensions in  Arizona  and  New 
Mexico.  In 1901  the Atchison purchased two-thirds of  the bonds, 
and practically all of  the capital stock of  the Pecos Valley  & North- 
eastern  Railway  Company,  stretching  370  miles  from  Texico 
&ough  the  southeastern  comer  of  New  Mexico  to  Pecos  City, 
In July of  the same year it bought the Santa Fe, Presmtt  & 
Phmix Railroad,  from Ash  Fork,  Arizona,  to Phaenix,  Arizona, 
'  Chon.  6q:  609, 1897.  a  Ibid. 67:  841,  1898. 218  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
some  195  miles.  Construction  has  been  practically  completed 
between  Belen,  New  Mexico,  a few miles  south of  Albuquerque, 
and Amarillo, Texas, to afford an alternative and somewhat shorter 
route from California to Eastern Kansas.  A still more noteworthy 
project is under consideration for a road to join the Gulf, Colorado & 
Santa Fe at Brownwood with the Belen line at Texico, and to open 
direct connection over the Atchison from California to the Gulf. 
Briefly stated, the  Atchison's  mileage has increased from 6479 
miles in 1897, to 9273 in 1907.  Its gross earnings have grown from 
$30,621,230  to  $93,683,407;  its net  earnings from  $7,754,041  to 
$32,153,692;  and its surplus above all charges from $1,452,446 to 
$21,168,724.  This marvellous showing has been  accompanied by 
heavy expenditures for improvements, so that the physical condition 
of  the system is much  better  than  before.  Operating expenses, 
fixed charges, and taxes took less than 77 per cent of  gross income 
in  1907, and a decline of over $21,m,ooo  can be  suffered in net 
before interest on even  the adjustment  bonds becomes imperilled. 
It is not to be  wondered  at that Mr.  Hamman saw fit to invest 
$10,395,000  of  Union Pacific money in Atchison preferred stock in 
1906,'  nor that dividends of  5 per cent on preferred, and 5 per cent 
on common stock are being paid.  The Atchison owns 1791 locomo- 
tives instead of  953 as in 1897 ;  I 135 passenger cars instead of  622 ; 
49,770  freight cars instead of  26,776.  There has been  a large in- 
crease in  the capacity and  power  of  rolling stock.  The average 
freight train load has increased from 131 to 320 tons.  Freight train 
mileage has grown but 35 per cent, while ton mileage has more than 
tripled.  Thus, although the average length of  haul  has increased 
and the average receipts per ton mile have diminished, the earnings 
per freight train mile are actually more than double in 1907  what 
they were in 1897.  And, finally, the Atchison is not dependent for 
its revenue upon any single kind of  business.  Coal, ore, and other 
mineral products yielded but 30.87  per cent of  its tonnage in 1p7  ; 
products of  agriculture 25.34 per cent ;  manufactures 17.37  per cent ; 
and products of  the forest 12.12  per cent. 
1 This was not  all the Atchison stock  which  Union Pacilic interests acquired. 
President Ripley testified before the Interstate Commerce Covn  on JanuarY 8. 
1907,  that two  years before E. H. Harriman and  his mwchtes had secured $30,000~- 
ooo of  Atchison stock, and had caused the election of  Messrs. H. C. Frick and  H. 8. 
Rogers to the Atchison directorate to represent them. 
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The capital  account,  meanwhile,  has  been  kept  from  undue 
eqansion.  The funded debt has increased from $17~,1~6,750  in 
1897 to $284,171,550  in  1907, but the capital stock has decreased 
somewhat, and the greater part of the new bond issues have been 
convertible serial debenture bonds,  which  occasion no permanent 
increase in charges.  It is within the last two years only that Atchison 
stockholders have  authorized the issue of  new  capital on  a  scale 
commensurate  with the growth of their property.  In I  906 $26,o60,000 
in 4 per cent convertible bonds were offered to them at par, and this 
last year they have authorized the issue of  $98,m,m of  common 
stock  for  improvements,  extensions, ad  the  like.  This provides 
ample facilities for the future without endangering the solvency of 
the road. UNION PACIFIC  22  I 
CHAPTER  VII 
UNION  PACIFIC 
Acts  of  1862 and  1864 -High  cost  of  construction -  Forced  combination with 
the Kansas Pacific and the Denver Pacific -  Unprofitable branches -  Adamsls 
administration -  Financial  difficulties -  Debt  to the  Government -  Receiver- 
ship and reorganization -  Later history. 
THE  construction of  the Union Pacific was made possible by direct 
grants of  lands and government bonds by  Congress.  The motive 
for the project was military and political as well as economic; on 
the one hand  California was  to be  cemented to  the Union,  and 
aggression on the  part  of  England was to be  forestalled; on the 
other a great and fertile territory was to be opened and an additional 
market provided for the products of  the East. 
In 1862 the first act "to aid in the construction of  a Railroad and 
Telegraph  Line  from the  Missouri  River  to  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
and to secure to the Government the Use of  the same for Postal, 
Military, and Other Purposes" was passed.'  It created a corpora- 
tion to be  known as the Union Pacific Railroad Company, with a 
capital of  ~oo,ooo  shares of  $1-  each, and authorized it to con- 
struct  a  railroad  from the  one hundredth  meridian of  longitude 
west  from Greenwich at a point within the territory of  Nebraska 
westward to the western boundary of  the temtory of  Nevada.  It 
granted the right of  way,  and in addition five  additional sections 
per mile on each side of  the track, plus a varying amount of  United 
States bonds per miIe, the use and delivery of  which was to consti- 
tute a first mortgage on the property of  the company.  All compen- 
sation for services rebdered to the Government was to be  applied 
to the payment of  these bonds and interest thereon; and after the 
road was compIeted, until the bonds and interest should have been 
paid, at least  5 per cent of  the net earnings of  the road was to be 
annually applied to the  payment  thereof.  The directors were to 
be not  less  than fifteen  in  number, of  who'm  two were to be ap- 
pointed  by  the President of  the United States.  It was hoped that 
the offer would  be sufficient to  attract  private capital to the un- 
Statutes at Large, 37th Congress,  2d Session, chap. 120. 
dert&ing,  and when  it  failed  in  this,  the  inducements were  in- 
creased.  The Act  of  1864 amended  that  of  1862.  It reduced  the 
par value of  the shares of stock from $1000  to $roo, and increased 
their number from ~oo,ooo  to ~,ooo,ooo. It increased the land grant 
from five to ten alternate sections per  mile, and  subordinated the 
government lien to the rank of  a second mortgage.  Only one-half 
the compensation  for services rendered for  the  Government was 
required  to be applied  to the payment of  the bonds issued by the 
Government.  The directors were to be twenty in number, of  whom 
five were to be  appointed by  the Federal President.' 
It was under these main provisions that the Union Pacific Railroad 
was constructed. In their final shape they were intended to provide 
for the greater part of the cost of  construction, while allowing the 
company to supply deficiencies by the issue of  its own hst  mortgage 
bonds.  Capitalization under these conditions would not have been 
excessive; the  Government's  investment  would  have  redounded 
unmistakably to its own benefit, as well as to that of  the country, 
and  the  corporation would  have  looked  forward  to  a  long  and 
prosperous career.  Three  things  interfered to  swell  the  cost  of 
the construction of the road, and with that its capitalization : First, 
construction was carried on during a time of  high  prices, swollen 
not only by depreciation of the currency, but by artificial conditions 
occasioned by  the war ; second, the normal level of  the prices paid 
was raised by the speed with which the road was  completed ;  third, 
construction was entrusted to a construction company, the famous 
CrCdit  Mobilier. 
In its comparison of  the prices of  the years 1864-9,  with those of 
1860, the  Aldrich  Committee arrived,  in  1893,  at  the  following 
result : 
Bar Iron  Rails, 
Year  Food  Rolled  Iron 
I  864  165.8  249.3  262.5 
1865  216.5  181.1  205.5 
1866  173.8  167.0  180.7 
1867  163.9  148.2  173.2 
I  868  164.2  145.8  164.3 
1869  162.9  139.0  160.9 
Metals &  Zmple- 
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These figures may be divided by the premium on gold, in order 
roughly to ascertain gold prices.  The index numbers then become : 
Bar  Iron 
Ymr  Food  Rolkd 
1864  106.6  160.3 
1865  100.1  83.7 
1866  124.1  119.2 
1867  121.8  110.1 
1868  118.6  105.2 
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The tables show that both currency and gold prices were much 
higher in 1866 than before the war, and  that  both  remained high 
while the Union Pacific was being built.  Wages were also above 
the normal, and for similar reasons.  During the war the demand 
for men and goods of  all kinds was great.  After  1865 the country 
turned with tremendous energy to industry ;  and the upward swing, 
which was unchecked until the panic of  1873, and which was espe- 
cially  directed  toward  railroad  building,  maintained  both  wages 
and prices at an unusual height.  Besides this, American rails were 
at the time in a period of  transition from iron to steel; and much 
of  the work  carried through  at such expense had completely to 
be done over within the next ten years. 
The high prices were made higher by the speed of  construction. 
The Union Pacific built west from the Missouri River, but at the 
same time the Central Pacific was building east from Sacramento, 
under  similar conditions as to  government  aid.  The two  roads 
were expected to meet at the eastern boundary of  Nevada; but to 
encourage their  early completion, the Act  of  1862  authorized the 
road which &st  reached the designated point to continue construc- 
tion, east  or west  as the case might  be,  until junction  with  the 
second road  should be  made.  Since the amount of  land granted 
depended on the mileage  completed, the haste of  the companies 
was feverish.  "The  Union  Pacific Company,"  says Davis,l  "had 
its parties of  graders  working  2w  miles in advance of  its com- 
Aldrich Committee Report.  The value of  gold used is $at  given in the American 
Almanac  for 1878, and varied from year to year as follows: 
1864  155.5  1866  140.1  1868  138.5 
1865  216.2  1867  134.6  1869  135.~ 
John P. Davis, History of  the  Union Pa&ic  Railroad, p.  151. 
pleted line in places as far  west as Humboldt Wells."  The Central 
Pacific had completed 105 miles east of  Sacramento by the autumn 
of 1867, hauling iron and supplies over the mountains without wait- 
ing for the piercing of its tunnels.  No less than 1038 miles of the 
Union Pacific, including the difficult  stretch over the Rocky Mount- 
ains, were completed by  1869, four years  after construction was 
commenced.  The prize  of  additional  land  was  thereby  secured, 
but-this land was long unsalable, and the cost of  construction was 
largely increased. 
Finally,  large  sums  were  misapplied  through  a  construction 
company.  The story of  the Cr6dit Mobilier has been so often told 
that only brief  mention need  be made of  it here.'  In 1864 T. C. 
Durant,  vice-president of  the Union  Pacific,  induced one H.  M. 
Ho=e to bid for a contract to build from Omaha to the one hundredth 
meridian.  Hoxie was financially irresponsible, and four days later 
assigned the contract to a company composed of  Durant and other 
stockholders of the Union Pacific.  Meanwhile Durant had purchased 
the charter of  the Pennsylvania Fiscal Agency, a corporation which 
possessed convenient powers.  Later in 1864  the members of  Du- 
rant's construction company were given stock in the Fiscal Agency, 
now  called the Crait Mobilier of  America, for the amounts they 
had paid  in,  and stockholders of  the Union Pacific were allowed 
to receive Crdit Mobilier stock for the amounts they had paid in 
on their Union Pacific shares.  Stockholders of  the Union Pacific 
thus became also stockholders of the Cr6dit Mobilier, and in their 
former capacity were enabled to vote lucrative contracts to them- 
selves as constructors of  the railroad.  Durant's  company assigned 
its contract  to the  Cr6dit  Mobilier.  Subsequently it  was  found 
more  convenient  to assign contracts  to  certain  individuals, who 
transferred  them  to  seven  trustees,  who  built  the required  road 
with funds furnished by  the Cr6dit Mobilier, and turned over the 
profits to that organization, but the practical result was the same.l 
These  various devices removed  all incentive to economy on the 
Useful accounts of  the  Credit Mobilier may be  found in Davis,  Union Paciiic 
-d;  Crawford,  Credit  Mobilier of  America;  Hazard, The  Cat  Mobiier 
af America; White,  History  of  the  Union  Pacific Railroad; Poland Committee, 
Report and Testimony, 42d Congress, 3d  Session, House Reports, No. 77. 
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part of  the Union Pacific stockholders.  Instead of  gaining by cheap 
construction, they  profited  by  dear; instead  of  aiming to  reduce 
the cost  in every possible way,  they schemed at making the con- 
struction contracts as lucrative as possible to the persons to whom 
they were assigned.  The advantages to them as stockholders of  the 
CrCdit  Mobilier  outweighed  the disadvantages to them  as stock- 
holders of  the Union  Pacific.  The profits realized  by  the CrCdit 
Mobilier are still a subject of  dispute.  H. K. White figures them as 
279 per cent, or $16,700,000;  Davis says that the profit was safely 
over  $2o,ooo,ooo;  but  whereas  White  calculates  the  percentage 
of  profits to the total cost of  construction, Davis insists that a large 
part of  the capital invested,  was replaced on the completion of  each 
section of  twenty miles by  the proceeds of  the government bonds 
and railway  bonds  and stock, and that though from $5o,m,ooo 
to  $7o,ooo,ooo  were  expended,  in  all probability  not  more  than 
$~o,ooo,ooo  were sunk at any one time; in which case a profit of 
$zo,ooo,ooo,  spread  over  four  years,  represents  $5,ooo,ooo  per 
year, or  50  per  cent  annually  on the capital employed.  Finally, 
the Union  Pacific Railway Commission estimated the actual cash 
profits at $23,366,320, and remarked that the obligations incurred 
by  the  railroad  company  represented  a  very  much  larger  sum, 
being measured by the bonds and stock at their par values.' 
The result of  the three factors was a corporation bonded at an 
extremely high rate.  The cost of  road in 1870 was reported to be 
$106,245,978,  or $102,951  per mile, against which was a capitaliza- 
tion of  $107,907,300,  or  $104,561  per  mile,  of  which  $32,715  per 
mile was stock, $26,080 government bonds, and $45,765 first mort- 
gage, land grant, and income bonds.  In 1873 the net earnings were 
$4,092,032,  and the interest on the funded debt, not including the 
government  interest,  was  $3,403,660.  In 1874 the  figures were 
$5,291,243  and $3,431,720 ;  in other words, t&  corporation started 
with  a  heavy  handicap,  which  its  monopoly of  transcontinental 
business at first helped to overcome, but which  grew heavier ad 
'  Union  Pacific  Railway  Commission Report,  1887,  p.  52.  The ~overnment 
endeavored to force the cancellation of the above mentioned construction contncts 
and the restoration of  unlawful profits, but was held by the Supreme Court to have 
no standing in  the  case which would entitle it to demand  relief.  U. S. vs. Union 
Paciiic Railroad Company, 98 U. S. 569. 
heavier as the years went  on.  During the seventies, to repeat, the 
Union Pacific enjoyed generally large prosperity.  The volume  of 
stock  outstanding  remained  the  same,  the  bonded  indebtedness 
but slightly increased, and the ratio of operating expenses to receipts 
declined.  The first dividend was  paid  in  1875 ; in 1876 and 1877 
8 per cent was declared, in 1878 53 per cent, and in 1879 6 per cent. 
In  1880,  however,  a  consolidrztion  took  place  with  the  Kansas 
Pacific and Denver Pacific railroads, and this operation may well 
receive somewhat detailed consideration. 
The Kansas Pacific, as well as the Union Pacific, was a creation 
of the Acts of  1862 and 1864, which required it to be constructed 
from Kansas City westwardly to form a junction  with the Union 
Pacific at a point on the one hundredth meridian.  Later, an Act 
of  July 3,  1866, authorized'it to change its route,  and to connect 
with the Union Pacific at a point not  more than fifty miles west- 
wardly from the meridian of  Denver in Colorado.'  Like the Union 
Pacific  the  Kansas  Pacific  was  built  by  means  of  construction 
contracts, which resulted in a total capitalization on its 638 miles of 
line of  $9,437,950 in stock and $22,651,000 in bonds, or $14,7~3  and 
$33,455 iespectively per mile, --high figures in view of  the compar- 
atively level character of  the country traversed.'  The road was not 
a paying one.  It was poorly built and poorly managed, and running 
parallel with the Union Pacific, it had to meet competition of  a very 
bitter kind.  The report of  Ah. Calhoun, expert accountant for the 
United States Pacific Railway Commission of  1887, showed that the 
total receipts of  the road from 1867 to 1879 had aggregated $9,220,- 
218, while the bond and interest account, exclusive of  United States 
interest, had amounted to $15,745,287; leaving a deficit of  $6,525,- 
069, or, including the United States accrued interest, of  $11,330,772.~ 
That is, the Kansas Pacific was  in a state of  chronic insolvency. 
In 1874 it was placed  in the hands of  receivers, and the following 
Year, by an arrangement with its creditors, it funded a considerable 
amount of overdue interest.' 
Statutes at Large, 39th Congress,  1st Session, chap. 159. 
United States Pacific Railway Commission Report,  1887, p.  55. 
'  Ibid. vol.  8, p. 4975. 
'  Records.in Union Pacific Railway Foredosure Cases, 55th Congress, 1st Session, 
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In 1878 a number of  securityholders of  the Kansas Pacific got 
together in an attempt to reorganize that  property, to take it out 
of  receivers'  hands,  and  to "unite  in interest the Kansas Pacific 
and  Union  Pacific Railway  Companies."  Twelve large  security- 
holders consented to contribute to a common pool or fund holdings 
of  securities taken at a fixed valuation, their interests in the pool 
to be proportional to the amounts of  said securities and stock taken 
at the  value referred  to.'  For the securities deposited they were 
to receive stock at a reduced rate :  thus for eight shares of  old stock 
they were to receive one share of new ;  for $2000  unsubordinated 
income bonds they were to get ten shares, and for $10,~  subor- 
dinated income bonds thirty shares of  new stock?  The ha1  result 
would have been to replace securities with a par value of  $17,330,- 
350 by stock with  a  par of  $4,855,300, and greatly to lighten the 
burdens  upon  the road; though  it  must  be remembered  that the 
$17,330,350  were  less than half  of  the total volume of  securities 
outstanding, that the payment of  interest  on  much of  these had 
been optional only, and that no provision was made for the floating 
debt. 
The scheme fell through, according to Mr.  Gould, who  was  a 
party to the agreement, because securityholders outside of  the pool 
refused to consent to so drastic a reduction of  their holdings; and 
at his suggestion a consolidated mortgage was substituted for the 
issues of  stock.  This mortgage was for forty years at 6 per cent. 
The total issue was to be for $~o,ooo,ooo,  of  which $24,000,000 were 
to be issued at once for the retirement of  earlier bond issues and for 
payment of  arrears of  interesLs Like the previous proposition the 
scheme contemplated a scaling in the principal of  the junior secur- 
ities,  and the  same rates  of  commutation were  retained;  but  in 
this  case the  old  Kansas  Pacific stock was withdrawn  from the 
operation of  the plan, and certain reservations were made for other 
purposes, so that  an actual increase in indebtedness was finally to 
Parties to agreement  were: Sidney  Dillon,  Fred  L. Arnes,  Jay  Gould,  C. S- 
Greeley, John- D. Perry, Robert E. Carr, Adolphus Meier, B. W. Lewis, Jr., Henry 
Villard, John P. Usher, D. M. Edgerton, Artemas H. Holmes. 
'  United  States  Pacific  Railway Commission Report, 1887,  testimony of  A.  H. 
Holmes, p.  165. 
Ibid.  Testimony of  Jay  Gould, pp.  454-6.  The change to  a mortgage  Was 
made between April,  1878,  and May, 1879. 
result, and even the interest charges were certain to increase.'  For 
the time  being, however, by  force of the reduction of  interest on 
the funding mortgage in January,  1879, from 10 to 7 per cent, and 
by the disallowance of  some claims for overdue interest, relief was 
obtained, while the consolidated mortgage was duly issued. 
The Kansas Pacific ran west  to Denver.  Between Denver and 
Cheyenne the Denver Pacific, 106 miles long, served as a connecting 
link between  the larger systems.  The Denver Pacific  stock  was 
held by  the Kansas Pacific, and 29,979 shares of  it were pledged 
in 1877 as part security for an issue of  10 per cent funding mortgage 
bonds.'  The total earnings of  the Denver Pacific from 1870 to 1879 
had  been  $3,122,141 ;  the expenses had  been  $1,709,477,  and the 
net earnings from operation $1,412,664,  or an average per annum 
of  $141,266; while for the first eight years of  that time the annual 
interest charge had been  about $185,000.  The only value of  the 
Denver  Pacific  stock  lay in  the  control which  it  secured  over a 
connecting link between Denver and Che~enne.~ 
Under the conditions of  competition existing between the Union 
Pacific, Kansas Pacific, and Denver Pacific, some sort of  agreement 
or consolidation was both desirable and likely.  The Kansas Pacific 
was  entirely  dependent  on  its competitor for  access  to  western 
business, and this was soon perceived to be equivalent to continuous 
bankruptcy.  Extension to Ogden would have removed the depend- 
ence; but this, while to be dreaded by the Union Pacific, was beyond 
the power of  the Kansas Pacific for financial reasons, and no cap 
italist or group of  capitalists before 1878 or 1879 seemed interested 
in the undertaking.  On the other hand, rates were  low, and the 
very success of  its exclusive policy forced the Union Pacific to meet 
the competition of  a road  which, with  no interest charges to pay, 
was able to cut all rates to the very verge of  the cost of  operation. 
As  early  as 1875  there was talk of  an agreement whereby the 
Kansas Pacific was to give up its claims for a pro rate on its Pacific 
business in return for a monopoly of  the local business of  Colorado, 
Records in  Union Pacific Railway Foreclosure Cases,  55th  Congress, 1st  Ses- 
sion, Senate Document 10, part 3 (contains text of  mortgage). 
'  United  States  Pacific Railway  Commission Report, 1887, testimony of  A.  H. 
Bolmes,  pp. 130 and  133. 
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and in connection with the deal was to acquire the Colorado Central 
Railroad  on issue of  $~o,ooo,ooo  Kansas  Pacific stock to  parties 
designated  by  the  Union  Pacific  Company; but  this  was  never 
carried out.  In 1878,  when  Gould  began  to  be  interested in the 
nroperty, a union by means of  stock control seemed feasible.  Gould's 
first purchases were of  bonds, and it was as a bondholder that he 
entered the pool of  1878; but with the purchase of  the holdings of 
the "St.  Louis parties,"  he and his friends obtained control of  a 
majority of  Kansas Pacific stock.  In fact one of  the pro~iisioos  of 
the pool was that if  on the first day of  June, 1878, it shou!d  be found 
that Messrs. Gould, Dillon, and Ames, all large stockholders in the 
Union Pacific, had not a majority interest in said pool, then they 
should have an option on such an amount of  other interest ratably 
and for cash as on the basis of  the schedule should give them such 
an interest; and though this majority did not necessarily involve a 
majority of  stock, the operations of  the pool  aided  Gould in the 
acquisition of  control.  The union between the Union  Pacific and 
the Kansas Pacific thus secured was, however, of  the frailest kind; 
for Mr. Gould at no time had the permanent interest of  either road 
at heart, and looked for his personal profit rather in their struggles 
than in  agreement between them.  For this reason, as he bought 
Kansas Pacific, Gould sold Union Pacific stock,  reducing his holdings 
from about 200,000 to about 27,000  shares.'  In 1879 the situation 
of  the two roads was thus much the same as before, and the har- 
mony apparent was of  the most superficial kind.  One change, how- 
ever, had taken place to  the  serious  disadvantage  of  the  Union 
Pacific;  for  the  Kansas  Pacific,  although  still  badly  built  and 
dependent upon its rival  for  an  adjustment  of  rates  sufficiently 
favorable to let it into the western business, had now interested in 
it a group of  capitalists quite capable of  financing an extension to 
Ogden, and even of  securing connections frpm Kansas City to the 
East. 
In 1879, doubtless relying upon the strength of  Kansas Pacific's 
new backing, Gould proposed to the Union Pacific a consolidation 
of  the Union,  Kansas,  and  Denver  Pacific  roads,  in  which  the 
shares of  each were to figure equally at par.  The terms were absurd 
l  United  States  Pacific  Railway Commission Report,  1887,  testimony of  Jay 
Gould, p.  463.  . 
by every test of  productive capacity which could have been applied. 
The relative earning  power  and  annual interest  per  mile of  the 
three roads at this time were given  by a government accountant as 
follows : 
Annual  Net Earnings per mile  Annwll Interest per mile 
Union Pacific  $561  7  $3185 
Kansas Pacific  1602  2295 
Denver Pacific  I333  1750~ 
The Union  Pacific had reported an annual surplus, the other two 
roads an annual deficit; the Union Pacific had  not defaulted, the 
Kansas and Denver Pacific had done little else; the highest mark 
which the Kansas Pacific stock had touched in January, 1879, had 
been  13, that of  the Union Pacific had been 683.  But the question, 
as Gould well knew, was not one of  productive but one of  destruc- 
tive capacity, and the means of  coercion which he employed was a 
demonstration of  the ease with which the Kansas Pacific could be 
made  formidable  as  a  competing line.  In November,  1879,  he 
purchased  the  Missouri  Pacific  from  Kansas  City  to  St.  Louis; 
about the same time he bought two minor roads between the Kansas 
Pacific and the Union Pacific in Kansas, and announced his inten- 
tion of  extending the Kansas Pacific to Salt Lake City, there to con- 
nect with the Central Pacific and to form a third  transcontinental 
route.  The story is clearly told in the report of  the United States 
Pacific Railway Comrni~sion.~  The result  was  the consent of  the 
Union Pacific directors to the terms imposed, and the execution of 
an agreement dated January  14, 1880, whereby the Union and the 
Kansas Pacific, with all their respective assets and liabilities, were 
put together at par  of  their  respective capitals, -  $36,762,300 and 
$~o,ooo,ooo,  -to  which  was  added  the  capital  of  the  Denver 
Pacific, $~,OOO,OOO,  forming a new company called the Union Pacific 
Railway Company, with  a  capital  of  $50,762,300, and a  bonded 
indebtedness of  $92,984,624.3 This corporation was larger in every 
way than the old Union Pacific Railroad, except in one particular- 
earnings above fixed charges.  It had  1821 miles of  line instead of 
'  United States Pacific Railway Commission Report,  1887, p. 58. 
Ibid. pp. 59 to 65. 
a  Ibid. Testimony of F. L.  Ames, p.  668.  The combined capital is  given  in the 
agreements as $51,762,300, but this is apparently a mistake. 230  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  UNION PACIFIC  23 I 
1042 ;  $22,455,134 gross earnings instead of $13,201,077 ;  $10,545,119 
operating expenses instead of  $5,475,503; and yet,  since the con- 
solidation was a union of some strength with a vast deal of  weakness, 
there were few who profited by it save the holders of Kansas Pacific 
or Denver Pacific stocks.  Those lucky and skilful individuals saw 
the quotations  of  Kansas Pacific common rise from a  high  level 
of  13 in January, 1879, to one of  59 in June, and of  923 in Decem- 
ber; and the stock which had  been  a football in the market  thus 
become of  such value  that in 1887 Gould was able  to lay before 
a committee of  Congress, in justification  of  the terms described, a 
table which showed for  1880 market  prices of  Kansas and Union 
Pacific stock which were approximately the same.' 
It was to Gould, as chief  owner of Kansas Pacific and holder of 
practically all of  the  Denver  Pacific stock  outstanding,  that  the 
lion's share of  the profits went ;  but Mr. Gould was not satisfied -with 
a harvest on these stocks alone.  In the course of  his operations he 
had become possessed of  certain branch and minor roads in whole 
or in part.  Thus he held $945,887 in bonds of  a company known as 
the St. Joseph  & Western Railroad Company, and 5013  shares of 
its stock ;  $634,000 in bonds of  the St. Joseph Bridge Company ;  and 
$59,000 in St. Joseph  & Denver  Pacific Railroad  receivers' certi- 
ficates ;  while to convince the Union Pacific directors of  the wisdom 
of  accepting his plan of  consolidation he had acquired the Missouri 
Pacific, the Kansas Central, and the Central Branch Union Pacific 
 railroad^.^  The earning capacity of  none of  these lines was large, 
that of  the Missouri Pacific being the greatest.  The St. Joseph  & 
Western had been sold in foreclosure in 1875, and had continued to 
be  managed thereafter by  a receiver.  What value it had was due 
Quotations of  Kansas Pacific common during 1879 (Chron. 1880) : 
January  February  March  April 
Low  High  Low  High  Low  rHigh  Low  High 
94  13  118  221  17  223  204  60 
May  June  July  August 
Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
50  591  54  59  56  60  53)  598 
September  October  November  December 
Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High 
55  738  70  851  838  92  85  925 
United States Pacific Raiiway Commission Report, testimony of  Jay Gould. 
to the fact that, as extended to Grand Island, it gave to the Union 
pacific an outlet to the East other than the one at Omaha.  The value 
of the Bridge Company bonds and of  the receivers' certificates was 
dependent upon  this same property.  The Kansas Central was a 
narrow-gauge road  and had been sold under foreclosure in April, 
Ig79.  The Central  Branch  Union  Pacific  had  been  designed  to 
join  with the  Kansas Pacific,  but  had  been  left  without western 
connection when this latter road had failed to meet the Union Pacific 
at the hundredth meridian.  At the time of  the consolidation, accord- 
ing to the United States Pacific Railway Commission, "the coupons 
for six  years were  in  default,  and were  retained  uncancelled as 
security for the income mortgage.  The company had never earned 
sufficient to pay its own coupons, without taking into account the 
accruing interest to the United States in any form." ' The Missouri 
Pacific was more prosperous, but need not here concern us.  Mr. 
Gould had  paid  various prices for the above, ranging  from  $40 
for the St.  Joseph  & Denver bonds to $238  for the stock of  the 
Central Branch Union Pacific.  In the case of  each road  he turned 
over his purchase to the Union Pacific for the same or a greater 
price.2  Thus for the St. Joseph & Western bonds, for  which  he 
had paid 40, he received par in Union Pacific stock selling as high as 
94 in January,  1880; for $634,000 bonds and 4000 shares of  stock 
of  the St. Joseph  Bridge Company, costing $480,440, he received 
6340 shares of  Union Pacific stock; for $479,000 in bonds and 2521 
shares of  stock of  the Kansas Central, he received 4790 ,shares of 
Union  Pacific; and  for  7616  shares  of  Central  Branch  Union 
Pacific, costing $1,826,500, he received $913,500 in Union Pacific six 
per cent bonds and $9~3,500  in Kansas Pacific six per cent bonds3 
The result was the issue of  considerable amounts of  stock of  the 
consolidated and bonds of  the consolidating companies, without equi- 
valent value received. 
The Union Pacific Railway Company, therefore, began its career 
in 1880 in worse shape than the Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
which had preceded it, for it suffered not only from an initial water- 
ing of stocks and bonds, but from a watering of  assets which had 
United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, p.  100. 
'  Except the Missouri Pacific, which Gould retained. 
'  United  States Pacific Railway Commission  Report,  1887,  testimony of  Jay 
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followed.  Including the government subsidy and accrued interest 
thereon, the total bonds and stocks of the company in 1880 were 
$179,058,902, or  $98,329  per  mile, of  which  $27,876 were  stock, 
$45,372 mortgage bonds, and  $25,081  government subsidy and  in- 
terest.  The figures per mile were slightly lower than in 1870, and yet 
the water in the capitalization was more abundant, for the average 
value of the assets had declined still more.  A dividend-paying road 
had  been  combined with  non-dividend payers,  with  the result  of 
large profits to the promoters of the consolidations, but of  serious 
harm to the solvent party. 
Between 1880 and 1883 a number of branches were constructed, 
to provide funds for which the capital stock of  the Railway Company 
was increased $~o,ooo,ooo. Of  these the Denver  & South  Park 
was  constructed  in  the years  1881  to  1883,  and  was  the  last of 
Mr. Gould's gifts to the parent line. This road was handled by several 
construction companies, in the last of  which  Gould took a quarter 
interest, receiving  stock  of  the  Denver  & South  Park  Railroad 
Company as a dividend on his investment.'  In November, 1880, act- 
ing in behalf  of  the Union Pacific Railway Company, he bought the 
stock of  the Denver road at par for cash, benefiting in his capacity 
as quarter owner  by  his action as representative and stockholder 
of  the Union Pacifi~.~  In relation to the road Mr. Charles F. Adams, 
Jr.,  subsequently said: "The chief  source of  revenue . . .  was in 
carrying men  and material into Colorado to  dig holes in the ground 
called mines, and until it was discovered that there was nothing in 
those mines the business was immense."  A more important and 
genuinely beneficial  project was  the organization  in  1881  of  the 
Oregon Short Line Railway Company to construct and operate a 
railway from Granger on  the Union Pacific to and into the state of 
Oregon, a distance of  610 miles, with  the intention of  securing the 
Washington  and  Oregon  business.  The Northern  Pacific  was  in 
financial difficulties at the time, and it was not expected that it could 
anticipate the  new road; but even though this expectation was dis- 
appointed, and the Oregon  Short  Line was second in reaching the 
United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, testimony of  Charles 
Wheeler, pp.  1735-6.  Amount, $571,000. 
a  Ibid. Testimony of  John Evans, pp.  1853-4. 
a  Ibid. Testimony of  C.  F. Adams, p.  47. 
disputed territory, its value was great and steadily grew.'  The road 
w,,  built by the construction department of  the Union Pacific, and 
was financed by the organization of  a subsidiary corporation which 
issued stock and bonds to an amount of  $25,000 per mile, one-half 
of  the stock being reserved in the Union Pacific treasury  for the 
purpose  of  control, and the Union  Pacific  guaranteeing the  pay- 
ment of  interest on the bonds.  This branch at least was not  un- 
loaded on the main line by interested parties, and forms an essen- 
tial part of the system to-day.  Other branches were bought or con- 
structed at the time, but do not require detailed mention. 
Gould for the time had obtained from the Union Pacific all that 
he thought possible, and quietly unloaded his stock, while keeping 
up the payment of  dividends.  By  1883 he was substantially clear, 
but he had left his mark; the consolidation of  1880, with the forced 
purchase of  worthless branches, aided as it was by the high capital- 
ization  caused  by  extravagant  original construction, and  accom- 
panied  by  a  steadily increasing intensity of  competition between 
transcontinental lines, had diminished the surplus  to  a dangerous 
extent.  At  the same time the prosperity of  the country as a whole 
was declining; the wheat crop of  1881  was only three-quarters as 
large as the crop of  1880, and the corn crop was the smallest since 
1874; though the decline was not so marked in Kansas and the far 
West  as in the states east and south of  Omaha and Kansas.  By 
1882, says Noyes, all the markets were moving downward, and after 
the reaction of  that year, the volume of  internal trade decreased 
continuously until  after the panic of  1884.~ 
The evidence of  distress on the part  of  the Union  Pacific was 
the mounting up of  the floating debt.  In November, 1882, President 
Dion stated that it then amounted to $3,4oo,ooo, and that a loan 
of 965,000,ooo  was to be negotiated to take care of  The annual 
report at the end of  the year stated the net debt to be only $842,743, 
but  included in the assets used to offset the gross debt $2,768,437 
in  fuel and material on hand, and $q7,648 in balances due from 
auxiliary roads;  so  that  early the following year  it  was  again a 
of  discussion,  and the stockholders recommended  to  the 
directors the issue of  collateral bonds in order to wipe it out.  Pur- 
l  United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, pp. 91 ff. 
Thirty Years of  American Finance, pp. 86 to 98.  a  Chron. 35: 578,  1882. 234  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  UNION PACIFIC  235 
suant to the recommendation  the directors executed to the  New 
England Trust  Company of  Boston an indenture under  which  it 
proposed to issue trust bonds to an amount equal to 90  per cent of 
the securities deposited.  By  1884 the gross floating debt amounted, 
nevertheless, to  $I 1,306,595, as  against $9,852,325 gross in  1882, 
and the quick assets, exclusive of  fuel and material, counted up to 
$8,068,898, instead of  to $6,241,145.  The chief increase in liabilities, 
as always, had taken place in bi  payable, meaning that the road 
had been giving its notes for the payment of  current indebtedness, 
with the consequent necessity of  paying a high rate of  interest, and 
of  making  frequent  renewals.  Meanwhile  dividends  had  been 
stopped and salaries cut down. 
At this juncture Mr. Sidney Dillon resigned the presidency, and 
Mr.  Charles Francis Adams,  Jr.,  was  elected  his successor.  Mr. 
Dillon was well along in years, was said to be in poor health, and 
doubtless missed the support which Mr. Gould had been accustomed 
to render him.  Mr.  Adams was  a  younger  man, only  forty-nine 
years of  age as against the sixty-nine of  Mr. Dillon.  He had been 
a  member  of  the  Massachusetts Railway Commission from  1869 
to  1879, had served as government director of  the Union Pacific 
in 1874, and now brought to his position as president an inexhaust- 
ible fund  of  energy, large  resourcefulness,  and  more  important 
still, a nice sense of  his obligations towards the bondholders and 
shareholders of  his road.  Under his rCgime the economies earlier 
initiated were continued and extended ; employees were discharged 
until, by  June  28,1884, the company had only about  10,ooo men 
in its employ instead of  the 20,000 who had been on the rolls at one 
time; and  rolling  mills,  etc.,  were  closed  wherever  the  company 
found it cheaper to purchase rails and equipment at current prices. 
This, with  the cessation of  dividends, leA  a  considerable surplus 
revenue applicable to the payment of  the floating debt.  In addition, 
bonds and stock from the company's treasury were sold  between 
January  I, 1884,  and  January  I, 1887, for which $6,550,000 were 
obtained;  and  the  aggregate  of  resources  made  available  was 
$16,200,000,  of  which $8,251,368  were applied to the floating debt, 
$6,708,632 to betterment of  the road and branch-line construction, 
and $1,240,000 to increase of  equipment.'  In addition the proceeds 
United States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 1887, p. 67. 
from land  sales were  used  to the same general end.  In August, 
to reassure investors, President Adams stated that no  part  of  the 
floating debt was pressing, and in November he repeated the state- 
ment ;  the truth of  which was made evident by  the payment of  the 
last bit of  net unfunded indebtedness on August  22, two years later. 
The result was highly creditable, although the continued cessation 
of dividends provoked some protest. 
~~~h  could be done at this time by  able and energetic manage- 
ment ;  there was, however, much that could not be done ;  and it is 
to this that we  must  attribute Mr. Adams's failure to put the road 
in a permanently stable position.  For first, the competition which 
the Union  Pacific was  obliged to meet  was  constantly increasing 
in severity.  In 1881  the Atchison, Topeka  & Santa  Fe was ex- 
tended to a junction with the Southern Pacific at Deming; in 1883, 
in the language of  the annual report, "  Not only was the Rio Grande 
completed  to  Ogden, making, in  connection  with  the  Atchison, 
Topeka  & Santa Fe  and  the  Burlington  & Missouri  extension 
of  the  Chicago, Burlington  & Quincy, a  direct competing route 
with  the Union Pacific from  Chicago and all eastern points to a 
common  western  terminus,  but  the  Northern  Pacific  also  was 
connected  through,  making  a  third  transcontinental  route."'  In 
1887  the Atchison built 450  miles of  line and the Chicago, Rock 
Island  & Pacific was scarcely behind, so that Kansas and Nebraska 
were covered with a network of  lines, which transformed the natural 
local traffic  of  the Union Pacific into competitive business of  the 
most  uncertain kind.  At  the same time the profitable high grade 
business was giving way to a larger volume of  mineral traffic, and 
the average length of  haul was increasing, all of  which resulted in a 
decrease of about 45  per cent in the average receipts per ton mile 
between  1881  and  1890,  a  slow increase in gross earnings which 
hre  little relation to the greatly increased volume of  business done, 
and  a  fluctuating progress  of  net  earnings, which  were  actually 
Over  $3,000,000 less in 1889 than they had been eight years before. 
And  second,  during this  time  the  fixed  charges of  the  Union 
Pacific did not  materially  decrease.  They were $7,626,626  when 
Mr.  Adams  assumed  the  presidency,  and  $7,309,142  five  years 
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later; and the necessity for further decrease was shown by the fact 
that  the  total  net  income  of  the road  was  $11,402~19~  in  I~Q, 
$10,339,402 in 1889, and $9,561,673 in 1890.  What Mr.Adamscould 
do he did, and the funded debt under his rCgime  decreased from 
$90,760,582 in 1884 to $82,090,585 in 1889,  and to $73,968,8S5 in 
1890 ; the company steadily buying up its own indebtedness : but the 
conditions which he had to face were  too exacting, and  the saving 
made here was offset in other ways. 
To save itself the Union Pacific was driven to a rapid extension 
of  its branch mileage, which Mr. Adams held to be the only means 
by  which  fixed  charges could be  paid.'  Between  1884 and  1890 
3132.45 miles were  built or acquired, all under separate organiza- 
tions, but  with their  accounts and management under  the super- 
vision and control of  the officers of  the parent line ;  and the amount 
invested in branch-line securities was raised from about $28,ooo,ooo 
in 1881 to $41,879,724 in 1892.  These  roads  reported  annual de- 
ficits, which were either paid out of  earnings or carried as floating 
debt.  The report  of  the  Government  Directors in  1891 declared 
that $~~,ooo,ooo  out of  $21,400,000 of  floating debt were the result 
of  expenditures and advances in  the construction  of  branch  and 
tributary lines and the purchase of  stock in such lines for the purpose 
of contr01.~  But speaking in 1887, Mr. Adams declared the branches 
to be worth $5,ooo,ooo a year to the main line, entirely apart from 
anything which appeared in the accounts of  the branches themselves, 
and in a letter to the Government Directors in 1884 he said :  "The 
branches and  auxiliary lines of  the Union Pacific should be  con- 
sidered the only real security the Government has for the repayment 
of  its indebtedness. . . . Were it  not for these branches the Union 
Pacific would be confined to such small local traffic as it could pick 
up at  points directly upon  its main line; and to  its share of  the 
through  transcontinental  business  which  has  recently  been  sub- 
divided  by four  through  the construction of  competing routes." s 
The most  important  of  the branches remained the  Oregon Sho* 
Line, with the connecting line of  the Oregon Railway & Navigation 
'  United States Pacific  Railway Commission  Report, 1887,  testimony  of C. 
Adams,  pp. 45-6. 
'  Chron. 53: 436, 1891.  Annual Report, 1884,  p. 165. 
Company, Of  which the Union Pacific became finally possessed in 
1889.  This last road had  been long considered the natural outlet 
of  the Northern Pacific to the Pacific coast, but had  been  leased 
by the Union Pacific in 1887 through the Oregon Short Line with 
a guarantee of 6 per cent dividends upon its stock as well as interest 
upon its bonds for 999 years.  In 1889 negotiations with the Northern 
pXific resulted finally in the sale of  the Oregon Railway & Naviga- 
tion stock held by  Mr. Villard and his friends.  Pending the issue 
of  a collateral trust mortgage the stock was deposited with a trust 
company, a note was given for the amount, and the sum was carried 
as floating debt. Whatever the value of  the property to the Northern 
Pacific, it proved of  great worth to the Union Pacific, providing it 
with an independent outlet to the coast, and giving it a haul on its 
main line of over 800 miles on all interchanged traffic.  The method 
of payment proved  a dangerous one, however, in that it so largely 
swelled the volume of  the Union Pacific's  quick liabilities. 
In 1891  Mr.  Gould  again  began  buying  Union  Pacific  stock. 
Mr. Adams therefore resigned late in the year, and Mr. Dillon was 
elected to his position.  The time was not ripe for expansion of  any 
kind,  and  Mr.  Gould's  death the following year  put  an effectual 
check  on  any  schemes  which  he  might  have  entertained.  The 
immediate problem was the floating debt, swollen to unwieldy pro- 
portions by the acquisition of  branch lines, and in particular by the 
purchase of  the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company.  During 
1890  a block of collateral bonds was issued and sold, but the re- 
mainder of  the proposed issue was kept back in the hope of  a better 
price.  While waiting, Mr. Gould devised a scheme for the postpone- 
ment of  the payment of  these and of other quick liabilities by the 
issue of three-year collateral notes, to be underwritten by a syndicate 
composed  of  himself  and  of  other  gentlemen  interested  in  the 
Property.  These notes were to bear  6 per  cent,  and were  to  be 
issued at 923 to such holders of  the floating debt as would  accept 
them,  the  syndicate taking care of  the balance.  The authorized 
amount  was  to be  $24,000,000,  of  which  $5,5oo,ooo  were  to be 
issued at once.  The plan was declared operative on September 28, 
1891.  If,  now, the Union Pacific had been a moderately capitalized 
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capacity, and if, in 1894, when the notes were to mature, the market 
conditions had  been  more favorable than in  1891,  it  is  probable 
that this scheme, temporary as it  was,  would  have met the needs 
of  the situation.  Since neither of  these contingencies occurred the 
insufficiency of  the plan may  be  said to be in part the misfortune 
of  the Union Pacific and in part its fault.  It was a particular mis- 
fortune that the severest panic since 1873 should occur when  the 
road  was  staggering under  a  load  which  it  could  scazcely bear; 
but it was altogether a fault that the railroad should have been so 
burdened as to be able to  lay by no  reserve  in  good  times for the 
hard times which were bound to come. 
In 1892, therefore, the Union Pacific was in a difficult position. 
Its capitalization was high; its earnings had  shown scarcely any 
increase for five  years; its surplus had  not  been  sufficient  to pre- 
vent the accumulation of  a large floating debt ; it had  to prepare 
to raise a large sum of  money in two years  for the payment  of  its 
short  time  notes;  and, in  addition, there  was  ahead  a  fact  of 
which little has been said so far, -the  maturing of  the government 
indebtedness. 
Briefly sketched, the history of  this indebtedness was as follows : 
The Acts of  1862 and 1864 had provided for the issue of  govern- 
ment bonds for stated amounts per mile on the subsidized portions 
of the system in aid  of  construction, which bonds were to mature 
thirty years from date of  issue, and to have a lien on the property 
covered second only to the first mortgage of  the company.  The rate 
of interest was 6 per cent, payable to the bondholders by the Govern- 
ment; and in 1875 the Supreme Court decided that the company 
was not obliged to repay to the Government the accruing interest 
before the maturity  of  the bonds.'  This ruling was regarded as a 
victory for the company, but meant the steady piling up of  arrears 
of interest, lessened only by  the retention by  the Government of 
one-half  the  amounts  due  for  government  transportation,  and, 
under the Thurman Act,  of  such additional sum not  in excess of 
$850,000  as,  added  to the  whole  compensation  for  government 
services and to the 5 per cent of  net earnings set aside under the 
Act  of 1862, should make the annual contribution equal to 25 per 
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cent of thc net  earnings of  the company, unless the remaining 75 
per cent should be insufficient to pay the interest on the first mort- 
gage bonds; in which  case the Secretary of  the Treasury was au- 
thorizedtoremit a portion of  the 25 per cent of  net earnings required.' 
The Thurman Act did not fulfil expectations.  The Supreme Court 
in  1891 held that expenditures for new construction and new equip- 
ment  could  not  be  deducted  from gross  earnings in  ascertaining 
net earnings,'  but the road met hard times and the maximum limit 
of the contributions  to the sinking fund was not  attained, and in 
investing the fund in government bonds the Secretary of  the Treas- 
ury was compelled to pay high premiums, thus reducing the net in- 
terest; so that from the beginning to 1892 the question of  indebted- 
ness to the Government occasioned constant dispute and litigation, 
introduced uncertainty into the affairs of  the railroad, and caused 
hard feelings between it and the Government.  In 1892 the neces- 
sity for  some settlement was  near  at  hand.  The principal  of the 
government debt matured as follows : 
November I, 1895 
January  I, 1896 
February  I, 1896 
January  I, 1897 
January  I, 1898 
January  I, 1899 
Deducting from this amount  the  sums paid to the Government 
and the company's credits for mail and carriage,  and  adding ar- 
rears of  interest, the sum due the Government at the last of 1893 
was  approximately $~~,ooo,ooo.~  '1t  was obviously highly difficult 
for the company to pay this sum in 1892 or 1898 or any other time, 
and for some years both the company and the Government had been 
earnestly discussing schemes for refunding, and the advantages and 
Statutes at Large, 45th Congress, ad Session, chap. 96. 
a  The Court held that while up to the passage of  the Thurman Act expenditures 
for improvements  could  be deducted  from gross earnings  in  calculating net,  the 
language of  that Act seemed to preclude the deduction of  any charges for improve- 
ments or betterments, or increase of  permanent value of  the works in any manner 
whatever.  See 99 U.  S. 402; 99 U.  S. 455;  138 U.  S. 84. 
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disadvantages of  the ownership and operation of  the road by  the 
United States.  Thus in 1892 an overwhelming obligation was hang- 
ing over the Union Pacific; and did not crush it only because the 
inability of  the road to pay was so evident, and the inadvisability of 
government ownership was so strongly believed  in, that  every one 
felt that the necessary concessions would  be  made. 
In 1893 the sinking-fund 8 per cent bonds matured to the amount 
of  $5,176,000, and were  partially extended and partially paid  off 
through the medium of  an underwriting syndicate ;  but this was the 
last  attempt to meet  indebtedness coming due.  During the year 
both gross and net earnings fell off enormously, owing to the gen- 
eral depression of  business, and particularly to the stagnation upon 
the Pacific coast.  Freight rates were said to be in a state of  chaos; 
and the Union  Pacific served  notice that it would  withdraw from 
the Western Passenger Association on October 10.  As the year wore 
on the continued decrease in earnings made the situation desperate. 
"The company for the year ending December 31,  1892," said Mr. 
John F. Dillon, counsel for the Union Pacific, in November, "had 
a surplus of  $~,OOO,OOO.  In the month of  September (1893)  there 
was a loss of  net revenue of $1,5oo,ooo  as compared with the pre- 
ceding  year, and  from  January  I to August  31  there  has been a 
falling off  in net  revenue of over $2,5oo,ooo.  The company is in- 
debted  for  labor  and  materials  on  October  I  to the  amount  of 
$1,5oo,ooo; and its sinking-fund and interest charges for September 
would be more than $r,ooo,ooo; for October $750,000,  for Novem- 
ber $850,000, for December $~,ooo,ow,  and for January $~,ooo,ooo. 
There will  be  a  deficit  for  the  year 1893 of  at least  $3,ow,ooo 
and  the company is without money or means to meet these obliga- 
tions. . . .  ,)  1 
Under these conditions a receivership was the only device which 
could  prevent  the  dismemberment of  the system and  protect  the 
interests  of  all  the  creditors; and  accordingly,  on  application of 
parties friendly to the company, Messrs. S. H.  Clark (president of 
the Union  Pacific), 0. W.  Mink  (comptroller), and  E. E. Ander- 
son  (government  director),  were  appointed  in  Oct~ber;~  Mr. 
Clark taking charge of  the operation of  the road, and Messrs. Mink 
Chron. 57: 684,  1893.  '  Ibid. 57: 639,  1893. 
Anderson of  the financial and legal business.'  One month later, 
on  of  the Attorney-General, Messrs. John  W.  Doane 
~~ederick  R. Coudert were  appointed additional receivers to 
safeguard the government interests and to assist the other receivers 
in the general administration  of  the  property.=  These gentlemen 
remained in  office  until  the  reorganization was  complete, though 
various portions of  the system passed  from their jurisdiction from 
time to time. 
The appointment of  receivers closed a long struggle to maintain 
the solvency of  the road.  A reorganization was now  in order, and 
in this it was to be  possible to d'o  what  Mr. Adams had  not been 
able to do, -namely,  to rearrange  the capitalization of  the road, 
thereby permanently lessening the fixed charges and securing a re- 
serve of  earning capacity sufficient to avoid bankruptcy when receipts 
for any cause should show a considerable decrease.  This was the 
fundamental condition of  future prosperity.  Besides,  the debt to 
the Government had to be  settled, cash raised to pay  the floating 
debt, including the  three-year notes of  1891, and the system held 
together so that its earning capacity should not be destroyed. 
As  might be expected, it was the debt to the Government which 
was most  publicly and persistently discussed.  There seemed to be 
four ways in which this might be handled: 
First, the Government might have cancelled the obligation and 
have remained satisfied with the enormous economies which it had 
secured in  the transportation  of  mails and other government busi- 
ness.  In the seven years between 1867 and 1873 alone the Quarter- 
master-General estimated  that  the Union  Pacific  had  saved  the 
Government $6,507,283 in the cost of  moving troops and ~upplies,~ 
and there was no doubt that by  1896 the investment of  the Govern- 
ment,  with  interest, had  been  many  times regained.  But  it  was 
pointed out not only that the Union Pacific deserved little considera- 
Sen. Com. 1896, 54th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 314, p. 42, testimony of 
E. E. Anderson.  For bill of  complaint see Report of  the Commissioner of Railroads, 
'8949  pp. gp-120. 
'  Ibid. pp. 391-2,  testimony of  0.  W. Mink.  This gave to the Government three 
Out of  the five  receivers.  For petition  of  the  Attorney-General  see Report of  the 
of  Railroads for 1894. 
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tion,  in that  its earnings had  been  wrongfully diverted from the 
payments demanded by the Thurman Act  by the manipulations of 
Gould and others, but that the precedent of renouncing a just claim 
would be an extremely bad one for the Government to set. 
Second, the  Government might  have  exacted larger  payments 
to the sinking fund, and have extended the debt at an unchanged 
rate of  interest until it should be  automatically discharged.  This 
was  the  proposal of  Mr.  Hampton,  Commissioner of  Railroads, 
who  suggested  the  amendment  of  the  Thurman Act  as follows: 
it  should embrace all the United  States  bond-aided Pacific rail- 
roads; it should compel the contribution of  50 per cent of  net earn- 
ings to a sinking fund instead of  -25 per cent, and should extend the 
indebtedness to the Government until discharged as  provided.  If 
any company should abandon a portion of  a subsidized line or divert 
its business from a subsidized  to an  unsubsidized line, that com- 
pany  should transfer  the conditions which  were  attached  to the 
former to the latter, in order to protect the interests of  the United 
States Government.'  The weak points in this scheme were many. 
Among them may be pointed out the fact that contributions to the 
sinking fund under the Thurman Act had been necessarily invested 
in government bonds, which, in view of  the premium at which they 
were necessarily purchased, yielded a very small return.  To  double 
the contributions would have been to double the amount of  the rail- 
road's funds sunk in but slightly remunerative investments ;  and the 
Government did not seem inclined to permit the company to adopt 
the only practicable alternative, that  of  investing its sinking fund 
in its own securities. Also, Mr. Hampton's amendment would have 
continued to an  enhanced degree the  constant  suspicious super- 
vision of  the company by the Government which had been, perhaps, 
the chief  evil result of  the Thurman Act. 
Third,  the  Government might  have  consented  to a  refunding 
of  the indebtedness to it at a lower rate of  interest.  This was most 
urgently  pressed  by  representatives of  the  road.  Mr.  A.  A.  H. 
Boissevain, representing the Dutch  bondholders, proposed to re- 
deem the first mortgage by the securities in the sinking fund so far 
as possible, and to renew the rest at a lower rate of  interest ; -  after 
Report of the Commissioner of  Railroads, 1895, p. 14. 
which the Government was to be given a 100-year 2 per cent bond 
for the principal and interest of  its claim.'  Attorney-General Olney 
similarly suggested a renewal of  the first mortgage bonds at a rate 
of not over 5 per cent, and an exchange of  100-year 2 per cent bonds 
for the government claim; though he differed somewhat from Mr. 
~~iss~vain  as to the lien which these bonds should have.2 Congress 
and  the Government Directors in  1894 were  inclined  to insist on 
harder terms.  The latter, in their annual report, proposed that the 
kst mortgage bonds be paid off  in cash, and that a 100-year 3 per 
cent instead of  a 2 per cent bond be given to the Government, with 
elaborate provision for a sinking fund; and the former had before 
it in the Reilly Bill a very similar suggestion.3  As a counter-propo- 
sition the  railway company offered  to  pay  off  the  first  mortgage 
bonds in cash if  the Government would  take a so-year 2 per cent 
instead of  a 3 per cent bond for its claim.  "The  petitioners further 
represent,"  it said, "that  it will be utterly impossible to obtain the 
very large sums referred to from the stockholders unless it be pos- 
sible to offer to them in satisfaction of  their assessments reasonable 
security for the moneys so advanced.  At  a meeting recently held, 
at which were present representatives of  a large amount of  the stock 
of the said company, the conclusion was reached that if  the debt to 
the Government could  be funded substantially on the terms of  the 
Reilly Bill, but at a rate of  interest of  2 per cent per annum instead 
of  3  per  cent, the said stockholders would  endeavor to raise the 
funds needed for the purpose of  meeting the requirements of  the 
Reilly Bill."  Finally, Mr. Pierce, on behalf  of  the Fitzgerald Re- 
organization Committee, proposed that the Government either take 
4  per cent bonds for the principal of its debt, and preferred stock 
for the interest, carrying into the settlement with the Government 
the scheme which  was  found  best  adapted  to the satisfaction of 
other creditors; or that it take a 3 per cent first mortgage bond for 
its principal, and a second mortgage non-interest-bearing bond for its 
interest ;  or that it accept a lump sum of  money equal to the value of 
its lien, which he informally estimated as 50  per cent of  the total 
'  Ry. Rev. 34: 335, 1894. 
"hron.  58: 775, 1894.  '  Ibid. 60: 132, 1895. 
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amount due.'  The plan of  refunding was the most obvious as weU 
as the most practicable of  all suggestions.  It had, however, the diS- 
advantage from the point of  view of  the Government of  surrender- 
ing some part of  the government claim, and from that of  the corn- 
pany of  continuing the relations of the Government with the road. 
Fourth  and  last,  the  Government  might  have  demanded  pay- 
ment  in cash.  The sum which the company would  have had to 
obtain was extremely large, but the accumulated sinking fund re- 
duced it considerably, and many thought that the balance could be 
raised.  In March,  1896,  before  a  Senate  committee,  Mr.  John 
Rooney, for the first mortgage bondholders, proposed that the Gov- 
ernment, through  a  commission, should  buy  in the Union  Pacific 
at foreclosure sale, should issue a new general mortgage at a lower 
rate of  interest than the existing prior liens, and should pay off  both 
the  first  and  the  government  mortgage  with  the proceeds; -  the 
road  to be  turned over to the  subscriber^.^  This suggestion took 
place among many  others which were in the nature of  a compro- 
mise.  Thus the reorganization  committee, in 1895, offered to pay 
the  principal  of  the  government  debt  provided  that  the  interest 
were  cancelled;  and  Receiver  Anderson  proposed  in  1896  that 
the company pay the principal of  the debt by adding funds raised 
by it to the amount of the sinking fund, and settle the arrears of 
interest with a so-year 2 per cent  bond.  Full payment  in cash was, 
of  course, what  the Government desired, and everything short of 
that  it  hesitated  to  accept; but  equally,  of  course,  full  payment 
was what the bondholders of  the road were most unwilling to con- 
cede; and hearing after hearing took place before committees of  the 
Senate and of  the House without definite result. 
Meanwhile the general  reorganization  of  the company was going 
on.  In November, 1893, the various  interests  and factions of  the 
road held a conference in New York, which resulted in the choice of 
a reorganization committee  as follows :  Senator  Brice, chairman ; 
Mr. A. H. Boissevain, for the foreign holders; General Louis Fitz- 
Senate  Commission,  54th  Congress,  1st  Session,  Document  314,  testimony 
of W. S. Pierce.  See generally the report of  this committee for a discussion of  alter- 
natives from the government point of  view. 
'  Ibid. Testimony,  pp. 451-2.  Chron. 60:  303, 1895. 
gerald, president of  the Mercantile Trust Company, for the Gould 
interests; Mr. Carr, for the estate of  F. L. Ames;  General Dodge, 
for the Denver  and Gulf  roads'  interests; and Colonel H.  L. Hig- 
ginson, for the Oregon  Railway  & Navigation  interests.'  Subse- 
quently Mr. J. P. Morgan accepted a place.2  This committee was 
the  only comprehensive  one  appointed  until  1895; but  numerous 
other committees sprang up to represent special interests of  one kind 
or another, appearing frequently as interest on new classes of  bonds 
was defaulted, and having, with the main reorganization committee, 
to deal specifically with the payment  of  the floating debt and the 
reduction of  fixed charges.  Upon the ability of  the committees to 
agree depended  the retention  of  the  Union  Pacific  in  something 
like its existing shape. 
Aside from the question  of  the government  debt  there  seemed 
to be a general agreement as to what was needed to be done.  Every 
suggestion contemplated the payment  of  the first  mortgage  in full 
and the reduction  of  the 'interest  upon the junior  securities; most 
included with this an assessment on the stock, and one at least pro- 
posed the cancellation of  the guarantee on the stock of  the Oregon 
Railway  & Navigation  C~mpany.~  The principles  were  obvious. 
A large sum of  money had to be raised with which to pay the float- 
ing debt  and to meet possible demands by the Government.  This 
had to come from the junior  securities or from the stock, and pre- 
ferably from the stock, which represented  ownership in the enter- 
prise.  On the other hand, reductions in fixed charges had to come 
from the junior securities as the youngest interests which had a mort- 
gage lien.  Differences of  opinion occurred upon the details.  Should 
there ol should there not be a foreclosure?  How large an assessment 
was required? How great must the reduction in interest charges be, 
and should bonds or stock or both be given to the junior  securities 
in exchange for their holdings?  Should the system as it  stood be 
Preserved, or should certain parts of  it be let go? 
In June,  18514,  Mr.  Boissevain  stated  that  the  reorganization 
thought that they should be in a position to formulate a 
Ry. Times, 64:  732,  1893.  Mr. Brice was also a  member of the Senate Com- 
on Pacific Railroads. 
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complete  plan  of  reorganization  speedily after the terms  of  the 
adjustment of the debt to the United States had been approved by 
Congress.  "It  is our  opinion that the fixed  charges of  the reor- 
ganized  company . . .  should not exceed $8,5oo,ooo per  annum. 
Certain classes of  existing bonds secured by mortgage on portions 
of the system cannot be  and should not be  disturbed, as they are 
amply secured by  property earning the interest which is payable 
thereon.  Other bonds, however, must be converted in whole or in 
part into securities not imposing a fixed charge upon the reorganized 
company.  While the reorganization committee has not  approved 
of any definite plan, we believe that holders of  bonds which must be 
disturbed  and creditors and stockholders interested in the system 
can be provided for upon an equitable basis by the creation of  the 
following securities : 
(a) An issue of  general mortgage bonds (at 4 per cent), secured 
by a general mortgage covering the entire system, subject to such 
mortgages  as cannot  be  disturbed, and to the lien of  the United 
States upon the main line and Kansas Paci%c division for the ad- 
justed debt. 
(b) An issue of  5 per cent preferred stock. 
(c)  An issue of  common stock. 
The plan  of  reorganization would  require  provision to be  made 
to take up the trust notes secured by valuable collaterals. The funds 
required for this purpose and for the other cash requirements of the 
reorganization would  be  met  in  part  by  a  reasonable assessment 
upon the stockholders, and in part by the sale of  new securities." ' 
A not dissimilar suggestion was made by the Government Direct- 
ors in 1894.  They proposed to ascertain the minimum net earning 
power of  the railroad or railroads to be reorganized, and to issue a 
blanket mortgage of  3 per cent 100-year bonds to an amount such 
that the accruing interest would not exceed the net earning power. 
By sale of  a portion of  these bonds, together with a $10 assessment 
on the stock, and the use of  the moneys and securities in the sinking 
fund, they would have paid off  the prior liens, and then, after ex- 
Ry.  Times,  65 :  750,  1894.  The reorganization committee stated that this plan 
was not  final.  They concurred, however, with  Mr. Boissevain in his recommenda- 
tion of  the above scheme. 
changing the new 3 per cent bonds for the government claim, they 
would have used the balance to retire the junior securities, adding 
preferred stock, so much as necessary, to compensate for the differ- 
ence in yield  between the old securities and the new ones received. 
T-,C  amount of sccuritics required they estimated at $r~o,ooo,wo 
per  cent  bonds,  $~O,OOO,OOO  preferred  stock,  and  $61,ooo,ooo 
common stock; the latter exchanging for old common stock at par. 
~~th  of  these  plans  contained  excellent  features, chief  among 
which were their provisions for the raising of  cash and their use of 
preferred stock.  The cash which Mr. Boissevain proposed to raise 
was to meet tne floating debt, for he hoped to refund the government 
indebtedness ;  and while he may scarcely seem to deserve commenda- 
tion for not attempting to fund the quick liabilities as well, this is 
not the case, as the history of  the Union Pacific itself  can demon- 
strate.  The Government Directors intended to use the cash procured 
not only for settling the floating debt, but also for partially retiring 
the prior liens, so under their scheme an assessment was quite in- 
evitable ;  and having made that as large as they dared they are not 
to be criticised for resorting to the sale of  securities for the additional 
funds required, especially since these securities were to have a first 
lien on the road.  As regards the preferred stock it is not clear from 
his statement at the time whether Mr. Boissevain had in mind the 
exchange  of  junior  securities for  bonds  and  stock  or  some  for 
bonds and some for stock alone, but subsequent developments show 
that his intention was the former.  Thus his idea was the same as 
that of  the Government Directors, viz., to give the junior bondholders 
a right to a low rate of  interest well within the earning capacity of 
the road, and to join with this the right to a higher return whenever 
the road should earn it.  Mr. Boissevain's estimate of  the maximum 
fixed charges which the road could safely stand was, however, high, 
and the plan of  the Government Directors, if  conservatively carried 
out, would have been better.  Finally, the Government Directors con- 
templated  foreclosure, while  Mr. Boissevain  did  not; tl r  relative 
merits of the plans on this point depending largely on the terms which 
the bondholders could be induced voluntarily to accept. 
During  1894 and  1895  discussion was active, both  in  Congress 
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which Mr. Boissevain had put forward, without making any formal 
announcement of  a plan.  Everything depended on the terms upon 
which the United States should insist.  The reorganization committee 
hoped for a refunding of  the government debt at 2 per cent.  It had 
suggested that it would raise the funds to pay off  the prior liens if 
Congress would  take a  2  per cent  so-year bond in satisfaction of 
the government claim, would extend the provisions contained in the 
Reilly  Bill  to a  committee charged  with  the duty of  purchasing 
the property  of  the Union Pacific, and would grant the committee 
the power to form a successor corporation for the general purpose 
stated in the Acts of  1862 and of  1864, and with the general powers 
given in those Acts, together with the same rights, privileges, and 
freedom of  action that were exercised and enjoyed by  other rail- 
roads.'  Subsequently it had offered to pay the principal of  the govern- 
ment  indebtedness in cash, providing  that the Government would 
relinquish all claims to interesL2 If  either of  these propositions was 
accepted it was willing to go ahead; while if  both were refused, and 
no official counter-proposition was made byihe United  States, it 
seamed idle for the general reorganization  committee or any other 
committee to promulgate a plan. 
But  meanwhile  the  Union  Pacific  system  was  disintegrating; 
partly from the efforts of  the receivers to rid themselves of  branches 
and contracts which had become burdensome, and partly through 
the action of  bondholders of  subsidiary roads who refused to wait 
for the slow action of  Congress, and insisted on foreclosure of  their 
liens.  As early as August, 1893, ex-Governor Evans, a prominent 
stockholder of the Union Pacific, Denver  & Gulf, had petitioned 
for an accounting from the Union Pacific, alleging that the branch 
was being bled for the advantage of  the main line.  When receivers 
for the Union Pacific system were appointed  Mr. Evans petitioned 
for a  separate receiver,  and was  granted  his  request.  Litigation 
followed, and an attempt was made to get Mr. E. E. Anderson ap- 
pointed  as co-receiver;  but the machinery  of  foreclosure and sale 
were duly put  in motion  and the.line became  separated from the 
parent  company.  In October,  1893, in view  of  an impending de- 
fault, the Fort Worth  & Denver City Railway Company was placed 
Chron. 60: 132, 1895.  Ibid. 60: 303,  1895. 
in the hands of receivers, as was the same month the Denver, Lead- 
ville  & Gunnison and the St.  Joseph  & Grand Island.  In April, 
,gg4,  a  receiver  was  appointed  for the Leavenworth, Topeka & 
southwestern; in June one for the Oregon Railway  & Navigation 
Company.  Foreclosure proceedings against these and other branches 
were instituted, and were attended by a very considerable measure 
of success.1 On the other hand, the receivers were anxious to get 
rid  of  onerous contracts and unprofitable branches.  On the 16th 
of  March,  1894,  they formally abandoned the Leavenworth,  To- 
peka  & Southwestern.  In July,  1894, they petitioned to be relieved 
from certain guarantees and contracts, and asked instructions con- 
cerning the operation of certain lines.  Judge Sanborn, in the United 
States Court  at St. Paul, set November  15  for a hearing,  and ap- 
pointed a special  master  to take  testimony.  The master reported 
in October.  He recommended the continuance of  operation of most 
of the lines in question, but found that the receivers were not bound 
by the disputed contracts; and in November  Judge  Sanborn con- 
firmed the bulk of  his report.  The net  result  was  a reduction in 
the mileage of  the Union Pacific from 8167 in the latter part of  1893 
to 4469 in May, 1895 ;  at which time proceedings against the Oregon 
Short Line Railroad  Company threatened to withdraw  1424 miles 
besides. 
With  matters  in  this  state the  reorganization  committee  was 
genuinely discouraged by the refusal of Congress to pass the Reilly 
Bill, providing for a refunding of  the government  debt ; although 
this had  been reported  to the House with the alternative  amend- 
ment proposed by the committee accepting the payment in cash of 
the principal of  the government  debt in full satisfaction  of  claims 
against the com~any.~  Since Congress had  earlier  refused  a pro- 
position to pay off  the prior liens in full on condition that the govern- 
ment debt be refunded  at 2  per cent,'  it was felt that nothing but 
cash payment  of  principal and interest would  be acceptablc  and 
this the committee refused to undertake.  On March 8 the announce- 
ment  was  made  that the reorganization  committee of  the Union 
For a summary  of the foreclosure suit pending in  1895 see the Report of  the 
Government Directors for that year. 
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Pacific road had abandoned its task and would return the securities 
deposited with it, and a few days later the actual disbandment took 
place.' 
Between March, 1895, and the following October little progress 
was made.  With the dissolution of  the general reorganization corn- 
mittee disappeared the one body capable of  formulating a compre- 
hensive scheme  and  of  securing its widespread  acceptance.  The 
committees which remained represented each some one or two mort- 
gages, and were thus confined too narrowly in their sympathies to 
command much confidence from bondholders as a whole.  Late in 
1895,  however,  new  interests undertook the reorganization of  the 
property, and another general committee was formed, comprising 
General Louis Fitzgerald ;  Marvin Hughitt, president of  the Chicago 
& Northwestern; Chauncey M. Depew, president of  the New York 
Central; Jacob  H.  Schiff  of  Kuhn,  Loeb  & Co.;  Oliver Ames, 
director of  the Union Pacific ; and T. Jefferson Coolidge, Jr., pre- 
sident of  the Old Colony Trust C~mpany.~  Tlris committee's plan 
of  action was noteworthy in three particulars.  Fist, it contemplated 
a foreclosure  sale.  This,  it  is  true,  was  but  resignation  to the 
inevitable, for foreclosure suits were  already under  way,  and  an 
attempt to check them  would  have had  scarcely a  possibility  of 
success.  Second, it  made no definite provision for the government 
debt.  A certain amount of  bonds and stock were reserved from the 
securities proposed to be issued for the purpose of  settling the gov- 
ernment claim, but the exact  method  in which that indebtedness 
should be treated was  left  for  future  arrangement.  Third, it did 
not  attempt to meet  the collateral trust notes of  1891,  which  con- 
stituted so large a portion of  the floating debt.  "The securities em- 
braced in these trusts,"  it declared, "  are largely those of  companies 
which have already, by orders of court made in the original general 
receivership, or in independent foreclosure proceedings, lost in part 
or in whole their character as parts of  what has been known as the 
Union' Pacific system.  Independent reorganization of  many of these 
properties  are pending.  The purposes which  brought  into exist- 
ence guarantees of  the obligations of  many of these auxiliary corn- 
panies have been  accomplished by  construction or otherwise, and 
*  Ry. Rev. 35: 153, 1895.  a  Chron. 61 :  663,  1895. 
will  not  exist,  upon  reorganization,  for  continued 
with  (them) upon the basis  of  any assumption of  their 
fixed charges." ' Thus, at the very outset, this new committee re- 
moved the three matters which had given its predecessors the most 
trouble.  The proposed foreclosure made it both  easier to get  as- 
sents to a plan and more difficult to block its operation; the post- 
ponement of the question of the government debt allowed the com- 
mittee to go ahead without waiting for Congress ;  and the refusal to 
provide for the collateral notes relieved it of  many difficulties, and 
threw the holders of these notes back upon the collateral which they 
had exacted as security. 
The plan of  the Fitzgerald Committee followed, for the rest, the 
general lines earlier laid down by the Brice Committee.  To retire 
all existing mortgage indebtedness it proposed to issue : 
First mortgage railway land grant so-year 4 per cent gold bonds  $~oo,ooo,ooo 
4 per  cent preferred stock  759000,000 
Common stock  61,000,000 
The reasoning  by  which these  sums were  arrived  at was as  fol- 
lows : 
The lowest  net earnings the Union Pacific Railway had ever re- 
corded had been those of  1894  h315,077 
The committee planned to issue $~oo,ooo,ooo  4 per cent so-year 
bonds, on which the interest would be  4,-,000 
This would  be  all  the  company would  have  to pay in any one 
year. 
The average  net earnings for the 10 years before 1894  had been  $7,563,669 
To  the $~oo,ooo,ooo  bonds the committee proposed to add $75,000,- 
ooo  preferred stock.  The annual dividend on this would  be  3,000,000 
Payment on bonds and preferred stock  together thus equalled the 
average earnings. 
Net earnings between 1885 and 1894 had gone in some years as 
high as  &1,-,000 
To the above bonds and stock the committee wished to add $61,- 
m,rn  common  stock, on  which  dividends might  be  paid  if  it 
ScCrned advisable. 
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New  common stock exchanged at par  for old; new  bonds and 
preferred stock exchanged for old bonds, with a residue which was 
to be  set off  against the government debt and to be used for cash 
requirements.  The cardinal  principle  of  the  reorganization was 
that no new 4 per cent bonds should be issued in exchange where the 
old mortgage did not  contribute the full value; or, to put  it  more 
accurately, that  no  securityholders were  to  be  given  the right  to 
claim a sum greater than their property could earn as judged from 
past experience.  At  the same time enough preferred stock was dis- 
tributed to give bondholders the same returns as before when the 
road should earn it.  A $15  assessment was levied upon stockholders. 
This was several times the quoted price of  the stock early in 1896, 
but was not more than the stock would probably soon sell for after 
reorganization.  A syndicate agreed to advance $~o,ooo,ooo  to $15,- 
ooo,ooo, for payment of  coupons as they fell due and for expenses, in 
return for which they received $~,OOO,OOO  in preferred stock quoted 
at 59,  or 19 per cent on a capital of  $15,ooo,ooo at current prices. 
In  addition the bankers who managed the syndicate received $1,000,- 
ooo in preferred stock; making a total expenditure of  $6,mo,ooo, a 
not exorbitant commission.  Besides the bonds and stock for strictly 
reorganization purposes, there was reserved to dispose of  equipment 
obligations, and for reorganization and corporate uses, $13,ooo,ooo 
in 4 per cent bonds and $7,ooo,mo in preferred stock.  Reorganiza- 
tion uses,  as defined by  Mr. Pierce, were those which might arise 
unprovided for and of  an extraordinary character, all of  which could 
not be foreseen.  Corporate uses were those which would be proper to 
the corporation thereafter, such, for instance, as the issue of  secur- 
ities in extension of  the property.' 
After all the securities of  the old corporation had been accounted 
for there  remained  $35,755,280  of  the iirst  mortgage bonds  and 
$20,864,000  of  preferred stock as a fund or resource for the settle- 
ment of  the government debt; or, in round numbers, an amount of 
4 per cent bonds equal to the principal of  that debt and an amount 
of preferred stock equal to the accrued interest.  Just  how this was 
to be used the committee did not pretend absolutely to say.  "We 
See testimony of  W. S. Pierce,  Senate  Commission,  1896, 54th Congress, lSt 
Session, Document 314. 
desire to meei any proposition of the Government," said Mr. Pierce, 
to suggest any proposition which, after investigation, we believe 
will meet  the approval of the Government within the limits of  the 
hancial  of  the property based upon this plan.  In other 
words, we  have made no sort of  a hard and fast rule."  In case the 
Government should prove  obstinate and  should  refuse  settlement 
on reasonable terms, it was the idea of  the committee that it would 
be  entitled on foreclosure to its share as a second mortgage bond- 
holder only, and that the property would  pass under the sale free 
from all liens, including that of  the United States.  "Our view upon 
that point,"  said Mr. Pierce,  "is that when the Government sub- 
ordinated its lien to that  of  the first mortgage bondholders, it did 
so deliberately and in terms effective for that purpose.  The Govern- 
ment  then  consented to all remedies that were  necessary  for  the 
protection of  this prior lien; and an indispensable element of  such 
priority would  be  the  right  of  foreclosure.  And  unless there was 
a concealed purpose on the part of  the Government, that  right  of 
effective  foreclosure was undoubtedly impliedly granted." ' 
Subsequent negotiations with the bondholders brought  a reduc- 
tion in the proposed issue of  mortgage bonds from $~oo,ooo,ooo  to 
$75,ooo,ooo,  affecting the  Kansas  Pacific  consols and  the  Union 
Pacific Sinking Fund 8s.  Thus the former were allotted 50 per cent 
in first mortgage 4s and  IIO  per cent in preferred stock, instead of 
80 per cent in 4s and 50 per cent in preferred as before ;  and the latter 
75  per  cent in 4s  and  IOO  per cent in preferred stock, instead of 
100 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.  This reduced the proposed 
charges $~,ooo,ooo,  and  proportionately strengthened the scheme. 
On the whole, the plan was a strong one.  It reduced fixed charges 
from over $~,OOO,OOO  to under $~,OOO,OOO,  with an eventual lower 
limit of $~,OOO,OOO,  and this amount such good authorities as Messrs. 
Mink and  Clark pronounced the road safely able to earn in spite 
of the reduction in its mileage.2 During the receivership, moreover, 
the system had become purged by the cancellation of  onerous con- 
tracts and the lopping off  of  unprofitable branches, and though some 
lines were lost which it was desirable to retain, the Union Pacific was 
not precluded from the repurchase of  these, and did in fact regain 
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the most important.  The bondholders were put in no worse psi- 
tion than before, for they could never  permanently get more than 
the earnings of  the road, and this the new distribution of  securities 
generally assured them.  The position of  the common stockholders 
was  improved, for whereas between  1883 and  1893 fixed  charges 
had only once fallen below  $7,3w,ooo, now  less than $~,ooo,~ 
were to be taken before their claims were heard, while both the gross 
and the net earnings of  the road promptly regained their old level. 
Finally, the general principle was sound, as has been emphasized 
several times before.  It gave to each class of  securities a claim to 
interest strictly proportional to the earning capacity of  the  road, 
and added to this a preferred stock on which no payment was to be 
made unless earned ;  whiie it provided for a liberal assessment upon 
stockholders, and  attempted  no funding of  the current  liabilities 
incurred during the past troubled years. 
The time limit  for deposits under the plm was originally set at 
December  31,  1895.  It was  then  extended to  January  IS,  1896, 
and later to January 29  of  that year.  By January 8 the reorganiza- 
tion committee was able to announce that it had secured majorities 
of  all of  the first mortgage bonds outstanding except an inconsider- 
able shortage in one class. This was followed, in spite of  some oppo- 
sition among London brokers, by  the deposit of  a majority of  the 
shares of  the company, and by the assent of  other securities.  In 
January, 1896, in  a  letter to the chairman  of  the House Commit- 
tee on Pacific Railways, Mr. Fitzgerald stated that his committee 
embraced a substantially single representation  of  all Union Pacific 
mortgage  bonds  in  circulation except  those  held  by  the  United 
States.' 
Foreclosure proceedings had been long under way.  In January, 
1897,  the ~overnment  agreed to join  in them in consideration of 
a guarantee of  a bid at least equal to the original amount of  govern- 
ment  bonds, less payments made by the company to the Govern- 
ment, with interest at 3+ per cent per ann~m.~  The guarantee was 
Chron. 62 :  187,  1896. 
Report of  Commissioner of  Railroads, 1897,  p. 8.  The Government's dealin@ 
with the reorganization committee followed upon  the  defeat  in  the  House  of  a 
renewed proposition for refunding the Government's loan. 
to be of cash, so that the Government's relations with the property 
would terminate  completely upon  confirmation  of  the  sale.  This 
was the first affirmative action which the Government had taken, 
and the reorganization committee accepted it, despairing of  better 
terms.  The guaranteed payment was  in part offset by  sinking-fund 
of $17,062,664, leaving a net amount to be  provided of  S28,- 
691,336.1 By  August, 1897, foreclosure of  the main line had been 
ordered by  the  courts in  all the states through  which  the  Union 
pxific  passed, both under the first and the government mortgages. 
Previous to this the plan of  reorganization had been declared oper- 
ative, and articles of  incorporation for the new company had  bwn 
fled; while the first instalment of  the assessment on the stock ITas 
called by  the  middle of  the month.  An  unexpected development 
now  occurred.  Although willing to join  in foreclosure proceedings, 
the Government  found  the  decrees of  foreclosure to some  extent 
unsatisfactory, and prepared  the papers for an appeal.  Objection 
was particularly made to the fact that the Omaha Bridge mortgage, 
amounting  to about $1,200,000,  was adjudged superior to the lien of 
the Government on that part of  the road between Omaha and Coun- 
cil Bluffs, and that the money and assets in the hands of  the receivers 
accruing from the operation of  the roads were  ordered to be sold 
instead of  being reserved to meet  a deficiency judgment  expected 
to be  obtained.  Learning  this,  the  reorganization con:mir  t ce  in- 
creased its guarantee by  over $~,OOO,OOO,  making  the  total guar- 
anteed  bid  $50,m,ooo instead of  $45,754,060.  "This  increase," 
said the Attorney-General, "removed the objections to the decrees 
so far as the money contents were concerned.  In all else the decrees 
were just  and satisfactory."  Even so, perhaps partly for political 
reasons, the Government was not ready to allow a sale, and later 
in  the year gave notice that it would apply for a postponement to 
December 15, in order to give Congress an opportunity to consider 
the matter.  The prospect of  renewed congressional agitation stim- 
ulated the reorganization committee to prompt action.  "The Com- 
mittee,"  it declared, "has reached the conclusion that the interests 
The guarantee  was provided  by a syndicate with the same personnel as that 
which had agreed to advance the money for reorganization expenses. 
Chon. 65: 730, 1897;  Report of  Commissioner of  Railroads, 1897, p. 9. 256  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
of  the securityholders represented  by  it  and of  the syndicate fur- 
nishing the funds to finance the reorganization demand reorganiza- 
tion without any further delay.  In this situation the committee con- 
templates . . .  to oppose any adjournment of  the sale of  the main 
line and to bid it in, if  need be, for the full amount of  the Govern- 
ment's claim, the additional sum involved in this being $8,ooo,ooo.~  1 
Postponement of  the sale of the Kansas Pacific was to be allowed, 
the committee meanwhile making up its mind on what terms to bid 
it in.  This proposition was telegraphed to Washington and quickly 
accepted.  It constituted  a complete surrender on the part  of  the 
committee,  so far as the Union Pacific proper was concerned.  In- 
stead of being refunded, the government debt was paid off  in cash ; 
instead of compromising for the principal alone, both principal and 
interest were paid in full.  The result  reflects credit on the sharp- 
ness of the Attorney-General, but the metbod was scarcely worthy 
of the Government which he represented. 
November  1st and ad,  1897, the property was sold under fore- 
closure of the government  and first mortgage liens, and the prices 
were : 
For the Union Pacific main line,  $40,253,605 
For bonds in the government sinking fund,  13,645,250 
$53,898,855 
In addition the Government received in cash in the sinking fund  - 
as of  November b st,  4,549,368 
$58,448,224 
In  addition to this sum the committee was obliged, under its agree- 
ment with the Government, to  buy  up  the first mortgage, amount- 
ing to  $27,637,436 
The total of  the first and second mortgages was  67,891,041 
Adding  13,645,250~ 
Of  securities purchased for cash, the total payment aggregated over  81,500,ooo 
On February 12,  1898, the reorganization committee  bought  in 
the Kansas Pacific, guaranteeing for the Government a bid at the 
sale which should equal the principal of  the government debt, i.  e. 
$6,303,000.9  Other minor  roads were  also bought  back  on fore- 
'  Ry. Age,  24: 897, 1897. 
1 Report of  the Commissioner of  Railroads, 1898, p. 9. 
"he  entire indebtedness of  the Kansas Pacific to the Government was $12,8919- 
900.  After the sale the  Government brought suit for the balance, but received  a 
decree for $821,898 only. 
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closure sales, and from time to time as the mortgage committee sold 
the collateral back of  the trust notes of 1891 the Union Pacific Rail- 
road  Company  bought  portions of  the same.  In 1899 the Union 
pacific stock was increased $27,460,000,  and the new issue was ex- 
,-hanged  share for share with Oregon Short Line stock, thus regain- 
ing control of  that important property.  Later the same year a further 
increase was effected to retire $I~,OOO,OOO Oregon Short Line bonds 
and $1 ~,ooo,ooo  Oregon Railway & Navigation Company preferred 
stock.  The net  result  was to avoid  any considerable dismember- 
ment of  the system.  Whereas 7673.59 miles had been reported for 
1892,  5399.01  were reported for  1899.  The main  line from Port- 
land, Oregon, to Omaha and  insa as City, via Ogden, Cheyenne, 
and  Denver, was kept  intact, the principal losses being of  branch 
lines in  Nebraska and Kansas.' 
A detailed account of the later financial operations of  the Union 
Pacific divides the company's recent development into three parts :  a 
First, the regaining of  control of  the principal auxiliary systems and 
branch lines which the receivership had temporarily separated from 
the parent  stem; second, the purchase of  large  amounts of  stock 
in the Southern Pacific and the attempt to share in the control of 
the  Burlington,  which  latter  involved  the purchase  of  Northern 
Pacific stock  and the formation of  the Northern  Securities  Com- 
pany; and third, the sale of the stock acquired in the fight over the 
Burlington, and the subsequent purchase of  Alton, Atchison,  Bal- 
timore  & Ohio, Illinois Central, and other stocks.  The repurchase 
of auxiliary lines has just  been alluded to; and into the history of 
the Burlington struggle there is no need to go at length. 
On June 30,  1900,  the Union  Pacific, Oregon  Short Line, and 
'  Cf. H. R. Meyer, The Settlements with the Pacific Railways, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, July, 1899.  The receivership records have been published in fourteen 
volumes. 
At  its  final  meeting in  1898 the  reorganization  committee  nominated  a proxy 
committee  of  five  members  "to  permanently  represent,  at the  annual and other 
meetings, such holders of common and preferred stock as (should) desire to entrust 
their proxies to the said committee for the purpose of  maintaining  the management 
and  general policies  inaugurated by the reorganization committee."  This took the 
place of a compulsory voting trust. 
'  Thomas Warner Mitchell, The Growth of  the Union Pacific and its  Financial 
Operations, Quarterly Journal of  Economics, vol. 21,  p. 569,  1907. 258  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  UNION PACIFIC  259 
Oregon Railroad  & Navigation Companies operated 5427.89 miles 
of line.  The  system stretched from Kansas City and Council Bluffs 
to Ogden, and reached the Pacific coast in the Northwest at Portland. 
It had no rails of  its own in California, but was dependent on the 
Southern Pacific tracks for connections both at Ogden and at Port- 
land.  The Southern Pacific extended from New  Orleans through 
Texas, New  Mexico, and Arizona to California, and thence up the 
coast to Sacramento.  At  Sacramento it divided ;  one line continued 
north to  Portland,  and  one turned  northeast  through  Nevada to 
Ogden,  Utah.  Now,  in  1901  it  so  happened  that  the  Southern 
Pacific was for sale.  Crocker, ~tanforh,  and Huntington, who had 
controlled it, were dead, and their successors were not eager to re- 
tain the railroad as an independent line.  Mr. Harriman seized the 
opportunity. In 1901 he bought for the Union Pacific 750,000 shares 
out  of  a little less than  2,000,000,  and the following year  he  in- 
creased his holdings to 900,000.  The Union Pacific linanced the 
purchase by the issue of  collateral bonds.  The acquisition was of 
vast importance.  Not only did it afford a direct connection between 
Ogden and the coast, but it eliminated one of  the Union Pacific's 
four great competitors in transcontinental business, and made Mr. 
Harriman the dominant figure in the Southwest. 
North of  the Ogden-San Francisco line the conditions were less 
satisfactory.  The Great Northern and the Northern Pacific were 
here supreme, and in 1901 were negotiating for the purchase of  the 
Burlington to give them an entrance into Chicago.  Mr. Harriman 
asked for a share in this purchase but was refused.  He thereupon 
began to buy Northern Pacific stock in the endeavor to secure by 
this a half control in the more eastern road.  It  was the struggle which 
then ensued between Mr. Harriman and Mr. Hill which caused the 
stock exchange panic of  May, 1901, and which resulted in the forma- 
tion of  the Northern Securities Company, in which Mr. Harriman 
was allotted a large though not a controlling interest.  On the break- 
up of  the Northern Securities Company the Union Pacific received 
back some $25,ooo,poo in Great Northern and $32,000,000 in North- 
ern  Pacific  shares,'  worth  at  market  prices  about $~oo,ooo,ooo.~ 
Besides $824,910 in Northern Securities stubs. 
'  See B.  H. Meyer,  A History of  the  Northern Securities Case,  Bulletin of  the 
University of  Wisconsin, July,  1906. 
This Northern Securities episode had little effect on traffic condi- 
tions in the Northwest, but it did profoundly influence the financial 
policy of the Union Pacific during the following years.'  The dissolu- 
tion of the Northern Securities Company gave to the Union Pacific 
Great Northern and Northern Pacific shares, which were valuable as 
investments only.  And  as investments these stocks soon became 
undesirable.  We have said that the combined value of  the securities 
transferred approximated $IOO,~,OOO  at the time of  transfer.  From 
that time on the stocks appreciated in value till they were worth from 
$145,ooo,ooo to $15o,ooo,ooo,  and yielded  an income of  less than 
3 per cent on their market price.  It was good policy to sell them, and 
$118,00o,ooo  worth  were  accordingly  disposed  of,  leaving some 
$3o,ooo,ooo worth still in the hands of  the ~ompany.~  What should 
be done with the enormous resources thus secured?  Some of  the cash 
was used to buy Chicago & Alton stock, -  some of  it was put out in 
demand loans.  But beginning with June 30,1906, the Union Pacific 
and Oregon Short Line began investment in stocks of  other com- 
panies on a great scale.  $41,442,028  were put into Illinois Central 
stock; $10,39g,ooo into Atchison preferred ; $4~,466,~60  into Balti- 
more  & Ohio, common and preferred;  $19,634,280 into New York 
Central; and lesser amounts into Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul, 
Chicago  & Northwestern, St. Joseph  & Grand Island, and other 
'  As  in  the  Southern Pacific  purchase  the  acquisition  of  the Northern  Paciik 
stock  was  financed  mainly  by  the  issue  of  convertible  collateral  bonds.  Some 
$3o,ooo,ooo  besides, it is supposed,  were borrowed from the banks. 
Testimony of  Mr.  Harriman  before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission. 
It is true that the Northern Securities stock held  by the Union Pacific system had 
been pledged as security for an equal amount of  Oregon Short Line 4 per cent and 
Participating  4s, and that when these bonds were refunded  there was pledged for 
the new issue whatever  the Union Pacific interests should receive in exchange for 
their Northern Securities holdings, and any other shares or bonds at not exceeding 
80 per cent of  their appraised value.  But the purchase of  the Southern Pacific and 
of  the Northern  Pacific  stocks had  been  previously financed by an issue of  con- 
vertible collateral bonds for which other collateral  had been pledged.  From  ~goq 
on, the rising price of  Union Pacific stock made conversion  desirable  and rapidly 
released  the securities  back of  the original  issue.  These released  securities, with 
S18,000,000  Southern Pacific  preferred  stock  paid  to the  Union  Pacific in  1904 
(with 52,460,960 cash), proved  a  su5cient pledge for the Oregon Short Lime  re- 
funding bonds, and the  Great Northern  and Northern  Paci6c  stock  shares were 
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companies.  In all, $131,693,271 were invested during a little over 
seven months.'  This has been the characteristic feature of recent 
Union Pacific hance.  The large purchases of stock in other roads 
have assured it favorable connections in the Illinois Central and in 
the Baltimore & Ohio, and have modified the severity of  competition 
with  the  Atchis~n.~  Including  the  Southern  Pacific,  its  system 
reaches from Chicago to Podand, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and 
the Gulf, and has an influential voice in two of  the principal roads 
connecting Chicago with the Atlantic seaboard.  At  the same time, 
the extensive investment of  Union Pacific funds to secure gains uncon- 
nected with increase of  traffic over its lines has provoked merited 
criticism.  A railroad is, after all, a machine for transporting pas- 
sengers and goods, not an engine of speculation ; and both from the 
point of  view of  the community which it serves and of  the investors 
who hold its securities it is advisable that its income should depend 
on the business which its managers conduct and are responsible for, 
and not on circumstances over which they have no control.  So far as 
Union Pacific purchases have been designed to open connections or 
to modify competition they have had a sound foundation.  So far as 
they have been  financial operations only they are not to be com- 
mended.= 
From  the  point  of  view  of  operation the success of  the Union 
Pacific has been  remarkable.  Like most  roads it came out of  its 
receivership in better shape than it went in, but with much lacking 
for the efficient and economical handling of  its traffic.  Since 1900 
over  $52,wo,wo  have  been  invested  in  betterments  and  in  new 
equipment,  of  which  some  $~g,ooo,ooo have  been  withdrawn 
directly from income.  Maintenance charges have also been liberal, 
particularly in the last  few years.  Grades and  curves have been 
eliminated, steel bridges have been put in place of  wooden, new and 
Annual  Report,  1907.  See  also Interstate  Commerce Commission, Report  in 
the  Matter of  Consolidations  and  Combinations  of  Carriers,  Relations  between 
such  Carriers, and  Community  of  Interests  therein,  their  Rates,  Facilities,  and 
Practices,  12 I. C.  C.  Rep. 319. 
The Union Pacific acquired a half  interest in the San Pedro, Los Angeles 
Salt Lake Railroad Company in  1904. 
Recent reports suggest that a holding company is to be formed, which will take 
over the securities now owned by the Union Pacific Railroad. 
heavier rails have been laid, ballast supplied, and equipment greatly 
enlarged and improved.  Whereas  in  1896  13 per  cent  of  all the 
Union Pacific system was laid with iron rails, and only 24 per cent 
had rails weighing more than sixty pounds to the yard, in 1907 there 
was  no iron reported, and only 33 per cent of  the track did not have 
rails  weighing more  than  sixty pounds to the yard.  The average 
of  freight cars was a shade over twenty tons in February, 
,g98;  it was over thirty-four tons on June 30,  1907, and the new 
freight cars added during the last-named year averaged a capacity 
of sixty-seven tons apiece. 
In consequence of  these improvements the Union Pacific has been 
able to handle a very greatly increased business.  Between 1899 and 
1907 the tons of  revenue freight carried one  mile  increased from 
r13g3,207,990  to 5,704,061,535, and the passengers carried one mile 
from 167,117,388 to 680,278,509.  This fourfold increase has been 
packed away in the larger cars, which in turn have been combined 
into longer trains.  Twenty-one tons are now  put into the average 
freight car, and thirty-two freight cars form an average train.  In 
1899 the average car held twelve tons and twenty-nine of  them car- 
ried a train-load.  Sixty-six is the average number of  passengers per 
train to-day; thirty-three was the average number in 1899.  And so 
the increased business has not occasioned a proportionate growth in 
cost.  It takes but little more than three times the outlay in conduct- 
ing transportation to do over four times the work, and other railroad 
expenses have varied even less. 
This increased business and less rapidly increasing cost has meant, 
finally, an increase in profits, and explains how it has been possible 
in seven years to take $~~,ooo,ooo  from income for improvements 
besides  liberally  maintaining the property.  The Union Pacific  is 
Prosperous as it  never  has  been  before.  In 1907  its  total  fixed 
charges, in round numbers, were $8,6oo,ooo, and its net income was 
$45,00o,ooo.  Of  this income $23,500,000 were paid out in dividends, 
$1~960,000  appropriated for betterments, additions, and new equip- 
ment, and $10,7oo,ooo carried to surplus.  There were $6g,o~,ooo 
in bills payable, incurred since 1906, in part for improvements and 
the like, but largely in the course of  the company's financial experi- 
ments; but $75,ooo,ooo in convertible bonds have been authorized to 262  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
cover them.  Stock and bond issues are much larger than in 189~  and 
will  be  larger still when  the new  convertibles are all sold.  Fined 
charges, however, are less than $~,OOO,OOO  greater than they were 
eight years ago.  In order to imperil bond interest net earnings will 
have to decline by 81 per cent; and even were this to happen it  is 
probable that some margin could be retained by  a decrease in the 
generous sums now being spent for the maintenance of  equipment 
and of  road.' 
Dividends upon Union Pacific Railroad Stock: 
Per Cent 
1898  1899  IF  1901-4  1905  1906  1907 
Common  34  - 4 
44  8  10  Preferred  13  33  4  4  4  4  4 
CHAPTER VIII 
NORTHERN  PACIFIC 
AC~  of  1864 -  Failure and  reorganization -  Extension into the  Northwest -  Vil- 
lard and the  Oregon & Transcontinental  Company -Lack  of  prosperity -Re- 
funding mortgage -  Lease of  Wisconsin Central -  Financial difficulties -  Receiv- 
ership -  Legal complications -  Reorganization -  Subsequent history. 
THE  Northern  Pacific Railroad  Company was chartered  in  1864, 
and failed in  1875 and in  1893.  Besides these bankruptcies it  has 
been in frequent financial difficulty, and on the whole furnishes an 
instructive chapter in a study of  reorganizations. 
The Act of  July 2, 1864,' empowered the Northern Pacific corpor- 
ation to build a line from some point on Lake Superior, in the state 
of Minnesota or Wisconsin,  westerly on  a line north  of  the 45th 
degree of  latitude, to a point near or at Portland,  Oregon.  It pro- 
vided  for organization on subscription for 20,000 shares out of  an 
authorized capital of ~,ooo,ooo  shares with 10 per cent paid in, and 
granted forty alternate sections  of  public land  per  mile  through- 
out  the  territories, and  twenty  alternate sections throughout  the 
states across which the road should pass.  This liberal donation was 
influenced in  part by the fact that the value of  lands in the North- 
west was then low, and in part by the refusal of  any money subsidy. 
The Government was to issue patents on the completion of  stretches 
of  twenty-five miles  built  in "good, substantial, and workmanlike 
manner," and was to survey lands for forty miles on each side of the 
line  as fast as the construction of  the road should require.  The 
company was to begin work within two years and was to finish the 
line within twelve years, and it was provided that in case of  non- 
fulfilment of  these conditions Congress could do "any and  all acts 
and  things  which  (might)  be  needful and necessary  to insure  a 
speedy completion of the road."  A section which gave trouble till 
'  Entitled  An  Act  granting Lands to aid in the  Construction of  a Railroad and 
Telegraph  Line  from  Lake  Superior to  Puget's Sound, on  the  Pacific Coast, by 
the Northern Route.  Statutes at Large, 38th  Congress, 1st Session, chap. 217. 
'  To make possible the selection of  indemnity lands. 264  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  NORTHERN  PACIFIC  26~ 
amended forbade the issue of mortgage or construction bonds, or the 
making of  a mortgage or lien upon the road in any way except by the 
consent of  the Congress of the United States.  The company was to 
obtain the consent of the legislature of  any state before commencing 
construction through it, and finally the Act  was to be  void  unless 
bona fide subscriptions of $z,ooo,ooo to the stock, with 10 per cent 
paid in, should be obtained within two years. 
A project so daring as the construction of  a railroad through the 
unsettled  Northwest  not  unnaturally  found  it  difficult to obtain 
financial support.  The capitalists who at first undertook the work 
were unable to carry it through.'  In 1869 and 1870 two developments 
occurred:  the  prohibition  of  bond  issub contained in  the  act  of 
incorporation was removed, and Jay Cooke became interested in the 
building of  the road.  Both facts were of  far-reaching importance. 
Mr. Cooke was one of  the foremost financiers of  his time.  He was 
a man of  great personal energy, large fortune, and extensive personal 
following, and was admirably adapted to the promotion of  the work 
in hand.  The removal of  the prohibition upon bond issues made it 
possible,  with his support, to secure some funds from a mortgage 
issue and to allow construction to begin. 
In 1869 Jay Cooke  & Company were appointed financial agents 
of  the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.  On July I, 1870, issues 
of  $~oo,ooo,ooo  in 7.3 per cent first mortgage bonds and $roo,ooo,ooo 
in  stock were authorized.  The bonds were  to be  sold to the agents 
at 88 ;  the bulk of  the stock was to go to the agents as bonus or to 
the syndicate interested with them.  The same parties agreed to raise 
$~,OOO,OOO  in cash within thirty days, in order to commence the 
building of  the line.  This made a fair start possible, and by  May, 
1873, over five hundred miles had  been completed.  The situation 
was nevertheless a difficult one because of  the reluctance of  capitalists 
to invest in the new first mortgage bonds.  In 1870 extensive plans 
were made to interest the European markets, but all in vain because 
of the outbreak of  the Franco-Prussian war.  In America a similar 
campaign was not much more su~cessful.~  The high price asked for 
Josiah Perham was the prime mover at first and after him certain Boston capi- 
talists were prominent. 
"Ellis  Paxsom Oberholtzer, Life of  Jay Cooke.  Philadelphia, George W. Jacobs 
& Company, 1907. See also Smalley, History of  the Northern Pacific. 
the bonds,' the uncertain nature of  the enterprise, the not altogether 
ill-founded rumors of extravagance and mismanagement of  the con- 
struction actually under way,  the presidential election of  1872, all 
hindered rapid sales.  Failure to sell bonds meant financial stringency 
for the Northern  Pacific.  Operating expenses were high, and the 
interest on outstanding indebtedness was considerable.  On the other 
hand,  earnings were  very  small.  No through  business  could  be 
secured till the completion of  the road at least to the Snake River, 
and local traffic was yet to be developed.  As a result, the company 
borrowed  more and more  from Jay  Cooke  & Co.,  and that  firm 
soon found itself heavily involved. 
On September 18, 1873, Jay  Cooke & Co. closed its doors.  The 
shock to the railroad was great.  The quotations of  first mortgage 
bonds dropped from par to about 11.  For a time the company strug- 
gled  on.  In December,  1873,  a  funding of  interest  was  carried 
through, whereby all coupons up to md including that of  January 
I, 1875, were  made exchangeable for  five-year 7 per cent coupon 
bonds, convertible into the company's first mortgage bonds at par, 
and into the company's lands at  25  per cent  off  from the regular 
 price^.^  In April, 1874, settlement was made with Jay Cooke & Co. 
by the  transfer  of  the  railroad's  first  mortgage bonds and other 
securities.'  These  measures  offered only temporary relief.  Busi- 
ness  was  at  a standstill throughout  the  country.  Gross earnings 
for the year  ending June  30,  1874, were reported to be $988,131, 
while  $30,780,904  7.3 per cent bonds  had  been  issued, and the 
floating debt stood at $777,335.  The Northern Pacific was not only 
unable to meet its fixed  charges, but was in default  by  a  margin 
which  it was hopeless to attempt  to overcome.  The original pro- 
ject  had completely failed; and the only means of  continuing the 
enterprise seemed to lie in a government guarantee of  the railroad's 
bonds, or in a reorganization so drastic as to sweep away fixed charges 
and to give the company a fresh start. 
In May, 1874, the first plan was tried.  A bill was introduced into 
Congress providing that the company should be authorized to issue 
notes were put on the market at par, though sold to the syndicate at 88. 
Chn.  18:  16,  1874. 
'  R.  R.  Gaz. 6:  135,  1874. The indebtedness  of  the  Northern  Pacific  to  Jay 
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its 5  per cent thirty-year bonds for 9650,000 per mile on its entire 
line, complete and incomplete, and that on completed sections of 
the road twenty miles long it should deliver its 7.3  per cent bonds at 
a rate of  $5o,ooo per mile, receiving in return $40,m of  the 5 per 
cent bonds with interest but not principal guaranteed by the Govern- 
ment,  which  should hold  the difference of  $10,-  as a  reserve 
fund.  Holders of  outstanding 7.3  per cent bonds were to have the 
right of  exchanging their bonds for new 5s on the same terms.'  In 
return for the guarantee the railroad was to surrender to the United 
States Government its entire land grant, to be sold under the direc- 
tion of  the Secretary of  the Interior, and to tnrn over semi-annually 
its entire net earnings.  The Government was to have the right in 
addition to sell the Northern Pacific 5 per cent bonds whenever the 
combined yield  of  the land grant and the net earnings should not 
equal the interest guaranteed.  Finally, Congress was to have power 
to fix fares, etc.,  provided that the government control did  not im- 
pair the security of  the bonds.  In brief, the capitalists who had 
involved themselves in Northern Pacific affairs were ready to sur- 
render their whole enterprise to the Government if  the Government 
would carry it through.  But Congress was so little willing to take 
the responsibility that the bill never came to a vote. 
Early in 1875, while the application for government aid was still 
pending, the directors called a general meeting of  the bondholders. 
When it assembled President Cass made a statement of  the &an- 
cial condition of  the company.  The outstanding debt, said he, was 
$30,441,300.  Of  the 7.3 per cent bonds issued as collateral for float- 
ing debt, mostly in 1875, there had been pledged $1,780,300 at the 
rate of  from twenty-five to forty cents on the dollar.  The interest 
on land warrants,  bonds,  and scrip given in funding of  coupons 
amounted to $732,632.  The floating debt was $634,758,  of  which 
$15o,m were arranged for settlement withi  a few days ;  and $250,- 
ooo were due to directors for money advanced to finish the Pacific 
section after the failure of  Jay Cooke  & Co. in 1873.  The total net 
earnings to date had been $124,056, and the capital stock was $25,- 
497,600.  By this report it seems that some slight advance had been 
R. R. Gaz.  6: 496,1874; Congressional Record, qjd Congress, 1st Session, &Y 
11, 1874, PP. 3749, 3773. 
made since June,  1874, but in no measure which afforded any hope 
for the continued solvency of  the company.  Most instructive were 
the figures for the floating debt, which  in less than five years had 
increased to a sum more than five times the net earnings for the 
whole period.  After  some discussion  the  bondholders elected  a 
committee of  seven to report at a future meeting.  The committee 
recommended a receivership, the directors did  not  oppose, and on 
April 16 General Cass was appointed receiver, resigning his position 
as president to accept. 
By this time hope of  government aid had vanished, and no time 
was lost in  accepting the alternative of  a drastic reorganization. 
Late in  May the bondholders'  committee reported a  plan  which 
was  considered by  the bondholders at subsequent meetings.  The 
principle was simple, and the means sufficient.  The company had 
earned  .4  per  cent  on its funded  debt: -  ergo, the  funded  debt 
was  to be  swept  away.  Fixed  charges  had been  heavy: -  they 
were now to be completely removed.  Scarcely less would have met 
the needs of  the situation, but the merit in refusing to tinker and 
experiment  was  considerable.  In more  extended  shape the  plan 
was as follows: Reorganization was to be carried out through fore- 
closure, and a committee of  six was appointed to take charge.  All 
outstanding bonds were to be  replaced by  preferred stock, and all 
common stock was to be exchanged for new common stock.  Float- 
ing debt was to be  likewise exchanged for preferred  stock, which 
was to be issued to the amount  of  $51,ooo,ooo  for the following 
purposes : 
(a) To  retire the principal of  the outstanding 7.3 per cent bonds, 
and the interest to and including July I, 1878, at 8 per cent, currency. 
(b) To retire the land warrant  bonds, principal and interest, to 
and including January I, 1875. 
(c)  To  paythe floating debt not protected under the existingorders 
of the court. 
(d)  Generally for the purpose of carrying the plan into effect. 
Preferred stock was to have all rights and privileges of  common 
stock, with the right to vote, and was to be  entitled to 8 per cent 
out of  net earnings before anything should be paid on the common, 
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clared on both  preferred and common.'  It was to be convertible 
at par  into any lands belonging to the company, or thereafter to 
belong to it, east of  the Missouri River in the state of  Minnesota 
or the territory of  Dakota, until default should occur in some of  the 
provisions of  the new  first  mortgage  bonds, and the  proceeds of 
all sales of  such land were  to be used  in extinguishing the stock. 
Common stock was to be issued to the amount of $qg,ooo,ooo, and 
was to  be  given to old  stockholders share for share.  To provide 
the means to complete and to equip the road there were to be issued 
first mortgage bonds not to exceed an average of  $25,ooo per mile 
of  road,  actually completed and accepted by  the President of  the 
United States, to be secured by a first  mortgage on the whole  line 
of  road, constructed  or  to  be  constructed, and on the equipment, 
property, lands, and franchises, including the franchise to be a cor- 
poration, subject only to the right  of  the holders of  the preferred 
stock to convert their  stock into lands.  The principal was to be 
payable in forty years, and the interest and sinking fund might be 
made payable in gold.  No other bonds were  to be  issued except 
on a vote of  at least three-quarters of  the preferred stock at a meet- 
ing specially held in reference thereto on thirty days' notice.  Sub- 
sequently it was resolved, and the resolution incorporated in the plan, 
that the holders of  the common stock should have no voting power 
until on and after July I, 1878, and that no assessment should be 
levied upon bondholders; but that the cost of  purchase and the ex- 
pense of  foreclosure and other proceedings should be  paid  out of 
the assets and the income of  the ~ompany.~ 
Applying to this plan the same tests to which all other plans have 
been subjected, it appears that from the point of  view of  the corpor- 
ation it left little to be desired.  The general depression throughout 
Net earnings "shall be  construed to mean such surplus earnings of the said rail- 
road as shall remain, after paying all expenses of  operating the said railroad and 
carrying on all its business, including all taxes and assessments and payments on in- 
cumbrances, and including the interest and sinking fund on the first mortgage bonds, 
the expenses of  repairing or replacing the  said railroad, its appurtenances, equip- 
ments, or other property, so  that the same shall be  in high condition, and of  pro- 
viding such additional equipment as the said Company shall deem necessaryfor tbe 
business of  said railroad."  Annual Report,  1876,  p. 45. 
a  Annual Report,  1876;  Chron.  20:  522, 1875;  Ibid. 21:  15,  1875. 
the country and the  needs  of  the  Northern  Pacific  Railroad in 
particular were  so great  that  for once, in  the conflict  of  interests 
between the bondholders and the corporation, the latter had all the 
dvantage on  its side.  As  a matter  of  fact, had  any attempt been 
made in this case, as so frequently in others of  recent years, to unite 
in the exchange of  new securities for old a bond and a stock as an 
equivalent for an outstanding bond, instead of  giving stock only, the 
rate of interest on the new bond would necessarily have been  so low 
as to deprive the combination of  its attractiveness.  That resource 
was not had to an income bond was perhaps due to the absence of 
English investment in the road.  The wise course was the one pur- 
sued: -namely,  to retire bonds with  a fixed  lien on earnings by 
stock which  represented  ownership in  the enterprise,  and  which 
could claim dividends only when earned.  The floating debt was not 
retired by an assessment but by new securities. This again, all things 
considered, was wise.  The existing stock represented so little actual 
investment in the property that holders would  doubtless have re- 
fused to pay an assessment, and would have surrendered their cer- 
tificates instead; while it would have been both difficult to collect 
a.  assessment on the depreciated bonds, and hard to convince bond- 
holders of  the justice of  a demand for such a contribution, so long 
as the  stockholders were  let  off  unscathed.  On the  other  hand, 
whether or  not  an assessment would  have yielded  cash, the issue 
of  stock for floating debt did not increase the fixed charges of  the 
road,  and  was  not,  therefore,  fundamentally  unsound.  Liberal 
provision was made for future capital requirements, and the only 
provision to which exception could have been taken was the limita- 
tion of bond issues to the moderate figure of  $25,000 per mile except 
with  the  consent of  three-quarters  of  the preferred stockholders. 
On the whole, the plan put the company fairly on its feet, presented 
it with all the work which had been accomplished, and bade it  at- 
tempt again the project in which its failure had previously been so 
complete.  The danger of  future bankruptcy  lay in this fact only: 
that a large section of  the road was yet uncompleted, and through 
business was non-existent ;  that the Northwest was still unsettled, 
and the local business was small; in short, that so much was yet to 
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possessed, might fail again for the same reasons which had led it into 
bankruptcy before. 
The plan was first reported on May 20,'  and was laid before the 
bondholders on the 30th of  June.  There was some protest that it 
proposed giving away the property of the bondholders, and the ad- 
ditional sections before mentioned, concerning the expenses of the 
reorganization  and  the  voting  power  of  the common  stock were 
added.  By  August  nearly  two-thirds of  the bondholders had  as- 
~ented.~  By May a decree of sale had been obtained, which was modi- 
fied  in August  so as to give  bondholders priority over  claims of 
directors for advances made;  and  on  August  12  all the property 
of  the company, except the  patented and certified lands,3 with all 
its rights, liberties, and franchises, was  sold at public auction and 
bought in by a purchasing committee for $100,000.~ No upset price 
was set by the Court ;  and it was surmised that the bid was purposely 
made low  in  order to force non-assenting bondholders to accept 
the new  stock.  The new  corporation was  organized  in  October, 
1875, by  the election of  Mr.  Chas.  B.  Wright of  Philadelphia as 
president, and with the denial of  a petition to set aside the sale the 
reorganization may be said to have been concluded. 
For fourteen years the company was now to be free from talk of 
further reorganization, and not until 1893 was there to be another 
receivership.  During this time the mileage, owned  or controlled, 
was to be made continuous from the Pacific coast to Chicago, and the 
Northern  Pacific was to mount high among American railroads in 
its extent and in the volume of  its business.  In 1875 the completed 
mileage was, roughly, 550 miles of  line; in 1893 it was 5431.92, and 
reached from Ashland, St.  Paul, and  Minneapolis on  the east  to 
Portland, Olympia, Tacoma, and Seattle on the west.  In  the former 
l  Annual Report,  1876. 
'  R. R. Gaz. 7: 330, 1875. Deposits of  bonds kept coming in, until on June 30, 
1879,  when  the  rights of  conversion into preferred stock expired, there  remained 
outstanding but $529,000. Annual Report, 1879. 
a  These lands were reserved for the time because some of  them had not been sur- 
veyed, and others which had been surveyed had not yet been deeded to the company 
owing to a dispute with the Interior Department over the payment of  the costs of 
the surveys.  R. R. Gaz. 7: 340,  1875. 
* R. R. Gaz.  7: 420,  1875. 
year the gross earnings were $414,722 and the net  $97,478; in the 
latter the totals were $23,920,109 and $11,416,283.  At the same time 
the fixed charges rose from nothing to $14,311,430, and the bonds 
to $133,545,500, besides $15,349,000 of  bonds of sub- 
sidiary companies guaranteed.  It appears, therefore, that the pro- 
moters were successful in raising funds for the completion of their 
enterprise,  although their road suffered at first from the thin popula- 
tion of the Northwest and the lack of  a through connection, and then 
from the competition of  other transcontinental lines. 
From the reorganization to 1879 very little was done in the ~7ay  of 
new construction, owing to the general financial depression.  Efforts 
to get the time allowed for completing the road extended failed, how- 
ever, and it became necessary to resume in order to keep Congress 
contented and to avoid a forfeiture of  the land grant.  In  1878 a small 
loan was placed, and the following year one for a somewhat larger 
amount ;  and with the funds so secured construction was vigorously 
pushed.  More liberal provision was made in 1880-1,  when successful 
negotiations  were  carried  through  for  the sale to a  syndicate of 
$4o,ooo,ooo  general mortgage 6 per  cent railroad  and land-grant 
bonds, to be issued at the rate of  $25,000  per mile of  finished road 
only, and to be secured by a mortgage on the entire property of  the 
company except the lands east of  the Missouri River, which were 
pledged for the redemption of  the preferred stock.  Provision was 
made for a reserve of  these bonds sufficient to retire the prior issues 
before  mentioned.'  Under  the  agreement  the  syndicate  took 
$~o,ooo,ooo  at once and had  an option of  taking $~o,ooo,ooo  per 
year in each of  the next three years.  The reported price was 90 for 
the first $~o,ooo,ooo  and 924 for the rest.  As a matter of  fact, the 
whole $~o,ooo,ooo  had been turned  over by  the end of  1883, and 
though  the  effect  on the company is  seen  in the  increase  in its 
bonded indebtedness from $3,881,884 in 1880 to $39,522,200 in 1883, 
and in its fixed charges from $334,482 to $2,478,939,  it was mean- 
while supplied with cash, and was enabled to advance toward the 
completion of  the 1000 miles of  line which remained unbuilt.  The 
financial embarrassment which was felt in 1882, in spite of  the syndi- 
cate contract, was due to an unforeseen cause.  According to the 
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statements of the company, it  was felt necessary, in order to avoid 
waste of  time and money, to build simultaneously from both ends of 
the line, and to start all the heavy work on the entire route at once. 
"This involved the shipment of millions of  dollars' worth of  track 
material, motive power, and rolling stock to the Pacific coast many 
months before their actual use on the road ;  and on the line east of the 
Rocky Mountains very large expenditure? of cash a long time before 
the works resulting from them could become parts of  finished road."  1 
The expenses were immediate ; -  the delivery of  bonds to the syndi- 
cate could take place by the terms of  the contract only after the com- 
pletion of  finished sections of  road, so that great stringency easily 
occurred between.  The trouble was only temporary, and was tided 
over with the help of  the syndicate and of  the Oregon & Transcon- 
tinental Company, a corporation of  which we  shall presently speak. 
As  the Northern  Pacific pushed into the Northwest, and at the 
same time vigorously occupied itself in filling the gap between the 
ends of  its main  line, it came into contact with a combination of 
Northwestern companies known.=  the Oregon Railway & Naviga- 
tion Company, of  which Henry Villard was at the time in control. 
This corporation owned a line of  steamboats running on the Wil- 
lamette and Columbia rivers in Oregon, together with an ocean line 
connecting Portland  and San Francisc0.l  In connection with  the 
water routes a narrow-gauge road had been built up the left bank of 
the Columbia River to a connection near  the mouth  of  the  Snake 
River with an existing narrow-gauge road to the town of  Walla Walla 
in  Southeastern  Washington;  and  this  narrow-gauge was  being 
widened, in 1880, to standard.  This was the very territory through 
which the Northern Pacific expected to make its connection with the 
Pacific coast ; and in 1880 it had passed the Rocky Mountains and 
had reached the confluence of  the Columbia and the Snake.  On Oc- 
tober 20,1880, a contract was signed between the Northern Pacific 
and the Oregon Railway & Navigation Companies whereby the for- 
mer, among other things, consented to a division of  territory with the 
Snake and the Columbia  rivers as the dividing-line ;  in return for which 
the latter agreed to completeastandard-gauge road within three years 
Annual Report, 1882, p.  13. 
Henry Villard,  Memoirs,  vol.  2,  pp.  272-94. 
from the western end of  the Northern Pacific, at the mouth of  the 
snake River, to Portland, and to grant the Northern Pacific the right, 
without the obligation, to run its own trains over it at a fixed charge 
per train mile.  It will be remembered that the Northern Pacific was 
not at this time too easy in its finances, so that it was quite willing to 
secure connection with the coast without outlay of  its own.  Soon after 
the execution of  the contract, however, the $4o,ooo,ooo loan earlier 
described was arranged for, and Mr. Villard  feared that  the road 
would build its own connection with Portland now  that the means 
seemed to be at hand.  To prevent it he conceived no less a plan than 
that of forming a new company which should purchase and hold a 
controlling interest in both  the Northern  Pacific and the Oregon 
Railway  & Navigation Campanies.'  This was done, and the new 
corporation, known as the Oregon  & Transcontinental Company, 
for a long time played a prominent part in Northern Pacific affairs ; 
aiding it in the construction of  the main and branch lines, and time 
and again advancing money when the road was in  strait^.^ 
The formation of  the Oregon  & Transcontinental Company put 
Mr. Villard in control of  the Northern Pacific.  Mr. Villard's finan- 
cial strength was due mainly to the support  of  German interests, 
notably the  Deutsche Bank of  Berlin,  of  which  he was from the 
eighties the representative ;  but his hold on the bank and on his fol- 
lowers was  partly due to his real ability and resourcefulness, and 
partly to his confident predictions of  results which sometimes he was 
but frequently was not able to attain.  One of  the company's first acts 
after his appearance was the declaration of  a scrip dividend upon the 
preferred stock.  The question had been raised in the course of  his 
fight for control, and he perhaps felt it incumbent upon himself  to 
show the sincerity of  his contentions; at any rate, the annual report 
for 1882 contained a statement that the surplus earnings since 1875 
had  been  used  for  construction  instead  of  being  distributed  as 
dividends, and that the sum of $4,667,490 was therefore properly 
due to the preferred stock.  On the strength  of  this the directors 
Memoirs, p.  297. 
For the manner in which the Northern Pacific directors attempted  to keep Vil-  . 
lard from obtaining control, see notices in the Chronicle for 1881. 
See  First Annual Report of  the  Oregon & Transcontinental  Company; R. R. 
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resolved that a dividend of  I 1.1 per cent be declared, for which there 
were  to be issued obligations of  the company bearing 6 per  cent 
interest, payable at the end of  five years, but redeemable after one 
year  at  the  pleasure  of  the company upon  thirty  days' notice, in 
amounts of  not less than 20 per cent to each holder.  The policy thus 
initiated was plainly non-conservative and unsound.  It may be true 
that as a general principle new construction should be paid for out of 
capital rather than out of  income account, yet this is subject to quali- 
fications ;  and the Northern Pacific had been and was in so precarious 
a condition that not a dollar of  its resources could safely have been 
alienated. The sequel came in 1883 when the annual report admitted 
that there had  been  an excess of  expenditures on account of  con- 
struction and equipment of  $7,986,508 over the cash receipts from 
the proceeds of  the $4o,ooo,ooo general mortgage bonds, sales of pre- 
ferred stock, and other sources ;  and when by October of  the same 
year the deficit had been increased to $9,459,921, and a circular from 
President Villard stated the additional cash requirements to amount 
to $~,~00,000.2 
Relief  had  to  be  sought  in  an increase of  indebtedness.  On 
October 6,  1883, the directors authorized a second  mortgage for 
$~O,OOO,OOO  upon  the  property,  subject  to the  consent  of  three- 
fourths of  the preferred stock, and in a circular explained that they 
had  accepted  a  proposition  of  Drexel, Morgan & Co.,  Rinslow, 
Lanier & Co.,  and  August  Belmont  &  Co.  to  take  $15,ooo,ooo 
of  the issue at 873, less 5 per cent commission in  bonds, with a six 
months' option to take  $3,ooo,ooo  more  on  the  same terms.  The 
stockholders assented, -they  could  do nothing else, -  a suit for 
an injunction was denied, and  the  syndicate exercised  its option. 
The result  was  an increase in bonds issued  from  $39,522,200  to 
$61,635,400, of  which the greater part was accounted for by the new 
mortgage. 
By August 22,1883, the gap in the Northern Pacific main line had 
been filled up, and on September 8 the formal opening occurred. The 
Annual Report, 1883. Arrangements had been made with the Oregon  &Trans- 
continental  Company for necessary advances in  order to avoid  the  accumulation 
of  a large floating debt. 
R. R. Gaz. 15:  716, 1883. For attempted explanation of  this deficit, see ~illard's 
statement to the stockholders in  1884, just after his retirement from the ~residency 
mileage in  operation was then 2365, of which 1952.5 was main line 
and 412.8 branches, and the rapid construction of  the last ~ooo  miles 
had done credit to most of  those concerned.  The total capitalization 
per  mile  was  $59,304,  of  which  less  than  one-third  represented 
bonds ;  and though the following year this percentage was increased, 
the  proportion of  mortgage to total issues remained considerably 
under one-half.  This showing was very favorable, and accounts for 
the success with which the Northern Pacific withstood the panic of 
1884.  With the completion of  its through line, moreover, earnings 
increased so materially as to cover the interest on the new bonds; 
and though the road was never to enjoy a monopoly of  transcontin- 
ental traffic, in February, 1883, it had concluded an agreement with 
the Union Pacific concerning  through rates and a division of  territory, 
and a period  of  prosperity was hoped for.  Meanwhile the Oregon 
& Transcontinental  Company had been  hard  hit by the decline in 
Northern Pacific stock, due to the publication of  the construction 
deficit.  The straits of  his company affected Mr. Villard ;  and in spite 
of  the relief  afforded by the Northern  Pacific second mortgage he 
"became  conscious that  neither himself  nor  the Oregon & Trans- 
continental Company could be saved." ' On January 4,  1884, the 
directors accepted his resignation, and soon after Robert Harris, then 
vice-president of  the Erie, was elected to fill his place.2 
The years immediately following the issue of  the second mortgage 
and the completion of  the  road  were  not  uneventful, although it 
is not  necessary to  describe  them  at  length.  The insolvency of 
the Oregon & Transcontinental, and  continued disputes between it 
and the Northern Pacific over an adjustment of  the two companies' 
financial relations, made some other means of  binding the Oregon 
Railway & Navigation with  the Northern  Pacific seem advisable, 
and a lease of  the former company to the latter was discussed.  In 
July, 1884, an arrangement was said to have been actually arrived 
at on the basis of  a guarantee by the Northern Pacific of  6 per cent 
On  the Navigation stock for two years, 7 per cent for three years, and 
Per cent in perpetuity; but the interest was very high, and an in- 
junction helped to prevent  a consummation at the time.  In 1885 
Memoirs, p. 315. 
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the idea of  a joint lease by the Northern Pacific and Union Pacific 
railroad  companies came  to the front.  The Oregon  Railway & 
Navigation was serving as the Northwestern outlet for both of  these 
roads,  and such a contract would have greatly simplified the corn- 
petitive situation, besides taking away from the Navigation Company 
the  power  to exact  an excessive  pro-rate  because  of  its double 
connection.'  During the next few  years  negotiations  were almost 
constantly in progress.  In 1887, however, the Navigation  Company 
was leased to the  Oregon  Short Line with  a Union Pacific guar- 
antee; and upon  the failure of  renewed  negotiations Mr. Villard, 
who  was  again  in  power,  sold  the  Oregon  & Transcontinental 
Company's  holdings of  Oregon Railway  & Navigation  Company 
stock at a "satisfactory"  price.  This consummation was  less un- 
favorable to the Northern Pacific because of  its completion of  a line 
of  its own to the Pacific coasL2 From now on the Oregon  & Trans- 
continental  Company existed only as a means of  obtaining finan- 
cial assistance for the Northern Pacific, and for making more easy 
the control of  that company's  stock.3 
While these operations were going on the Northern Pacific once 
more found it  advisable to increase its indebtedness, and added a 
third  mortgage  of  $12,ooo,ooo  to the first  and  second mortgages 
which already have been described.  Of  the issue $8,ooo,ooo were 
at  once taken  by a  syndicate, and the $~,ooo,ooo  remaining were 
early disposed of to the same parties.  The mortgage was said to be 
for the purpose of  completing new work and for paying the floating 
debt; it also assisted in the redemption and refunding of  the divi- 
dend scrip which had been issued to preferred stockholders in 1883 ; 
and the payment of  $3,073,321 of  this in cash, besides the extension 
of  $1,567,500  more, now  took  place.  The extended  scrip was  to 
be payable  in 1907, to bear  6 per cent, and to be  redeemable on 
'  In 1886 the  Oregon Railway & Navigation  was  obtaining  28  cents per  100 
pounds for its haul of  213 miles from Wallula Junction  to Portland, leaving to the 
Northern Pacific 28 cents for its haul of  1699 miles from St. Paul to Wallula.  R. R. 
Gaz. 18: 681,  1886, Report of  Vice-President and General Manager Oakes. 
a  For the negotiations  between the Union Pacific, the Oregon Railway  & Navi- 
gation, and the Northern Pacific from 1885 to 1889, see the financial papers of  that 
time and the reports of  the railroads concerned. 
In 1890 it v:~s reorganized  as the North American  Company. 
thirty days'  notice on any interest day on or after 1892; and up to 
January I, 1893, holders had the option of  converting it into third 
mortgage bonds.'  The third  mortgage  itself  required  the consent 
of three-quarters of  the preferred  stockholders, but this there seems 
to have been little difficulty in securing. 
The years 1886-9  saw also a considerable extension of  branch and 
other construction.  It was a time of  great general activity.  In an- 
other place the large additions to the Atchison  system have been 
described ;  at the same time the Union Pacific grew from a system of 
5825.6 miles in 1886 to one of  6996 in 1889, adding over 1100 miles; 
the Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific increased from 1384.2 to 1592.7 ; 
the Chicago, Burlington  & Quincy from 4036 to 5140.8; and the 
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba from 1509.4 to 3030.1.  Mean- 
while the Northern Pacific added 656.8 miles, or an average of  219 
miles a year.2  In the far Northwest  the great tunnel through the 
Cascade  Mountains was nearly completed  by  May,  1888; and by 
the end of  the following year a continuous line of  road was in opera- 
tion from Ashland, Wisconsin, to Portland,  Oregon, which was of 
particular service in view  of  the difficulties with the Oregon Rail- 
way  & Navigation Company, and was the reason for the willingness 
of  the Northern Pacific to surrender  control of  that  c~nnection.~ 
In 1888,  also,  negotiations  were  carried  on  with  the  Canadian 
Government  for  an extension  into Manitoba; and the same year 
the Cceur d'Alene Railroad  & Navigation Company was purchased, 
comprising a steamship and narrow-gauge  line in Northeastern Wash- 
ington which extended through the mining region of  the same name.4 
Generally speaking, the Northern Pacific retained its character as 
a single-track transcontinental route with but few branches.  Where 
it did expand  was on the east, where it reached  Duluth, Ashland, 
Superior, St, Paul, and'hIinneapolis, and on the west, where it joined 
Wallula,  Portland,  and  Tacoma.  The  principal  other  branches 
Annual Report, 1888, p. 8; Chron. 44: 752, 1887; Ibid. 44: 782, 1887. 
The preponderance of  west-bound  freight  prior to  1888 forced  the  Northern 
Pacific to carry grain east-bound at very low  rates in order to fill its empty cars. 
See Daniel Buchanan  vs. the Northern  Pacific Railroad Company, 5 I. C. C.  Rep. 7. 
For immigrant traffic into the Northwest see Ry. Rev. 28: 163, 1888. 
The capital  stock  of  the  Cceur d'Alene  Company was  $~,ooo,ooo,  and there 
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were the ones mentioned:  namely, those to Winnipeg, and  to the 
mining districts in Montana and Washington. 
In spite of  its moderation the  Northern  Pacific was  not  over- 
prosperous.  Its passenger earnings remained small, being scarcely 
greater in 1888 than they had been in 1884; and while its freight 
earnings increased from $7,867,367 in 1884 to $10,426,245 in 1888, 
and to $15,600,320 in 1889, this was so far offset by increased oper- 
ating expenses that the increase in net earnings from both passengers 
and freight was only $2,223,194.  Construction meanwhile caused an 
increase in funded indebtedness outstanding of  $I 5,202,000, to say 
nothing of  $20,981,000 of  branch-line bonds which the road by 1889 
had guaranteed ;  and the floating debt began to grow uncomfortably 
large.'  At  the same time, if  Mr. Villard is to be  believed, officials in 
charge of  the operation of  the road were eager for appropriations for 
the improvement of  the track, the replacement of  wooden by metal 
bridges, additional motive power and rolling stock, enlargement of 
terminal facilities, and the purchase and construction of  new lines. 
The truth was that the problem of  getting the road built had been 
more important  than that of  how it was to be built ;  so that  much 
work had been done in a hasty and imperfect manner which it was 
now advisable to renew. 
Since, then, there was need  for additional capital, while it  was 
unsafe to increase the fixed charges of  the road, the managers felt 
called upon to devise a scheme whereby these circumstances should 
both, at least in appearance, be met.  Their solution was the proposal 
of  a large refunding mortgage to retire as soon as possible existing 
mortgages, and to provide a balance which could be spent upon the 
line.  If, they argued, bondholders could be induced to accept new 
4 per cent or even 5 per cent bonds in exchange for their 6 per cent 
securities, the road would be free to issue new additional bonds until 
the margin of  charges so obtained should have been taken up.  The 
plan was worthy of  its ingenious promoter, Mr. Villard, and will be 
criticised in the proper place. 
Interest due and accmed, bills payable and accounts payable for the following 
years were: 
1884  $6,941,513  1886  $4,959,406  1888  $9,287,616 
1885  41748s235  1887  6,504,274  1889  7,858,261 
On September 19,1889, the managers issued a circular to the pre- 
ferred stockholders.  "In the opinion of the Directors, " said they, 
11 the time has come to make new financial provision on a liberal scale 
for the gowing needs of  the Company."  Then followed a statement 
of  gross  earnings.  "A further  corresponding  increase  may  be 
expected in the present fiscal year, which will bring the gross earn- 
ing~  up to $23,000,000 or $24,ooo,ooo. . . .  But the Company could 
not in the past, and will not be able hereafter, to take full advantage 
of  this  auspicious situation without  further  large  investments of 
capital.  Secondly. -  The prosperity of  the road attracts competi- 
tion. . . . The Company  must  be  prepared  to  build  additional 
feeders wherever and whenever the local developments warrant, and 
the  danger  of  hostile  occupancy  appears. . . .  Another  strong 
[motive] lies in the Company's ownership of  a large land grant, the 
benefits of  which cannot be fully realized without the promotion of 
settlements through the construction of  branch lines.  The Board is 
also of  opinion that the time has come to make such provision, that 
the Company may take advantage of its high credit to effect a reduc- 
tion of  fixed charges." ' 
It was  proposed to issue a $160,000,000 one hundred-year con- 
solidated mortgage, bearing interest not to exceed 5 per cent, to cover 
the entire Northern Pacific Railroad, together with its equipment, 
land grant, branch lines, and securities of  branch lines.  This was to 
be applied as follows : 
For the retirement of  $77,430,000 outstanding first, second, and 
third mortgage bonds  $75,000,000 
For the retirement of the existing $26,000,000 branch bonds  Z~,OOO,OOO 
For additional branches at a rate per mile not over $30,000  20,000,000 
For enlargement of terminals and stations, additional rolling stock, 
betterments  and  renewals,  and  other expenses  not  properly 
chargeable to operating expenses  20,000,000 
For premiums on bonds exchanged  10,000,000 
For general purposes  9,000,0001 
Only a portion of  these securities was, therefore, to be issued  at 
once.  The provision for enlargement of  terminals, etc., was likely 
to call  for early issues,  as might  a  portion  of  that  reserved  for 
'  Annual Report, 1889. 
Annual Report, 1889; Chron. 50: 279, gives text of  mortgage. RAILROAD  REORGANZZATZON 
new branches and for general purposes.  It was expected that a cer- 
tain  amount of  branch-line bonds could  be  retired  without  much 
delay.  On the whole, the bonds  immediately  put  forth  were not 
expected to exceed $15,ooo,ooo; though there was nothing in the plan 
to prevent  a  greater  issue.  The interest  rate was "not  to exceed 
5 per cent."  That this wording was deliberately adopted is shown by 
the terms of  the mortgage, which expressly gave to the company the 
power to issue the new bonds, from time to time, bearing such a rate 
of  interest as the managers might think advisable up  to 5 per cent. 
It was understood that the issue was to be in three classes, one of 
$57,ooo,ooo to  bear 5 per cent, one of  $23,000,000  to bear 43 per cent, 
and one of  $8o,ooo,ooo to bear 4 per cent; and on this basis it was 
thought that fixed charges would be reduced  $z,ooo,ooo, to which 
would have to be added interest on bonds issued in excess of  those 
previously outstanding.'  The reserve of  $~o,ooo,ooo  for premiums 
shows that in the opinion of  the directors the offer of  substantially 
more  than  par in new bonds was  necessary in order to induce  ex- 
changes  of  old  bonds  for new.  To prevent  careless  use of  this 
reserve it was provided that the $~o,ooo,ooo  in bonds could be used 
to pay premiums only upon the affirmative vote of  at least nine mem- 
bers (out of thirteen) of  the board, and when in the opinion  of  the 
trustees, expressed in writing, a  saving of  interest to the company 
could be effected. 
Not the least important part of  the plan was that designed to gain 
the preferred stockholders' approval.  It will be remembered that by 
the terms of  the reorganization of  1875 the consent of  three-quarters 
of  these stockholders was necessary to validate any mortgage after 
the first mortgage then proposed.  The increase in indebtedness now 
suggested threatened to postpone indefinitely divihends on the pre- 
ferred, and could not be expected to be welcome.  In consequence, 
the directors offered three distinct inducements : first, a promise of a 
distribution to the preferred  stockholders of  sums which had been 
taken from earnings and spent  on the property  to date; second, a 
promise of  early and regular dividends in the future; third, a pre- 
ferential  right of  subscription to the  new bonds.  By resolution  of 
August  21,  1889, they therefore definitely declared  in favor of the 
Ry. Rev. 29: 541, 1889. In fact the issues were all made at 5 per cent. 
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distribution of  a sum equal to the earnings which should be found to 
have been applied in earlier years to the capital requirements of  the 
property.  An  investigation  was  made,  the amount  was  officially 
declared to be $2,844,430, and an equivalent amount of  new bonds at 
85 was set aside to cover it.  For the future Mr. Villard and his asso- 
ciates announced a determination to begin dividends at the rate of 
per cent, the first to be paid January I, 1890; and declared that 
thereafter dividends would be paid out of  the current net earnings, 
or, if these should be insufficient, out of  a reserve fund until the net 
earnings should justify a larger distribution.  Finally, it was provided 
that the common  and preferred  stockholders should  be given the 
privilege of  subscribing to the new bonds at 85 to the extent of  15 per 
cent of  their holdings.  That these  concessions  attracted  attention 
was shown by the action of  the preferred stockholders in calling for an 
actual distribution as soon as possible of  the amounts deducted from 
earnings in past years.  On October 17, 1889, they passed a resolu- 
tion recommending to the incoming board of  directors "to take into 
consideration the distribution of  the whole amount due to the Pre- 
ferred Stock, under the plan of  reorganization, as soon as the Com- 
pany shall be financially in a proper position to do so ;" '  and again 
the following  year they resolved "that the incoming Board of  Direct- 
ors be . . .  requested to set apart the additional earnings in . . . 
consolidated  bonds . . .  and to (consider)  the question of  either 
increasing the . . .  dividend  above 4 per  cent or of  declaring an 
extra dividend to the preferred  stock." 
All  things  considered  it  is improbable that  the refunding  plan 
could have been put through without the promise of  dividends to the 
preferred stock, but it remains unfortunate that such promises had 
to be made.  The money which had been put into the road had been 
of necessity so invested to preserve the solvency of  the company.  In 
asense it  had  increased  earning power, but  not  all expenditures 
which affect earnings may be charged to capital.  In the first place, 
if earnings are below fixed charges, or are constantly tending to fall 
Annual Report, 18go.  For answer of  directors see R. R. Gaz. 21: 759, 1889. 
Chron. 51 :  539, 1890.  The point of view of the stockholders is briefly but clearly 
Set  forth in  a  circular  issued by  Mr. Robert Hams, chairman of  the board of di- 
rectors.  Ry. Age, 14: 658, 1889. RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  NORTHERN  PACIFIC  283 
below, sums put into the property merely assist the company to keep 
its head above water, and are not a sound basis for an increase in 
indebtedness; and in the second place expenditures which serve to 
peserve earnings may not be charged to capital account, even when 
the method of preservation is the construction of  branch lines, and 
still less when the method is the improvement of  the existing plant. 
If,  then, as was the case, the earnings claimed by the preferred stock- 
holders had gone to preserve the solvency of  the company, and to 
defend it against competition, the arguments of  these stockholders 
in 1889 did not hold  good. 
As for the plan itself, it was simply a method for providing new 
capital, and should be judged as such.  Its refunding provisions were 
mainly misleading. It proposed to secure a reduction in fixed charges 
by the exchange of  bonds bearing 5  per cent or less for bonds bearing 
6 per cent, but how the reduction was to be  accomplished was not 
clear.  The maturity of  the bonds to be retired was remote, and the 
assured reduction was therefore also remote.  The hst  mortgage had 
been issued in 1881, and ran for forty years; the second dated from 
1882 and was to mature after fifty years; and the third, which had 
been  issued only the year before,  was not redeemable until  1937. 
The Missouri division and Pend d'oreille mortgages matured some- 
what earlier,' but had nevertheless a considerable time to run.  The 
mortgage issues would  therefore not  soon  fall in  of  themselves. 
Secondly, bondholders would evidently not consent voluntarily  to sur- 
render old unexpired bonds without such a premium in new bonds 
as would make their annual return approximately the same.  Some- 
thing they might concede in view of  the more remote maturity of  the 
new issue and the somewhat more inclusive character of  its mort- 
gage lien, but hot enough to create any considerable saving.'  The 
new  issues for improvement of  the road,  moreover,  involved  an 
increase in the annual interest payments; which we must not, per- 
haps, condemn ofiand, for the raising of capital was in some meas- 
ure forced upon the company, but which is important in considering 
the railroad's financial condition and prospects.  The fact was that 
the Northern Pacific was not self-supporting; it had been  obliged 
In 1919. 
a  Evidence of this appears in the  $~o,ooo,ooo  reserved for premiums. 
to issue $20,867,000 bonds of  its own and to guarantee $2o,981,ooo 
besides,  between 1884 and 1889,  in order to secure an advance of 
$2,462,288 in annual net income during a period of  rapidly increasing 
prosperity; and it was now obliged to increase this indebtedness in 
the attempt to maintain its solvency for the future. 
Between  1889 and the end of  1892 business increased, and net 
at first gained more rapidly than did fixed charges.  Mr. 
~illard  was again supreme in the management, and actively directed 
bancia1 operations until his departure for Europe in  1890.  The 
most important operation conducted was the lease of  the Wisconsin 
Central, whereby the eastern terminus of  the Northern Pacific sys- 
tem was transferred from St. Paul and Minneapolis to Chicago.  The 
directors who were elected with Mr. Villard in 1887 controlled the 
Wisconsin  Central and  the Terminal  Company, which  had  been 
formed to secure an entrance for that road into the Lake city.'  Per- 
haps because of  this financial interest, the conviction seems to have 
crept over them that the Northern  Pacific would  do well to make 
connection with  the  trunk lines at  Chicago,  instead  of  stopping 
further west; and they brought the  subject up in  1889, and again 
in 1890.  On July I, 1889, a traffic contract went into effect, under 
which  the  Northern  Pacific  obtained  the  use  of  the Wisconsin 
Central lines in consideration of the business which it should turn 
over  to them.  Certain  provisions imposed on both  roads a share 
of  the  operating  expenses whenever  the  proportion of  operating 
expenses to gross earnings was greater than 65 per cent, and which 
gave both a profit whenever the proportion fell below this level.  The 
Wisconsin Central retained entire and absolute control of  its own 
property, except that the Northern Pacific was to share in the profits 
of the subsidiary Terminal Company whenever these profits should 
be more than $800,ooo.'  This was considered unsatisfactory, because 
Memoirs, vol. 2,  p.  336. 
'  Annual Report, 1889; R. R. Gaz. 21: 318, 1889. The Wisconsin Central divided 
its gross earnings into two parts, 65 per cent and 35 per cent; retained 35 per cent for 
its own use, and appropriated 65 per cent for operating expenses and for certain im- 
provements tending to reduce operating expenses.  When operating expenses were less 
than 65 per cent the Wisconsin Central was to pay over one-half of  the difference to 
the Northern Pacific in consideration of  the business which the latter gave it.  When 
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the Northern Pacific had no control of the Central's operation; and 
on April I of the following year a new contract gave to the former a 
lease of all the lines owned and controlled by the Wisconsin Central 
Company and the Wisconsin Central Railroad  Company between 
St. Paul and Chicago for 999 years; including terminal facilities at 
Chicago  held  by  the  Chicago & Northern Pacific Railroad Com- 
pany, a subsidiary corporation.'  "It was deemed by  the Board," 
said the annual report, "as of  the utmost importance that your road 
should have access to the city of  Chicago by a line in its own owner- 
ship and possessed with terminal facilities which it could control and 
have possession of.  The whole subject was most carefully considered 
by the Board, and the contracts and leases were adopted after delib- 
erate and careful consideration."  The advantage of  this lease to 
the Wisconsin Central lay in the large volume of  traffic which the 
arrangement secured to it; that to the Northern  Pacific was more 
doubtful.  Connection with  Chicago was desirable, but  it  was  to 
prove difficult to operate the Wisconsin Central for 65 per cent, and 
the acquisition was to arouse the hostility of  all the other roads 
between Chicago and  St. Paul.  We  shall see that  the  lease  was 
presently given up and that the attempt to make Chicago the eastern 
terminus was for the time abandoned. 
The year  1891 was a good one, but during the following twelve 
months the situation changed for the worse.  Most noteworthy was 
an increase in fixed  charges of  over  $2,000,000, due in part to an 
increase in the funded indebtedness, but more largely to an increase 
in  rentals  paid.  This increase  brought  charges  above  total  net 
income, and shows how  serious the position of  the company had 
become.  In fact, the company's repeated issues of  bonds had failed 
so completely to put it in a stable position that in but three of  the 
ceeding 23 per cent of this excess out of  its 35 per cent, and to divide one-half of any 
excess of operating expenses above 673 per cent equally between the Wisconsin Cen- 
tral and the Northern  Pacific.  The Northern  Pacific, however, was not  bound  to 
pay its half of such excess except out of  future profits received under the contract. 
Annual Report,  1890.  For a  brief  statement of  the complicated relations be- 
tween the Wisconsin Central, the Chicago & Northern Pacific, and the Chicago & 
Great Western, see R.  R. Gaz. 22:  350,  1890.  Terms were agreed upon with the 
Baltimore  & Ohio for the use of  the Chicago terminals of  the Chicago  & Northem 
Pacific, by that corporation.  Annual Report, 1891. 
'  Annual Report, 1890, p.  14;  R. R. Gaz. 21:  318,  1889. 
nine years from 1884 to 1892 was a surplus greater than $500,000 
above fixed payments secured, while the operations of  two of  these 
same years resulted in a deficit. 
The first  admission by  directors that  the road was  in difficulty 
consisted in the passing of  the preferred stock dividend for March 31, 
,892.  That this action did not deprive the holders of  all return was 
due to the previous conversion of  the consols formerly reserved into 
a trust for ten years on which to draw whenever the road should be 
unable to pay the usual dividends.  The directors therefore added to 
their declaration of  suspension a resolution that the "time, manner, 
and method of  the distribution of  so many of  the $3,347,000 of  con- 
solidated bonds set aside for the benefit of  the preferred stockholders 
as may be necessary to supply the deficiency, if  any, in this or any 
subsequent fiscal year,  between  the  amount  of  net  earnings  and 
4 per cent on the preferred stock, be submitted to preferred stock- 
holders at the annual meeting in October next." ' Not unnaturally 
stockholders were  alarmed.  At  the annual meeting in October an 
investigating committee was app~inted,~  and proceeded to a careful 
examination of the property accompanied by certain officers of  the 
road.  The committee was not friendly to the management.  Its pre- 
liminary report announced that the physical condition of  the system 
was good, but its later criticism of  the company's financial condition 
was severe.  In the words of  the London Standard "there has been 
no such scathing arraignment of  Directors since the exposures of  the 
Erie Railway."  The committee stated that the bad condition of  the 
property was due to the reckless hancial methods of  the directors. 
Chron. 54: 845,  1892.  Resolutions  adopted at the stockholders'  meeting were 
in substance : 
"Resolved, That the  $3,347,000 of  consolidated  mortgage bonds now deposited 
with the Farmers' Loan  & Trust Company as trustee for the preferred stockholders 
- . . be not sold below 90 and accrued interest. 
'I  Resolved, If  all the bonds be not sold as above, and smaller lots can be disposed 
of at 90 and interest, then the Directors may sell enough to make up the deficiency 
any year between the dividend actually paid to preferred stockholders and the 4 per 
cent which should be paid. 
"  Resolved, If  4 per cent dividends or more are declared by the Board of  Directors 
any year, then enough bonds shall be sold  to produce I per cent additional  dividend 
to be paid to preferred  stockholders."  Chron. 55: 679, 1892. 
Ry.  Rev.  32:  687,  1892.  Members were, Henry Clews,  Brayton  Ives,  Frank 
Sturges, William Solomon, and Jay Cooke, Jr. 286  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  NORTHERN  PACIFIC  287 
It  alleged that officers had held dual positions, and had subordinated 
the interests of  the Northern Pacific Company to those of  the Wiscon- 
sin Central, relieving themselves at the expense of  the former road. 
It commented upon the unprofitable character of  certain of  the other 
branches.  The floating debt, it maintained, had been financed by 
Mr. Villard personally at double the current rates of  interest, and it 
recommended litigation in default of  some assurance that the policy 
of  the company should be changed.'  In reply the directors issued a 
lengthy statement taking up the charges in detail.  The policy of 
building branch lines, said they, was imperatively necessary in order 
to develop business.  Although some of  the branches had not earned 
their fixed charges, yet, if  they had been credited with 60 per cent of 
the gross earnings on business which they had brought to the main 
line, they would have shown a good profit.  The policy of  branch-line 
construction had met  with  the unanimous approval of  successive 
boards of  directors, and had  been  ratified by  the stockholders in 
1886; and  in this  connection the  reply  defended  specifically the 
acquisition of  the Wisconsin Central and other lines.  The carrying 
of  the floating debt by officials interested in the property, instead of 
being subject to criticism and censure, was entitled to the highest 
cornmendati~n.~ 
It is difficult to pass with justice upon the conflicting contentions 
above outlined.  However, writing in 1905, long after his retirement 
from Northern Pacific affairs, Mr. Villard expressed himself  as fol- 
lows:  "In 1891 Mr. Villard . . .  made . . .  his last official tour of 
inspection of  the main line and principal branches of  the Northern 
Pacific. . . .  The most alarming impression of  all made upon hi 
was the revelation of  the weight of  the load that had been put upon 
the company by the purchase and construction of  the longer branch 
lines in Montana and Washington, which he then discovered for the 
fist time.  There was  the Missoula branch  to the  Cceurd'Alene 
mines; the Cceur d'Alene Railway  & Navigation, a mixed  system 
of  steamboats and rail lines ;  the Seattle, Lake Shore & Eastern ;  and 
the roads built into Westernmost Washington; representing a total 
Ry. Times, 63:  275, 1893;  Chron. 56: 332, 1893. 
Ry. Rev. 33: 143,1893;  Chron. 56:  362,  1893;  Ry. Times,  63:  302, 1893;  Ibid. 
p. 360.  See also R. R. Gaz.  25: 161,  1893. 
investment in cash and bonds of  not far from $~O,OOO,OOO,  which 
together hardly  earned  operating  expenses.  The acquisition and 
building of  these disappointing lines had in a few years absorbed the 
large  amount of  consolidated bonds set aside for construction pur- 
poses, which had been assumed to be sufficient for all needs in that 
direction for a long time." ' No man should have known the real 
profitableness of  these extensions better than Mr. Villard; and the 
circumstances of  his  account give  it special weight.  The admitted 
fact that in several cases the managers of  the Northern Pacific voted 
as directors of  that corporation to buy property from themselves as 
whole or part owners in other enterprises also excites distrust, and 
this feeling is strengthened by the unsatisfactory financial condition 
in 1893 of  the Northern  Pacific system as a whole. 
Even before the report of  the investigating committee the directors 
had been busy with the floating debt.  This amounted to $g,g18,ooo 
late in  1892, according to the treasurer's  statement.  In February, 
1893, it was decided to cancel  it  by  the sale  of  the stock of  the 
St. Paul & Northern Pacific held in the treasury, but  this aroused 
violent opposition.  The St. Paul & Northern Pacific ran, it will be 
remembered, from Brainerd to St. Paul and Minneapolis, and had 
formed the eastern terminus of  the Northern  Pacific system until 
the acquisition of  the Wisconsin Central.  It was justly considered 
an extremely important section of  the main line, and the possible 
loss of  its control was regarded as disastro~s.~  Dissuaded from their 
first purpose, the directors considered the issue of  a collateral mort- 
gage sufficient in amount to relieve. all pressing necessities, and pro- 
posed to utilize in this way treasury securities which it would have 
been unwise to sell.  At  the same time the stockholders' committee 
had much the same idea in mind, and wrote to President Oakes in 
March, and again in May.  "Referring to my letter to you of  March 
15," said Brayton Ives, "I  beg to say that the financial plan therein 
referred to contemplates the creation of  a collateral trust in which 
shall  be  placed  $~o,ooo,ooo Northern  Pacific  consolidated  gs, 
$~,OOO,OOO  Chicago  & Northern  Pacific firsts,  and  all of  the  St. 
Memoirs, pp. 359-60. 
a  Among others the investigating committee protested loudly against a sale.  Ry. 
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Paul  & Northern Pacific stock belonging to the Northern  Pacific 
Company, estimated  at $7,000,000.  Against  these  securities it  is 
suggested that notes to the extent of  $~a,ooo,ooo  be issued, bearing 
6 per cent interest, and payable in five years, or before, at the pleas- 
ure of  the company, provision being  made at the same time for 
the increase of  the amount of  the notes to $15,ooo,ooo on the de- 
posit  of  additional  collateral  securities satisfactory to the  under- 
writers. I am happy to be able to repeat the belief already expressed, 
that if  the board of  directors will allow $he underwriters to name 
seven directors of  the company the entire amount of  notes will  be 
subscribed for without delay."  This plan was backed by respons- 
ible houses, including the Mercantile Trust Company, Kuhn, Loeb 
& Co.,  the Equitable  Life Assurance  Company, and  others, who 
agreed to take  $~,OOO,OOO  of  the  new bonds at 95, less 14 per cent 
commission.  The directors  paid  no attention to Mr. Ives's letter, 
and his offer was subsequently withdrawn. 
The directors' own scheme was dated May I, 1893.  It provided 
for  a  collateral  five-year 6  per  cent  mortgage to the  amount  of 
$I ~,ooo,ooo,  of  which $12,000,000 were to be issued at once.  There 
was to be a committee of  five which should take charge of  the issue, 
and which might sell the collateral before the maturity of  the notes 
at certain minimum prices or over.  Until all the notes should have 
been paid the railroad company agreed not to undertake the construc- 
tion  of any new lines without the  consent of  the committee, or to 
purchase or lease any railroad or navigation lines, or to guarantee, 
endorse, or  purchase  the  bonds or  other  obligations or  stocks of 
other  companies.  The committee was  to have  the  voting  power 
on the underlying stocks, and might direct the trust company to 
waive any default of  the railroad company in payment of  interest. 
The railroad company might call in the notes before maturity, after 
May I, 1896, and pay them off  at par and accrued interesLz This, 
it will be seen, did not differ in esience from the scheme proposed 
by  Mr.  Ives: -the  real contest  was between parties and not  be- 
tween plans.  In June, Mr. Villard resigned his position as director 
and  chairman  of  the board, and J. D.  Rockefeller was  elected a 
'  Ry. Times, 65: 595, 1893. 
Chron. 56: 1017,  1893; R. R.  Gaz.  25: 398,  1893. 
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director.  Somewhat earlier,  but  doubtless in  anticipation of  this 
action, a syndicate agreed to underwrite the collateral issue, subject 
to the stockholders' right  of  subscription;'  and by  the end of  the 
year $10,275,000 of  the collateral notes were outstanding, of  which 
the bulk had been taken by  the syndicate.'  The whole device was 
very similar to that employed by the Union Pacific in 1891.  It was 
not  designed  as a permanent remedy for anything, but  served  to 
postpone a reckoning to what was hoped would be better times.  As 
a matter of  fact its effect was very small. 
Receivers for the Northern  Pacific Railroad  Company were ap- 
pointed  August  15,  1893,  on a petition alleging that  the company 
was insolvent  and had no funds to meet  payments coming due on 
September I, October I, November I, and December I. The com- 
pany in its answer admitted the facts, and the United States Circuit 
Court  at  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin,  put  Messrs.  Henry  C.  Payne, 
Thomas F.  Oakes,  and Henry  C. Rouse in charge of  its  affair^.^ 
Receivers were rapidly appointed for most of  the branch lines, the 
intent  being  to put  all these properties in separate hands.'The 
receivers  of  the  main  line had  nothing to do with the branches, 
although in November they were authorized to enter into temporary 
traffic agreements with them.  In regard to the Wisconsin Central, 
application was early made to compel the Northern Pacific to carry 
out the provisions of  the lease; but Judge Jenkins of  the Milwaukee 
court granted the receivers until September I 5 to decide whether or 
not they desired to continue, and upon their negative reply author- 
ized  a surrender.  The accounts submitted, he  said,  showed  that 
since the lease had gone into effect the Chicago  & Northern Pacific 
had been  operated at a loss to the Northern  Pacific of  $1,304~16~ 
and the Wisconsin Central at a loss of  $1,142,316; although business 
during the three years in question had been generally prosperous.  In 
accordance with the decision the property was turned over to the 
The heaviest subscribers were the Rockefellers and Villard and his friends. 
Annual Report,  189 j; Ry. Times, 64:  290,  189 j. 
a  Criticism Kas aroused by the alleged fact that all three receivers were adherents 
and virtually protCgEs of  Henry Villard.  Ry. Times, 64: 290,  1893. See also  Smalley, 
p.  291. 
Except that Henry Stanton of  New York was to be  the Eastern receiver for all 
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Wisconsin  Company  on  September 26,  1893, and  the Northern 
Pacific for a time gave up the idea of  a Chicago terminus.  Of  the 
other leases those of  the St. Paul  & Northern  Pacific and of  the 
Ceur dlAlene Railway  & Navigation Company were at this time 
approved by  the court, and the receivers were authorized to make 
the necessary payments. 
The failure of  the Northern Pacific was the signal for still more 
active and bitter personal struggles between opposing factions than 
had  before  occurred.  The opposition,  led  by  Brayton  Ives  and 
August Belmont, endeavored to get control of  the company through 
the annual election on October 19,  and to procure the removal of 
the  appointed receivers.  They  displayed the  greatest  bitterness 
toward  Mr.  Viard, and held him responsible for the position  in 
which the company was placed.  Villard's  "remarkable  qualities," 
wrote Ives, "have  been of  advantage only to  himself. . . .  The 
syndicate composed of  Viard, Colby, Abbott, and Hoyt, and their 
friends made  millions  [by  the Wisconsin Central deal]  and  the 
Northern Pacific has suffered and is suffering a corresponding 10~s."~ 
Circulars were  sent  out  asking proxies,  and August  Belmont,  J. 
Horace Harding,  Brayton Ives,  Donald  Mackay,  and  Winthrop 
Smith were appointed a committee to receive proxies as they came 
in.  On the other side the directors appealed to the stockholders, 
reminded them that though the company had failed while they were 
in office it was also during their term that it had reached its greatest 
prosperity, and took the cautious step of  amending the by-laws so 
as to shorten the term of  future boards from three years to one. 
Conditions were against the management, and the result of  the elec- 
tion was a complete victory for the Belmont-Ives party, which was 
followed up by the choice of  Mr. Ives for president.  The real results 
were less than might be supposed, for the operation of  the  railroad 
and the control of  its funds were to be in the hands of  the receivers 
and not in those of  the officers of  the road.  On January 20 President 
Ives filed a petition in the Milwaukee Federal Court for an order 
directing-the receivers to surrender the seal, books and papers and 
stock certificates, and to pay  over sufficient money to enable the 
president to rent rooms and pay the salaries of  the auditor, secre- 
Ry.  Ties,  64:  337, 1893. 
tary, and treasurer.'  The petition was denied, and the elected offi- 
cers were left in an anomalous position. 
In other  matters  the  opposition lost  no time in  appealing to 
the courts.  Previous even to the election two actions had been begun 
against  Henry  Villard: the one in  September by  John  Swope of 
Philadelphia to compel Henry Villard  and others to restore stock 
and bonds obtained as a result of  an illegal conspiracy:  the other 
a petition in October by the Northern Pacific Company to force the 
receivers  to bring  suit  against Messrs.  Villard,  Hoyt,  and  Colby 
to recover nearly $2,6oo,ooo alleged to have been made unlawfully 
through Northern Pacific deals.s  The complaints were in the main 
the same as those which had been made by the investigating com- 
mittee, and charged, inter  alia, that Villard  had  secured  a  profit 
to himself  by bringing about the purchase of  the Chicago terminal 
properties by the Northern Pacific.  Mr. Villard swore that his whole 
interest in the transaction had been as officer and stockholder and 
securityholder of  the Northern Pacific Company,'  and the receivers 
professed themselves ready and willing to bring suit, provided they 
were  furnished with  the information and  evidence wherewith to 
prosecute the same.'  The Court reserved the Ives motion for further 
consideration, and the following year directed the receivers to bring 
suit ;  but the litigation was eventually dr0pped.O 
In December, 1893,  the Ives faction filed  a petition for the re- 
moval of  the receivers.  The charges were in  part similar to those 
of  the Swope suit.  It was asserted that at the time the receivers were 
appointed the road had practically had no hearing; that its managers 
had in less than a year burdened it with the interest of  $60,00o,ooo 
for properties which were of  no value to it, but in many of which 
they were personally interested and out of  which they made large 
profits, and that when insolvency was produced by this fraud they 
had put the road in the hands of  receivers nominated by them for 
the purpose, with the effect of  perpetuating the same control which 
had brought the bankruptcy.  Specific charges were made against 
Oakes, Villard, and Roswell C. Rolston, president of  the Farmers' 
These officers had resigned in consequence of the non-payment of their salaries. 
'  Ry. Rev. 33: 587, 1893.  Chron. 59: 697, 1894.  '  Ibid. 57: 765, 1893. 
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Loan & Trust Company ;  no charges were made against Receivers 
Payne  and  Rouse, but  their  removal was  asked for because they 
happened to be in the company of  and presumably in the interest 
of  Mr. Oakes.  Besides this, finally, it was  alleged  that  separate 
receivers had  been  unnecessarily  appointed for branch  lines, and 
that the expense of  administering the affairs of  the company had 
been  enormously  increased.'  The receivers filed  lengthy answers 
on February 3 ;  Receiver Oakes in particular answering every charge 
specifically, filing exhaustive documents in proof,  and maintaining 
in general the value  of  the branch  properties and his innocence of 
unlawful profits.= The court on the whole inclined to his view.  On 
April 14  Judge Jenkins handed  down his decision, dismissing the 
petition for the removal of Messrs. Payne  and Rouse, and holding 
Mr.  Oakes's  conduct  to have  been above investigation  except  in 
three  instances, to examine  which  a  master was  app~inted.~  In 
the course of  his decision Judge Jenkins concluded that the branch 
lines in question, though unprofitable for a while,  were  necessary 
to the system; and that in particular the branches in Washington, 
Oregon, Montana,  and Idaho were built  as feeders,  and owing to 
the  sparsely settled district  were  necessarily built  for the future. 
If  Mr. Oakes were to be removed on these charges, said he, then 
it would make the entire board of  directors of  the company at that 
time liable to impeachment.'  Mr. Cary, the master, reported that 
Mr. Oakes had had no pecuniary interest and no personal advantage 
or gain from any of  the matters referred to him for investigation. 
Mr. Villard was said to have made unlawful gains in the acquisi- 
tion of  the Northern Pacific & Manitoba Company to the extent of 
$363,494,  but  Mr.  Oakes did  not  know  that  Mr.  Villard  was  so 
interested, and was not bound to take notice to prevent such gains.' 
In consequence,  Judge  Jenkins  in  October  granted  a  motion  to 
dismiss the petition for the removal of  Oakes as re~eiver,~  and the 
incident was closed. 
Ry. Rev. 33: 783, 1893; Chron. 57: 1123,  1893; Ry. Age, 19:  11,  1894. 
a  Ry. Age,  19:  89, 1894. 
Ibid. 19:  231,  1894. 
R. R.  Gaz.  26: 294, 1894;  Chron, 58: 683, 1894. 
'  R. R. Gaz.  26:  642, 1894;  Chron.  59: 473, 1894. 
'  Chron. 59: 738, 1894;  Ibid. 59: 697, 1894. 
It thus appears that Mr. Ives and his friends obtained but little 
satisfaction in the courts up to this point.  They were unable to force 
the receivers to turn over any share of  the Northern Pacific's earn- 
ings,  and they were  equally unable to remove the receivers from 
office. So long as the road should remain in the receivers' hands their 
authority seemed destined to be nominal, and they were thus spurred 
on by their own private interests to make some attempt at reorgan- 
ization.  At the same time their opponents, as bondholders, were not 
unwilling to receive some interest on their bonds, and succeeded in 
this, as in other matters, in drawing substantial control into their 
own hands.  The year 1894 was a bad one and made the importance 
of  a  reduction  in  fixed  charges  loom  large.  Passenger  earnings 
decreased from $s,~I  7,054 to $3,960,772, and freight earnings from 
$17,017,630  to $11,418,692; while in spite of  attempted economies 
by the receivers, net earnings decreased by almost the same absolute 
amount.'  Cuts in wages were inevitable, and a serious strike aggra- 
vated the situation.  It became necessary to borrow money from the 
Adams Reorganization Committee, of  which more will be said later, 
and to issue $~,OOO,OOO  in receivers' certificates to pay off  $~,OOO,OOO 
already authorized in 1893.  On September 8 formal announcement 
was made that the receiverships of  the twenty-four branch lines of  the 
Northern  Pacific system were to be terminated, and that the trustee 
was to undertake the  legal management of  all the lines for a stated 
sum per annum ;  while the general receivers, Messrs. Oakes, Rouse, 
and Payne, were to operate the separated  lines under a fair traffic 
agreement.  It was figured that $64,000 per annum would be saved ; 
and further economies were made in the cost of  the administrative 
staff at  New  York.  The relief  was  insufficient.  Net  earnings for 
1894 were $5,506,007, and fixed charges were $12,004,985, and the 
need of a reorganization was impressively shown. 
The work of  devising a reorganization plan was done in the vari- 
ous bondholders' committees.  Late in 1893 a committee of  consoli- 
dated 5 per cent bondholders had been formed, with E. D. Adams as 
chairman  and  General Louis Fitzgerald  as vice-chairman; which 
This is  not  to be  explained  by  more liberal  expenditures by  the receivers on 
maintenance of  way and equipment, for the sums applied to both these purposes were 
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declared itself to be independent, but was regarded as affiliated with 
the former managers of  the road.  In March, 1894,  this committee 
announced  that, having received  responses from the holders of  a 
majority of  the consolidated bonds, it had prepared  an agreement 
and had  secured its acceptance by  the German bondholders.  All 
consolidated bondholders were requested to deposit their securities 
with the Mercantile Trust Company, which would  issue engraved 
certificates of  deposit, which the committee would endeavor to have 
listed on the Stock Exchange.  Mr. Ives was opposed to any step 
toward reorganization of this sort, and objected particularly to the 
composition of the committee; he  therefore asked bondholders to 
withhold their acceptance of  the agreement, and gave various rea- 
sons to lend weight to his request.  In April, as a counter-move, he 
invited bondholders to send in their names and addresses to him, 
together with the amount of  their holdings, saying that this action 
would not commit the bondholders, and was  desired only to enable 
the company to furnish information respecting its affairs, and, when 
the proper time should arise, to confer about a reorganization plan. 
The rapid falling off  in earnings soon imperilled the interest of  the 
second  and  third  mortgage  bonds,  superior  to  the  consolidated 
mortgage.  In July the Adams Committee appealed to the holders of 
these issues, and secured a considerable number of  deposits.  Hence- 
forth it planned to act as a general reorganization committee.  On 
the other hand a committee headed by  Johnston Livingston com- 
peted for deposits of  the second mortgage, and one headed by C. B. 
Van Nostrand for deposits of  the third mortgage bonds.  It  was urged 
that holders of  the earlier issues should not deposit with the con- 
solidated committee, because its interest lay in cutting down prior 
liens; whereas the Van Nostrand Committee declared that the road 
could earn the interest on the third mortgage, and that these bonds 
should not accept less than par and interest in cash.  Nevertheless 
the Deutsche Bank's London agency announced in September that 
it was prepared to receive second mortgage, third mortgage, and con- 
solidated bonds on behalf of  the Adams Committee, and to forward 
the same to New York for deposit.  Various rumors were afloat at 
this time concerning reorganization, and suggestions were made for 
converting the third mortgage bonds into 5 per cent income bonds 
and the consolidated bonds into preferred stock; '  but the only result 
was to stir up protests from the third mortgage bondholders, who 
still insisted in August that earnings were more than sufficient to pay 
the interest on all prior liens.  Late in the year there was talk of  sell- 
ing  the  road  under  foreclosure of  the second mortgage, but  this 
too came to nothing. 
Meanwhile the operation of  the road went  on.  Receiver Rouse 
reported  on  the condition of  the  property  in  January,  1894.  He 
estimated that $~o,ooo,ooo  would be required to bring the perman- 
ent way into the most effective condition for economical operation. 
Exceptional causes, said he, had contributed to make the earnings 
for  the  previous  three  years  exceptionally large,  and  this  fact, 
together with the prevailing depression, the competition of  the Great 
Northern, and reduced rates, would decrease the gross earnings in 
the immediate future at  least  27  per  cent.  Although  Mr. Rouse 
believed in the value of  the Northern Pacific's branch lines, his report 
was not enco~raging.~  In September, on the approach of  the annual 
election, President Ives issued a long circular.  The serious decrease 
in the earnings of  the road, he said, had affected for the worse the 
position of  the stockholders, and these holders  should understand 
that no one of  the reorganization committees was working for their 
interest.  He announced the appointment of  a committee to receive 
proxies, and revealed the embarrassment of  the management by  a 
request for contributions of  $12.50  per hundred shares in order to 
pay the expenses of the officers.  So far as the officers should have 
any voice  in the matter,  President  Ives assured the stockholders, 
contributions should be credited on any assessments which might be 
made thereafter.  On the day of  the election no opposing ticket was 
presented, and the Ives party were reelected to their positions.  This 
is where matters stood at the beginning of  1895.  The hostility of  the 
opposing committeeswas inno way abated; but the Adams Commit- 
tee had secured deposits of  nearly $21,oco,ooo of  the consolidated 
mortgage bonds, $~,ooo,ooo  more than a majority of  the third mort- 
gage bonds,3  and $3,ooo,ooo less than a majority  of  the second 
Ry.  Times,  65:  87, 1894. 
Ibid. 65 :  38, 1884. 
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mortgage bonds, and with the hearty support of  the Deutsche Bank 
was steadily strengthening its position.' 
In May,  1895, the Adams Committee reorganization plan came 
out and marked the first serious suggestion for a rehabilitation of  the 
property.  It proposed a sale, under foreclosure, of the old company 
and the formation of  a new company under special arrangements for 
this purpose.  The new company was to issue $~oo,ooo,ooo  in shares, 
and a maximum of  $200,000,000 in gold bonds free from taxation, 
secured by a mortgage lien on the whole Northern Pacific system, in- 
cluding the St. Paul & Northern Pacific Railway, and bearing inter- 
est partly at 4 per cent and partly at 3 per cent, all under the same 
mortgage.  A sufficient amount of  these bonds was to be reserved to 
replace the existing first  mortgage, besides a further amount to ac- 
quire independent branch  lines or for new  construction at a maxi- 
mum charge of  $zo,ow per mile.  The principal and interest of  the 
new  bonds  were  to  be  guaranteed  unconditionally by  the  Great 
Northern Road, in return for  which the Great Northern was to receive 
one-half of the stock of  the new company.  The new board was to 
consist of  nine directors, of  whom four were to be nominated by the 
Northern Pacific Reorganization Committee.  Each $1000 Northern 
Pacific second mortgage bond was to receive a  $I 125 new Northern 
Pacific guaranteed  bond;  each $~ooo  third  mortgage bond  a new 
$1000 3 per cent guaranteed bond, and at least $250 in shares; each 
$1000  5 per cent consol at least $500  in new 3 per cent guaranteed 
bonds and $300 in shares.  Overdue coupons of  the second mortgage 
were to be paid in cash at the rate of  5 per cent annually, those of  the 
third mortgage at 4 per cent, and those of  the consols to be adjusted 
at the rate of  23  per cent in new  3 per cent  bonds.  The floating 
debt of  the receivership was to be paid by an assessment of  about 
$II,OOO,OOO  on the old stock.  The reorganization and the raising of 
the necessary working  capital  were  to be  secured  by  a syndicate 
headed by J. P. Morgan & Company and the Deutsche Bank.2 
For opposing circulars by  the Livingston Committee and by the directors  see 
Ry.  Rev.  35: 55, 1895 On February  20,  1896,  a  Stockholders'  Protective  Com- 
mittee  was  appointed,  consisting of  August  Belmont,  Brayton  Ives,  and  George 
R. Sheldon of  New York, and Charlemagne Tower, of  Philadelphia.  Chron.  62: 
365, 1896. 
a  Chron.  60:  930, 1895. 
Briefly stated, this plan proposed to decrease somewhat the funded 
debt, while reducing also the interest rate from 6 and 5 to 4 and 3 
per cent.  The reduction in fixed charges which would have ensued 
it is impossible to estimate without further details.  The amount 
which bondholders were asked to give up  was, however, consider- 
able, and for this compensation was variously given in new bonds 
and in new stock.  The floating debt was not to be funded, but was 
to be paid  off  by the commendable method of  an assessment; and 
provision was made for working capital, although at what cost in 
profits to the syndicate was not stated.  But  more important than 
the details of  the plan was the guarantee of the new  issues by the 
Great Northern  Company for which it provided.  The question of 
consolidation between the Northern Pacific and the Great Northern 
was said, on what purported to be good authority, to have originated 
on the side of  the Northern Pacific among men to whom an alliance 
seemed necessary to the prosperity of  the latter road.'  Mr. Hill was 
said to have been at first reluctant, and to have consented only on 
condition that a majority of  the Northern  Pacific stock should be 
placed within his hands.  It can scarcely be supposed, however, that 
he. did not welcome such a union; and the petition of  the Northern 
Pacific receivers for the cancellation of  contracts  with  the Great 
Northern  and  the  Minneapolis Union  railway companies  made 
consolidation especially desirable at this time.  To the  end of  this 
consolidation the Adams Committee plan was chiefly framed, and 
on its execution the  adequacy of  the  plan  depended.  If  the Great 
Northern could have been induced to guarantee the principal and 
interest of  the new Northern  Pacific bonds the likelihood of  a de- 
fault would have been reduced to a minimum, even on the indebted- 
ness outstanding before the receivership; and a scheme for paying 
the floatkg debt and for providing a certain amount of  new capital 
would have been all that would have been required.  But it is clear 
that a proposal for a consolidation  of  two of  the principal lines serving 
the Northwest brought the consuming and producing public to an 
interest in the Northern Pacific reorganization which they had not 
R. R.  Gaz. 27: 590, 1895. 
'  For the use of trackage and terminals at and between St. Paul and Minneapolis. 
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felt before.  So long as a reorganization plan dealt merely with ex- 
changes and  manipulation  of  securities by  and  among security- 
holders, the influence of  any settlement on outsiders was very indi- 
rect; but when it operated to reduce competition in a large section 
of  the country the effect was plain and striking.  Certain conserva- 
tive  hanciers suggested  a  holding  company to hold  the  Great 
Northern and Northern Pacific stock, in order to throw some sort of 
a veil over the proceedings, but Mr. Hill would not consent.'  Late 
in August,  1895,  therefore, a bill in equity was filed to prevent the 
proposed  cooperation,  and  on  September  17  Attorney-General 
Childs, for the state of  Minnesota, brought suit for an injunction 
on the ground that the combination was contrary to the laws of  the 
state and would prevent competition.  It was said that Mr. Childs 
was supported by the practically unanimous sentiment of  the people 
of  Washington and Montana.  The matter came before the Supreme 
Court on suit by one Pearsall, a stockholder of  the Great Northern, 
and this tribunal held  that the combination was contrary to the 
laws of  Minnesota and should, therefore, be enjoined, affirming the 
principle for which  Mr.  Childs c~ntended.~  This settled the fate 
of  the Adams reorganization plan; and an entirely new scheme had 
to be devised. 
But while once more progress toward  reorganization seemed to 
have  ceased,  sensational  developments occurred  in the factional 
conflicts to which we  have already referred.  To Mr. Ives, barred 
from all  participation  in  the  management  of  the  road,  denied a 
salary, and unable to obtain the removal of  the receivers by Judge 
Jenkins, came the idea of  appealing to another court.  It will be re- 
membered  that the original receivership suit had  been  instituted 
in the circuit court of  Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and that that court 
ever since had  been  regarded  as possessing  primary  jurisdiction. 
Since no compulsion existed on other courts to recognize this juris- 
diction of  the Milwaukee court, the orders of  which were supreme 
in its own district only, and the smooth working of  the receivership 
was  due to a  respect  for "comity,"  it was  possible, as Ives well 
knew, for any circuit court along the line to throw existing arrange- 
Chron. 61:  325, 1895. 
Pearsall vs. Great Northern Railway Company, 161  U. S. 647. 
ments into the direst confusion.  Relying on this fact, President Ives 
sent the  General  Counsel of  the company to present  applications 
for the removal of  the receivers to one court after the other along 
the road.'  In September, 1895, judges willing to take jurisdiction 
were found in Seattle, in the far northwestern comer of  the United 
 state^.^  Petition  was  made  in two parts:  first, that the Seattle 
court take jurisdiction ;  second, that it remove Messrs. Oakes, Rouse, 
and Payne.  Judge Hanford of  the Federal Court of  the Washington 
District called Judge  Gilbert of  the United States Circuit Court to 
sit with him, and deciding on the question of  jurisdiction first, ac- 
cording to the request of  the receivers, the two judges held that the 
principle of  comity did not of  necessity apply in the Northern Pacific 
case because no part of  the railroad was within the jurisdiction of 
Judge Jenkins's  court, and any court  along  the road  could more 
properly and efficiently administer the trust.  The court, therefore, 
directed the receivers to answer the charges of  malfeasance, and to 
He their answers in Seattle by October 2 ;  also to file their accounts 
with the clerk of  the court at Seattle;  and to file each a $~oo,ooo 
bond .' 
The result was the prompt resignation of  the recqvers, who in a 
letter to Judge  Jenkins made their feelings clear.  "Your receivers 
manifestly cannot  administer  the trust,"  said they,  "with  justice 
to the parties interested, or themselves, if  subject to the orders and 
instructions  as to  the  general  administration  from  two  or  more 
independent tribunals.  We cannot abide, nor can we ask our sure- 
ties to abide, the danger of  the dserences of  opinion between courts, 
each assuming to be  controlling as to the expenditures of  the re- 
ceivership in the general administration, in view of  the immensity 
of  the interests involved. . . .  Unless your receivers recognize, as 
they understand it, that that honorable court [the Seattle court] is the 
court of  primary jurisdiction they will of  necessity be in contumacy. 
. . .  Your receivers are not willing under any circumstances to file 
an additional bond in such jurisdiction, nor are they willing to put 
Ry. Rev. 35: 461, 1895. 
'  Proceedings were  begun in the Seattle court in  August.  See  Chron. 61:  241, 
1895;  Ry.  Age,  20: 394, 1895;  Ibid. 20: 418, 1895;  Ibid. 20: 430, 1895. 
'  Up to this time such accounts had been filed in the Milwaukee court. 
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themselves in  a  position to endanger their  right  to challenge the 
jurisdiction of  that honorable court." ' Judge Jenkins accepted the 
resignations and  appointed  Messrs.  McHenry,  chief  engineer  of 
the Northern Pacific, and Bigelow, a Milwaukee banker,  receiver^.^ 
The hitherto respected  principle of  comity had,  however, lost  all 
force.  On  September  30  Judge  Sanborn at St.  Paul confirmed 
Judge Jenkins's  appointments for the states of  Minnesota and North 
Dakota; on October I Judge Hanford at Tacoma refused to accept 
the resignation of  the old receivers, but removed them and appointed 
Andrew F. Burleigh for the district of  Washington; on October  2 
Judge Billinger concurred in Burleigh's  appointment for Oregon; 
on October  7  Judge  Knowles at Helena, Montana, confirmed the 
above  for the districts  of  Washington and Oregon, and appointed 
Captain J. H. Mills and E. L. Bonner for the district of  Montana; 
and in the week ending October 26  Judge Beatty appointed Bur- 
leigh  receiver  for Idaho.  The only conservative action was that 
of  Judge Lacombe in New York, who deferred his appointments as 
often as the matter came before him, in the hope that the Western 
judges would come to an agreement. 
The situation at the end of  October,  1895, was  as follows: in 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota there were two receivers, 
Messrs.  McHenry and Bigelow; in  Montana there were  three re- 
ceivers, Messrs. Mills, Bonner, and Burleigh; and in Idaho, Wash- 
ington, and Oregon there was one receiver, Andrew F. Burleigh.  It 
was a condition of  affairs which  could  not be endured.  In each of 
the Western States orders were made compelling all agents or per- 
sons connected with the road to deposit all money collected in that 
state, and it was at any time in the power of  the receivers in any 
state  to appoint operating  officers distinct  from  those  managing 
traffic over the other parts of  the line.  On January g,  1896, Judge 
Gilbert simplified the situation by retiring Messrs. Mills and Bonner, 
and  by  appointing Andrew F. Burleigh  sole  receiver for the dis- 
trict of  Montana.  This reduced the number of  receivers to three, 
and left Burleigh in control of  the road west of  North  Dakota, and 
McHenry and Bigelow in control of  the rest.  Application was now 
1 Ry. Age,  20:  478,  1895; R. R. Gaz. 27: 648, 1895. 
Chron. 61: 611,  1895; Ry. Times, 68: 442,  1895. 
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made to the Supreme Court of  the United States, and on January 
28, 1896, four justices of  this tribunal, acting as justices assigned to 
the several districts in which the Northern  Pacific Railroad  Com- 
pany had property,' decided that Judge Jenkins's court for the East- 
em District of  Wisconsin should be considered the court of  primary 
jurisdiction, and issued each an order to this effect to take effect in 
his particular circ~it.~  The various circuit judges hastened to con- 
form.  On February  21  Judge  Lacombe  conhmed  the appoint- 
ment  of  F.  G. Bigelow and E.  H.  McHenry  as receivers for the 
Second Judicial District, and similar action had by then been taken 
by the judges of  the other districts except that of  the state of  Wash- 
ington.  There  Judges  Gilbert and  Hanford  refused  to discharge 
Burleigh, although recognizing that the general orders for the man- 
agement and control of  the railroad  property  were henceforth to 
issue from Judge Jenkins's court.!'  The judicial strife was thus at an 
end.  President Ives obtained the removal of  the receivers to whom 
he particularly  objected, but  did not  overthrow the authority  of 
the Milwaukee court, nor  secure any material gain to compensate 
for the great trouble which he caused. 
With the receivership tangle straightened out it became possible 
1 Justices  Brown, Harlan, Brewer, and Field. 
a "  We are of  the opinion," said Justices Field, Harlan, and Brewer, "that proceed- 
ings to foreclose a mortgage upon  lines  extending through  more than one district 
should be  commenced in the Circuit Court in which the principal  operating offices 
are situated, and in which there is some material part of  the railroad embraced by 
the mortgage.  Such court should be  the court of  primary jurisdiction.  But in view 
of  the fact that a $rtion  of  the line of  road owned by the Northern Pacific Company 
is within the State of  Wisconsin, and that at the time of  the filing of  the creditors' 
bill  the  Northern  Pacific Railroad  Company  was  operating  a  road  through  the 
Eastern District of  Wisconsin, although such road was under lease to it for 99 years; 
and in view of  the further fact that the railroad  company  assented  to the  action 
of  the  Circuit Court for the  Eastern District of  Wisconsin in  taking jurisdiction, 
and as such jurisdiction  has been recognized by the Circuit Court in every district 
. . .  for the space of  about two years, we are of  the opinion that the Circuit Court 
for the Eastern District of  Wisconsin has jurisdiction to proceed to a decree of  fore- 
closure which will bind the mortgagor company and the mortgaged  property, and 
ought to be  recognized by the Circuit Court of  every district along the line as the 
court of  primary jurisdiction."  Chron. 62: 234, 1896. 
Justice  Field of  the Supreme Court declined to exercise his authority to remove 
Burleigh, intimating that the  existing  arrangement was  satisfactory.  Ry. Age, 21: 
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to proceed again with the work of  reorganization, and on March 16, 
1896, the ha1  plan was published, endorsed not only by the Adams 
Committee, but by President Ives and his Stockholders' Protective 
Committee, and by other important interests as well.  The feeling 
had  become  general that  some  action  should  speedily  be  taken, 
and that it was in the interest of  all parties that the factional conflicts 
which  had  raged  so long  and with  so  little  result  should  cease. 
Reorganization was proposed on the following basis : 
(a) The abandonment of  Chicago as the eastern terminus, and the 
limitation of  the railway on the east by the Mississippi River and the 
Great Lakes; -the  bonds and stocks of  the Chicago  & Northern 
Pacific and of  the Chicago & Calumet Companies to be sold. 
(b) The ultimate union of  the main line, branches, and terminal 
properties through direct ownership by a single company. 
(6) The reduction  of  the fixed  annual charges to less than the 
minimum earnings under probable conditions. 
(d)  Ample provision for additional capital as required in a series 
of  years for the development of  the property and for the greater 
facilities necessitated by  an increased business. 
There were to be issued : 
$I~O,OOO,OOO  in prior lien 100-year 4 per cent gold  bonds, to be 
secured by a mortgage upon the main line, branches, terminals, land 
grant, equipment, and other property embraced in the reorganization 
. . .  and . . .  thereafter acquired.' 
$19o,ooo,ooo in general lien 150-year 3 per cent gold bonds, with a 
lien junior to the previous issue, but covering the same property, of 
which $~go,ooo,ooo  were to be reserved to retire the $13o,ooo,ooo 
prior lien bonds when they should fall due. 
$~O,OOO,OOO  in 4 per cent non-cumulative preferred stock. 
$80,00o,ooo  in common stock. 
Generally speaking, the new prior liens were to go for old first and 
second mortgage bonds, receivers' certificates, equipment trusts, col- 
lateral trust notes, St. Paul & Northern Pacific bonds, and for new 
construction ;  the new general liens for mortgages junior to the second 
mortgage ;  the new preferred stock as additional inducement to the 
'  The  existing general  mortgage  covered  only the  main  line, land  grant,  and 
equipment so far as owned by the company. 
exchanges mentioned  above, and in part for the retirement  of  old 
preferred stock; and the common stock for old pfeferred stock (in 
part) and common stock.  Existing first mortgage bondholders were 
not, however, to be  forced to give up their old securities.  "It is not 
sought in any way to enforce a conversion of  the present general first 
mortgage bonds," said the plan, "and this offer is made solely on the 
belief  that on the terms proposed such conversion, while advantage- 
ous to the company, is also manifestly to the advantage of  the bond- 
holders so converting."  There were reserved $~,OOO,OOO  of  the gen- 
eral liens for new construction, and $2,5oo,ooo new preferred and an 
equal amount of  common were set aside under the general head "to 
provide for reorganization purposes or ava'ilable  as a treasury asset." 
None of  the new bonds were to be subject to drawing or to compul- 
sory redemption prior to their regular maturity.  The proceeds from 
land sales to an amount not exceeding $~OO,OOO  in any year were to 
be  devoted to the redemption by  purchase and cancellation of  the 
new bonds, purchases to be made of  prior liens so long as these could 
be secured at not over 110, after which to continue of  the securities 
next in rank.  The preferred stock was to have a claim for 4 per cent 
before anything should be  paid on the common stock, and was to 
participate equally with the common after 4 per cent had been paid 
on each.  There was to be  a voting trust until November I, 1901, 
unless closed out earlier by the voting trustees, after the expiration of 
which the preferred stock was to have the right to elect a majority of 
the board of  directors whenever for two successive years 4 per cent 
dividends on their holdings should not have been paid.  No addi- 
tional mortgage was to be put upon the property, and the amount of 
preferred stock was not to be increased, except, in each instance, 
after obtaining the consent of  a majority of  the whole amount of  the 
preferred stock, given at a meeting of  the stockholders called for that 
purpose, and the consent of  a majority of  such common stock as 
should be represented at such meeting, the holders of  each class of 
stock voting separately.  During the existence of  the voting trust the 
consent of  holders of  like amounts of  the respective classes of  bene- 
ficial certificates was to be necessary.  There was to be an assessment 
of  $10  on preferred stock and of  $15  on common.  Branch lines were 
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with separately, and a fair basis of  adjustment arrived at, for which 
general lien  3 per  cents  and  new  preferred  stmk were  reserved. 
There was to be an underwriting syndicate, formed by J. P. Morgan 
& Company, and the Deutsche Bank  of  Berlin, to the subscribed 
amount of  $45,ooo,ooo, to provide amounts of  cash estimated to be 
necessary to carry out the terms of  the plan, and to furnish the new 
company with some $~,OOO,OOO  working capital for early use in bet- 
terments  and enlargements of  its property.  The syndicate's com- 
pensation was not stated in the plan, but was to be "reasonable," 
and in addition to it the sum of  per cent of  the par value of  all 
securities deposited was to be paid to J. P. Morgan & Company and 
the  Deutsche  Bank for their  respective services as managers and 
depositaries.  Finally, at the discretion of  the managers, the various 
properties were  to be  sold  under one of  the several mortgages in 
default, and a successor company was to be organized.' 
An  examination of  this plan shows that the total capitalization 
proposed, exclusive of  bonds and stock reserved for new construc- 
tion, etc.,  amounted to $311,ooo,ooo;  of  which  $161,ooo,ooo  were 
4 per  cent  and  3  per  cent  bonds  and  $15o,ooo,ooo  stock.  The 
reported capitalization of  the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1893 had 
been $218,685,631, including the bonds of branch roads guaranteed ; 
but comparison of  this figure with that given by the plan is not fair, 
because in 1893 the Northern Pacific property had  been owned by 
fifty-four distinct corporations, which  the reorganization proposed 
to consolidate into one.  A comparison of  the total bonds and stock 
issued by the fifty-four corporations with the issue under the reorgan- 
ization plan reveals an increase from $271,949,044 to $311,ooo,ooo, 
or 14.3 per cent.  At the same time fixed charges were to be decreased, 
according to estimates, from $1o,S;o9,690  to $6,052,660; to cover 
which the managers reported net earnings of  $6,015,846 for the year 
ending June 30, 1895, and of  $7,801,645 for the average of  the five 
years ending with that date.  It will be observed, therefore, that the 
plan left no margin between net earnings in 1895 and fixed charges, 
but relied upon an increase in earnings for the future to preserve the 
solvency of  the road.  It is,  however, only just  to say that the net 
See Circular of  the Reorganization Committee,  or  Chron.  62: 550,  1896;  Ry. 
Times, 69: 287-8,  1896. 
earnings in 1895 were less than they had been in any year since 1887, 
with the exception of  1894, and that  a considerable increase was 
probable.  The large reduction in fixed charges which was to take 
place was to be chiefly at the expense of  holders of  the consolidated 
mortgage bonds of  1889.  These unfortunate investors received but 
129 per cent in new securities, of  which nearly one-half was stock, in 
return for a reduction in their fixed annual income from 5 to 2 per 
cent, the reason being the inferior character of  their mortgage lien. 
That  securityholders who had  consented  to  exchange their  prior 
securities in 1889 for the consols then issued in the hope of  benefiting 
the road should have fared considerably worse than bondholders who 
had refused to make concession~is  an example of  the injustice some- 
times occasioned by successive reorganizations and refundings.  Of 
the other securities the second mortgage  received  prior  liens  and 
stock sufficient to bring its return over 6 per cent, providing the road 
should  earn  it,  and the  third  mortgage  and  dividend certificates 
received general liens and stock sufficient to yield  something over 
5 per cent except in very prosperous times, when their income would 
be larger.  The underlying principle in these cases was the union of  a 
security with a fixed claim on earnings with a security with a condi- 
tional claim only.  The first mortgage received no stock, and so was 
denied participation in future profits, but in recompense gave up only 
some .6 per cent in the annual income received.  The collateral trust 
notes fared nearly as badly as the consolidated mortgage, but the 
northwest equipment stock was  paid off  in cash.  In brief, all secur- 
ities but the equipment stock yielded something, and the greatest sac- 
rifices were demanded from the junior securities.  On the other hand, 
the stock was far from escaping unscathed.  On January  2,  1896, 
the quoted  prices were 33 for common  and 129 for preferred.  As 
against this the plan made assessments of  $I  5 on common and $10 on 
'preferred ; -  sums which could obviously be demanded only because 
of  the probable future appreciation of  the shares. A point in favor of 
the stock was the fact that the reduction in fixed charges brought it 
nearer a dividend; although it must be remembered that the common 
stock had to divide any return above 4 per cent with the preferred. 
The other salient points of  the plan were the provision for paying 
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improvements, for consolidation of  branch lines with the main stem, 
and for a voting trust.  The total floating debt in 1895 amounted to 
over  $zo,ooo,ooo,  of  which  $4,900,000  consisted  of  outstanding 
receivers' certificates and $8,329,205 of  interest matured and unpaid.l 
The unpaid interest was provided for in the exchanges which have 
already been described ;  the receivers' certificates were cancelled by 
prior lien bonds, and the balance was provided  for by assessment. 
This method was a sound one.  The provision for new construction, 
betterments, etc., was  liberal, consisting of  $25,000,000  prior  lien 
bonds, of  which no more than $1,5oo,ooo  were to be issued in any 
year, and $4,ooo,ooo general lien bonds, presumably to be used as 
needed.  One of  the great difficulties in the history of  the company 
had been the lack of  necessary capital for needed work upon the line, 
and it was well that future requirements were provided for.  The  con- 
solidation of  the branch lines into the parent company was also wise. 
"As  it  [the Northern  Pacific system] now  stands,"  the committee 
said, "the system, in its form of  incorporation and capitalization, is 
a development without  method or adequate preparation for growth. 
Scarcely any single security is complete in itself.  The main line mort- 
gages cover neither feeders nor terminals.  The terminal mortgages 
may  be  bereft  of  their  main  line  support.  The branch  lines are 
dependent on the main line for interchange of  business and the main 
line owes a large part of  its business tothe branch  line^."^  The plan 
contemplated separate  bargains  with  each  branch.  Negotiations 
were carried on during 1896, and some of  the arrangements arrived 
at were  as follows:  The bondholders of  the Northern  Pacific  & 
Manitoba Terminal and of  the James River Valley Railroad agreed 
to take 50  per cent in new Northern  Pacific 3 per cent bonds and 
50 per cent in preferred stock, and to allow the Northern Pacific to 
retain their pr~perty.~  Bondholders of  the Duluth  & Manitoba were 
given 90 per cent in cash.'  Bondholders of  the Spokane & Palouse 
received 523 per cent cash, 523 per cent in general 3s, and 25  per cent 
in Northern Pacific preferred stockj5  and Helena  & Red Mountain 
In addition there were $73,875  of  unpaid interest on receivers'  certificates. 
a  See R.  R. Gaz. 28: 219, 1896,  for editorial on plan. 
Ibid. 28: 349, 1896. 
'  Chron. 62: 1139,  1896;  Ibid. 63:  155, 1896. 
Chron. 62:  990, 1896;  Ibid.  62: 1041,  1896. 
bondholders agreed to accept IOO  per cent in new preferred.'  A num- 
ber of  the branches were foreclosed and bought in by the Northern 
Pacific reorganization committee, and the net result was an exceed- 
ingly beneficial unification of  the system.  Finally, the voting trust 
was designed to secure permanence in policy during the first years 
of  the new company's existence.  The idea has been a common, and 
on the whole a wise one.  In this case the membership represented 
fairly  the  interests  which  had  been  prominent  throughout  the 
receivership, and consisted of  J. P. Morgan, George Siemans, repre- 
senting the Deutsche Bank, August Belmont, Johnston Livingston, 
and Charles Lanier.  The trustees were to fill their own vacancies, 
except that  the successors of  George Siemans were  always to be 
nominated by the Deutsche Bank. 
In  the main the plan was a good one, following a sound principle, 
and reducing fixed  charges to a point which, if  not far below the 
danger-line, proved low enough in view of  the subsequent develop- 
ment  in  business.  Current  opinion was  generally  favorable, and 
criticised only the amount  of  profits which the  syndicate was to 
secure on the basis of  its large subscribed capital.  Mr. Hill of  the 
Great Northern said : "I think the Northern Pacific reorganization 
plan will be  successful.  The promoters have adopted  a  conserva- 
tive policy,  and have marked  the interest charges down.  We  are 
entirely satisfied to have the Northern  Pacific securityholders run 
the road,  pay its debts,  and be charged with the responsibility of 
meeting all its proper obligations, rather than to have it  operated 
by the officers of  two or three courts which are continually contending 
as to jurisdiction."  By  April 23,  when the time for deposits ex- 
pired, the reorganization committee was  able to announce that it 
held over 923 per cent in amount of  general, second, and third mort- 
gage  bonds,  dividend  certificates, consolidated  mortgage  bonds, 
collateral trust  notes,  preferred  stock,  common  stock,  northwest 
equipment stock, and Northern Pacific and Montana first mortgage 
bonds,  and  that  the  plan  and agreement was  therefore declared 
operati~e.~  By June a majority of  the first mortgage bonds had been 
secured, and it was announced that after June 30 the basis of con- 
Chron. 62:  1088,  1896.  '  Ry. Times, 69: 511,  1896. 
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version of this issue would be reduced from 135 to 132 per cent in new 
4 per cent prior lien bonds.  On July 24 the Northern Pacific Rail- 
way  filed  its articles of  incorporation at St. Paul, Minnesota, and 
the next day the sale of  the property took place, in spite of  suits by 
the general creditors and the preferred stockholders.  The sale was 
in  three  parcels,  and the property was  bid  in for $12,500,000 by 
Mr. Winter,  the newly  elected  president.  After the  first  sale the 
company's lands in Wisconsin were offered and bid in for $575,000, 
and two days later the lands west  of  the Missouri were bought in 
for sums aggregating $600,000.  Finally, on August 4, the  lands in 
Washington and Oregon were bought in for $1,705,200 and $558,000 
respectively.  The property of  the company was turned over by the 
receivers to the reorganization committee at midnight, August 31, 
and on  November  7 the final step in the reorganization plan was 
taken by the formal authorization by the stockholders of  the issue 
of  $190,000,000 of  bonds.' 
From 1896 to the present time the Northern Pacific has enjoyed 
a development scarcely less noteworthythan that of  the Union Pacific. 
Gross earnings have increased from $23,679,718 in  1898, the first 
full year after the receivership, to $68,534,832 in 1907; net revenue 
from $13,471,544  to $33,208,840; and mileage from 4350 to 5444. 
Gross earnings per mile were $5443 in 1898; they were $12,590 in 
1907.  The retirement of  the eastern terminus of  the system from 
Chicago to St.  Paul and  Minneapolis was  accomplished in the 
course of 1897 by arrangement for connection with the Chicago  & 
Northwestern instead of  with the Wisconsin  Central, and the sale 
of  the certificates of  proprietary interest in the Chicago Terminal 
Transfer Railroad received  by the Northern Pacific under the Chi- 
cago & Northerp Pacific plan of  reorganization ;  while the improve- 
ment  of  the  position  of  the  new  mortgages has  been  vigorously 
prosecuted by the rapid drawing for redemption of  old first mortgage 
bonds at 110, and by the calling of  the entire issue of  the Missouri 
division bonds at par and accrued interest. 
1  Curiously enough the sale did not extinguish the old Northern Pacific Railroad 
Company.  Some  25,000 or  more  shares did not assent to the  reorganization plan 
and are still outstanding.  They assert that it is because of  the& that the old organ- 
ization is kept up. 
In the years following 1897 large sums have been spent for bctter- 
ments and enlargements.  Some $68,500,000 have been invested from 
the proceeds of  the sale of  prior lien  bonds  and of  miscellaneous 
assets, and over $18,ooo,m have been temporarily withdrawn from 
income for  the same purpose.'  Grades  have  been  reduced, lines 
straightened, new branches  built, real estate acquired, track relaid 
and ballasted,  bridges strengthened  and  renewed,  equipment  re- 
built  and increased in amount,  and other similar betterments un- 
dertaken.  It is a work which all the great American systems have 
carried on, but the Northern  Pacific has surpassed even the Union 
Pacific in the extent of  its operations.  Ordinary maintenance re- 
quirements have not meanwhile been neglected, and in  1906 and 
1p7  the Northern  Pacific set aside $2,000,000 for depreciation of 
equipment, which is over and above the other sums which have been 
mentioned.  The company  owned  1255  locomotives on  June  30, 
1907, of  an average weight of  174,000 pounds; in 1898 it had owned 
542 of  an average weight of  104,000 pounds.  It had 42,000 freight 
cars in 1907 with an average capacity of  over 33 tons; it had pos- 
sessed 18,500 in 1898 of  an average capacity of  22  tons.  Seventy- 
five per cent of  the main line was  laid with track of  72 pounds or 
over in  1906, but only thirteen  per cent in  1898.  In consequence 
heavier trains are ruq2  at a less expense per ton, and the net revenue 
is correspondingly increased.  Even the liberal expenditures which 
have  hitherto  been  made  are  insufficient, however,  for  present 
conditions, and the stockholders have approved a proposal to issue 
$93,ooo,m of  new common stock at par for the purpose of  extend- 
ing the Northern Pacific's mileage and facilities.' 
The endeavor to stimulate traffic to fill  the trains has led to im- 
portant  developments.  In order to increase the exchange of  com- 
modities between their territory and the Middle West, to establish 
stable conditions on transcontinental business and thereby to secure 
back  loading  for  their  cars,  the  Great  Northern  and  Northern 
From  1898 to  1907 inclusive.  This does not  include advances to  subsidiary 
companies, which have aggregated nearly $ao,ooo,ooo. 
'  The average train load in 1907 was 406.77 tons; that in  1898 was  264.59 tons. 
Chron. 83: 1524%  1906; Ibid. 84: 103, 1907.  The new issue is to go in part for 
improvements previously made  out  of  income.  The directors  have  adopted  the 
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Pacific in 1901 arranged for the purchase of  the Burlington system 
which connected both their lines with Chicago.  The refusal to share 
their purchase with Mr. Harriman led to the competitive purchase 
of  Northern Pacific stock by rival interests, and to the retirement of 
the Northern Pacific preferred, but did not prevent the consumma- 
tion of  the deal.'  This purchase has been  a profitable one.  The 
Burlington has paid in dividends upon its stock almost enough to 
cover the interest on the bonds issued to acquire it, and the indirect 
effects of  its control have satisfied expectations.  Indeed, the east- 
bound lumber traffic has so developed that the Great Northern has 
recently raised its lumber rates in order once more to equalize east- 
and west-bound shipments. 
The Northern  Pacific has been  openly dominated  by  the Hill- 
Morgan interests for the last six years, and probably has been under 
their control since its reorganization.  From the financial as well as 
from the traffic point of view its position is secure.  The voting trust 
was dissolved in 1901 "by reason," in the words of  the trustees, "of 
the evidence of financial strength, conservative management, skilful 
and profitable operation, superior physical condition of  the property, 
and the reasonable prospect of  continued prosperity."  In 1907, out 
of  a net income of  $33,208,840 only $9,575,183 were  paid out for 
interest, rentals, and taxes, and $2~,473,~29  were left for dividends, 
improvements,  and  reserve.  This whole  sum,  which  amounts to 
33 per cent of  gross income, is available as a protection for the mort- 
gage bonds; and a  considerable portion could  be  dispensed with 
without forcing a decrease in the present rate of   dividend^.^  It is 
likely that the coming years will see a check in the advance of  na- 
tional prosperity, but the Northern Pacific is in excellent condition 
to stand the strain. 
For this and for an account of  the Northern Securities episode see B. H. Meyer, 
A History of  the Northern Securities Case, Bulletin of  the University of  Wisconsin, 
July,  1906. 
Annual Report,  1901. 
The dividends declared by the Northern Pacific Railway have been: 
1898  1899  1900  1901  1902  1903  1904  1905  1906  1907 
Common stock  2  4  4  54  7  62  7  7  st* 
Preferred stock  5  4  4  4  I 
* Including August. 
CHAPTER  IX 
ROCK  ISLAND 
Charter -  Early prosperity -  Reorganization of  1880 -  Conservative policy -  Ex- 
tension -  Pays dividends throughout the nineties -  Moores obtain control -  Re- 
organization of  1902 -  Further  extensions -  Impaired credit  of  the company. 
THE  original Rock Island Railroad, chartered in 1847,' was com- 
pleted  between  Chicago and Rock Island  in  1854.  Construction 
was continued from Rock Island to Council Bluffs across the state 
of  Iowa,  under  the charter  of  the Mississippi  & Missouri, until 
1866, when this company was merged with the original Rock Island 
Railroad  Company, and after 1866 under the Rock Island charter 
until the extension was completed in 1869.  Unlike the Atchison, the 
Rock Island  passed through  a fairly well-settled  territory,  which 
was at the same time one of  the most fertile in the United States. 
In 1870, according to the census returns, Iowa produced 28,708,312 
bushels of spring wheat out of  a total for the United States of  112,- 
549,733 bushels, more than any other state in the Union; while Illi- 
nois in its yield of winter wheat was surpassed by Indiana and Ohio 
alone.  Of Indian corn  Iowa and Illinois together produced  198,- 
856,460 bushels against 562,088,089 for all other states combined. 
Manufactures were  well  begun,  and  even  mining had  attained  a 
considerable development, particularly in the extraction of  bitumin- 
ous coal  in  Illinois.  Naturally  the  road  was  prosperous;  gross 
earnings increased from $3,154,236 in  1866 to $5,995,226 in 1870, 
and to $9,409,833 in  1879; while  net  earnings attained the  very 
considerable sum of  $4,548,117  in  1879, being 48 per  cent  of  the 
gross receipts. At the same time the capitalization was very moderate, 
due to the relatively level character of  the country through which 
the road ran, and, not less important, to the absence of  speculative 
financial operations in the course of  its construction.  To  build 1231 
miles had cost in 1879  but  $35,664,200,  of  which  $4,702,202  had 
been supplied from earnings; leaving a total of  bonds and stocks of 
Poor's Manual, 1878.  The name was first the Rock Island & La  Salle Railroad 
Company, and was changed to the Chicago  & Rock Island Railroad Company in 
February, 1851. ROCK  ISLAND  3I3 
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$30,96z,ow, or $25, I 51  per  mile.  Fixed  charges were,  therefore, 
low.  In 1875, when net earnings were $3,853,676, interest on bonds, 
taxes, and  all other necessary disbursements took but $1,065,395; 
and in  1879 the  payments were markedly less.  Is it  strange that 
the troubles of  the road came from too great earnings rather than 
from too small, and that  instead of  striving to maintain  solvency 
the directors had to seek ways and means for concealing or getting 
rid of  earnings without arousing the hostility of  legislators to whom 
10 per cent dividends seemed high, and anything over 10 per cent 
proof  of  extortion?  Between 1866 and 1876 four cash distributions 
of  10 per cent were made to stockholders, five of  8 per cent, one of 
83 per cent, and one of  73 per cent.  The dividend for 1879 was again 
10  per cent, that of  1878 8 per cent, and that for 1879 93 per cent. 
Meanwhile large sums were carried to surplus.  The balance, after 
all disbursements, never after 1873 fell below $665,000, and in 1879 
was nearly equal to the dividend declared; that is, while distribut- 
ing $1,~~3,086,  or  9.5  per  cent, the road  earned, over and above 
charges, $3,947,065, or 18.8 per cent. 
It was inevitable that some attempt should be made to increase 
the distribution to stockholders; and the most obvious method was 
the one adopted, viz., a watering of  the stock.  The plan devised in 
1880 was as follows : It was proposed to consolidate various branches 
of  the railroad company, hitherto operated as separate corporations, 
with the main line; and to do this through the formation of  a new 
company, which should exchange its stock for the stock of  the pre- 
viously existing corporations in the ratio of  two to one.  Practically 
all the stock  retired  was  owned  by  the  Chicago, Rock Island  & 
Pacific Railroad Company, so that the only increase in stock out- 
standing came through the distribution to the stockholders of  the 
parent company.  In March the executive committee of  the Rock 
Island passed the following resolution : "  Resolved, that the proposi- 
tion to consolidate the capital stock, property, rights, franchises, and 
privileges of  the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company 
with  the capital stock, property, rights, franchises, and  privileges 
of  the Iowa Southern & Missouri Northern Railroad Company, the 
Newton  & Monroe Railroad  Company, the Avoca,  Macedonia & 
Southwestern  Railroad  Company, and  the  Atlantic  & Audubon 
Railroad Company into a consolidated Railroad Company, with an 
authorized  capital  of  $5o,ooo,m,  and  such  powers  as  shall be 
assumed in the articles of  consolidation, be submitted to a vote of  the 
stockholders  of  this company at their annual meeting."'  Of  the roads 
named only the Iowa Southern & Missouri Northern was of  import- 
ance, extending 270 miles from Washington, Iowa, to Leavenworth, 
with branches which raised its total to 347 miles.  This company had 
been organized as the Chicago & Southwestern Railroad Company, 
and the main line had been completed in 1871.  The Chicago, Rock 
Island  & Pacific Railroad Company had guaranteed its $5,m,m 
main-line bonds, with a provision that it could demand foreclosure if 
called upon to pay  either interest or principal, and in return had 
secured a lease in perpetuity.  The road had been sold under fore- 
closure and reorganized in 1875 as the Iowa Southern & Missouri 
Northern, and had issued its stock to the Rock Island in return for 
money advanced by that company, the stock to be held in trust to 
1926, and then to become the property of  the lessee.  The other roads 
did not together possess more than 80  miles of  line, so that the oper- 
ation was a genuine case of  stock-watering. The opinion of  the stock- 
holders may be inferred from the quotations of  their shares.  Between 
January 2 and June I, 1880, the quotations of  Rock Island common 
rose from 149 to 189, with few sales, in anticipation of  the distribu- 
tion.  On June 2 the stockholders formally gave their approval, and 
on June 4 the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway started on its 
~areer.~  The price of  the new stock was of  course less than that of  the 
old.  It started at 1064, but by December it had reached 1221, and 
by June the following year had risen to over 141. 
This may be called Rock Island's first reorganization. It doubled 
the stock of  the road, and increased its indebtedness by the assump- 
tion  of  the $5,ooo,m  bonds  of  the  Iowa  Southern  & Missouri 
Northern;  but the new stock involved no increase in fixed charges, 
and the new bonds a nominal increase only.  Instead of  being occa- 
sioned by  too  little  prosperity it  was  caused  by  too  much; and 
instead of  being carried through after active opposition from many 
of  the interests concerned, and reluctant acquiescence from theothers, ROCK  ISLAND  315  3 I4  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
it occasioned a rise in price of  the common stock of  27 per cent in six 
months. 
Between this date and 1902  no reorganization occurred.  A rapid 
review of  the period brings out, however, certain interesting features : 
First, that  the  stockholders and the directors were extremely con- 
servative ;  second, that this conservatism did not keep the road from 
sharing in the expansion of  mileage from  1887-9,  which  was so 
general in the Middle West ;  thud, that this expansion decreased the 
average receipts per  mile,  and consequently the rate of  dividends, 
and occasioned a fall in  stock quotations from 1408 to 632 ;  fourth, 
that though weakened the road went through the panic of  1893 and 
the subsequent depression without suspending dividends ;  and fifth, 
that the year 1901  saw  the beginning of  a  new  expansion  of  the 
system, accompanied by a change in control and the carrying out 
of more  ambitious plans than had ever occurred to the men of  the 
previous generation. 
The copservatism of  the stockholders  is shown in the election, year 
after year, of  the same men to positions of  authority.  Rock Island 
was  not  a  speculative road; the high  price  of  its stock  forbade. 
Stockholders regarded their shares as permanent investments, and, 
satisfied with the returns secured, loyally supported the management 
in good times and in bad.  Between 1875 and 1897 there were but two 
presidents, Mr. Riddle holding the position until  1883, and then 
giving way to Mr. R. R. Cable, who, after directing the policy of  the 
company for fourteen years,  served  as chairman of  the board of 
directors from 1898 to 1901.  Among the five members of  the execu- 
tive committee, if  the reckoning is begun with the year 1881,  three 
had been in office five years by  1886, one 2 years, and one I year, 
or an average of  33 years.  In 1891  two members had been  in 10 
years, one 7 years, one 6 years, and one I year, or an average of 
6$ years ;  and in 1901 one member had been in 20  years, one I 7 years, 
one 8 years, one 3 years, and one 2 years, or an average of  10 years. 
The board of  directors showed the same general tendency.  In 1890 
seven of  the thirteen directors had served for 9 years, and the aver- 
age service was 6&  years ;  in 1897 four of  the directors had served for 
16  years, and the average was  It was but natural that men 
For the attempt of Vanderbilt to get representation on the board see the pamphlet 
working under these conditions should have been apt to err on the 
side of caution rather than on the side of  recklessness ;  and we iind 
them, therefore, slow to extend their system, and slow to stretch into 
new territory where traffic returns were uncertain, and where the 
road had to create its business as it went.  At the date of  the consoli- 
dation the company had become the owner of  1038 miles and oper- 
ated under lease 273 miles more, or a total of  1311 miles.  By 1883 
this had  been  increased to 1381;  but  in  1887 the total was only 
1384.2, showing a total construction.of little over three miles in four 
years. 
This policy had to be abandoned, for other roads were extending 
their  lines in  Iowa  and  Illinois,  and  the  Rock Island's  share of 
Western business tended to fall off  with the construction of  rival lines 
west of  the Missouri.  As the report of  1889 expressed it, "while the 
lines of  this company terminated at the Missouri its competitors for 
business had extended beyond, reaching in many cases the extreme 
western boundaries of  population and even further.  Thus the volume 
of traffic  received by the company for carriage to and from the West 
was  materially affected, while in order to restore the equilibrium 
overbalanced by the reduction in rates, the reverse was necessary, a 
larger rather than a smaller share of  the tonnage to and from points 
west of  the Missouri was demanded by the situation."  The directors 
were forced against their will to take active measures in self-protec- 
tion.  As early as 1884 a bond issue was approved for construction 
from  Minneapolis  westward  to  an  eventual  junction  with  the 
Northern Pacifi~.~  Building was to be carried on in the name of  the 
Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad Company, and the secur- 
ities of  this company were to be received by the Rock Island as col- 
lateral for the issue which it made?  Two years later more extensive 
plans were put on foot, and the Chicago, Kansas  & Nebraska Rail- 
road Company was organized to cany out construction west of  the 
Missouri.  The new company had a capital stock of  $I 5,000,000, and 
then (1887) of  $30,000,000, and an indebtedness in 1889 of  $25,141,- 
issued by  the Rock  Island Company at this time; also R  R  Gaz.  16:  420, 1884; 
Annual Report, 1884;  Ry. Age, 9: 428, 18& 
'  R. R. Gaz.  16:  @I,  1884. 
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ooo  6 per cent fist mortgage bonds ;  and turned over all of  its bonds, 
and practically all of  its stock to the Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific 
Railway in consideration of  advances made to it.  The Rock Island 
Company in its turn reserved the branch-line bonds as collateral, and 
issued  against  them  its own  5 per  cent  collateral and  extension 
bonds;  agreeing to supply all money needed for construction and 
equipment,'  and leasing the new railway at a rental of  30 per cent of 
its gross earnings.= Under this arrangement 1388 miles were built by 
1889  and  276  leased, making a  total of  1664.4.  In 1889 it  was 
thought more convenient to consolidate the two systems, so interest 
was defaulted on the Chicago, Kansas & Nebraska bonds, and fore- 
elosure proceedings commenced ;  resulting in 1891, in spite of  protests 
by  municipalities along the  route, in a foreclosure sale and union 
of  the two properties in name as well as  in  fact.  The collateral 
bonds of  the  Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific now became a direct 
instead of  an indirect lien upon the Kansas  & Nebraska mileage.s 
Owing to these  operations the mileage  of  the system increased 
from 1384 in 1887 to 3257 in 1889, and to 3408 in 1891.  The greater 
part now lay in Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado instead of  ig Illinois 
and Iowa, while at the same time the addition of  the new mileage 
through sparsely settled districts decreased the density of  traffic and 
the gross and net receipts per mile of  line.  In 1887 the Rock Island 
was earning the very high return of  $8899 gross per mile operated ; 
in 1891 this had fallen to $5126;  in 1887 the net return was $3478 
per mile; in 1891 it  had fallen to $1484;  in other words, the new 
mileage  brought  an increase in traffic, but  not  nearly so  great  a 
traffic per mile as the Iowa and Illinois lines had enjoyed, while the 
financing of the new construction swelled the annual charges from 
$1,795,351  to $4,775,601,  and  even  with  the  larger  mileage  in- 
creased the charges per mile from $1295  in 1887 to  $1400  in 1891. 
We  need  not,  therefore,  be  surprised that  the  rate  of  dividends 
dropped from 7 per cent to 53 per cent and then to 4 per cent ; nor 
that the priceof common stock fell from its high level of  1403 in May, 
1887, to 639 in March, 1891. 
It was in this weakened condition that the Rock Island encoun- 
tered the ianic of  1893 and the years of  depression which followed ; 
Annual Report, 1891.  '  Ibid.  1889.  I  Ibid.  1891. 
and yet,  in spite of the marked decrease in business in the years 
1895-6-7,  it continued to pay dividends,  and showed no signs of 
financial distress except the lowering of  its rate to 2 per cent.  As a 
matter of  fact the road was stiU in these years one of  the strongest in 
the United States.  Its lines were well located, its management was 
conservative, and consequently trusted, and its credit was good; so 
that at a time when some of the largest systems in the United States 
were beiig forced to the wall, it was enabled to preserve its solvency 
and even to keep up fairly liberal expenditures for maintenance of 
way  and  rolling  stock.  Little  new  construction  was  of  course 
indulged  in.  In 1892  an  extension  was  begun  from Minco, the 
terminus of  the Rock Island in the northwest corner of  the Indian 
Temtory,  southwards; '  in  1893  the  southern  boundary  of  the 
Territory was reached, and the Chicago, Rock Island & Texas Rail- 
way  Company was  organized  to  build  through  Texas;  and  in 
1894 a combined line was opened to Fort Worth ; but  exclusive of 
the Chicago, Rock Island  & Texas, the total mileage  increased  by 
but 360 miles between 1890 and 1900, being an average of  33 miles 
a year. 
In 1901 Messrs. William H. Moore and D. G. Reid were elected 
directors in place of  Messrs. H.  M. Flagler and H. A.  Parker, and 
a new era in the road's affairs began.  Mr. Moore had not long been 
interested in railroad matters.  Known as a daring and successful 
promoter  of  industrial  companies, he had  made large profits out 
of  the organization of  the National  Biscuit  and  Diamond Match 
companies;  had  lost  almost equally large amounts in speculation 
which had followed, and had then regained a fortune through the 
organization and  promotion  of  companies which  were  absorbed 
into the United Steel Corporation.  In these last operations he had 
come into contact with Mr. W.  B.  Leeds, who,  though originally 
Annual Report, 1892. 
'  "With  the  Chicago, Rock  Island  & Texas  Railway Company  this company 
has financial and traffic agreements under which the Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific 
Railway Company supplies all funds necessary to build and equip the road in con- 
sideration of  receiving all the stock and all of the bonds of  the Texas company, the 
latter issued at the  rate  of  S15,ooo per mile of  completed road and additional for 
equipment to an amount equal to cost of  the same, not exceeding 5.p~  per mile." 
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a railroad man, had acquired wealth through a tin-plate plant which 
was afterwards turned  over to this  same Steel Corporation.  Mr. 
Moore was apparently in 1901 seeking for an investment.  He was 
too well acquainted with  industrial  properties to care to sink his 
money in them, while he realized that for obvious reasons good rail- 
road property was as safe, and might be made as profitable as any- 
thing else to which he could turn.  The Chicago, Rock Island  & 
Pacific was at the time the system most available for his purpose. 
It was not under the control of any large New York interests; it had 
an excellent financial record ;  its mileage was so placed as to admit 
of  ready expansion; and, moreover, it is probable that to a man of 
Mr.  Moore's  speculative disposition the very low capitalization of 
the road opened up vistas of  almost indehite increase.'  Just when 
Mr. Moore and his friends began their purchases, and what  price 
they paid is of  course largely a matter of  conjecture :  large blocks of 
stock were, however,  undoubtedly secured in the early months of 
1901,  during which time quotations ranged from 116p to 136; and 
it is probable that the larger part of  the purchases were made nearer 
the upper than the lower level.  During the following year the Moore 
party increased their holdings.  It has been said that in April, 1901, 
Messrs.  Moore and Reid were elected to the directorate.  In No- 
vember, 1901, at a special meeting of  the stockholders,  the directors 
were authorized to elect two new members to the executive commit- 
tee, and Messrs. Moore and Wm. B. Leeds were chosen. In Febru- 
ary, 1902,  H. R. Bishop, Tracey Dows, and F. E. Griggs resigned, 
and Geo. McMurtry, F.  L. Hine, and  I?.  S. Wheeler were elected 
directors in their place.  Mr. McMurtry had formerly been president 
of  the American Sheet Steel Company, merged in the Moore Steel 
Combine, and Mr. Hines, vice-president of  the First National Bank 
of  New  York,  presumably  brought the backing of  that  powerful 
in~titution.~  Meanwhile Mr.  James H.  Moore had been chosen a 
director, and the Moore interest had gained control of  the execu- 
tive committee, so that a majority both  of  that  committee and of 
1 Bonded indebtedness, 1900,  amounted to $18,395  Per mile. 
Capital stock, 1900,  amounted to  -  13,711 
$32,106 per mile. 
a  Ry. Age,  33: 186, 1902. 
the board of directors was in their hands.  The new group of  capital- 
ists were not railroad men; their training had been on the financial 
side of  corporation dealings, and the bulk of  what experience they 
had had in actual management had been  derived from industrial 
and not  from railroad  operations.  It was natural,  therefore, that 
the most striking results from their accession to power should appear 
on the financial rather  than on  the operating end, and that their 
ability to manipulate stocks and bonds should prove more unques- 
tionable than their ability to handle railroad affairs.  Results in the 
development of  the Rock  Island  system were, however,  attained, 
and for two reasons: in the first place, the Moores were able, and 
above all enterprising men, and untrammelled by traditions of  con- 
servatism, they were quick to see and bold to execute plans made 
possible by  the admirable location of  their 4000 miles of  road; in 
the second place, they soon had large blocks of  securities which they 
wished to sell, and were impelled to undertake large operations in 
the hope of  raising quotations upon the Exchange. 
In June,  1901,  the stockholders  authorized an increase in  the 
capital  stock  from  $~O,OOO,OOO  to $6o,ooo,ooo;  stockholders  of 
record June 28,1901, to have the right to subscribe at par.'  The pro- 
ceeds were  to go in part  for  extension from Liberal, Kansas, to 
El Paso, Texas, and in part for a new depot and elevation of  tracks 
in  Chicago, and  for  the  improvement  of  the  physical  condition 
of the road.  This El Paso extension plan was  not  new, since in 
December,  1900,  the  Chicago,  Rock  Island  & Mexico,  and  the 
Chicago, Rock  Island & El Paso had been incorporated to build 
a line from Liberal,  Kansas,  to Santa Rosa, New  Mexico; there 
to connect with the El Paso & Northeastern, and to afford a through 
route to the Pacific coast and into Mexico.  The other plans were, 
however, new.  In  April, 1903, the Chicago, Rock Island  & Texas 
filed an amendment to its charter providing for an extension from 
. 
Fort Worth to Galveston, 295  miles.  The same month the sale of 
the Choctaw, Oklahoma  & Gulf  to the Rock Island was officially 
confirmed.  This road has been, with one exception, the most im- 
Stock quotations:  June I,  1g01  15@ 
July I, 1901  155% 
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portant  acquisition  of  the  Moores.  It stretches  from  Memphis, 
Tennessee, through the Indian Territory, Arkansas, and Oklahoma, 
to the border line of  Texas, and furnishes a nearly direct line from 
those  states to the Mississippi River; while  a projected extension 
to New Mexico will connect with the Rock Island main lines to the 
southward, and make it a valuable link in the through route from 
El Paso to Memphis and Birmingham.  The Rock Island paid $80 
a share for the common stock and $60 for the preferred,' and under 
the terms of the sale agreed to take at the same price all stock offered. 
The premium was very large.  Choctaw preferred had been paying 
5 per cent for some years, and the common had received 2 per cent 
in 1889,4 per cent in 1900, and 43 per cent in 1901, plus 10 per cent 
in stock; but reckoned on a basis of  120 and 160 respectively, these 
returns sank to a very modest rate.  The property is a valuable one, 
but will have to show great development to justify its purchase price. 
Payment was made by the issue of  collateral trust 4 per cent bonds 
to the amount of  $23,520,000,  in return for which practically all of 
both issues of  stock were  deposited.  Certain  smaller roads were 
also bought  in.  In June,  1902, the stockholders voted  to increase 
the capital stock from $60,000,000 to $75,ooo,ooo; and in July the 
directors decided to allow the stockholders to subscribe at par for 
$8,235,000 of  the new  issue in amounts equal to  123 per  cent of 
their holdings; -  the new stock to take up shares of  the Burlington, 
Cedar Rapids  & Northern, the Rock Island  & Peoria,  and the 
St. Louis, Kansas City  & color ad^.^  The first of  these roads con- 
nected  the Rock  Island  system with  Minneapolis and  St.  Pa~l.~ 
The Rock Island & Peoria was a short line in the state of  Illinois. 
The St. Louis, Kansas City & Coldrado was to afford, when finished, 
a more direct route  between  the important cities of  St. Louis and 
Kansas City. 
This is  where  matters  stood  when  the reorganization  plan  of 
August,  1902, was brought forward.  There had  been  a refunding 
put through in 1897 whereby some simplification of  bond issues had 
1 The par  was  $50 for both common and pxeferred. 
a  R. R. Gaz. 34: 56a,  1902. 
This line had been leased before, and the majority of  its stock and that of  the 
Rock Island  & Peoria had been owned by the  Chicago, Rock  Island  & Pacific. 
been secured;' but this scheme of  1902 was for a dzerent purpose 
and differed radically in  the methods employed.  Its explanation 
is to be found in the character of  the men in control.  We have seen 
that Mr. Moore had made his reputation in the speculative promo- 
tion of  industrial combinations, that he had entered Rock Island in 
search of  an investment, and that he had thrown himself  into the 
extension of  the system in part because he saw the opportunityfor 
development, in part because he hoped to pave the way for profit- 
able manipulation of  the stock.  The time he had awaited seemed 
now to have arrived.  His projects had caught public attention, com- 
ment on the whole had been favorable, and the price of  his shares 
was at a high level; all indications pointed to the probable success 
of  a scheme of  stock-watering on an enormous scale.  At  the same 
time Mr. Moore was too well  pleased with the position he had at- 
tained to wish  to sacrifice it by  the sale of  his holdings; and his 
desire was, therefore, to devise an arrangement whereby the stock 
of  the Rock Island should be inflated and large blocks sold to the 
confiding public, while the control should remain where it had been 
before, -in  the hands of  Mr. Moore and his followers.  It is to be 
noticed that there was no call for a reorganization by the creditors 
of  the road, and no question of  a default  in interest, or even of a 
cessation of  dividends upon  the common stock ;  nor, on the other 
hand, were earnings so great that the managers felt it unwise to dis- 
tribute them.  The reason for the reorganization was entirely the 
financial ambition of  the Moore group and the chance which its 
members saw of making larger profits than the earnings of  the pro- 
perty would ever bring. 
With these objects the following plan was put through.  Instead 
of  one Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific Company the Moores now 
proposed  to have three  companies,  of  which  one was to operate 
the railroad, one was to hold the stock of  the operating company, 
and one was to hold the stock of the company which held the stock 
of  the operating company.  That is to say, the Chicago, Rock  Island 
& Pacific Railway Company was left  undisturbed,  while in Iowa 
a Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific Railroad  Company was formed 
to hold the stock of  the Railway Company, and  in  New  Jersey 
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a Rock Island Company was organized to hold the stock of  the Rail- 
road  Company, and  of  such acquisitions as might  afterwards be 
made.  The retention of  the Railway Company made unnecessary 
the consent of  creditors, for the lien and interest rate of  outstanding 
bonds remained the same as before ;  the formation of  the Railroad 
Company served  apparently to meet  legal requirements;  and  the 
organization of  the Rock  Island Company seemed  likely to make 
more easy the  purchase of  parallel and competing lines.  But the 
great  advantage of  the new companies lay in the opportunities for 
stock inflation which  they presented, together with  the lessening of 
the amount of  capital required for  control.  This appears  plainly 
in the following : The old Railway Company had a capital stock of 
$75,ooo,ooo; the new Railroad Company issued stock to the amount 
of  $IZ~,OOO,OOO  and 4 per cent bonds to the amount of  $75,000,000. 
The Rock  Island  Company issued  common  stock  to  a  total of 
$96,ooo,ooo and preferred stock to a total of  $54,000,000; and the 
aggregate, excluding the undisturbed  bonds of  the Railway Com- 
pany, footed up to $425,000,000 instead of  to $75,000,000 as before. 
From this total must be deducted $200,000,000, which represented 
issues of  stock by one company to another, and $21,ooo,m  Rock 
Island  Company stock and $I,  500,000  Railroad  Company bonds 
reserved for future extension, leaving a net increase from $75,000,- 
000 to $202,50o,ooo. This involved some increase in fixed chargcq 
since 4 per  cent on  $75,000,000 became obligatory; but the true 
significance lay in the inflation of  principal rather than in the in- 
crease of  interest charges, opening as it did an opportunity for great 
profit to the managers in the sale of  the new securities. An incidental 
result was the transformation of  the Rock Island shares from in- 
vestment securities to media for speculation.  At the same tide the 
investment  required  for  control was  diminished.  $75,000,000  of 
Railway  stock  was  exchanged  for  $75,ooo,ooo  Railroad  bonds, 
$96,ow,ooo Rock Island Company common stock, and $54,000,000 
Rock  Island  Company preferred  stock.  Of  these the bonds  ob- 
viously had no voting rights.  To both the common and preferred 
stock the right to vote was given, but in unequal degrees.  "Until 
the number thereof  shall be  increased,"  read the certificate of  in- 
corporation of the Rock Island Company, "  the number of  directors 
shall be nine.  There shall be five classes of  directors.  The first class 
shall contain a majority of  the whole  number of  the directors as 
fixed at any time by the by-laws. . . .  The holders of  the preferred 
stock shall have the right, to the exclusion of  the holders of  the com- 
mon  stock, to choose  directors of  the  first class. . . ." In other 
words, to the preferred stock, which constituted a minority of  the 
whole, was given the right toelect a majority of  the board of  directors ; 
so that whereas in the old Railway Company 51  per cent of  $75,000,- 
000 common stock, selling at from 120 to 179, had been required for 
control, in the new combination of  companies 51 per cent of  $54,000,- 
ooo Rock Island Company preferred stock, selling at 833, was suffi- 
cient to the same end, in spite of  a doubling of  the stock outstanding. 
To repeat:  Two new  corporations were  formed,  of  which  the 
Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific Railroad Company of  Iowa issued 
$125,000,000  stock to the Rock Island Company of  New Jersey, and 
in return received $127,500,000  Rock Island preferred and common 
stock.  With this stock, and with $75,000,000 of its own bonds, the 
Railroad Company purchased the $75,000,000 stock of  the Chicago, 
Rock Island  & Pacific Railway Company, paying for every $100 
in shares 
$100 in Rock Island Company common stock; 
70 in Rock  Island Company preferred stock; and 
IOO in its own 4 per cent bonds. 
The Railway shares acquired were pledged for the Railroad bonds, 
and from them came the total income of the Railroad Company; and 
dividends upon the Railroad shares, together with dividends upon 
shares of  other companies which it might chance to own, constituted 
the total income of  the Rock Island Company.  After thus receiving 
indirectly the earnings of  the Railway Company through two sets of 
dividends, the Rock  Island  Company paid  dividends on  its own 
shares, which  were held  by  the public; the preferred  stock being 
entitled to 4 per cent from 1903 to 1909 inclusive, to 5 per cent from 
1910  to 1916  inclusive, and to 6 per cent thereafter. 
Other provisions were as follows :  The Rock Island common stock 
might  be  increased from time to time according to law,  but  the 
amount of  the preferred stock could not be increased except with the 
assent of  the holders of  two-thirds of  the entire preferred stock and 
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two-thirds of the entire common stock at the time outstanding, given 
at a meeting called for that purpose.  Preferred stock was to be pre- 
ferred as to principal as well as to interest; it had the right, as has 
been said, to elect a majority of  the board of  directors, but this right 
could be surrendered by the affirmative vote of  the holders of  two- 
thirds in amount of  the preferred stock at the time outstanding at a 
special meeting of  the holders of  the preferred stock called for that 
purpose.  A Finance Committee might be appointed from and by the 
directors which should have such powers as the directors and stock- 
holders should choose to give it, and which should have all the powers 
of  the directors when the board was not in session.  The directors 
might accumulate working capital, but no reservation for working 
capital should be made in any year out of the surplus or net profits 
of  such year until after the payments for such year of  the dividends 
on the preferred stock of  the company. The directors might also use 
the working capital in  purchasing or  acquiring the shares of  the 
capital stock of  the company as they might  deem expedient, but 
shares so purchased might be resold unless retired for the purpose of 
decreasing the capital stock of  the company.'  This last provision 
aroused so much criticism that the directors gave up the right  of 
dealing in the shares of  their own company by resolution of Novem- 
ber 5,  1902. 
The important features of  this reorganization were, as has been 
indicated, those in connection with the inflation of  the capitalization 
and with the control of  the property.  In this connection it may be 
asked, first, whether the Moores made a profit by the deal; second, 
how large an investment they have had to keep in the property in 
order to retain control; and third, what cost to them this investment 
represents. 
On January  2,  1902,  Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific Railway 
Company common was quoted at 154.  On February I it was 1624, 
on April I, I 79, on July I, 1723, on August I, I go, on October I, 200, 
and on November I, 1993.  It is safe to assume that the rise from 
1723 to 200 was due to the publication of  the plan, and it may be that 
some of  the earlier increase in  value was  owing to purchases by 
insiders, or by people who had obtained some inkling of  what was 
1 Annual Report,  rgoj. 
Wig considered ; but  a comparison of  the aggregate value of  the 
securities given for the railway common stock on January 3,  1903, 
with the price of  the stock on July I, 1902,  shows that the former 
exceeded the latter by 22.3 points, with the error tending toward an 
understatement ,of the excess.  That is, for every $1723  invested in 
July,  1902,  the  Moores, and  other  stockholders with  them, held 
securities worth $194.8  in  January of  the following year.  During 
1903 the Rock Island securities fell with others upon the market, till 
on January  2,  1904, the aggregate value of  the stocks and bonds in 
question was only $132.2 ; but the decline was temporary, and by 
January 3,1905, recovery to $176.6 had taken place.  The operations 
therefore did result in a chance for large profits, and gave renewed 
evidence that the public demand for stocks and bonds does not fall off 
proportionately to an increase in their volume.' 
It is obvious that neither before nor after the reorganization could 
the Moores have sold all their holdings and yet have kept control. 
Starting again with the price of  1723 for Chicago, Rock Island  & 
Pacific Railway common on July I, 1902, it may be calculated that 
the cost of  a majority of  the issue then footed up to $64,687,672.  If 
this had been carried on margin, and the brokers had demanded on 
every share a deposit of  $40,  with $40  more instantly available if 
needed, the total investment required for control would have been 
$I 5,000,040, with as much more held in readiness for any emergency. 
On January 2, 1903, Rock Island preferred stock was selling at 833, 
and the cost of  a majority of  the whole issue would have been $22,- 
545,083 ;  which, if  carried on margin with a deposit of  $20  a share, 
would have represented an investment of  $5,400,020, with as much 
more  in  reserve.  In other  words,  while  all went  well,  less  than 
$II,OOO,OOO  sufficed to control properties with a total mileage of  7718 
miles of  line, a bonded indebtedness of  $201,660,475,  and an out- 
standing capital stock of  $118,249,007.  It is of  course improbable 
that the Moores in  1903 carried  all, or even  a large part of  their 
holdings on margin ;  supposing, therefore, that all of  their stock was 
1 Quotations of  securities : 
Jan. 2, 1903  Jan. 2, 1904 Jan. 2,  1905 
Rk.  I. Co. common stock  49  222  36f 
Rk.  I. Co. preferred stock  831  61  84 
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bought and paid for, the fact still remains that with $22,545,083 they 
were able to control a system capitalized at $31 9,909,482. 
In examining the cost to the Moores it is at once to be said that 
these gentlemen did not pay 1723 for their old Railway stock.  What 
they did pay is of  course uncertain.  It is known that much of  their 
holdings was  acquired in the early  months of  1901,  when  prices 
ranged from 116i to 136.  An average of  140 would represent a con- 
servative estimate of  what they paid, at which price a majority of  the 
$75,000,000 would have cost $52,500,140.  In return for this stock, 
at the prices of  January 2,  1903, they obtained 
$18,375,049 in Rock Island Company common stock, 
21,918,808 in Rock Island Company preferred stock, and 
32,765,712 in Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific Railroad Company 4 per cent 
bonds. 
Since  the  preferred  stock  sufficed  for control, there  were  left 
$18,375,04~  of  Rock Island Company common, and $32,765,712 of 
Railroad Company bonds, or a total of  securities  with a nominal mar- 
ket value of  $5 1,140,761.  Deducting this fromthe  original investment, 
which has been estimated at $52,500,140, there is left $1,359,379 to 
represent the actual cost to the Moore crowd of  control of  the great 
Rock Island property.  Beneath all of  these figures lies, of  course, the 
erroneous assumption that it would  have  been possible to unload 
large blocks of  securities upon the market without causing a break 
in price;  and yet, though large deductions must  be  made on this 
account, the figures are eloquent of  the skill with which the Moores 
have  manipulated Rock  Island issues, and of  the slender basis on 
which their control rests.  It has been truly said that the question is 
raised anew as to what is legitimate in corporate finance. 
All this is very different from anything described before ;  and so far 
as motives go, the two Rock Island reorganizations stand by them- 
selves.  In the matter  of  methods some similarities appear.  The 
great increase in capitalization resting on the Rock Island  system 
was accomplished mainly by an inflation of  stock, not of  mortgage 
bonds, and involved a comparatively slight increase in fixed charges ; 
the Rock  Island  Company closely resembled  other  holding com- 
panies in its method of  operation, and seemed likely to offer some 
facilities for the consolidation of  competing lines; and though  the 
extraordinary privileges given the Rock Island preferred stock have 
perhaps  never  been  paralleled in degree, the practice of  granting 
such stock preferential treatment in other things than dividends is 
not  unknown.  On the whole, however, this kind of  reorganization 
stands apart, and is rather instructive as showing what may be done 
in  the  handling  of  corporation  securities than  in  indicating any 
sound principles on which bankrupt roads may proceed. 
The reorganization plan aroused sharp criticism both from Wall 
Street  and from the wider public, but met no opposition sufficient to 
prevent its being carried through.  In September Attorney-General 
C. W. Mullen, of  Iowa, in an opinion filed with the Governor of  that 
state, held that the acts of  the new Iowa corporation of  the Rock 
Island, i.  e.  the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company, 
were not outside the powers conferred by ~tatute.~  The Governor, in 
concurring with the opinion from a legal point of  view, added, "the 
thing done is neither a mergernor a consolidation. Not a mile of  track 
nor a dollar in value is added to the Rock Island  property.  It is 
simply a new device for watering securities ;  it is for the next General 
Assembly to say whether it is wise to permit our laws to so remain that 
such things are po~sible."~  The various corporations were, there- 
fore, organized, and the various issues of  stocks and bonds put forth. 
During the past four years the events which require mention are 
four :  First, the acquisition of  the St. Louis & San Francisco ;  second, 
the connection of  the Rock Island with the Gulf; third, the tempor- 
ary control of  the Chicago & Alton ;  and fourth, the issue of  a new 
refunding mortgage. 
In October, 1903, the Rock Island operated 7123 miles of  line.  Its 
tracks  stretched  southwest  from  Chicago to  El Paso,  west  from 
Memphis to Tucumcari, New  Mexico, and  northwest  from Rock 
Island, Illinois, to Minneapolis and  St. Paul, and to Watertown, 
South Dakota.  This extensive mileage surrounded, however, instead 
of  occupying, a large territory in Missouri, Kansas, Indian Territory, 
and Arkansas, and could claim no share in the vast  traffic passing 
up and down the Mississippi Valley.  One of  the first acts of  the 
Moores was to remedy this defect.  In May, 1903, the Rock Island 
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made a formal offer to purchase any and all shares of  the St. Louis 
& San Francisco Railroad Company, providing $22,500,000 in par 
value should accept, at a rate of $60 par value in the common stock 
of  the Rock Island Company and $60 par  value in a new issue of 
5 per cent gold bonds of  1913 of  the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railroad Company, for  each $100 par value of  Frisco common stock 
deposited ;  the new bonds to be secured by the stock acquired.  This 
Frisco Company, it will be remembered, was the same that had previ- 
ously been acquired and given up by the Atchison, Topeka  & Santa 
Fe.  Since that time it had greatly extended its mileage, had gained 
control of the prosperous Chicago & Eastern Illinois, with entrance 
into Chicago, and was  altogether more valuable than it  had  been 
before.  In relation to the Rock Island it possessed precisely the mile- 
age which was required.  It connected the latter's terminus at Chicago 
with the terminus of  the Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf at Memphis ;  it 
traversed Southern Illinois, Southern Missouri, Southeastern Kansas, 
and Indian Territory, to say nothing of  lines in Oklahoma  and in 
Texas ;  and by means of  a line from Memphis to Birmingham it gave 
entrance into the heart of  the South.  In  brief, it filled the gaps in the 
southeastern part of the Rock Island  system, and afforded  a  solid 
foundation for further expansion.  Good authorities consider  the price 
which the Rock Island gave for the Frisco to have been too high. It is 
certain that the Frisco stockholders  jumped at the chance.  By June I, 
1903, the necessary $22,500,000 worth of  stock had  given their con- 
sent and only technical details remained to be carried through.' 
With the St. Louis  & San Francisco under its control the Rock 
Island could make a final advance to the  Gulf.  An attempt to com- 
plete a road through Texas occurred simultaneously with the Frisco 
purchase in 1903.  The Moores, that is, arranged with the Southern 
Pacific for the purchase of  a half-interest in the Houston  & Texas 
Previous to this the stockholders of  the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacifi~  Rail- 
road Company had approved  the deal, had authorized  the  new bonds of  1913,  and 
had voted to increase the capital stock of their company $zo,ow,ooo, which increase 
was turned into the treasury of  the Rock Island Company of  New  Jersey, in return 
for an equal amount of  this latter company's  stock.  It is worth  noting that the 
purchase was to be  made by Railroad Company and not by Rock  Island Company 
bonds, although  the desire of  the management was ultimately to see  the indebted- 
ness of  all subsidiary roads replaced by Rock Island Company bonds. 
Central, from Fort Worth to Houston and Galveston, with a branch 
to Austin, Texas ;  the Houston, East & West Texas, extending north 
from Houston  to Shreveport, Louisiana; and the  Texas  & New 
Orleans, from Dallas to Sabine Pass on the Gulf of Mexico.  As a 
part of  the agreement the presidents of  these lines were to be selected 
by the Rock Island Company.'  This would have established a line 
to the  coast  in  a  very  satisfactory manner.  Connection  between 
Dallas and Fort Worth  was to be completed in December,  1903, 
and from this point the two lines of  the Houston  & Texas Central 
and the Texas & New Orleans would have furnished direct outlets 
to the Gulf.  The scheme did not  go through,  because the Texas 
Railroad  Commissioners pronounced the contracts contrary to the 
state constitution, in that they amounted to a consolidation of  the 
corporations concerned, and to the establishment of  a community 
of  interest between the Rock Island and the Southern Pacific, which 
would preclude competition between them in respect to their Texas 
bu~iness.~  The Rock Island was at first disposed to test part of  the 
decision in  the   court^.^  It later decided  that  discretion was  the 
better part of  valor, stopped the transaction, and cancelled the stock 
which it had issued as part of  the purchase price.' 
What the company could not do in Texas it could do, however, 
in Missouri, Louisiana, and Arkansas.  As early as November, 1902, 
the St. Louis  & San Francisco had  purchased the entire capital 
stock of the St. Louis, Memphis  & Southeastern Railroad,  a line 
which was opened from St. Louis in 1904 to a junction with a branch 
of  the Frisco above Memphis.  From Memphis the Kansas City, 
Memphis  & Birmingham stretched southeast through  Mississippi 
into Alabama.  These roads formed a basis for extension which was 
practicable though less convenient than the western route.  Accord- 
ingly,  in  1904,  trackage  agreements were  concluded which  gave 
to the Rock Island system: 
(I) Trackage rights over the Mobile & Ohio and the New Orleans 
& Northeastern between Tupelo, Mississippi (on the Kansas City, 
Memphis & Birmiigham), and New Orleans, Louisiana. 
(2)  Trackage rights over the St.Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern 
Ry. Rev. 43: 408,  1903. 
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and the Texas & Pacific from a point opposite Memphis, Tennessee, 
to a point opposite Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
(3)  Trackage rights over the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley between 
Baton  Rouge, Louisiana, and  New  Orleans, Louisiana, and  over 
certain tracks in the latter city. 
This &orded  alternative routes of  considerable directness from 
Memphis to the Gulf, while from the junctions of  the Frisco with 
the Southern roads freight could  be  sent  north to St.  Louis and 
Chicago over the Rock Island  system's own  rails.  Arrangements 
were made for the construction of  terminals in New  Orleans by  a 
subsidiary company whose stock was to be owned and whose bonds 
were to be guaranteed by  the Southern and the St. Louis  & San 
Francisco companies.' 
At the present time the Rock Island is reaching south at two points 
other than those so far mentioned.  Under the name of  the Rock 
Island,  Arkansas  & Louisiana  Railroad  C~mpany,~  it  has  built 
almost due south from Little Rock, Arkansas, while from New Or- 
leans to Houston it has completed a line which connects at Eunice, 
Louisiana, with the Rock Island,  Arkansas  & Louisiana, and  at 
Houston with the Trinity & Brazos Valley Rail~ay.~  This last line 
runs from Houston to Fort Worth and Dallas, Texas, and is con- 
trolled by a half-interest in its capital stock.  The Rock Island is 
thus in fair shape to share in the south-bound grain movement from 
Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas, and to take a part in the north 
and south business of  the Mississippi Valley.  There is no question 
but what the company is making a bold bid for an enormous traffic, 
and that failure will not be due to any narrowness of  view. 
About the time that it was struggling to reach the Gulf the Rock 
Island took hold of the Chicago & Alton in the north in order to have 
another and a more direct line between Kansas City aqd Chicago. 
See the Annual Report of  the St. Louis  & San Francisco Railroad for 1904: 
'  A  consolidation  in  1905 of  the  Arkansas  Southern  Raiiroad  Company,  the 
Arkansas  & Louisiana Raiiroad Company, and the Little Rock  & Southern Rail- 
road  Company.  See  the  Annual  Report of  the  Chicago, Rock  Island  & Pacific 
Railroad Company for 1906. 
See letter from Mr.  C. W. Hilliird, vice-president of  the  Colorado Southern, 
New Orleans & Pacific Railroad, and comptroller of  the St. Louis & San Francisco 
Railroad Company, in Chron. 84:  507, 1907. 
A strong minority interest had previously been bought in the Alton 
by Mr. Harriman, and a board of  directors had been elected.  In 
1904 the Rock Island bought within a few hundred shares of  abso- 
lute control, and since the classification of  the board prevented the 
displacement of  its opponents for two years, arranged a compromise. 
Between them the Harriman and the Rock Island interests deposited 
a controlling number of Alton shares with the Central Trust Com- 
pany of  New York, to be held in a voting trust.  Each of  the rival 
interests was to have five directors, and the odd director was to be 
in alternate years &st  a Harriman and then a Rock Island man.' 
The Rock Island was, further, to have an option on the Harriman 
holdings for two years.  It was an unfortunate time to buy.  Mr. 
Harriman  had  previously  displayed  his  splendid  dividend  pro- 
ducing ability in Alton finance, and the road was short of  money. 
Market conditions were unfavorable, bonds were hard to sell, and, 
after all, the Alton was not of  vital importance to the Rock Island, 
although it  opened up new temtory of  some considerable import- 
ance.  By  1907 it seems that the Moores had become tired of  their 
bargain.  In  June of that year they served notice on theunion Pacific 
that the compromise agreement of  1904 was illegal and should be 
abrogated ;  a and shortly after they sold their holdings to the Toledo, 
St. Louis  & We~tern.~ 
All  in  all  the growth of  the Rock Island  has been astounding. 
Instead of  the limited number of  7123  miles which the system pos- 
sessed in 1903, or the 381 9 of  1901,  it comprises 14,270 miles of  line 
operated in 1907.  Gross earnings are $I 12,464,000 in 1907 as against 
$25,365,000 in 1901 ;  net income $40,828,000  instead of  $8,9o1,ooo; 
capitalization about $525,ooo,ooo instead of  $I 18,081,000.  In fact, 
the very size of  the system and the diverse nature of  its interests 
make the economical management of  the whole almost beyond the 
capacity of  any one man.  The Rock Island handles traffic from 
the West  and South to Chicago, St. Louis, and  Birmingham, and 
connects with the trunk lines to the Atlantic coast ;  it is also striving 
to receive and care for the constantly increasing business from the 
Northwest to  the Gulf.  It  reaches into Mexico; it extends into Colo- 
rado, and sends branches into the Northwest ;  while at the other end 
After Odober, 1go6.  a  Ry. World,  51: 531,  1907.  Chron. 85:  468, 1907. 332  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  ROCK  ISLAND  333 
it connects Kansas City, Memphis,  and St. Louis by  a triangle of 
lines.  It was remarked a year ago that a contrast between the opera- 
tions of  the Rock Island and of  the Atchison lines in the Southwest 
disclosed what might  be  called demoralization on the part  of  the 
former, and it is in the multiplicity of  its operations that the cause 
must  be  sought. 
It is to be  expected, therefore, that the financial position of  the 
company should not  be secure.  Operating expenses, fixed charges, 
and taxes absorbed 87 per cent of  gross income in 1907 and 89 per 
cent the year before.  We must not be blinded by the magnitude of 
the reported figures.  Although $9,476,397  were carried to surplus 
in the year ending June 30,  1907, and $5,568,092 were paid out in 
dividends, these two items together comprise only about 13 per cent 
of  gross income, and a bad year might readily see a decrease suf- 
ficient to sweep this margin away.  Unlike  the Union  Pacific and 
the Northern Pacific, moreover, the Rock Island has not made con- 
sistently heavy improvement expenditures from income.  Less than 
$40,000  was deducted by  either the Frisco or the Rock Island  & 
Pacific Railway in 1905 or in 1907 ;  less than half  a million in 1904; 
a little over two millions in 1903 and in 1906.  And this in spite of 
the fact that the mileage of  the Rock Island system is greater than 
that of  any other road which this study has taken up.  The fate of 
the company's  refunding  mortgage of  1904  probably  testified  as 
much to the distrust of  the Moore group of  financiers and of  the 
soundness of  the property which they control as it did to the general 
financial uneasiness of  the time.  This proposition  for a refunding 
mortgage was first framed in July, 1903.  It then comprised an issue 
of  $250,00o,ooo 4 per cent bonds, to be used for the refunding of 
outstanding  obligations,  future  enlargements  and  construction, 
purchase of  bonds and stocks of  other companies, and for the re- 
imbursing of  the company for advances already made.  Subscrip- 
tions were sought in New York in vain.  Whereas the project was 
to have come up at a meeting of  the stockholders on October 8, the 
managers obtained an adjournment  of  this meeting until  January 
without action, and before that month  arrived announced an in- 
definite postponement of operations.  On March 21 the stockholders 
voted on and approved a modified version of  the original scheme, 
whereby $163,000,000 instead of  $25o,ooo,ooo viere  authorized, of 
which $15,ooo,ooo were to be issued at once, and $82,025,000 were 
to be reserved for retiring certain outstanding obligations. It proved 
no easier to secure subscriptions to this than to the previous plan, 
and in April $5,m,ooo 43 per cent notes were issued instead and 
taken by the First National Bank of  New York, which was already 
closely  identified  with  the company.  Not  until November,  1904, 
after fourteen and one-half months of  persistent effort, was a firm 
of  bankers  found  to take  the  refunding  issue.  $25,108,000  were 
then sold to Speyer  & Co.  Mr.  Speyer became a director of  the 
Rock Island and entered the finance committee, while the proceeds 
of  the sale went  to reimburse the treasury  for capital expended, 
and to provide for the payment of  obligations maturing in  1905. 
Since this time other blocks of  the bonds have been  sold. 
It is thus evident that the Rock Island has not regained the po- 
sition which it held prior to the operations of  Mr. Moore and of  his 
friends.  The recent developments have done two things :  they have 
piled upon the company a mass of  excessive capitalization ;  and they 
have transformed it from a moderate sized railroad with a clearly 
defined flow of  traffic into a great system sprawled over the Central 
West  and  handling  at  least  three  different currents of  business. 
Neither one of  these changes alone can account for the present con- 
dition of  the road.  Together they have made it  what  it  is.  It is 
only fair to say that large sums from capital account are being spent 
upon the  property  and that the managers announce an intention 
of  bringing it up to the highest standard of  physical condition.  Over 
$4,000,000  were  appropriated  for additions and improvements in 
1907,  and nearly $3,5oo,ooo in 1906, besides still greater sums for 
construction and equipment.  Heavier rails have been  laid down, 
bridges have been strengthened, equipment increased and improved. 
Meanwhile maintenance charges have not been unduly low, though 
not so high as on some other Western roads.  It is true, nevertheless, 
that the Rock Island has lost its former stability and must await a 
period of  lessened earnings with serious apprehension. CHAPTER  X 
CONCLUSION 
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capital requirements -  Voting trusts -  Summary. 
A GENERAL survey  of  railroad reorganizations may now be attempted. 
Eighteen different ones and no less than forty-two reorganization 
plans  have  been  examined  in  detail.  In their  seemingly infinite 
variety may not some guiding principles be found which will assist 
both in interpreting the past and in directing the future? ' 
It is apparent that a readjustment of  a railroad's  affairs is more 
Number of  rew-  Name of  rew- 
Date  ganizatwns  ganieatwn  Number of  plans  Foreclosures 
1900-4  I  Rock Island  I  No 
1895-9  6  At chison  a  Yes 
Baltimore & Ohio  I  No 
Erie  3  Yes 
Northern Pacific  2  Yes 
Reading  4  Yes 
Union Pacific  3  Yes 
1890-4  a  Atchison  I  No 
Richmond Terminal  3  Yes 
1885-9  3  Atchison  I  No 
Reading  6  No 
East Tennessee  1  Yes 
1880-4  3  Reading  5  No 
Rock Island  I  No 
Union Pacific  I  No 
1875-9  2  Erie  4  Yes 
Northern Pacilic  I  Yes 
1859  I  Erie  I  - 
Yes  - 
I  8  42 
Carl Snyder, American Raidroads as Investments (N. Y., The Moody  Corporation, 
1907),  offers, inter dia, an analysis of the results of operation of  the railroads con- 
sidered in the text. 
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difficult  than the readjustment of  those of  an individual.  A railroad 
is a complex financial, as well  as a complex operating  machine. 
Especially when it has been built up by the union of  numerous small 
properties, each of  which has been allowed to retain a certain indi- 
vidualityof its own, are the relations between the different parts intri- 
cate and involved.  The obligations which have been incurred in the 
course of  its career, and the kinds of  paper which represent these ob- 
ligations, disclose a variety which the debts of  an individual seldom 
or never present. This complexity in railroad capitalization inevitably 
leads to clashes in  interest  between  different  classes of  security- 
holders.  Divergencies in interest seem to appear even while a road is 
solvent.  If  classes of  securities exist upon which payment of  interest 
is optional, it is to the advantage of  the junior issues to prevent pay- 
ment of  interest or dividends upon others until earnings are such that 
payment may be made upon all.  If  common stockholders can rein- 
vest in the property sums which normally would be paid in dividends 
on the preferred stock, they advance the day upon which they can 
secure dividends for themselves at the expense of  their seniors.  The 
same situation may also arise as between the preferred stock and the 
income bonds.  Or, again, it may be to the advantage of  speculative 
stockholders to pay dividends to themselves by means of  the accumu- 
lation of  a floating debt, and to sell out at top quotations, leaving the 
floating debt to take precedence even of  mortgage bonds.'  Both this 
and the preceding operation are facilitated by the control which the 
least valuable portion of  the capital, the common stock, usually has 
over the policy of  the entire company.  But it is when a reorganiza- 
tion becomes necessary that these conflicts in interest become most 
apparent, and it is as a compromise between  contending forces that 
a reorganization plan must take its shape. 
The term "reorganization"  is used  in this study to denote the 
exchange of  new securities for the principaI of  outstanding, unma- 
tured, general mortgage bonds, or for at least  50 per cent of  the 
unmatured junior mortgages of any company, or for the whole of  the 
capital stock.  These exchanges have been the essential features of 
The lien of  a floating debt is inferior to that of  a bond when unsecured, except 
as it represents arrears of  wages and payment for supplies.  But it is usually very 
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the operations which have been described.  This exchange of  secur- 
ities  must  take place upon  a considerable scale.  Small readjust- 
ments may involve valuations of  specific bits of  property, but they do 
not require that comprehensive survey of  the relations of  all parts of 
the system to each other which distinguishes the general reorganiza- 
tion. In fact, the small adjustments are at once more simple and more 
difficult than the larger kind.  More simple because they involve less 
change; more  difficult because the same pressure cannot often be 
brought to bear.  It is useful to mark a dividing-line between the 
small and the large.  No such line can be defended as exact ;  but the 
one chosen seems to include a tolerably homogeneous group, and will 
lend a convenient definiteness to the discussion. 
As thus defined, a reorganization may be, and generally is, accom- 
panied by other operations essential to its success. If  a large floating 
debt has been accumulated, provision for the cancellation of  this debt 
must be made;  if  unprofitable leases have been entered into, these 
must be abolished ;  or if  the system has been unduly hampered by 
inability to issue new capital, appropriate relief  must be afforded. 
But none of  these are determining features.  They are means to an 
end, as is the exchange of  new securities for old, and they may have 
their effect just  as the economical management of  the Union Pacific 
under Charles Francis Adams had its effect in  the years  prior  to 
1890; but they are not  essential parts of  that group of  operations 
which have been characterized as reorganizations. 
The exchange of  new securities for old on a large scale usually 
takes place when a railroad is unable to meet maturing obligations. 
In the case of  the Rock Island in-1902 there  was no floating debt to be  con- 
sidered, while  in  1885 the  Erk  funded overdue coupons and issued a  6 per  cent 
mortgage on  its Jersey City terminals  to cover accumulated liabilities, but did not 
disturb  its outstanding mortgage  bonds,  and  cannot,  therefore,  be  said to have 
reorganized. 
'  This was, in fact, a prominent feature of  the reorganizations between 1893 and 
1898. The Atchison surrendered the St. Louis & San Francisco; the Erie absorbed 
the New York, Pennsylvania & Ohio into its system instead of  continuing the lease 
thereof; the Northern  Pacific surrendered the lease of  the  Wisconsin  Central  and 
cancelled various unprofitable traffic contracts and traffic agreements; the Reading 
gave up the Lehigh Valley and its New England extensions; the Southern reduced 
its mileage by over one-half; and the Union Pacific shrunk  from 7674 miles in 1892 
to 5399 in 1899. 
Of  18 reorganizations and 42 plans, 15  reorganizations and 39 plans 
have  had  to do with  the extrication  of  companies from  financial 
embarrassment.  But though impending insolvency is the usual occa- 
sion it is not the only one.  Reorganization sometimes occurs when 
prosperity is too great as well as when it is too little.) Or a manage- 
ment may desire to get rid of  hampering restrictions, or it may desire 
to manipulate the conditions of  control.  This last named  cause - 
the desire to manipulate conditions of  control -  has been fortunately 
an  infrequent  cause of  reorganization.  An example  is,  however, 
afforded  by  the  Rock  Island  reorganization  of  1902.  It will  be 
remembered that the Chicaga, Rock Island  & Pacific Railway had 
long been a prosperous road in the Middle West, and that its control 
had  required  the ownership of  between  40  and  50  per  cent  of 
$75,000,000 of  common stock, quoted at over 160 in the early part of 
1902.  By the issue of  new bonds, new preferred and new common 
stock to a total of $270 for every $100 of  old common stock, and by 
giving to the preferred stokkholders the right to elect a majority of 
the  directors, the owners  of  the  property were  able to part with a 
large portion of  their holdings and yet  retain absolute control.  A 
somewhat similar case was that of  the Chicago & Alton.  This road 
had been a conservatively capitalized enterprise, doing a large busi- 
ness between Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas City.  It had paid 7 per 
cent or better on its two classes of  stock for eighteen years without a 
break, and had accumulated in that time an uncapitalized construc- 
tion  expenditure of  $12,444,178.  In 1899 a  syndicate of  Eastern 
capitalists bought  control, and the  following year  reorganized  the 
property by forming a holding company, which  issued $22,000,000 
in 3+ per cent bonds, $1~,48~,ooo  in preferred and $19,542,800 in 
common  stock to exchange for  the $22,230,600 old  common and 
preferred shares outstanding.  At current prices on January 3,1899, 
a majority of  both the old  issues would  have cost  $19,030,048;  on 
January  4,  1901, however,  a  majority of  both  of  the  new issues 
represented an investment of  $10,729,437; and this investment  it 
would  have been possible to reduce to $2,241,377  by the sale of  the 
new bonds received, without in any way endangering control.' 
See  Interstate Commerce Commission: In the  Matter of  Consolidations and 
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It is evident that both the Rock Island and the Chicago & Alton 
reorganizations were influenced by the very great prosperity of  the 
companies concerned.  It was desired to reap a profit by the sale of 
new securities as well as to lessen the investment required for control; 
although it may be remarked that the advantage of retaining control 
depended on the future prosperity of  the roads. Reorganizations con- 
cerned witil manipulation of  control are therefore closely allied with 
reorganizations due to too great prosperity.  These latter may, how- 
ever, take place independently, and  are  likely  to occur whenever 
profits  are extraordinarily  large,  and  a  simple  stock dividend  is 
deemed inadvisable. An example was the reorganization of  the Chi- 
cago, Rock Island  & ~atifii  in 1880, when the formation of  a new 
company and the exchange of  new stock for old was deemed wise, in 
view  of  the large earnings which were  to  be  distributed. 
The desire to eliminate hampering restrictions is seldom the sole 
cause for a reorganization, but frequently it is a contributing one. 
When, for instance, the managers of  the Union  Pacific wished to 
extend their system in the years following 1880, they were forced to 
establish a separate organization for each branch line.  By the terms 
of  the charter  nothing could be  consolidated with the main stem 
except the Kansas Pacific and the Denver Pacific, the consolidation 
with which was provided for in the original acts.'  This obviously 
prevented considerable economies, and could be remedied only by a 
new incorporation.  The Northern Pacific was hampered in yet  an- 
other way because the consent of  three-fourths of  the preferred stock 
was required by the terms of  the reorganization of  1875 to the imposi- 
tion  of  new  mortgages;  and  similarly the  Atchison,  after  1889, 
found it extremely difficult to issue new bonds because of  the posi- 
tion of  the outstanding income bonds.  In this last case the restriction 
was the sole cause of  the reorganization which followed.  It should be 
remarked that the cancellation of  such provisions sometimes works 
*  Testimony of  C. F. Adams, United  States Pacific Railway Commission Report, 
1887,  vol.  I,  p.  45. 
"It is only by the fullest knowledge of  the affairs of  the company that a correct 
judgment  of  the best manner of  meeting its wants can  be formed, and there is no 
other practicable way to manage the business of  the company to its best advantage 
than for the stockholders to elect directors worthy of  confidence, and to leave the 
management to them."  Annual Report,  1887,  Robert Harris, President. 
considerable injustice.  Restrictions on future increases in capital, 
for instance, may have facilitated the issue of  bonds in the past, and 
in this case have formed part of  the consideration given for subscrip- 
tions. The readjustment  is defended on the ground of  the need of 
the corporation, or  is so accomplished  as not  to lessen the value 
of  the creditors' holdings.' 
The typical railroad reorganization, as has been said, occurs when 
a road ceases to be  able to pay interest on its outstanding obliga- 
tions.  Whether because  of  excessive capitalization, or because of 
unexpectedly low earnings, or owing to an accumulation of  floating 
debt which ties up all current resources, the reorganizing railroad 
finds itself  incapable  of  meeting  payments falling due.  For this, 
experience shows that  two deep-seated causes have generally been 
responsible.  First, there is the almost entire freedom in matters of 
capitalization which  railroads have enjoyed.  Far from the recom- 
mendation of  Secretary Taft that no railroad company engaged in 
interstate commerce be permitted to issue stock or bonds and put 
them on sale in the market except after a certificate by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission that the securities are issued with the ap- 
proval of  the Commission for a legitimate railroad purp~se,~  Ameri- 
can railroads have in the past been practically unrestricted.  It was 
open to the Erie to increase its capitalization per mile from $81,068 
In 1864 to $117,760  in 1872, with no corresponding addition to its 
property; it was open to the Union Pacific to create a capitalization 
of  $104,561  per mile  by  1870, of  which about one-quarter was in 
the form of  government bonds ;  and it was possible for the Atchison 
to issue $129,162,350  in new bonds and  stocks between 1884 and 
1889 while its net  earnings seriously decreased.  Had there been a 
supervision of  new issues, or had even a certain percentage of  stocks 
to bonds in those instances been required, failures would have been 
less frequent and reorganizations less common.  New  construction 
would probably have been less rapid, but not so much so as is often 
asserted.  A smaller number of  new enterprises might have yielded 
1 In the case of  the Atchison, old income bonds were retired  by new second mort- 
gage bonds, with the result that the aggregate value of  creditors' holdings was  largely 
increased. 
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larger profits; the chances for land speculation might have tempted 
many, and liberal regulations might have allowed a generous profit 
while at the same time eliminating all inflation due to fraud.  Un- 
fortunately railroad-hungry communities seldom stopped to count 
the cost.  West, South, North, and East, privileges were offered to 
railroads, donations of  land and money were made, and exemptions 
from taxation were conferred. 
The second  fundamental  cause  of  railroad  distress  has  been 
competition.  If  unrestricted capitalization has increased the load 
which the railroads have had to bear, unrestricted competition has 
impaired their ability to support any load at all.  The forms which 
this competition has taken have been mainly two :  firscthe cutting of 
rates,  either openly or  by  secret  concessions ;  second, reckless ex- 
tensions of  line, generally followed by rate-cutting.  The cutting of 
railroad rates is now a subject familiar to all.  Illustrations may be 
found in the  history of  any great railroad  system.  President Had- 
ley has made classical the theory that roads will take business until 
rates fall below the specific cost of  hauling a given shipment; that 
is, below the additional cost which the articles in question impose. 
Even  this limitation is  often non-existent.  Railroads which  serve 
different cities will take freight when a war is in progress whether 
or not the rate repays the specific cost of  hauling.  If  their rival imi- 
tates them  they  hope  to wear  it  out  by  their  superior  ability to 
stand the loss.  If  it does not, the city which they serve will tempo- 
rarily eject all others from common market, and may obtain so firm 
a footing that a permanent  increase in business will result.  All  of 
the railroads which have been studied, in fact, have suffered more 
or less from rate-cutting.  Repeated attempts at pooling and agree- 
ments to maintain rates have improved conditions only during the 
short periods in which the agreements have  been  of  effect. In the 
South there have been scarcely more successful attempts to secure 
harmony by  community of  stock control.  Competition by  means 
of  extensions has been  also vigorously practised.  The reader will 
recall the growth of  the Atchison from 1884  to 1889. It was after 
the  dissolution of  the  Southern  Railway  Security Company that 
the East Tennessee entered upon its policy of  purchase and of  new 
construction.  The entrance of  the Reading into New England was 
the direct cause of  its failure in 1893;  and that of  the Baltimore & 
Ohio into New York largely contributed to its difficulties in 1887. 
Sometimes such extension is into territory where there is no business 
to justify it.  Sometimes the business is there, but has to be divided 
among too many rivals.  Sometimes the new lines are so poorly built 
as to be unduly expensive to work, and not infrequently they are so 
good  that the resources of  the expanding road are strained in ac- 
quiring them.  In any one of  these four cases new extension causes 
a drain upon the parent  road  which  may readily bring  about its 
failure. 
Other  conditions  may  lead  to  railroad  failure.  Simon  Sterne 
alleges the following causes to be often responsible: ' 
I. The control of  railroads by stock which represents little or no 
original cash investment. 
2.  The development  of  the territory  served by  individual rail- 
roads at a slower rate than is anticipated, and the influence of  com- 
petition in reducing profits when the territory has developed. 
3.  The undertaking  of  railway construction when there is con- 
siderable activity in the money market, and when capital commands 
a high rate of  interest. 
4.  The circumstance that railways,  lacking reserve capital,  can 
never avail themselves of  a cheap market for labor or supplies, but 
must always buy when everything is inflated, because then only can 
they float their loans and borrow capital. 
5.  The necessity of  complete reconstruction within a brief  period 
of  most railroads built  through new territory, and the increase in 
funded and in floating debt involved. 
7. The growth of  railroads beyond the ability to handle them. 
8.  The steadily increasing expenditures required  by  law to ac- 
commodate the public. 
9. The abuse of their position by  directors and trustees. 
10.  The irresponsibility of  railway accounts. 
And it may be  added that the control of  American railways by 
foreign investors who  apportion  charges  between  operating  and 
capital accounts in a way unsuited to American conditions has been 
upon occasion a cause of disaster.  Unlimited freedom in matters 
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of  capitalization  and  unrestricted  competition  have  nevertheless 
been the fundamental causes of  bankruptcy. 
It is interesting to observe that the majority of  the principal rail- 
roads which failed in the nineties had taxed their resources nearly 
to the point  of  exhaustion before the panic of  1893  finally drove 
them to the wall.  For every $100  received in 1892  the Richmond 
& Danville and East Tennessee systems were paying out $68.79 for 
operating expenses and $31.15  for interest on bonds, rentals, etc., 
leaving only 6  cents for dividends, necessary improvements, and the 
like.  For every $100 received  the Erie  paid  out  the same year 
$66.,46 for operating expenses and $31.85  for interest and other fixed 
charges, leaving only $1.68 as a surplus to ensure solvency in case 
of  a decline in earnings. In 1893  the Atchison, the Northern Pacific, 
the Reading, and the Union Pacific had no surplus at all, but rather 
a deficit.  The following table shows similar figures for all of  our 
reorganized roads : 
Percentage  to Gross Income 
1893  1892 
Operating  Fixed  Operating  Fized 
Expenses  Charges  Surplus  Expenses  Charges  Surplus 
B.  & 0.  66.89  24.27  8.83  67.68  24.55  7.76 
Erie  64.91  32.12  2.96  66.46  31.85  1.68 
N.  Pac.  59.25  43.55  53.71  36.34  9.94 
Reading  57.04  45.41  52.64  33.91  13.44 
Rich.  & Danv. and  73.49  25.63  .IS  68.79  31.15 
E. Tenn. 
U. Pac.  59.66  43.18  51.91  36.42  11.66 
Atchison  77.47  24.96  77.16  21.59  1.24' 
With these figures may be  compared statistics for seven  roads 
which  went  through  the  depression  of  1893-7 without  failure. 
These roads'had a more extensive margin which  could be  cut off 
before interest on their bonds should be endangered.  Furthermore, 
this margin was secured, not by low operating expenses, but by low 
fixed  charges,  including interest  on  bonds.  Operating  expenses 
averaged higher than for the preceding group, fixed charges averaged 
The percentages for the Atchison are corrected according to the report of  Mr. 
Little.  Owing to the lack of available detail it has been necessary to increase operating 
expenses by the total amount of the erron which  he discovered, and this figure is, 
therefore, unduly inflated. 
much lower.  In the hst  group but one road  had charges in 1893 
which were less than 25 per cent of  gross income; in the second 
group but two roads had  charges which were greater.  The condi- 
tion of  the roads of  the second group referred to was as follows: 
Percentage & Gross Income 
Opmating 
Expenses 
C.,  B.  & Q.  64.46 
C., M.  & St. P.  65.95 
C.,  R. I.  & P.  71.72 
Great No.  50.44 
Ill.  Cen.  61.92 
N.  Y.,  N.  H. & H.  72.31 












operating  Fixed 
Ezpemm  Charges 
65.17  20.86 
64.00  22.36 
69.88  19.83 
52.66  32.98 
64.58  23-99 
73.36  8.77 
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The causes which lead to railroad  failure have  now been  men- 
tioned.  When  bankruptcy has  at  last  occurred,(three  groups of 
interests take part in the reorganization which must ensue.  These 
are the creditors, who hd  interest and perhaps principal  of  their 
bonds in default ;  the stockholders ;  and the bankers and financiers 
who advance ready money and subscribe to necessary guarantees. 
Of  these the creditors and the stockholders are widely scattered, 
and are quite unable  to protect themselves by  individual action. 
Their hst  impulse is, therefore, either to elect committees to repre- 
sent them, or to authorize self-appointed committees of  well-known 
men to look after  their  interests.  Stockholders in a reorganization 
have little voice.  They are the owners, and all that the dorporation 
has is subject hst  to the bondholders from whom it has borrowed 
money.  Occasionally they  seem to make their  Muence felt.  In 
1880  the Reading actually attempted to pay off  its floating debt by 
bonds with a lien inferior to the  common stock; and in 1892  the 
Olcott plan for the reorganization of  the Richmond Terminal Com- 
pany strongly favored  the junior  securities.  But  as a  rule  stock- 
holders must accept, and rightly, about what the creditors desire. 
The creditors, then, are the most important factors, and they, like 
the stockholders, act through  committees.  There may be a com- 
mittee for every class of  bonds, or one or more classes may join  to- 
gether.  The Union Pacific, in 1893,  had committees for the consoli- CONCLUSION  345 
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dated first mortgage, the collateral trust gs,  the Oregon Railway  & 
Navigation  consols,  the  Dutch  bondholders,  and certain  branch 
lines ;  and in 1894 for the collateral trust 43s and the Kansas Pacific 
consols.  As the financial situation grew worse the interest on senior 
mortgages  became  imperilled,  and  even  the  Union  Pacific  first 
mortgage bondholders deemed it wise to elect a committee ;  while a 
second committee arose for the Kansas Pacific consols, and a new 
committee for the Denver Extension mortgage.  By April, 1895, at 
least fifteen committees were in active operation, of  which fourteen 
represented not more than two classes of  bonds each.  The Reading 
reorganization of  1884 to 1886 was largely shaped by two commit- 
tees representing the general mortgage bondholders ;  seven reorgan- 
ization trustees representing the  foreign creditors, the general, in- 
come, junior securities, and stockholders ;  and an opposition commit- 
tee known as the Lockwood Committee.  Within four months after 
the failure of  the Erie in 1875 the English bondholders and stock- 
holders each had elected a committee, and had urged all security- 
holders to join;  a meeting of  bondholders had elected Mr.  John 
Hooper chairman of  a committee in New York; and another meeting 
had elected Mr. N. B. Lord chairman of  another committee in that 
city.'  The more general a committee the greater the influence which 
it seems able to exert on reorganization, and the greater the likeli- 
hood that the plan which it approves may be  accepted.  The fact 
that a scheme has to meet the criticism of  opposing interests during 
its formation renders it less likely to contain any injustice which 
conditions make it possible to avoid; and the endorsement of  their 
representatives makes all classes of  bondholders more ready to ac- 
cord it temperate consideration. Among the numerous Union Pacific 
committees it  was  the  joint  committee, representing  the  foreign 
holders, the Denver  & Rio Grande, the Oregon Railway  & Navi- 
In 1893,  after the Northem Pacific failure, the consolidated  5  per cent  bond- 
holders formed a committee; Mr. Brayton Ives invited  bondholders to send in their 
names and addresses to  him  (1894); and later in 1894 the falling off  in the rail- 
road's  earnings induced the formation of  the Livingston  and Van  Nostrand  com- 
mittees, and the announcement of  the consolidated  committee that it would  accept 
the deposit of  second and third mortgage bonds.  Finally, within  four months after the 
Atchison failure of  1893, four important reorganization  committees were asking for 
deposits in the United States and one was soliciting deposits in London. 
gation, and other interests that took the leading part.  In the case 
of the Reading from 1884 to 1886 the seven reorganization trustees 
outweighed any other representatives of  the creditors ;  in that of  the 
Northern  Pacific the Adams Committee succeeded in becoming a 
general reorganization committee, and took the leading part; and 
the Atchison reorganization  was  accomplished only  by  the union 
into a joint executive reorganization committee of  three of  the pre- 
viously existing bodies.' 
The situation  which  bankers and financiers occupy in relation 
to a bankrupt road is almost equally important.  Their aid is essen- 
tial to a reorganization while that of  the officers and receivers of 
the company is not.  And they are not subject to the pressure of  im- 
minent iinancial loss which forces creditors and stockholders to ac- 
cept plans of  which they do not altogether approve.  It is true that 
these bankers may have money invested in the securities of  the road. 
It may even happen that they have been  formerly in control.  In 
this case a certain pressure does exist.( But as bankers their function 
is to do one or both of  two things; namely, to advance cash to keep 
the railroad system together pending reorganization, and to under- 
write assessments or the sale of  securities.  ~iiher  one of  these in- 
volves them in new risks, and in undertaking either they will be only 
indirectly affected by investments which they may previously have 
The officers of  bankrupt roads have no need of committees to make their wishes 
known, but only so far as  they are bondholders, or in so far as they can influence 
bondholders by argument do their opinions cany weight.  President Ives of the North- 
em Pacific in 1893  was able to use  his position to fight his opponents through  the 
courts, and secured besides appointment on a stockholders' protective committee, but 
exercised no great influence on the reorganization;  President  Jewett,  of  the Erie, 
gained the confidence  of  the visiting committee of English bondholders in 1875,  and 
had  some voice accorded him; but generally speaking officers have to rest content if 
they can successfully defend  themselves against charges of  inefficiency and misman- 
agement.  They are, in fact, both  the choice  and the representatives of  the  stock- 
holders, and the stockholders  having no authority in  the event of  bankruptcy can 
delegate none.  Officers  of  the courts which are in control of  bankrupt railroads enjoy 
sometimes a different  position  from officers of  the corporations  themselves, in that 
they do not represent or  depend on stockholders, and may not be  connected with the 
circumstances which have caused the ruin of  the road.  Thus the receivers of  the 
Union Pacific in the nineties were called to testify before Congressional committees, 
and those of the Erie chose a committee which prepared  the first reorganization plan 
suggested, but in both cases the functions  of  the court ofticers were  purely advisory, 
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made.  Their influence on reorganization is strong because they are 
necessary, and because they are free to participate or not to parti- 
cipate according to their opinion of  the precise reorganization plan 
proposed.  For much the same reason their influence is  a wholesome 
one.  We shall see that the primary conflict which takes place in any 
reorganization is  between  the  interests  of  the  corporation which 
needs a lessening of  its burdens, and the interests of  the security- 
holders which  is opposed  to any reduction in their claims.lhhe 
degree to which the former interest prevails determines the strength 
of  the reorganized company.  In this confict the bankers naturally 
take the side of  the company.  As bankers, who advance cash, and 
who usually receive their pay in securities, they wish to make the 
corporation prosperous, and to raise the quotations of  its securities 
to a high  figure.  An  important factor also  is  that  as reputable 
banking  firms they wish  the future career of  corporations which 
they have handled to reflect credit upon themselves. 
An example of  the influence of  bankers and financiers appears in 
In 1895 the final Atchison reorganization plan announced the following arrange- 
ment: "A  contract has been made with a syndicate to furnish an amount of  money 
equal to the assessments of non-assenting or defaulting stockholders, and such syn- 
dicate, by  such payment,  shall take the place of  the non-assenting or defaulting 
stockholders, and shall be entitled to receive the new common and preferred stock, 
which non-assenting or defaulting stockholders would have been entitled to receive 
if  they had deposited their stock and paid their assessment in full.  Syndicates may 
also be  formed to Mi  the money needed, in case of  foreclosure, to pay the non- 
assenting bondholders their #ro rota  share of  the proceeds of  sale, and to advance any 
cash which  may be  required during the  reorganization and for other purposes." 
Chron. 60:  658-62, 1895.  The reorganization plan  of  the Baltimore & Ohio in 
1898  contained  the following:  "A  syndicate has been formed . . .  which agrees: 
 st, To purchase $6,ggg,ooo of  the new preferred stock, and $30,250,000 of  the new 
common stock, and to offer  the same for sale to depositing holders of  old 1st and 2d 
preferred and common stock of  the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. . .  .  zd, 
To  purchase Sg,ooo,ax, 34 per cent prior lien bonds; $12,450,000 1st mortgage 4 per 
cent bonds;  $16,450,000  preferred stock.  gd,  To protect the new company in the 
ownership and possession of  the properties covered by $49,974,098 .  . .  of  the exist- 
ing mortgage bonds of the old company of  different issues by agreeing to purchase 
from the new company the new securities not taken, but to which the holders of  such 
bonds would have been entitled if  depositing under the plan, at a price equal to the 
principal of  the respective old securities, and also to make advances and perform 
other obligations essential for the purposes of  the plan."  Poor's  Manual, 1898, p. 
1381.  Simiiar provisions appear in the plans of  the Erie, the Northern Pacific, the 
Reading, the Southern, and the Union Pacific. 
the case of  the Union  Pacific.  A  committee comprising General 
Louis Fitzgerald, Jacob Sch*,  T.  J. Coolidge, Oliver Ames,  and 
two railway presidents took  the road out of receivers' hands,  cut 
charges per mile by over one-half, and paid the Government's claim 
in full.  The Reading reorganization of  1886 to 1887 was the work 
of  a syndicate which took hold after interests closely connected with 
the properties had failed to produce a satisfactory plan.  The result 
was the best plan ever applied to the Reading Railroad.  The Rich- 
mond Terminal Company was reorganized by a single banking firm. 
In this case the operation cut charges less than could  have been 
desired, though the other parts of  the plan were well-advised.  The 
intervention of  a syndicate has fortunately been usual of  late years. 
And it is doubtful if  the compensation accorded has been exorbitant, 
even for the direct services rendered.  In 1886 the Reading agreed 
to pay a syndicate 5 per cent upon $15,ooo,ooo of subscribed capital, 
plus 6 per cent on all money advanced.  The Richmond Terminal 
paid Drexel, Morgan  & Co.  $IW,OOO  in cash to cover their office 
expenses and $750,000 in common stock at $15 per share '  for their 
work of  cooperation and supervision.  The Union Pacific paid the 
syndicate which financed its reorganization $5,ooo,wo in preferred 
stock quoted at 59, or 19 per cent at current prices on a subscribed 
capital of  $rg,ooo,ooo.  All three syndicates, however, ran the risk 
of  depreciation in the value of  the stock given them, and all three 
rendered  great service in  providing large sums of  cash  at a time 
when capital was not readily to be  obtained. 
Payments to bankers  or trust companies receiving  deposits of 
bonds and stocks and undertaking the clerical work of  a reorgan- 
ization, should be sharply distinguished from those made to under- 
writing syndicates above described.  Depositaries assume no risk, 
and are paid  a  definite sum  for definite services performed.  In 
1895 the Erie set the compensation of  Messrs. J. P. Morgan  & Co. 
and J. S.  Morgan & Co.,  for their services as depositaries and in 
carrying out the plan of  reorganization, at $500,~  in addition to 
all expenses incurred ;  and the same year the Union Pacific allowed 
$~,ooo,ooo  in preferred stock to the bankers who managed its un- 
derwriting syndicate, as against $5,00o,ooo  to the syndicate itself. 
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It should be  said that the compensation to depositaries is in part 
payment for the use of  the name of  the firms employed as well as 
in part payment for clerical work performed.  Bondholders are more 
ready to deposit their securities with a well-known house than with 
an obscure one; and are to some extent influenced by  the implied 
approval of  the reorganization plan which  acceptance of  deposits 
by such houses involves. 
At the beginning of  the ordinary reorganization, then, creditors, 
stockholders, syndicate, and corporation find themselves face to face. 
The interests of  the syndicate and of  the corporation most nearly 
coincide except in so far as the syndicate is an owner of  stocks or 
bonds.  The syndicate desires a radical reorganization, -the  cor- 
poration requires it.  But as between stock- and bondholders and the 
corporation ;  between the stockholders and the bondholders; or be- 
tween the junior and the senior bondholders ;  there is well-nigh com- 
plete antagonism.  The corporation, to repeat, needs a reduction in 
the fixed charges which it has to pay.  The securityholders wish to 
lose as little as possible.  The stockholders hope to force sacrifices 
from the bondholders, and the bondholders to levy a heavy assess- 
ment upon the stock. The junior bondholders call upon their seniors 
to bear their part; and the seniors reply that they are well secured 
and that the juniors and the stock must take care of  themselves. 
The first question which arises is that of  the cash requirements. 
How much cash must be raised to pay off  the floating debt, and how 
much working cash capital will the new corporation require? It is 
almost always true that a large floating debt has accumulated prior 
to reorganization. The Northern Pacific in 1893 had a gross debt of 
no less than $15,000,000; the Reading in 1895 one of  $13,800,000; 
the Baltimore  & Ohio in  1896 one of  $13,ooo,ow; the Atchison in 
1893 one of  $16,ooo,ooo.  In part this means simply the accumu- 
lation of  unpaid  bills.  In part, however,  it represents promissory 
notes or other short time paper which the corporation has issued, 
generally to pay  current indebtedness, but occasionally for  financ- 
ing somewhat extensive  operations.  Thus  Mr.  McLeod carried 
his purchases of  New England railroad stock by means of  advances 
from brokers, and the Government Directors of  the Union Pacific 
reported that  $15,000,000  out  of  $21,400,000  of  floating debt  of 
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that road in 1891 were the result of  expenditure and advances in the 
construction of branch or tributary lines.  The cost of  carrying such 
indebtedness is naturally  high.  Mr.  McLeod is reported to have 
paid  an average of  9 per  cent for  his  loans.  The reorganization 
committee of  the Atchison stated in 1895 that during the five years 
preceding,  the  road  had  paid  over  $I,IOO,OOO  in  discounts and 
commissions to secure the renewal of  $g,ooo,ooo of  guarantee fund 
notes.  And floating indebtedness is by far the most dangerous as 
well as the easiest sort of  obligation to incur.  It represents a possible 
demand for large sums of  cash on short notice which even a solvent 
company may  find it impossible to meet ; -  a demand, moreover, 
which is likely to be made at a moment of  stringency in the money 
market.  For this reason, and on account of  the high interest de- 
manded, corporations endeavor to fund their floating debts when 
these reach unwieldy proportions.  In 1891 the Union  Pacific au- 
thorized three-year 6 per cent notes to the amount of  $z4,000,000  to 
be used in taking up its floating debt.  In 1893 the Northern Pacific 
authorized $15,ooo,ooo collateral five-year 6 per cent notes for the 
same purpose.  In each case it was hoped to refund these short time 
issues with bonds of  longer term when the date of  their maturity 
should arrive.  After a company has been in receivers' hands, .issues 
of  receivers' certificates are pretty sure to swell the current liabilities. 
These, again, may be issued to pay current bills, or to maintain or 
to improve  the  railroad  when  other  resources  prove  insufficient. 
For whatever reason incurred, it is plain  that the problem of  the 
floating debt is a serious one for the creditors and owners of  a bank- 
rupt road to meet.  If  the provision which they make is insufficient 
their company will not regain a safe financial footing.  And if, in 
addition to cancelling the debt outstanding, they do not provide a 
margin  for working capital, the  company will  be  forced  to  incur 
new floating debt and their work will have to be done over again. 
In general there are two ways by which cash for floating debt and 
working capital can be  raised 
(I) By  assessment on securit  yholders. 
(2) By the sale of  securities. 
Sales of  securities may comprise the sale of  securities of  the bank- 
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they may be sales of  part of  new bond or stock issues reserved for 
that purpose.  In 1898 the Baltimore &  Ohio  sold  among  other 
thiigs $3,800,000 of  Western Union Telegraph  stock held  in its 
treasury  since  1887; while  in  1889 the Atchison issued  and sold 
$12,500,000  general mortgage qs and $1,250,000  income 5s.  When 
outside securities are sold the value of  which is in no way dependent 
upon the prosperity of  the road which  sells them; and which  are 
such, moreover, as the selling road can readily spare, this method 
of  raising capital is open to few objections.  Its chief  disadvantage 
is that the sale is apt to be made at a time when the level of  general 
prosperity is not high, and the price obtained is therefore apt to be 
low.  But the question is quite different when the securities are those 
of  the embarrassed or bankrupt road itself.  In this case the credit 
of  the company and the price of  its securities are sure to be at a low 
ebb.  The initial sacrifice entailed is necessarily great; while if  the 
securities sold are bonds, as they are almost sure to be, the company 
increases its annual interest charge without receiving an equival- 
ent value in return.  If, on the other hand, the railroad endeavors 
to prevent  a rise in charges by the use of  income bonds or stock, 
the gain is usually neutralized by the extremely low price obtained.' 
In general we  may say that sale of  a railroad's securities in time of 
general depression is impossible except at  a ruinous sacrifice ;  that 
sales should not be resorted to at all except when the road's difficult- 
ies are acute rather than chronic, as in the case of  the Reading in 
1896; and that when securities are to be sold the best of  the avail- 
able bond issues should be used and not the worst. 
The case of  an assessment is very different.  Securities may be 
sold to outsiders or to present securityholders.  In the one event 
no pressure at all can be brought to bear; in the other only that of 
the indirect loss which the difficulties of  the reorganizing company 
would in~olve.~  An  assessment, on the other hand, is levied solely 
H. V. Poor (Manual,  1900)  compiles the  following statement for  57  selected 
companies reorganized between 1886 and 1898: 
Securities povi&d  for  0th  wpde  purposes of  new  companies 
Capital stock: Pmferred,  $89,97~,268  Bonded Indebt. 1nt.-bearing, $~~8,277*63~ 
Common,  96,555,753  Income,  48,902,701 
a  Where  stock- or  bondholders are  compelled to subscribe to  an issue  of  new 
securities the operation becomes an assessment and not a sale. 
on securityholders and is compulsory.  Stockholders or bondholders 
who refuse to pay are ordinarily debarred from all participation in 
the  and lose all chance to recoup their losses from 
their &are  in subsequent prosperity.  In return for the assessment 
some security is usually given, SO that from one point of  view an as- 
seSment  and a sale resemble each other.  But the element of  com- 
pulsion appears in this: namely, that in the case of  a sale the new 
securities are taken at the buyers'  valuation; but in the case of  an 
assessment  the company determines what it shall give for the cash 
paid  in.  Hence the  usual  compensation for  an assessment is an 
equal nominal  amount  of  preferred  stock; -  while  that  for  the 
purchase money in a sale is a greater nominal amount in bonds. 
Either an assessment or a sale of  securities may be fortified by  a 
syndicate guarantee.  In the one case the syndicate agrees to sub- 
stitute itself for all non-assenting or defaulting stock- or junior bond- 
holders ;  in the other it engages to take and dispose of  the new secur- 
ities offered, or such part of  them as the company is unable to sell. 
The advantages of  syndicate assistance we have already discussed. 
It will be  recalled that both assessments and sales of  securities 
have been freely employed in the reorganizations which have been 
considered,  and that syndicate guarantees have been  of  ordinary 
occurrence.  Out of  eighteen reorganizations, fourteen were forced 
to pay attention to the raising of  cash ;the four which did not consist- 
ing of the consolidation of  the Union Pacific with the Kansas Pacific 
and of the Chicago, Rock Island  & Pacific with its branch lines in 
1880, the income conversion reorganization of  the Atchison in 1892, 
and the Rock Island reorganization of  1902, -each  a reorganiza- 
tion of a more or less peculiar nature.  Of  the fourtPPn remaining, 
f~ur  provided cash by assessment, three by the issue of  securities, 
and fiyf:  hy a  combination  of  both  methods.  Adding to this the 
Northern  Pacific  reorganization of  1896 and that of  the  Erie  in 
18.59, which  combined an assessment with funding provisions, we 
have eleven reorganizations which relied on assessments in whole or 
in Part.  This preponderance is, however, due to the extensive use 
assessments from 1893 to 1898; since the earlier reorganizations 
show assessments in only about one-half of  the cases.  This does not 
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1893.  For the reorganization of  the Northern Pacific in  1895 was 
otherwise so radical that an assessment was less necessary ;  and that 
of the Atchison in 1889 took place at a time when business conditions 
were not in general depressed.  The effect of  widespread depression 
on the means employed for raising cash is, however, perfectly clear.' 
Of the reorganizations of  1893 to 1898, to repeat, there was none 
which we  have considered which did not make use of  assessments. 
The following table shows the amount and distribution thereof: 
Assessmmts,  I  893-8 
Common 
Stock 
Atchison  $10 
B.  & 0.  20 
Erie  12 
N.  Pac.  I5 
Richm. Term.  10 
E. Tenn.  7.20 
Reading  20 
1st Pre-  zd Pre- 
ferred  ferred  Junior Securities 




20 per cent on I, 2, and 3  incomes 
4 per cent on deferred incomes 
U.  Pac.  I5 
It thus appears that the assessments varied from $7.20  on the East 
Tennessee  to  $2.0  on  Reading  common,  with  less  sums  on  the 
preferred stock and  the junior  sec~rities.~  The real  sacrifice de- 
manded of  the stockholders is ascertained  by deducting  from the 
above the  value  of  securities given for assessments whenever such 
were allowed.  Taking for the purpose the market quotations of  these 
securities six months after  actual reorganization, that is, after the 
sale of  the road,  or the putting into effect of  the plan  proposed, 
it appears that the common stock of  the Atchison received $1.90; 
that of  the Baltimore & Ohio $I 5.20 ;  that of  the Richmond Terminal 
$5.02 ;  that of  the East ~einessee  $3.55 ;  and that of  the Union Pacific 
$8.10.  The Erie, the Northern Pacific, and the Reading gave nothing 
Among the  reorganizations  of  the eighties,  for instance,  the  Denver  & Rio 
Grande levied $8  per share in 1885 upon its $38,w,w common stock; the Pitts- 
burgh  & Western  assessed its common stock 4 per cent in  1887; the New York, 
Chicago  & St. Louis assessed its common $10,  and its preferred an equal sum; and 
the Central Iowa levied 24 per cent on its debt certificates, 5 per cent on its 1st pre- 
ferred stock,  10 per cent on its ad preferred,  and 15  per cent on its common. See 
Chron.  40:  480;  Ibid.  44:  212,  370,  653. 
'  A syndicate  guaranteed the  assessment  in each case between  1893 and  1898- 
The  Reading assessment is calculated on a par of  $100. 
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for  assessments  in  the  nineties.'  Preferred  stock, whenever  as- 
sessed,  received  the  same relative amount  and  kind of  securities 
for assessment as did the common stock, and the same is true of the 
junior securities.  Since, however,  these new  securities had  but  a 
prospective value at the time of  the issue of  the various reorganiza- 
tion plans, it is advisable to make no attempt to determine precisely 
the net  assessment, and to call attention to their allowance merely 
as a fact on which the stockholders could rely as they could count 
on a future rise in the value of their shares.  With this qualification 
the relative height of assessments and stock quotations one month 
after the publication of each reorganization plan,  and six months 
after the completion of  each reorganization may be  given. 
Six Reorganizations, 1893-8 
Comnwn Stock  Preferred Stock 
Price  Price 
Price  6 months  Price  6 months 
I  math  after  r month  after 
A sscss-  after  reorgan-  Assess-  after  reorgan- 
menis  plan  izalion  menis  plan  ization 
Atchison  $10  $ 5)  $13* 
B. & 0.  20  128  561  $20  $1 14 
Erie  12  81  14#  8  $22 
N. Pac.  1.5  13  13%  10  10 
369 
Reading  20 
26) 
21  22% 
Richm. Term.  10  4  118 
E. Tenn.  7.20  1  3  10 
U.  Pac.  104  20 
13f 
15 
Four Reorganizations before  1893 
E. Tenn., '86  6 
Erie,  '59 
23  5  % 
Erie, '77 
21  4 
4  181  2 
Reading,  '86  10  388  58  29  I0  53fZ 
'  The assessments before 1893 were as follows:  The Erie levied  zf per cent on 
its common and preferred in 1859, and a minimum of  $4  on its common and $2  on 
its preferred in 1877, with no allowance of  new securities in either case.  The East 
Tennessee assessed its common stock 6 per cent and its income mortgage 5 per cent 
in  1886, and gave to the one a corresponding  amount of  2d  preferred, and to the 
other of 1st preferred stock.  The Reading assessments in 1886 ranged from 24 per 
cent on the deferred incomes to 15 per cent on certain junior securities, with an assess- 
ment of $10  on both classes of stock.  Preferred stock was given for all assessments 
UP to the full amount of  the sums taken. 
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In every case during the nineties the amount of  assessment ex- 
ceeded the sum  for which common shareholders could have sold 
their stock one month after the publication  of  the reorganization 
plan.  The difference ranged from $3.50  for the Erie to $173 for 
the Reading; in other words the assessments wiped out the whole 
value remaining to common stockholders, and exacted an additional 
contribution as the price of  participation in any future prosperity. 
In the case of  the preferred stock, where values were greater and 
assessments less heavy, the results were not the same ;  but even here 
the proportional demand was large, and amounted to IOO  per cent 
of  current quotations in the case of  the Northern Pacific.  Before 
1893 assessments were fewer in number and not so great in amount. 
It is to the subsequent rise in.stock  quotations to which we  must 
turn for an explanation of  the willingness of  stockholders to con- 
tribute such heavy sums.  The assessments, we  find, did not come 
out of  the stockholders' pockets in the end; for their payment, in 
connection with other features of  reorganization, so enhanced the 
value of  shares that only six months after reorganization the price 
of  stocks in all cases was nearly equal to the assessment plus the 
previous market quotation. In  some instances, such as  the Baltimore 
& Ohio, the sum amounted to much more than this total.'  Refusal 
to pay would have wiped  out the stockholder's interest and have 
kept him from benefiting  from the rise.  It is needless to add that 
quotations to-day are many times the amount of  the assessments. 
The increase in value has occurred alike for common and preferred 
stock, even in times of  severe depression.  On the whole,  it has 
abundantly justified  the  payments which stockholders were asked 
to make. 
The use of  assessments alone represents the most radical and the 
soundest method of  raising cash.  It disposes of  the accumulated 
quick liabiities once and for all ;  and involves no subsequent  increase 
given in exchange for the old preferred stock.  In the case of  the  Baltimore & Ohio 
e. g., this was 150 per cent in new common; for the Northern Pacific it was 50 per 
cent new common and 50 per cent new preferred.  Only $~,ooo,ooo  of Baltimore & 
Ohio preferred  stock were  outstanding before the  reorganization of  1898, and  no 
record of  quotations can be found.  Quotations are  similarly unobtainable for the 
Reading in 1886. 
The very large increase in the Baltimore & Ohio quotations was  doubtless due 
to the lateness of  the reorganktion. 
m interest charges. It was the method of the Atchison and the Union 
pacific after 1893, of the Reading from 1883-6, and of  the Erie from 
1875-7.  It was furthermore the method of  the Western, New York 
& pennsylvrnia in  1893,' of  the Norfolk & Western  in  1896,~  and 
of other railroads which might be named.  Probably its most drastic 
application was in the case of  the Houston & Texas Central in 1887, 
&ere  an  assessment of  73 per cent was found necessary to dis- 
charge the floating debt and to provide cash payments for interest 
and bonus to first mortgage bondholders, and to pay the charges, 
expenses, and other liabilities made or incurred by the Trust Com- 
pany.' 
The sale of  securities also has been relied upon for the production 
of cash.  The most striking example of  the use of  securities alone 
is  afforded by the  Reading  reorganization of  1883, which at the 
same time illustrates the possible unsoundness of  the method.  The 
floating debt of  the Reading companies amounted in June,  1880, 
to $12,155,248,  the bulk having been incurred in attempts to main- 
tain solvency.  To cover  this  Mr.  Gowen  proposed  an issue  of 
$343oo,ooo deferred income bonds,'  to be sold at 30 per cent of  their 
par value, and to be entitled to dividends after 6 per cent had been 
paid on the common stock.  These securities were practically worth- 
less, and had to be set aside in favor, hst, of  new general mortgage 
bonds, and then of  old unissued general mortgage 7 per cent bonds 
which the company happened to have in its treasury.  So ineffective 
was even this expedient that in  October, 1884,  the floating debt 
amounted to a sum nearly one-third greater than that reported in 
1880. Another example was the Erie scheme of  1886, which was not, 
however, a reorganization, according to our definition.  The floating 
debt of the Erie in September, 1884, amounted to $5,455,338, of  which 
$1,007,~22  consisted of  unpaid coupons.  On the suggestion of  Eng- 
lish securityholders these coupons were funded ;  and the balance was 
raised by a new terminal mortgage issued and disposed of by a sub- 
sidiary terminal corporation  known as the Long Dock Company. 
The result was an increase in fixed charges, which contributed to the 
' Chron. Investor9 Supplement, January,  1894. 
'  Ibid. 62: 641, 1896. 
a  Chron. 45: 792, 1887 (reorganization plan).  See also chron. 49: 269,  1%. 
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final failure in 1893.  The history  of  the  Southern Railway affords 
a third example.  At the end of  1888 the Richmond  & West Point 
Terminal Railway  &Warehouse Company found itself with a float- 
ing debt  of  $5,000,000,  and proceeded to authorize  an isssue of 
$24,300,000 5 per cent 25-year collateral trust bonds,of which$5,ooo,- 
ooo were to be sold to cancel this indebtedness.  In subsequent years 
the current liabilities again increased, and for this and other reasons 
a general reorganization became necessary, in which both an assess- 
ment and a sale of  securities were required.  On the whole the result 
of  experience bears out the statement as to the unsoundness of re- 
liance on the issue of  securities for cash even when the sale of  the 
securities is guaranteed. 
Yet another method of  raising cash has been the combination of 
assessments with the sale of  bonds or stock or both.  In 1898  the 
Baltimore  & Ohio disposed of  $3,800,000 Western Union Telegraph 
stock.  It  also provided a total of  $37,9oo,ooo prior lien and first mort- 
gage bonds and preferred stock, which was in part given for assess- 
ments, and in part turned over to a syndicate in return for cash. 
The Erie, in 1895, besides its assessment sold $15,ooo,ooo in prior 
lien bonds ;  while the Reading sold $4,000,000  in new general mort- 
gage bonds and $8,ooo,ooo in new first preferred stock.  In each case 
the success of  the sale was ensured by a syndicate agreement.  In 
1886, to go outside of  the reorganizations which have been particu- 
larly described, the Texas  & Pacific  provided funds with which 
to cancel a part of  its floating debt by an assessment of  $10  and an 
issue of  $6,500,000 common stock.  Three years later, the St. Louis, 
Arkansas  & Texas assessed its second mortgage bondholders 5 per 
cent and its stock 10 per cent and sold securities to the par value of 
$4,490,880 to cover $3,4oo,ooo of  cash requirements.'  In 1894 the 
New  York  & New  England  issued  $4,355,000  in securities and 
levied  $20  and $25  respectively upon  its common and preferred 
shares.2  In 1896 the St. Louis  & San Francisco planned to raise 
$821,410  by assessment and $5,5oo,ooo by sale of  securities.  Such 
examples might be multiplied indefinitel~.~ 
Chron. 50: 141, 1890.  a  Ibid. 58: 762,  1894. 
'  Chron. 62: 829, 1896.  Poor states in his Manual for 1900 that of  $96,094,960 
of  assessments levied  on securities of  fifty-seven selected companies, $86,972,703 
were on stock and %,1aa,al;7 on bonds. 
The problem of  cash requirements must be met and solved before 
the parties interested can consider the fixed charges.  It  is the reduc- 
tion in &arges,  nevertheless, which is usually of  the more funda- 
mental importance.  A floating debt accumulated through inability 
to pay current  expenses is the direct  result  of  excessive charges, 
and a settlement which did not lower these, as well  as pay off  the 
debt, could give but temporary relief.  Only when failure has been 
due to special causes can a decrease in the annual burden be even 
a matter for debate.  The following  tables show the absolute changes 
brought  about by  those of  the reorganizations earlier considered 
for which precise figures are available : 
FIXED  CHARGES 
Seven Reorganizations, 1893-8 
Per cent  Per cent 
Road  Before  A fler  decrease  increase 
Atchison  $9,423,160  $6,486,842  31.16 
B.  & 0.  7,202,855  6,359,896  11.70 
Erie  8,637,700  8,126,283  5.92 
N. Pac.  13,813,945  6,761,960  51.04 
Reading  11,422,054  9,043,944  20.81 
Richm. Term.  system  7,498,584  4,195,925  44.04 
U.  Pac.  7,985,921  4,502,134  43.9 
$65,984,219  $45,576,984  30.92 
Seven Reorganizalhs before 1893 
Atchison, '89  $11,157,770  $7,256,054  34.9 
Atchison, '92,  7,189,199  9,423,160  31.0 
E. Tenn. '86  1,742,495  1,167,-  33.0 
Erie, '75  4,697,802  5,215,146  11.0 
Reading, '80  7,734,031  11,535,078  49.1 
Reading, '83  8,235,047  7,581,032  7.9 
Rk. I. '80  1,508,989  1,271,836  16.3  -  - 
&3,276,372  $43,449,306  -53 
Om Reorganization, 1932 
The figure of $9,043,~~~  is the true figure for the Reading fixed charges after 
"Organization,  eliminating duplications.  In computing the percentage  of  charges 
to earnings in 1898, however, the unrefined figure of  $12,21o,2~1 is used in connec- 
tion with a similarly unrefined figure of  earnings. 
a  The reorganizations omitted are those of  the Union Pacific in 1880, which did 
alter fixed charges, and of the Erie in 1859 and the Northern Pacific in 1875, for 
which Precise  figures are  not  available.  In this last charges were  almost entirely 
=moved;  its exclusion, therefore, tends to lessen the percentage of  reduction shown 
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From these  tables, it  appears that each of  the reorganizations 
from 1893-8  occasioned an absolute reduction in fixed charges which 
varied from 5.92 per cent in the case of  the Erie to 51.04 per cent 
in that of  the Northern Pacific.  On the other hand the reductions in 
the earlier reorganizations were more irregular and were exceeded 
by the increases.'  Absolute figures, however, reveal little. Charges 
may be reduced and the road be worse off  than before because of 
more than proportional reductions in mileage or in earnings.  The 
preceding  table must therefore be  supplemented by one showing 
the changes in charges per mile of  road and changes in the relations 
of  charges to earnings. 
FIXED  CHARGES 
Saten Reorganizations, 1893-8 
Charges per  ml  Per cent of  charges to  net  iw 
Before  Affe*  Before  After 
Atchison  $1415  $1001  110.5  80.9 
B. & 0.  3438  3107  98.2  86.3 
Erie  4116  3824  114.7  95.8 
N.  Pac.  2630  I494  106.8  50.2 
Reading  9856  6611  111.3  82.1 
Southern  I553  955  105.1  81.5 
U.  Pac.  4381  1859  105.7  40.6 
Seven Reorganizafionr btfore 1893 
Atchison, '89  $1603  $1064 
Atchison, '92  1079  1415  85.8  110.5 
E. Tenn. '86  1578  1083  134.3  79.5 
Erie, '75  4984  5619  93.9  91.1 
Reading, '80  9138  7287  98.1  83.0 
Reading,  '83  8760  7185  78.3  77.0 
Rk. I., '80  1200  952  13.2  10.2 
One Reorganization, 1902 
~k.  I. '02  1231  1448  39.8  59.0~ 
The six reorganizations before 1893  include that of  the Atchison in 1892,  which 
was  not caused by  inability to earn charges, and consequently made no attempt to 
lower their figure.  Excluding this reorganization, the reductions in charges before 
1893  overbalanced the increases.  H. V.  Poor calculates the absolute reduction in 
fixed charges for sixty-eight railroads reorganized between  188s  and  1897 at $24,- 
007,490.  (Manual,  IF,  p.  cvi.) 
a  The decrease in charges per mile for the Reading in 1880 was due, not to any 
reduction in charges, but to an increase in mileage through the lease of  the Central 
Railroad of  New Jersey.  In this case the increase in absolute charges better repre- 
sents the real effect of  the reorganization. 
A summary of  the preceding tables is as follows: 
FIXED  CHARGES  BEFORE  AND  AFTER  REORGANIZATION 
Seven Reorgattizations, 1893-8, 
Per cent Decrease  Per cmrt Increase 
Absold  Charges  Chrges  Absolute  Charges  Chgm 
Charges  to income  per mile  Charges  to 1-  mils 
Atchison  31.1  26.7  29.2 
B.  & 0.  11.7  12.1  9.6 
Erie  5.9  16.4  7.0 
N. Pac.  51.0  53.0  43.0 
Reading  20.8  26.2  32.9 
Southern  44.0  22.4  37.7 
U. Pac.  -  43.6  61.5  - -  57.5 
30.9  31.2  31.2 
Seven Reorganidions bcfm  1893 
Atchison, '89 34.9  33.6 
Atchison, '92  31.0  28.5  31.1 
E. Tenn. '86  33.0  40.8  31.3 
Erie, '75  2.9  11.0  12.7 
Reading, '80  15.3  20.2  49.1 
~eading,  '83  7.9  2.2  17.9 
Rk. I. '80  16.3  22.7  20.6  -  - - -  - - 
One Reorganization, 192 
Rk. I. '02  119.3  48.2  I  7.6' 
It is perhaps unnecessary to warn the reader that these tables can be taken as 
generally indicative only.  The percentage of  charges to earnings varies not  only 
with charges but with earnings; and an increase or decrease in the latter may con- 
ceal a decidedly contrary movement in the former.  Since the reorganizations were 
accomplished at different dates the error is not in all cases in the same direction, 
and in particular the percentage of  charges to earnings for one road cannot be com- 
pared with the percentage for another.  The figures of  charges per mile of line are 
somewhat more reliable, but are nevertheless to be used with care.  Different rail- 
mads report their mileage differently,  and it has not been possible in all cases to use 
the homogeneous figure of mileage operated.  Further, the significance of high charges 
Per  mile varies with the character of the mileage.  A reorganization which lops otf 
many  unprofitable branch lines may conceivably cause thereby an increase in the 
charges per mile  of  road remaining, and yet place the system in a much stronger 
position than before.  This difficulty disappears if  the figure of charges per mile be 
Used in connection with the percentage of  charges to earnings, and in general the 
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These  tables  show  plainly  that  substantial  reduction  in  fixed 
charges was the rule In  the reorganizations of 1893-8,  though less 
universal and less important in the reorganizations before that date. 
Even before 1893, however, the fact that reductions must be made 
was  apparent.  Three  reorganizations increased  absolute charges 
instead of  decreasing them.  Of these the Atchison reorganization of 
1892 was not due to lack of prosperity, and the Erie reorganization 
was a failure.  The Reading reorganization of  1880 increased abso- 
lute charges, increased mileage more than correspondingly, but was 
also a failure. And it is significant that only those roads which gener- 
ously reduced charges regained even a temporary prosperity. 
The distribution  of  losses  which  a  reduction  in  fixed  charges 
requires can best be made by acomprehensive redistribution of  secur- 
ities.  All the bonds and stocks which are to suffer must be called in; 
and varying amounts of new securities must be given in their place. 
Among the important considerations to those who fix the rates for 
exchanges are these : 
(I) Maximum charges under the new rCgime should approximate 
minimum net earnings under the old. 
(2)  As large a proportion of the charges as possible should consist 
of  the one item of  interest on bonds. 
(3)  Losses should fall most heavily on the junior securityholders. 
(4)  The nominal value of outstanding securities should be reduced 
as little as possible. 
(5)  Bondholders whose  claims have  been  cut  down  should  be 
afforded some chance to participate in future increased earnings of 
the property. 
These rules may be  considered in turn.  The point to which the 
best  practice  should reduce  fixed  charges is  readily  understood. 
Nothing less than solvency under the least favorable conditions is the 
goal toward which a reorganization plan should strive.  It appears, 
accordingly, that the minimum earnings of  the Atchison property 
from 1891-4  had been $5,204,880; while the fixed charges ~roposed 
for it were  $4,528,547.  The lowest net  earnings which  the Union 
Pacific had ever recorded had been $4,315,077.  The interest on its 
new bonded indebtedness was placed at $4,ooo,ooo.  The net earn- 
ings for the Northern Pacific in 1895 were $6,052,660, which was the 
least that the road had earned for eight years. The new fixed charges 
,ere  estimated at $6,015,846.  The minimum net earnings of the 
~~ltimore  & Ohio from 1887 to 1898 had been  $6,610,774.  The 
fixed  ,-barges of  the plan of  1898 were set at $6,25~,~51. 
In  order to simplify the charges, as well as for other reasons, it is 
desirable to have the item of  interest bear a large proportion to the 
whole.  The fixed charges of  six of  our seven reorganizations from 
Ig93-8  amounted together to $54,562,165.  Of  this sum, interest on 
bonds comprised $35,239,146 or some 64 per cent.  The charges of 
the same railroads after reorganization amounted to $36,533,040, of 
which sum interest on bonds comprised $30,926,638 or 84 per cent. 
The distribution of  losses should bear most heavily on the junior 
securities.  The simplest  readjustment  would  seem  at first sight 
to demand a proportionate concession from all creditors.  But this 
would be both unjust and impossible.  In no sense do all bond- and 
stockholders stand upon an equal footing.  In the fist place, the cost 
at which senior bondholders have acquired their claims has much 
exceeded the cost at which junior bondholders and stockholders  have 
acquired  securities of  equal nominal  amount.  Apparently equal 
claims represent very unequal investment.  In the second place this 
increased  cost  has been  due to certain  legal provisions touching 
security which become prominent during reorganization.  All mort- 
gage bonds possess by law a lien upon the property pledged to secure 
them.  Upon  default in repayment of  principal,  and usually  also 
upon default in payment of  regular interest, their owners have the 
right to sell the pledged property at auction and to recoup themselves 
from the proceeds.  After the underlying bonds have been satisfied 
the selling price is applied as far as it will go to the settlement in full 
of mortgages in the order of  their issue ;  whiie the stock, representing 
the owners of  the property, takes what is left.  As  a rule a railroad 
will not sell for anything like the sum required to pay off  all its mort- 
gages, and the junior issues are threatened with extinction.  Usually, 
however,  it is possible  for the junior to guarantee interest on the 
senior bonds, or to buy the railroad at foreclosure sale under some 
Senior mortgage, thus preserving to themselves the knefit of  the 
earning power  of the corporation.  When this is done earnings are 
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issues on penalty of  still further foreclosure and readjustment. The 
principle  of  reorganization which is followed prescribes because of 
this the payment in full of  all claims which can be satisfied by the 
purchase price of  the bankrupt railroad at foreclosure sale, and the 
distribution of  losses among the remainder according to the relative 
priority of  their liens. 
The consent of  securityholders  to a reduction in their claim to an 
annual return is more easily obtained if  the nominal value of  their 
holdings be little or not at all reduced.  There is a magic in the par 
value stamped upon a certificate which affords a certain consolation 
to those from whom sacrifices in interest are demanded.  An unim- 
paired  principal, moreover,  constitutes a real advantage when the 
date of  maturity arrives.  But if  the low earning power of  the corpora- 
tion compels it to ask sacrifices from the holders of  its securities, it is 
only fair that these sacrifices should cease when the earning power 
improves.  In other words,  it is but just  that old bondholders be 
given securities upon which payment of  interest is optional, so that 
they may  share in future prosperity, and obtain the same return 
which they once enjoyed whenever the road earns enough to pay it. 
The foregoing rules dictate the amount of  reduction to be made in 
charges, and also the kind and amount of  new securities which are 
usually offered in the exchanges.  Interest and rentals must be  cut 
down without decreasing the nominal value of  the securities out- 
standing. To  reduce interest without reducing nominal value, either 
the interest rate on outstanding securities must be lowered, or mort- 
gage bonds must  be  replaced by  income bonds or by  stock.  To 
reduce rentals annual payments may  be  arbitrarily cut down,  or 
rental contracts may be funded into mortgage bonds.  These mer- 
ent methods may be taken up in some detail. 
The accompanying tables (see  opposite   age)  show for fourteen 
reorganizations the number and amounts of  outstanding issues before 
and after reorganization at the various rates of  interest designated. 
Few collections of  figures in railway finance deserve more careful 
attention than those given in these tables.  Whereas the  greatest 
number of  the issues before the seven reorganizations prior to 1893 
bore 6  per cent, and the greatest amount outstanding was similarly 
at that  rate; the overwhelming preponderance in amount after the 
Rorganizati~ns of  1893-8 bore 4  per cent, and a total of  14.7 per 
cent of all the bonds outstanding bore a lower rate of  interest than 
bad appeared at all at the earlier date. 
BOND  ISSUES 
Seven Reorganizations, 1893-8 
Before  After 
pn  cent  Number  Amount  Per  Cent  Number  Amaunt  Per  Cent 
7  33  $56,741,222  6.1  13  $43,942,500  4.9 
6  85  3007925,695  32.7  30  82,586,-  9.3 
5  51  267,623,426  29.0  23  90,853,035  10.3 
44  11  34,490,800  3.7  5  13,400,-  1.5 
4  9  2(jO,055,689  28.2  16  520,709,117  59.0 
34  2  76,733,350  8.7 
3  -  -  -  1  53,350,-  6.0 
189  9919,836,832  99.7  90  $881,574,002  99-7 
Not specified  5,141,238  1,-,529 
*24,978,070  $882,574,531 
Seven Reorganizationv before  1893 
7  40  8153,251,-  23.7  21  $81,327,544  10.3 
6  59  173,641,790  26.8  55  150,9991589  19.1 
5  22  I 74,060,032  26.9  16  180,341,768  22.8 
44  2  4,611,000  .7  I  79,-  .OI 
4  5  140,041,70021.6  -  5  375,881,614  47.6 
128  s45,605,522  99.7  98  $788,629,515  99.81 
Not specified  5,7129749  --  8,940,939 
%51,318,271  $797,570,454 
Graphically indicated the change was as follows : 
Me  Per Cent  hte  Per Cent 
Period prior to 1883  Period of 1893-8. 
Comparing the total interest with the total bond issue, we  find 
the average rate to have decreased from 5.5 per cent to 4.9  per cent 
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cent  by the reorganizations of  1893-8.  Of  some significance is a 
comparison of  the  rates  prior to the reorganizations before  1gg3 
with  those subsequent to the reorganizations of  1893-8.  The total 
interest payable on the issues at the later date was $38,291,31~. ~f 
the same proportions of  bonds had been issued at the same rates of 
interest  as before  the  reorganizations  prior  to 1893,  this interest 
would have amounted to $48,552,688.  The total interest payable on 
the issues before the reorganizations prior to 1893 was $35,658,1~~. 
If  the  same proportions of  bonds had  been  then  outstanding  at 
the same rates  as after the reorganizations of  1893-8  the interest 
charge would have been $27,941,807.  Thus in the first case there 
would have been a saving of  $10,261,369 annually, and in the second 
case one of  $8,279,775.  This computation is inexact because it fails 
to take account of  the normal reduction of  interest rates due to im- 
proved  credit and to increased prosperity from causes other than 
reorganization ;  but it is included here because, in the first place, a 
large part of  the reduction was due to actual reorganization; and in 
the second place, because much of  the improved credit is attributable 
indirectly to reductions of  charges and other reorganization features. 
It should be noticed that the new bond issues not only bore lower 
rates of  interest, but were of  greater volume and of  longer term than 
the issues which they replaced. The greater volume is reflected in the 
considerable reduction in the number of  issues at the same time that 
the  total  amount  of  bonds  outstanding decreased slightly  or  in- 
creased.  Thus the reorganizations before 1893 increased the amount 
of  bond  issues from $645,605,522  to $788,629,5~5,  and decreased 
their number from 128 to 98; while the reorganizations of  1893-8 
decreased the amount of  bonds from $91~,836,832  to $881,574,002, 
and decreased the number of  issues from 189 to go, or in far greater 
proportion.'  The matter may be viewed in another way.  Just before 
the beginning of  the later reorganizations the predominant rate of 
interest for the roads concerned was 6 per cent.  The number of 
issues at 6 per cent outstanding was 85 and the average amount per 
issue was $3,540,302.  The predominant rate just after those reorgan- 
izations was 4 per cent. The number of  issues at 4 per cent outstand- 
These figures do not include the comparatively small amount of  bonds  for which 
no interest rate was  specified. 
ing was 16, and the average amount per issue was $32,544,31~.  In 
other words, the process was to replace numerous small issues which 
bore high rates of  interest, by a few comprehensive issues at lower 
rates ;  thus simplifying the financial situation, as well as lightening 
the burdens which the roads had to bear. 
The lengthening of  the terms for which  the  various mortgages 
were to run is equally apparent.  Before its reorganization in 1897 
he  Union Pacific had no mortgage issued for more  than 40 years. 
The first mortgage of 1897 ran for 50  years.  The Reading in 1895 
had four mortgages, all issued during the reorganization of  1888, 
terms of  70 years.  All its other mortgages were for shorter pe- 
riods.  In 1897 it put forth a grand divisional mortgage with a term 
of 100 years.  The Erie in 1894 had two mortgages of  91 years each 
and one of 84 years, issued during the financial scandals of  1869, but 
no other of  over $~,ooo,wo  which ran for more than 43 years.  Both 
its prior lien and its general mortgage bonds now  outstanding are 
to mature IOI  years from date of  issue.  The Atchison in 1889 could 
boast of  only one mortgage with a term of  51  years.  Its reorganiza- 
tion at that time gave it two of  IOO  years.  The Northern Pacific is- 
sued one  100-year mortgage in the course of  its troubles in  1889, 
and two mortgages for  IOI  and  150 years respectively in its reor- 
ganization of  1896.  The reason for long terms has been the wish 
to  make new mortgages attractive.  Reorganization mortgages,  as 
has just  been said, tend to be large mortgages, at a lessened rate of 
interest.  They are  also  blanket  mortgages  with  an inferior lien. 
Some inducement besides the compulsion of  necessity  is useful in 
securing the assent of  old bondholders to the proposed exchanges 
of these bonds for outstanding securities.  The long-term bond pro- 
tects the holder against the probable steady fall in the rate of  inter- 
est on capital.  It promises him advantage in the future in return for 
Surrender in the present. 
reduction in charges by the substitution, for mortgage bonds 
with  fixed interest, of  securities upon which payment of  interest is 
has been  as important as the reduction  in the rates  of 
interest just described.  Such securities may be either income bonds 
Or  Stock. The income bond has a lien upon railroad property simi- 
lar in kind to the lien of  an ordinary mortgage.  Upon default in the 366  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  CONCLUSION  367 
payment  of its principal it can exercise foreclosure rights.  But it 
has no claim on earnings except in a right to receive dividends out 
of net earnings before any dividend shall be paid upon the stock, 
Stock certificates control the company by  their right to vote,l but 
are entitled to its profits only after expenses of every kind have been 
met.  When divided into preferred and common shares the former 
receive  preference in  dividends and  sometimes  in  voting  power, 
Among the reorganizations described in the text three made use of 
income bonds before 1893 and one after 1893.  The amounts of the 
issues and the percentages of  incomes to total capitalization before 
and after the reorganizations were as follows : 
Income  Bonds 
Per cent 
Befwe  After  Before  After 
Atchison, '95  $51,728,-  31.8 
Atchison, '89  %-,-  35.4 
Reading, '83  $22,347,227  56,389,466  21.7  39.3 
Reading,  '80  11,678,~CQ  18,737,709  15.0  19.3 
The East Tennessee reorganization of 1886 did away with income 
bonds, as did that of  the Atchison in 1892.  It  will be noted that these 
bonds were more used before 1893, owing probably to the fact that 
the name of bond was considered to increase the salability of  a se- 
curity  on  the  market.  Securityholders hesitated  to  accept  stock, 
but received bonds without too great a protest.  Th.e extent to which 
railroads catered to this preference is seen in the case of  the Read- 
ing deferred income bonds, on which payment of  interest was de- 
ferred to a6  per cent dividend upon the common stock. From certain 
points of  view,  however,  the income bond is inferior to preferred 
stock.  For instance, preferred stock almost always has voting power, 
while income bonds usually have none.  And although the income 
bondholder is sometimes protected from the insertion of  new claims 
upon earnings between his bond and the underlying property, pro- 
visions in preferred stock certificates may afford an equal guaran- 
tee.  In  consequence, the use of  income bonds has declined as a more 
accurate knowledge of  their limitations has become widespread, and 
the Atchison adjustment 4s  represent the sole use of this security 
in our reorganizations from 1893-8. 
Income bonds sometimes, though rarely, possess the right to vote- 
~h~ exchange of  preferred stock, with or without new bonds, for 
old bonds which have borne a fixed interest rate represents the best 
practice.  Sin of  the seven  principal railways reorganized 
from Ig93-8  retired old bonds with fixed interest by new bonds and 
preferred stock or by  preferred stock alone.  Take for illustration 
the case of the Erie, which exchanged new general lien bonds and 
preferred stock for old second consolidated bonds; of  the Northern 
pslcific, which exchanged new prior or general lien bonds and pre- 
ferred stock for its second and third mortgages ;  of  the Union Pacific, 
which gave 4 per cent bonds and preferred stock for its old hst 
mortgage 6s; exchanges which are but typical of  a widely extended 
use.  Even the Reading, which alone refused so to lighten the claims 
upon  its earnings, employed preferred stock in retirement of  old 
kst, second, and third income bonds. 
These issues were all protected from future introduction of  new 
bonds between them and their property.  The preferred stock cer- 
tificates of  the Atchison in 1897 contain the following words: "No 
mortgage, other than its general and its adjustment mortgage, exe- 
cuted in December,  1895, shall be executed by  the company, nor 
shall the  amount  of  the preferred  stock be  increased unless the 
execution of  such mortgage  and such increase of  preferred stock 
shall have received the consent of  the holders of  a majority of  the 
whole amount of  the preferred stock which shall at the time be out- 
standing, given at a meeting of  the stockholders called for that pur- 
pose, and the consent of  the holders of a majority of  such part of  the 
common  stock as shall be  represented at that meeting."  Similar 
restrictions were imposed by the Southern in  1893, by the Erie in 
1895, by the Northern Pacific in 1896, by the Reading in 1896, and 
by the Baltimore & Ohio in 1898; or in other words by all the large 
cor~orations  except the Union Pacific, whose failures in the nineties 
we  have described. 
As  for the years before 1893, in them the use of  preferred stock 
was  known,  if not so widely resorted to.  The East Tennessee in 
1~~6  offered new consols and preferred stock fpr old consols, divi- 
sional and debenture bonds.  In 1881 securityholders of  the Reading 
proposed7 and in 1886 nearly secured, the adoption of  plans which 
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partial exchange for old mortgages.  The influence of  English capi- 
tal, however, and the liking for the name of  bond to which we  have 
referred seems to have prevented large employment of  the device. 
Where either preferred stock or income bonds were used protection 
was  afforded.  When,  in  1875,  all the  outstanding  bonds  of the 
Northern Pacific were replaced by stock, provision was made for an 
issue of  first mortgage bonds to an average of $25,000 per mile of 
road completed; but no other bonds were to be issued except on a 
vote of  at least three-fourths of  the preferred stock at a meeting spe- 
cially held in reference thereto on thirty days' notice.  In the Read- 
ing reorganization of  1886 a clause provided that in calculating the 
net earnings from which dividends on income bonds should be paid 
there should be deducted from gross profits operating expenses, taxes 
and existing rentals, guarantees and interest charges, but not fixed 
charges of  the same sort subsequently created. And in the case of the 
Atchison in 1889 the provision that no bonds could be  inserted be- 
tween the incomes and the general mortgage 4s was so absolute as to 
prove an almost complete bar to new issues. 
It is this use of  preferred stock and income bonds which makes it 
possible to realize  the lzst  and highly important  rule which  the 
engineers of  exchanges have in mind.  Only by  the combined use 
of  securities upon  which  payment  of  interest is optional with  se- 
curities upon  which  payment  is  obligatory can  the  claims which 
their corporations are forced to meet be reduced, while at the same 
time former bondholders are given  the chance  to share in future 
prosperity.  Such  a  result  is  deliberately sought.  "The  general 
theory of  adjustment of  disturbed bonds," said thk Richmond Term- 
inal  reorganization plan  of  May, 1893,  "has  been  to substitute 
for them the new 5 per cent bonds to such an extent as is warranted 
by  the  earnings  and  situation  of  the  properties covered  by  the 
present mortgages, and the new preferred stock for the remainder of 
the principal."  This purpose receives, moreover, a natural develop- 
ment.  Justice does not demand that old bondholders be given the 
unlimited chance at future surpluses which old stockholders should 
enjoy.  Their  former holdings could expect  but  a  fixed  amount, 
and the maximum to be  paid on their new  bonds and preferred 
stock is therefore rightly restricted.  But fair play dictates that they 
be g.~n  to receive the same income as before.  If  they 
must surrender 6 per cent bonds in exchange for 4 per cent bonds 
it is equitable to allow to them as well 50  per cent of  their original 
holdings in new 4 per  cent preferred stock.  The corporation thus 
mounces  its intention of saving them unharmed if  it can possibly 
do so,  while it insists that its solvency be not dependent on the suc- 
cess of its attempt.  This idea has been realized in a number of  cases 
+th  approximate exactness.  The old third mortgage 6 per  cent 
bonds of the Northern  Pacific in  1896 received  1184  per cent in 
new  3 per cents, 50 pef cent in 4 per cent preferred stock, and 3 per 
cent in  cash, -which  together could yield nearly the same as the 
old mortgage.  The holders of  Chicago Division 5s of  the Baltimore 
& Ohio in 1898 surrendered an annual income of  $50 for a chance 
to receive $50.30; the Union Pacific first mortgage 6s in 1898 ob- 
tained  precisely 100 per cent in new 4 per cent bonds and 50  per 
cent in  new 4 per cent stock.  It would be too much to expect that 
such exactness should generally obtain.  The variations in security 
between  issues, the well-founded desire to distinguish and not  at 
the same time to swell unduly the amount of  new stock put forth 
lead to fluctuations both above and below the point of  equivalence 
of return.  The important fact to remember is in short this: that the 
use of bonds with  a fixed rate of  interest, together with bonds or 
stock upon which payment of  interest is optional, provides that com- 
promise between the interests of  the old bondholders and the inter- 
ests of  the corporation which alone can afford justice to both sides 
and can allow the reorganization to proceed. 
The matter of  rentals may now be considered.  "The extent of 
the  66  reduction in rentals from reorganization," says one authority,' 
is seen where thereduction of  this item of  fixed chargesfor the entire 
country is considered.  The net reduction in lease rentals from 1892 
to 1898 was $24,527,000,  and of  this sum $17,768,000  appears in 
the South and West  where the failures were most numerous and 
extensive.  The reductions of  rentals are most  conspicuous in the 
Northwest and Pacific coast railroads.  It is true that a part of  this 
decrease in rentals is to be ascribed to the steady movement in the 
direction of consolidation which is constantly converting lease into 
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purchase;  but  corning  so close  together,  the  difference between 
the figures of  1892  and those of  1898  is sufficiently  marked to wa- 
rant the conclusion that most of  the reduction is due to the numer- 
ous reorganizations which intervened." 
This conclusion is at first sight borne out by the following tables, 
which  show the decreases or increases in absolute rentals and in- 
terest for thirteen reorganizations, of  which six fall within the period 
covered by the quotation : 
FIXED  CHARGES 
S&  Reorganizations, I 893-8 
Interest  Rentals, etc. 
Decrease  Increase  Decrease  Increase 
Atchison  40.6  13.7 
B.  & 0.  19.7  77.2 
Erie  33.3  62.7 
N.  Pac.  14.2  88.9 
Reading 
U.  Pac.  21.8  78.1 
Average  - 






Rk. I., '80 
Average 
decrease 
TOW  Charges 







Ow  Reorganization,  1902 
Rk. I. '02  139.0  29.0  119.3' 
It appears that while the decrease in rentals was of  little import- 
The figure for the Reading in 1880  is affected by the lease of  the Central of  New 
Jersey,  which  took  place  simultaneously with  the  reorganization.  Excluding the 
increase  in rentals, the  remaining increase in fixed  charges  amounted to only 9.5 
per cent.  The East Tennessee reported no rentals in either 1885  or in 1887. The 
data for the Southern Railway are not in such shape that rentals and interest can be 
compared.  Its reorganization reduced rentals, however, very greatly. 
ante in the six reorganizations before 1893,  it was of  great import- 
ance  in  the reorganizations from 1893 to 1898. Whereas  absolute 
kterest charges were reduced by none of  the later reorganizations by 
over 40  per cent, four of  the railroads cut rentals by over 60  per cent, 
and two others might have shown a similar result if  a satisfactory 
division between interest and rentals could have been made.  Unfor- 
tunately, both  these statistics and Meade's statement are open to 
criticism for the reason which Meade recognized but to which he did 
give sufficient weight.  The relative amounts of  interest and of 
rental paid by a railroad at any time represent the method by which 
its system is held together. If  a parent company raises money by the 
sale of bonds, and purchases its branches outright, or buys a majority 
of their shares, its interest charges will be large and its rentals small; 
if it leases these same lines its interest payments will be small and its 
rentals large.  A steady movement in the direction of  consolidation 
doubtless existed  before  1893,  but  this  movement  was  certainly 
accelerated by, and made a prominent feature of  many of  the reor- 
ganizations of  the following five years.  Thus the Northern Pacific in 
1893  reported a total length of  line of  5431.92  miles; of  which leased 
lines  and lines operated  under  contract  constituted  1912.92.  In 
1898,  after reorganization and surrender of  the Wisconsin Central, 
it reported 4524.45 miles owned and operated, of  which 2430.42 con- 
sisted of  main line, and 2030.82 of  branch lines owned.  The Erie in 
1893  reported  551.12 miles leased and 598.51 operated for 32 per 
cent out of  a total of  1970.32.' Four years later it either owned out- 
right or held a majority of  the stock of  1806.92  miies out of  a total of 
2162.81.  The Baltimore & Ohio operated 26.5 per cent of  its mile- 
age in 1897  under lease or contract, but had reduced this by 1899  to 
-5 Per  cent.  The Southern Railway proportion was 38.1 per  cent 
in  1892 and  28.4 per cent in 1895.  A reduction in rentals through 
reorganization  has  occurred,  but  a  reduction  due  nevertheless 
largely to consolidation of  systems, rather than to revision of  rental 
contracts. 
It was partly because of  the difficulty of  exact statement on the 
Subject  that a discussion of  rentals was postponed till the matter of 
'  The  32 per cent paid has been included under rentals. CONCLUSION  313 
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interest should have been considered. It  now appears that the reduc- 
tion in interest payments which was so prominent took place in spite 
of  a reduction in rentals. If, for instance, the annual interest charges 
fell $10,261,369  in the course of all reorganizations, and if in later 
years the interest figures represented charges which at earlier date 
appeared as rentals, then the real reduction in interest was greater 
than the figures show.  It is true that consolidation is not responsible 
for all of  that decline in rentals which has occurred.  It is as  open 
to a reorganizing railroad to continue old leases at easier terms as it 
is to absorb the leased roads into its system ;  and much of  this has 
been done.  The East Tennessee, Virginia  & Georgia, for instance, 
leased the Memphis  & Charleston in 1877 for a yearly payment of 
$297,750;  while  the  Southern Railway  Security Company a  few 
years before had agreed to pay $318,763.50  annually for the same 
property.  And it is a fact that both consolidation and direct agree- 
ment have been the occasion of  considerable reductions in the pay- 
ments for the control of  subsidiary lines.  There is no reason why 
leased lines which have not earned their rentals should not suffer 
as much  as portions of  the main  system which  have  not  earned 
interest on their bonds.  On the whole, then, rentals have decreased, 
both  by  means of  direct negotiation and  through an absorption 
of leased roads into the main system accomplished by exchange of 
new  securities  for  old.  The significance  of  precise  figures must 
not  be  exaggerated.  The losses which  have occurred  have been 
distributed according to  the  same  principles which  have  already 
been detailed. 
It is now clear that creditors, stockholders, and syndicate in prac- 
tically all successful reorganizations agree that cash must be raised, 
fixed charges reduced, and the losses distributed according to the 
seniority of  existing claims; and  that of  all methods the compre- 
hensive exchange of  new securities for old is best suited to accom 
plish at least the last two of  these necessities.  To give a compre- 
hensive view of  the operations the capitalization after reorganiza- 
tion of  the roads which  have been studied may be  compared with 
the capitalization before.  It will then be possible to see at a glance 
the consequences of  the great variety of  exchanges.  The following 
table  gives  the  percentages which  the stock  and bonds  of  these 
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Preferred  Common 
Bonds  Stock  Stock  Total 
69.2  30.7  100 
72.9  4.5  22.5  100 
58.4  4.1  37.4  100 
61.0  16.5  22.4  roo 
%.3  19.6  100 
52.5  8.8  38.6  100 
1893-8 
AfW 
Prcfewed  common 
Bonds  Stock  Siock  Total 
48.9  39.6  30.7  119.2 
121.3  35.4  31.6  188.3 
59.0  22.1  48.1  129.2 
71.3  34.2  36.5  142.0 
61.2  33.2  33.2  127.6 
43.8  23.5  59.8  1a7.1 
50.4  457  *I  2 
59.1  33.6  39.1  132.0 
Seven Reorganizations befme 1893 
Atchiin, '89  67.7  31.8  100  95.6  31.8  127.4 
Atchison, '92  68.8  31.1  100  70.2  31.1  101.3 
E.Tenn.'8648.2  19.2  31.9  100  22.1  34.0  31.9  88.2 
Erie, '75  38.5  61.4  100  47.4  60.5  107.9 
Reading,'&69.1  1.3  29.5  100  86.3  1.3  29.6  117.2 
Reading, '83  71.9  .4  27.6  100  100.4  27.6  137.7 
Rk.  I. '80  32.2  67.7  IO0  403 -  -  ---  -  135.4  I75.7 
62.5  1.7  35.7  100  73.9  2.8  37.6  114.4 
One Rewganhfion, 1902 
The most striking fact is that every reorganization but one has 
occasioned an increase in total capitali~ation.~  The increase vanes 
from 1.3 per cent for the Atchison in 1892 to 88.3 per cent for the 
Baltimore  & Ohio in 1898; and the average increase is 32 per cent 
for the later period and 14.4 per cent for the earlier. This reflects the 
exchange of  new securities on which a lower rate of  interest is pay- 
able with  securities on which  all payments are optional, for old 
'  Government Debt. 
a  In considering the  capitaliition of  the  Erie  before and after the reo~h- 
tion of 1895 the  securities of  the  New York,  Pennsylvania & Ohio have been a- 
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securities which claim a high annual return.  It is the result of the 
attempt to reduce the demands upon reorganized corporations with- 
out materially reducing the sums which old securityholders may in 
times of prosperity receive.  It reflects also, however, the sale of  secur- 
ities for ready cash, or the exchange of  these for assessments, as well 
as the investment of  minor sums in the improvement of  the roads.  A 
closer examination of  the table shows that the increase comes chiefly 
in bonds before 1893 and in  stock after that date.  The average 
increase in bonds of the seven reorganizations before 1893 was 11.4 
per cent and of  common stock .9 per cent ;  whereas bonds decreased 
between the reorganizations of  1893-8  from 65.8 per cent to  59.1 
per  cent  of  the  previous  capitalization,  although  common  stock 
increased 9.2  per cent and there was introduced a great volume of 
preferred stock which is scarcely found at all before.  The less radical 
nature  of  the early reorganizations and the use  of  income bonds 
instead of  preferred stock as a security with optional interest are here 
apparent.  In brief, the statement of  capitalization before and after 
reorganization summarizes and conhs  the conclusions which we 
have reached.  A few fundamental principles have underlain the com- 
plicated details of  the exchanges of  new securities for old.  These 
principles appear when the reorganizations are examined one by one, 
and they show not less clearly when all the reorganizations are taken 
in two general groups. 
Another question now naturally arises. If  an increased capitaliza- 
tion has been obtained without an increase in charges, owing to the 
lowering of  the rates of  bond interest and to the liberal use of  stocks 
or income bonds, what has been the effect on the market value of  the 
securities concerned?  Is the  aggregate value of  the new securities 
less or greater than the aggregate value of  the securities which they 
have replaced?  It has been seen that taken as a whole less annual 
payments can be claimed from the railroads as of  right.  Has this fact 
decreased aggregate quotations, or has the larger volume of  securities 
and the chance for dividends over and above the minimum interest, 
raised such quotations higher than they were before?  The following 
tables compare the quotations of  securities disturbed by the various 
reorganizations  one year before the failure of  their railroads, with the 
quotations one year after reorganization of  the new securities issued 
to exchange for them.  A third column is inserted to show the effects  - 
of years of  prosperity upon quotations subsequent to reorganization. 
Seven Reorganizations, 1893-8 
Luwest  quotation  Lowest quotalion 
of month one  of  month one 
year before  year after  hst  quotation 
failure  reorganiedion  December, 1906 
~tchison  $184,857,934  $129,364,451  $342,941,683 
B.  & 0.  26,955,-  34,092,518  452634,437 
Erie  67,190,748  38,895,077  82,230,457 
N. Pac.  157,5551214  135,507,699  289,557,415 
Reading  88,940,250  71,607,223  I79,190,107 
Southern  45,653,414  35,231,356  71,411,937 
U.  Pac.  83,241,672  103,3299339  187,596,748 
$654,394,232  $548,02 7,663  $1,198,562,784 
D. 16.2 per cent  I. 83.1 
Four Reorganizations before 1893 
Atchison, '89  $129,142,003  $1 13,993,417 
Atchison, '92  35,100,000  42,600,000 
E. Tenn. '86  17,657,377  21,746,188 
Reading, '83  39,061,531  48,664,864 
$220,860,911  $2279004,469 
I. 2.7 per cent 
It thus appears that the increased volume of  securities of  the reor- 
ganizations of  1893-8  sold for a less aggregate price than did the 
smaller volume which it replaced.  Whereas the disturbed securities 
of  the seven roads in question, multiplied by their quotations one 
year before reorganization, give a product of $6~4,3~4,232,  the new 
bonds and stock given  for the disturbed securities, multiplied by 
their quotations one year  after  reorganization, give a  product  of 
$548,027,66~.' This is not true for three of the four reorganizations 
The difliculties which prevent wider extension of  these tables consist partly in 
the absence of quotations for certain classes of  bonds, and partly in the lack of  su5- 
~ently  detailed and precise information in some of  the early reorganization plans. 
Thus there are no quotations recorded in  1874-5  for the 2d consols and convertible 
bonds of  the Erie Railroad which were disturbed by the subsequent reorganization; 
and no detailed figures of  the exchange of  new bonds for old appear in the reports 
the reorganization plans of  the Reading in 1881-3,  and of  the Northern Pacific in 
1875. The reorganization of the Union Pacific and of  the Chicago, Rock  Island  & 
Pacific in 1880  did not disturb the bonds outstanding. 3  r6  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  CONCLUSION  377 
before 1893, and it is not true for the reorganizations  of  the Baltimore 
' 
& Ohio and of  the Union Pacific  in  the later period.  Individual 
causes account for most of  the difference.  The Reading reorganiza- 
tion of 1886-8  took place so soon after the previous failure that our 
method  makes  it  necessary  to  take  the  quotations  of  securities 
"before reorganization"  only five  days after  the railroad has left 
receivers'  hands.  These  figures  are  therefore unduly  depressed. 
The Atchison  reorganization of  1892  was voluntary, and was not 
caused by  financial difficulties.  The reorganizations of  the Union 
Pacific and of  the Reading in 1897 and 1898 respectively occurred 
later than most of the other reorganizations and benefited from the 
sharp increase in stock and bond quotations which began in 1897. 
For the seven reorganizations of  1893-8,  to repeat, the aggregate 
market value of  old securities before reorganization was greater than 
the market value after reorganization of  the new securities given in 
exchange for them.  The smallest changes took place in the senior 
securities. In the case of  the Northern Pacific the aggregate value of 
the three prior mortgages disturbed increased from $85,498,685 one 
year before failure to $86,158,702  one year after foreclosure; while 
;he consolidated or blanket mortgage of  the company decreased from 
$36,032,360 to $Z~,~~~,III.  In  the case of  the Reading the value of 
the general mortgage qs increased from $37,160,~77  to $37,383,503, 
while  the  first, second,  and third  income bonds  decreased  from 
$32,353,497 to $22,784,700.  The reason was not generally a smaller 
increase in volume, but the fact that new bonds of  fairly stable value 
were  given  for  the better  sorts of  old  securities, while  old junior 
mortgages were apt to receive new income bonds or preferred stock, 
of  which  the value varied within wide limits. 
The wide difference in the nature of  the securities of  the different 
roads forbids any attempt at precise classification.  The following 
divisions may, however, be made :  Three of  the reorganizations from 
1893-8 retired branch-line bonds for which quotations are obtainable, 
with a resultant increase in value for the issues of  $3,256,127, or 142 
per cent.  Five of  the reorganizations dealt with what may be classed 
as general mortgage bonds, and the value of  the new securities given 
was to the value of the old as $182,160,406  to $1~6,186,382, or a 
decrease of  7.1  per cent.  Three of  the reorganizations retired junior 
bonds  other  than  income.  The value  of  the  old  securities was 
$47,874,648 and that of the new $22,272,174,  or a decrease of 53.6 
per cent.  Four of  the reorganizations retired income bonds.  The 
of the old securities was $40,913,662, the value of  the new was 
$28,~77,721,  and the decrease was 31.1  per cent.  Three of the reor- 
ganization~  retired old preferred stock, and reduced the aggregate 
market  value  from $36,509,662  to $13,825,138,  or 62.1  per  cent. 
Finally, the common stock decreased 21.3  per cent from an aggre- 
gate value of $1z5,160,409 to one of  $98,316,060.  Stated in tabular 




Branch-line bonds  $22,840,928 
General mortgages  196,186,382 
Junior mortgages  47,874,648 
Income mortgages  40,913,662 
Preferred stock  36,509,662 
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This makes more dehite the conclusion which has been outlined 
in general terms before.  The burden of  the reorganizations from 
1893-8 fell on the junior  securities and stockholders.  The holders 
of prior lien bonds actually had more value than before one year only 
after reorganization had taken place ;  the general mortgage bond- 
holders had nearly recouped their losses ;  whiie the former position 
of the other creditors and of  the stockholders was far from being 
regained. 
It may be objected that the decreases in market quotations were 
due to a general decline in prices of securities and not to reorganiza- 
tions of the roads in question. This  objection, however, cannot hold. 
It is true that a general decline began in the United States in Febru- 
ary, 1893, and continued through 1894, reaching its lowest point in 
August, 1893, and, after that, in March, 1895 ;  and that this decline 
Was due to general conditions of  panic and depression.  In 1895, 
hmever, a revival took place, and, proceeding with uncertain steps 
tbugh 1896,  became obvious and  important in  1897 and  1898. 
T6e  average date  of  failure  from 1893-8 of  the seven roads de- 378  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION  CONCLUSION  3 79 
scribed in the text was  October I, 1893,  and the average date of 
reorganization  was  September I,  1896.  Since  the market  price 
figures quoted are taken one year before failure and one year after 
reorganization, conditions in October,  1892,  should be compared 
with those in September, 1897.  The following diagram traces the 
movements of  twenty-six important railroad common stocks between 
those dates.  Quotations for none of  the seven railroads in question 
are included.' 
It is evident that the prices of  the above stocks were not materially 
lower on September I, 1897, than on October I, 1892.  The exact 
average was 733 for the earlier month, and 71i for the later.  The 
comparison may fairly, however, be carried further than this, and 
considerable pains have been taken to arrive at general figures which 
are conclusive.  Such, it is believed, are the following.  The market 
value of  thirty-nine different bond issues of  seventeen companies, 
taken at random from among those frequently bought and sold upon 
the New  York and Philadelphia exchanges, was in October, 1892, 
$388,628,968.  This di£fered little from the market value of  the same 
securities in September, 1892,  which was $388,198,432,  or that in 
November,  18g2,  which was  $390,170,323.  The market value of 
these  issues in 1897 was $371,125,135  in  August, $373,875,293 in 
'  The twenty-six milmads are  as follows:  Canad. Pac.; Cad.  So.;  C.  & 0.; 
C.,B. &Q.;C. &E.I.;C.,M. &St.P.;C. &N.W.;C.,R.I. &P.; C., C.,C. 
&St.L.;D.,L.&W.;m.C.;L.S.&M.S.;L.&N.;Manh.El.;Mich.C.;  M., g. 
&T.;Mo.Pac; Mob.  &O.;N.Y.C. &H.R.;N.Y.,O. &W.;So.~ac;~abah; 
Tex. &P.;C.of.N. J.;LE. &W.;St.P.,M.&M. 
septernber, and $372,962,239 in October.  Represented in tabular 
form the situation appears as follows : 
Market  Value of  Securities 
1892  1897  Decrease. 
september  $388,198,432  August  $371,125,135  4.4 per cent 
october  388,628,968  September  373,875,293  3.7 per  cent 
November  390,170,323  October  372,962,239  4.4 per cent 
~n other words, the quotations for this large mass of  representative 
gcurities were within 43 per cent in 1897 of  what they were in 1892. 
~f to these are now added the same proportions of  stock that existed 
for the disturbed securities of  the seven reorganizations from 1893-8 
there appears the following result: 
Market  Value of  Securities 
1892  1897  Decr~are 
September  $641,105,160  August  $620,794,202  3.1 per cent 
October  644,276,634  September  631,061,329  2.0 per cent 
November  644,131,632  October  629,005,577  2.3 per cent1 
This is,  as nearly as possible,  a  computation comparable with 
figures already cited.  It is made up the same way, has too broad a 
basis to give  a non-typical result, and is not dependent upon the 
selection of  a single month for its conclusion that security prices had 
nearly regained their former level by the last half of  1897.  A decrease 
in value of  16.2  per cent for the securities of  seven reorganized rail- 
roads has been determined. Less than one-fifth of  this can be attrib- 
uted to general causes.  The significance of  the decrease therefore 
remains. 
In conclusion, two other points of  interest may  be  mentioned. 
First, the provision which sound reorganization plans should make 
for the future development of their properties, and second, the crea- 
tion of voting trusts to prevent sudden changes in control.  It has 
been seen that restrictions on new mortgages have accompanied the 
of income bonds and of preferred stock, in order to afford  to 
The securities in  the table are taken from the following companies: St. P.,  M. 
&M.;Wabash;N.Y.~.;~.,B.  &Q.;C.,M.  &St.P.;L. & N.;D.,L. &W.; 
Penna.;W.U.Tel.;B.,R.  &P.;Can.So.;LongI.;P.C.C. &St.L.;Tex. &P.; 
C. & N. W.;  I. C.; C.  & E. I. CONCLUSION  381 
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these latter a desirable protection.  If  old bondholders demand these 
clauses, a certain amount of new issues is required by the interests of 
the corporation.  A railroad is never finished.  New extensions and 
improvements which shall increase earnings are generally called for 
to a degree which current earnings are insufficient to meet.  Some 
provision for regular increments of  new capital, without the need of 
stockholders' approval in each case, is highly advisable, and implies 
no lack of  conservatism. In fact, some such provision is often forced 
upon a railroad.  Take the case of  the successive reorganizations of 
the Atchison properties.  In 1889 no new bonds were to be allowed to 
be inserted between the income and the mortgage issues, but it was 
left optional with the management to deduct all improvements before 
estimating the earnings applicable to dividends on the former bonds. 
This proved quite inadequate, and the reorganization of  1892 pro- 
vided dehitely a fund of  $20,000,000 second mortgage bonds, which 
were to be issued to a limit of  $5,000,000 each year, for specific im- 
provements on the Atchison, exclusive of  the Colorado Midland and 
the St. Louis & San Francisco.  The right was reserved to the com- 
pany, when all the above should have been used up, to issue more 
bonds of  the same sort for the same purpose, and on the same mileage 
up to a limit of  $50,000,000.  Finally, in 1895, there were reserved 
$30,000,000 general first mortgage bonds, to be issued each year to a 
limit of  $3,000,000, and $20,000,000 adjustment bonds, to be issued 
each year to a limit of  $2,000,000,  after the general mortgage fund 
should have been exhausted.  In each of  the reorganizations in the 
nineties considered in this study, in which restrictions on new bond 
issues were imposed,  there was concomitant provision for regular 
increments of  mortgage bonds to be used for improvements, better- 
ments, and new construction.  Thus the Baltimore  & Ohio in 1898 
reserved  $5,000,000  prior liens and $27,000,000  general mortgage 
bonds, of  which the latter were to be issued at the rate of  not exceed- 
ing $1,500,000  for the hst four years after the organization of  the 
new company, and not exceeding $1,000,000  a year thereafter ;  and 
the former were to be put forth at the rate of  not exceeding $1,000,000 
a year  after  January I, 1892,  for enlargements, betterments,  and 
extensions.  The Erie in 1895 provided $5,337,208 in cash to be spent 
at once, and $~g,ooo,ooo  in general lien bonds to be issued during the 
ears following  the reorganization.  The Northern Pacific in 1896 set  Lde  $25,mo,ooo  prior lien bonds, of  which not more than $1,5m,ooo 
were to be issued in any one year, and $4,000,000 general lien bonds, 
presumably to be  used  as needed.  The Reading in 1895 reserved 
~20,0~o,ooo  general mortgage bonds for new construction, additions, 
and betterments, of  which not over $1,500,000 were to be used in any 
one year.  And, finally, the Richmond Terminal reserved $2o,ooo,~ 
in 5 per cent bonds to be used at the rate of  $2,000,000 per year, and 
has recently authorized a $200,mo,ooo 4 per cent mortgage which 
raise the yearly limit of  expenditure to $5,ooo,ooo.' 
Before the nineties, as after, provision for new capital accompanied 
on the future issue of  bonds.  In 1886 the Reading pro- 
vided a lump sum of  $9,792,000 general mortgage bonds for future 
use in the improvement of  the railroad ;  and in 1875.  the Northern 
Pacific contemplated the issue of  first mortgage bonds to an average 
of $25,000 per mile of  new road actually completed.  Where, as with 
the Atchison in 1889, some such provision did not accompany the 
general restrictions placed upon new bond issues, or where, as with 
the Northern Pacific in 1875, the provision proved inadequate, fresh 
measures of  relief  were compelled.  The Atchison reorganization of 
1892 has been mentioned ;  in 1889 a financial operation of  the North- 
em Pacific,  which  according to our definition was not properly a 
reorganization, provided $2o,ooo,ooo 5 per cent consolidated mort- 
gage bonds for additional branches at a rate not to exceed $30,000 
per  mile, and a like sum for betterments, etc. 
Even where no restrictions on future bond issues are imposed, it is 
highly advisable that some provision for future capital requirements 
be  made,  and that the management have at its disposal a fund of 
bonds issuable without the approval of  stockholders in each case.  It 
is probable, therefore, that some such provision would have been a 
feature of some, at least, of  the reorganizations even had the restric- 
tions described not made the clauses an imperative necessity; but if 
We  may judge from the rather restricted basis on which we  are here 
at work, the provisions would have been far less liberal than we have 
found to be the case.  In 1895 the Union Pacific set aside $~g,ooo,.xx, 
4 Per cent bonds and $7,000,000 preferred stock to dispose of equip 
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ment  obligations, and for reorganization and corporate uses.  of 
these, corporate uses were stated to be those which would be proper 
to the corporation thereafter, such as the issue of securities in exten- 
sion of the property. This, of  course, was quite inadequate. Similarly 
the Rock Island in 1902 and the Erie in 1875-7  provided for a certain 
issue of  stock or bonds to be applied to future capital requirements. 
It  is undoubtedly true that both the Erie and the Reading railroads 
were hampered by  the lack of  adequate provision of this nature; 
though as the main difficulty of  each corporation was the continued 
existence of  heavier charges than it could bear,  an automatic in- 
crease of  indebtedness would not  have proved  a solution of  their 
troubles. 
The essence of  a voting trust is the deposit of  stock in the hands 
of  trustees (most frequently five in number).  These trustees issue 
certificates in return.  All dividends declared on the stock are paid 
over to holders of  certificates, but all the voting power is exercised by 
the trustees so long as the trust endures.  Of the reorganizations  which 
we have described, ten reorganizations with foreclosure included five 
voting trusts and one proxy committee ;  eight reorganizations with- 
out foreclosure included two voting trusts ;  ten reorganizations before 
1893included two voting trusts (though a third was proposed for the 
Atchison  in  1889) ; seven reorganizations in  1893-8  included five 
voting trusts and one proxy committee.  The use of  voting trusts has 
therefore become more general, denoting a realization of  the dangers 
of  fluctuating and speculative control at critical periods in a railroad's 
history.  This desire to secure conditions of  stable control has been 
the dominant one in the cases under consideration.  "In order to 
establish such control of  the reorganized company for a series of 
years,"  said the reorganization plan  of  the Baltimore  & Ohio in 
1898, "both  classes of  stock of  the new company shall be vested in 
. . .  five  voting  trustees."  "The  importance of  vesting  in  the 
present creditor class the management of  the properties until their 
productiveness is considerably increased . .  .  is manifest," said the 
syndicate reorganization plan of  the Reading in 1886.  It is of su- 
preme importance that a reorganized company be well started on its 
way by men who have jn interest in making the reorganization plan 
permanently successful, and that conservative direction be assured 
Until danger of  bankruptcy  be  past.  For this reason  we  should 
expect the use of  voting trusts to increase in direct relation to the seri- 
ousness of  the difficulties experienced, and  to the  vividness with 
which the need for stability is felt. If  we may generalize, and say that 
a railroad which cannot be reorganized without a foreclosure sale is 
Usually in more desperate straits than one which can be  saved by 
voluntary concessions, we have an explanation of  the coincidence of 
 foreclosure^ and voting trusts.  The teachings of  experience, which 
have shown both  the usefulness of  voting trusts as tools,  and the 
necessity of  a solution such as they offer,  further explain the in- 
creased prominence of  the trust in later years. 
It is not true that voting trusts are always used for the purposes 
indicated.  In 1892 certain stockholders of  the Baltimore  & Ohio 
agreed to deposit their certificates in a trust for one year and five 
months.  The stock deposited amounted to $8,975,000 out of  a total 
outstanding of  $25,ooo,ooo, and a limit of  $II,OOO,~  was set to the 
amount to be  so placed, the object of  the arrangement apparently 
being to increase the influence of  the stockholders concerned by con- 
centration of  their holdings.'  Again, in 1895, to take an outside exam- 
ple, the stock of  the Oregon Railway  & Navigation Company was 
placed in trust with the Central Trust Company in order better to 
protect the preferred stock.  It  was provided that during the continu- 
ance of  the trust the Central Trust Company should vote  all the 
stock: &st,  against any increase in the preferred stock unless the 
holders of  all the voting trust certificates of  both classes should give 
their  unanimous consent at general meetings; second,  against all 
propositions relating to the mortgaging, selling, or leasing of  the rail- 
road  and telegraph lines of  the company, or  to the consolidation 
thereof, unless a majority of  each dass of  certificates should consent ; 
third, on all other questions as directed by the holders of  a majority 
of the aggregate of  all voting trust certificates of  both classes repre- 
sented at general meetings2 Further provisions gave to the preferred 
Stock control of  a majority of  the board of  directors.  These instances 
are of interest; but  the principal purpose  of  the voting trusts in 
the reorganizations which we have considered has been nevertheless 
the securing of  stability of control for  a  definite period  after  the 
rehabilitation of  the bankrupt companies. 
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The duration of the voting trust varies from company to company. 
The most usual provision is for five  years.  Frequently the voting 
trustees may terminate the trust earlier at their discretion, as in the 
case of  the Baltimore & Ohio trust of  1898, the Richmond Terminal 
trust of  1894, or the Northern Pacific trust of 1896.  Frequently, also, 
certain conditions must be fulfilled before termination.  In the case 
of  the Erie in 1895 no stock certificates were to be due or deliverable 
before December I, 1900,  nor until the expiration of  such further 
period, if  any, as should elapse before the Erie Railroad Company in 
one year should have paid 4 per cent cash dividend on the first pre- 
ferred stock.'  In the case of  the Reading in 1896 4 per cent cash 
dividends on the hst  preferred stock were required for two consecu- 
tive years, and this delayed dissolution three years beyond the time 
originally c~ntemplated.~  The Richmond Terminal trust had pro- 
visions similar to those of  the Erie. 
The number of  trustees also varies.  The scheme proposed for the 
Atchison in  1889 contemplated a trust of  seven; the Baltimore  & 
Ohio in 1898 and the Richmond Terminal in 1894 provided for five; 
and the Erie in 1896 for three ;  but this point is not material.  When 
the reorganization plan requires the consent of  stockholders to an 
increase in the issue of  securities the consent of  holders of  trust certi- 
ficates is apt to be required on similar occasions during the existence 
of the trust.  Thus the Northern Pacific agreement of  1896 forbade 
the trustees to increase the preferred stock or to issue any new mort- 
gage, except with the consent of  the holders of  a majority of  the whole 
amount of  preferred stock trust certificates, and of  the holders of a 
majority of  the common stock trust certificates represented at the 
meeting. 
This ends the present treatment of  the subject of  railroad reor- 
ganization.  The results of  the discussion may be briefly summed up 
as follows : 
First. Reorganization is most frequently an attempt to extricate 
an embarrassed company from its difficulties. 
Second. These difficulties can generally be  traced  either to an 
unrestricted freedom of  capitalization, or to destructive competition- 
Third. The shape in which trouble appears is likely to be that of 
Chron. Investors' Supplement, April,  1897.  a  Chron. 79: 2087, 1904 
,  large floating debt or of  excessive fixed charges; either or both of 
which may have brought the corporation to a critical condition some 
time before the actual collapse. 
Fourth. The best  practice favors the retirement of  floating debt 
by  assessments 02 securityholders, though  sales of  securities are 
sometimes resorted to, or a combination of  sales and assessments is 
employed- 
Fifth. Fixed charges are composed chiefly of interest and rentals. 
Interest payments are reduced by the retirement of outstanding bonds 
by new bonds which bear a lower rate of  interest, or by income bonds 
or stock, or by a combination of  securities with a fixed rate of  interest 
with securities upon which payment of  interest is optional. Rentals 
may be  reduced by direct negotiation, or the leased roads may be 
absorbed into the  main  system, and their securityholders receive 
new stocks and bonds as above. 
Sixth. The new bonds are of  fewer kinds and have longer terms to 
run than the bonds which they displace. 
Seventh.  This reduction in fixed  charges imposes a loss on the 
greater part of  securityholders, both in respect to the annual interest 
which they can claim, and in respect to  the selling price of  their hold- 
ings.  A similar loss is suffered by those securityholders who pay the 
required assessments. 
Eighth.  The loss falls on securityholders according to the seniority 
of their holdings, -  those bonds escaping which can expect to satisfy 
their claims from the selling price of the railroad at foreclosure sale. 
Ninth. The most important development in reorganization prac- 
tice has been the increasing use of new securities bearing a fixed rate 
of interest with new securities bearing a conditional rate of  interest; 
a use which may make the losses of  junior securityholders temporary 
instead of  permanent, and yet safeguard the interests of  the corpora- 
tion.  In this connection preferred stock has gained in  popularity 
Over  income bonds. 
Tenth. This development, and  the  issue  of  new  securities for 
floating debt and for other purposes, have caused the capitalization 
after reorganization in all but one of  the cases which we have exam- 
ined  to exceed the capitalization before. 
%enth.  In  order to perfect a reorganization additional provisions 386  RAILROAD  REORGANIZATION 
are often inserted, which  protect junior securityholders against the 
reckless issue of  new bonds, supply the corporation with  ability to 
make necessary betterments from capital account, protect the cor- 
poration from sudden changes in control, and similarly supplement 
the main clauses. 
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INF~WTION  about railroad reorganization must be gathered from 
a wide variety of  sources.  The most important are five in number. 
First,  there  are the  annual  reports  of  the  railroads  themselves. 
Second, there are the tiles of  financial and railroad papers.  Third, 
there are contemporaneous pamphlets.  Fourth, there are memoirs 
and biographies containing first-hand material.  And fifth, there are 
government documents, which comprise (I) regular reports by and 
testimony before bodies like the state and national railway com- 
missions;  (a)  reports  by  and  testimony  taken  before  occasional 
committees;  (3)  legislative  records;  (4)  state  and  federal  court 
proceedings. 
Of  the five sources mentioned, the 6les of  contemporary papers 
are the most useful.  The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the 
Railroad Gazette, the  Railway  Age,  the Railway and Engineering 
Review,  the Railway  Times of  London,  the  New  York  Tribune, 
the New  York Jmrd  of  Commerce, the Wall Skeet Journul, and 
many  others  are  generally  accurate  and  trustworthy,  though  it 
should be noted as a limitation that they seldom have inside informa- 
tion,  and that  their  comment is not  always independent.  These 
papers  are  supplemented  by  pamphlets  and  circulars.  Many 
reorganization plans are published in pamphlet form.  Opposition 
to them  is not  infrequently  thrown into the same shape.  Reports 
of experts are printed in pamphlets.  In general, the live literature of 
reorganization must be put out on short notice, and so is issued in 
this informal way.  The official statistics of  railroads are to be found 
in the reports of  the railroad companies themselves, made to stock- 
holders or to supervisory government bodies.  These statistics, like 
the  news items in the financial and railroad papers, must  be used 
with care.  They are sometimes incomplete, and they are sometimes 
Purposely misleading.  Nevertheless, they are useful, and serious inac- 
curacies in any of  them are usually exposed within a few years after 
their original publication.  The material to be  found in legislative 
records is not abundant.  Railroads almost invariably, however, ap- 
pear before the courts in the course of  their reorganizations, and in 39O  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  39I 
the decisions of  these tribunals some facts of  interest may be found. 
The records of  the receivership of  the Union Pacific have been pub- 
lished  in  fourteen  volumes.  The decision  of  the  United  States 
Supreme Court in Pearsall vs.  Great Northern '  blocked  the first 
of  the reorganization plans proposed  for  the  Northern  Pacific 
1895.  An  earlier decision  enabled the Union Pacific to postpone 
the payment of interest upon  the public debt  until the principal 
should have fallen due.  The Erie has been  at times almost con- 
tinuously before the courts, and the same is true of the Reading 
during its reorganizations, of  the Northern  Pacific,  and of  other 
roads.  The student is most fortunate when he can uncover testimony 
before government committees, of  men who  have  taken part in re- 
organization proceedings,  or who  are  personally acquainted with 
developments which have led up to railroad failures.  Mr. Blanchard, 
before the Hepburn C~mrnittee,~  and Mr. Fink, before the Hepburn 
and the  Cullom Committees,'  helped their hearers to understand 
the policy which finally resulted in the failure of  the Baltimore  & 
Ohio.  The report  of  the Poland  Committee disclosed the  scandd 
of  the  CrCdit  Mobilier.'  The testimony  of  Gould, Adams, Ames, 
Holmes, and others before the United States Pacific Railroad Com- 
mission of  1887-8 e made clear  the  iniquity of  the Union  Pacific 
reorganization of  1880.  The statements of  Mr.  Pierce before the 
Senate Committee on Pacific Railroads in 1896~  explained the atti- 
tude of  the Union Pacific towards the repayment of  that company's 
debt to the Government.  The testimony of  Messrs. McLeod, Rice, 
Harris, and others before the Industrial Commission of  ~gw  threw 
much light upon the Reading bankruptcy of  1893.  The arguments 
of  counsel in the matter of  export differentials, reprinted in the fifth 
volume of  the Elkins Committee report," gave valuable information 
on the subject of  trunk-line competition.  Many of  the  witnesses 
before these committees are frank in criticism of  the railroads with 
which they have been connected.  Others are forced to admissions 
161 U.  S. 647.  a  138 U. S. 84. 
New York, 1879.  49th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report, NO.  42- 
5  42d Congress, 3d Session, House Reports,  No.  77. 
50th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No.  51. 
1 54th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 314. 
58th  Congress, 3d  Session, hearings before the Committee on Interstate Corn- 
merce,  United States Senate, in Special Session, 1905. 
by the keen questioning to which they are exposed.  The only similar 
to be found elsewhere lies in memoirs, such as those of 
Henry Villard,'  or  in  biographies like  Oberholtzer's Life of  Jay 
C~ke  which  make use of  private  papers of  men  prominent in 
railroad finance. 
This enumeration,  while  in  no  way  exhaustive,  indicates the 
principal sources from which material may be obtained.  Secondary 
works do not  exist  which  treat solely of  railroad reorganization. 
There is an article by E. S. Meade in the Annuls of  the American 
Academy,3  and articles by Simon Sterne in the Fo~um,~  but no books 
of which the author is aware.  Poor's Manuul for 19w  contains the 
most convenient set of  general statistics.  On railroad receiverships, 
besides legal works, there is a monograph by H. H.  Swain,'  which 
has a brief bibliography, and articles in the Forum, North American 
Review, and other periodicals. 
On the history of  the great American railroad systems the litera- 
ture is also quite inadequate.  The Union Pacific has been written 
up frequently, because of  its relations with the United States Govern- 
ment.  Works by  Davis:  Bromley,? Dillon,'  Crawford,@  Hazard,lo 
and White"  treat various phases of  the company's development up 
to its final reorganization, and an article by Mitchell in the Quarterly 
Jaurnul of  Economicslz deals with Union  Pacific finance since that 
time.  There may also be mentioned an account by Bailey,13 which 
covers the whole of  the road's history, but in a superficial way.  The 
Memoirs of  Henry Villard, 1835-1900.  Boston,  1904. 
Ellis Paxon Oberholtzer, Life of  Jay Cooke.  Philadelphia, 1907. 
a  Annals of  the American Academy for Political and Social Science, March, 1901. 
'  Forum, September, 1890, and March, 1894. 
H. H. Swain, Economic Aspects of  Railroad Receiverships,  Economic Studies 
of  the American Economic Association, April,  1898. 
John P. Davis, History of  the Union Pacific Railroad.  Chicago, 1894. 
I. H. Bromley, Pacific Railroad Legislation.  Boston, 1886. 
J. F. Dillon, Pacifi~  Railroad Laws.  New York, 1890. 
J. B.  Crawford, The CrCdit Mobilier of  America.  Boston, 1880. 
"  Rowland  Hazard, The Crait Mobiier of  America.  Providence,  1881. 
'l  Henry Kirk White, History of  the Union Pacific Railroad, Economic Studies of 
the University of  Chicago, 1895. 
l2  T. W. Mitchell, The Growth of  the Union Pacific and its Financial Operations, 
Quarterly  Journal of  Economics, August, 1907. 
lS W. F. Bailey, The Story of  the First Trans-Continental Railroad, its Projectors, 
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student of  the Erie has at his disposal the elaborate narrative by 
E. H.  Mott,l and  the  chapters by  Charles Francis  Adams,  Jr.z 
Milton Reizenstein has sketched the progress of  the Baltimore  & 
Ohio up to 1853,~  and for this  road there is material  to be  found 
in Smith's Book of  the Great Railway Celebrations of 1857,' and in  a 
compilation of  the Laws,Ordinances, and Documents Relating to the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, published in  1840:  For the Norther- 
Pacific the history by  Smalley  covers in  popular style the period 
from 1864 to 1883, and the careful History of  the Northern Secur- 
ities Case, by B. H. Meyer,'  treats  of  an interesting later develop- 
ment.  Wilson  has  written  two  volumes  upon  the  Pennsylvania 
Railr~ad,~  while  Worthington  and  Bishop"'  have  described  the 
internal improvements undertaken by that state.  Ackerman is  the 
author of  a Historical Sketch of  the Illinois Central Railroad,"  and 
Hollander of  The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A Study in Muni- 
cipal Activity.12  The Chicago & Northwestern  has  published  a 
volume called Yesterday and To-day,Is which contains some infor- 
mation.  Bliss is the author of  a Historical Memoir of  the Western 
Railroad."  Cary in  1893 described the Organization and History 
E. H. Mott, Between the Ocean and the Lakes; the Story of  Erie.  New York, 
1899. 
a  Charles Francis and Henry Adams, Chapters of  Erie and Other Essays.  Boston, 
1871. 
Milton  Reizenstein,  Economic  History  of  the  Baltimore  & Ohio,  1827-53, 
Johns Hopkins University Studies, July-August,  1897. 
W.  P. Smith, The Book of the Great Railway Celebrations of  1857. New York, 
1858. 
"aws,  Ordinances, and Documents Relating to the Baltimore  & Ohio Railroad 
Company.  Baltimore,  1840. 
a  E. V.  Smalley, History of  the Northern Pacific Railroad.  New York,  1883. 
" B. H. Meyer, A History of  the Northern Securities Case, Bulletin of  the Uni- 
versity of  Wisconsin, July,  1906. 
a W. B. Wilson, History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Philadelphia, 1899. 
T. K. Worthington, Historical Sketch of  the Finances of  Pennsylvania, Publica- 
tions of  the American Economic Association, May,  1887. 
lo A.  L. Bishop, The State Works of  Pennsylvania, Publications of  Yale  Uni- 
versity, New Haven, 1907. 
"  W. K. Ackerman, Historical Sketch of  the Illinois Central Railroad.  Chicago, 
1890. 
J. H.  Hollander, The Cincinnati Southern Railway:  A  Study in  ~unicipal 
Activity.  Johns Hopkins University Studies, January-February,  1894. 
l8 Chicago, 1905. 
George Bliss, Historical Memoir of  the Western Railroad.  Springfield,  1863. 
of  the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Company.'  Phil- 
lips discusses in excellent fashion the early history of a number of 
Southern  railroad^.^  Works like those  of  Van Oss  and  Snyder,' 
and brief descriptions which have appeared in the columns of  the 
Railway Wm~?d  and  in  Moody's  Magazine, treat  of  a number of 
railroads, but  make no attempt at a  scholarly examination of any 
one.  Some  general works  like  Bancroft's  History of  the  Pacific 
states:  Davidson and StuvC's  Complete History of  Illinoi~,~  Hol- 
lander's Financial History of  Baltimore,'  Sanborn's Congressional 
Grants of  Lands in Aid  of  Railways:  and Million's  State Aid  to 
Railroads in Missouri:  contain incidental information about indi- 
vidual railroads. 
These books are of  service.  Their number is, however, small and 
their scope limited.  It is surprising that a field so rich as that of  the 
history of  American railroad systems should have attracted so little 
attention from competent students.  It is not too much to say that 
the history of  the Erie by Mott is the only comprehensive work of 
the kind which  our literature  possesses,  and that  is already nine 
years old. 
1 Cary, Organization and History of  the Chicago, Milwaukee  & St. Paul Raiiroad 
Company.  Milwaukee,  1893. 
U. B.  Phiips. A Hiitory of  Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to 1860. 
New York,  1908. 
'  S.  F. Van Oss, American Raidroads as Investments.  New York,  1893. 
'  Carl Snyder, American Railways as Investments.  New York,  1907. 
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Pacific, 226,  228-30;  unloads  brancb rod 
on Union Pacific,  2391; 233,  237. 
Gowen, F. B.,  76,81,84,86,87-91,957,99, 
Io~,  112-15,  118-19,  IW. 
Grand Trunk, 2,  6, 7,  17,  18. 
Grant  & Ward, 54. 
Great  Northern,  258,  259,  277;  proposes  to 
guarantee  Northern  Pacific  bonds,  296-8, 
39-10. 
Gregory, Dudley S.9  35. 
Guarantee fund, 199, 29. 
~~lf,  Colorado  &  Santa  Fe,  196,  WZ,  ms, 
218. 
Hallgarten  & Co.,  on Reading underwriting 
syndicate, 139; on  Southern reorganization 
committee, 171; oppose Erie reorganization 
plan, 63-6. 
Barriman, E. H., 323,63-6,188,218,258-60, 
309-10,  33' 
Harris, Joseph S.,  77-8,83,97,125-8,129,131. 
Hams, Robert, 275. 
Hartshorne Committee,  136. 
Hepburn Committee, Albert  Fink testifies be- 
fore, 7. 
Higginson, H. L.,  206,  245. 
Hill, J. J., buys interest in Baltimore & Ohio, 
31-2;  struggle  with  Hamman,  258,  310; 
proposed  guarantee  of  Northern  Pacific 
bonds, 296-8,  307. 
Hollins, H. B.,  165, 179, 188. 
Hwper, John, 344 
Houston  & Texas  Central,  328-9,  355. 
Houston East  & West Texas, 329. 
Hoxie, H. M., 223. 
Huidekoper, F. W.,  176, 177, note. 
Huntington, Collis P.,  194, 258. 
Illinois Central, 19, 146, 259-60,  343. 
Improvements, Baltimore & Ohio, IS,  23, 28, 
3-31;  Erie, 42, 51,60, 73; Reading, 8-81, 
118, 144; Southern, 152,168,170,  189, 190; 
Atchison, 202, note, zq,  212,218-19;  Union 
Pacific, 234,  260-1;  Northern  Pacific, 276, 
278-9,  309;  Rock Island, 332, 333. 
Income bonds,  203-5;  before and  after reor- 
ganization, 365-6.  See  also Deferred income 
bonds. 
Inman, John H.,  164.  165. 
Iselin, A.  & Co.,  139. 
Ives, Brayton, 285, 287-8;  president of  North- 
ern Pacific, zgo; secures removal of  receivers, 
291-2,  298-9;  294,  295;  endorses Northern 
Pacific reorganization plan, 302. 
Jenkins, Judge,  289, 292,300, 301. 
Jewett, H. J.,  39, 40, 41,  49,  50-53,  55,  57. 
Joint Executive Committee, 6. 
Joint  Executive  Reorganization  Committee, 
21-16. 
Junior  Securities Protective Committee,  137. 
Kansas Pacific, poor condition of, 225; attempt 
at  reorganization  of,  2267;  consolidated 
with  Union Pacific, 228-30;  sale of,  2567. 
King,  Edward, 206, 210-16. 
King, John,  55,  57,  59,  note, 61. 
Kuhn,  Loeb  &  Co.,  take  part  of  securities 
issued under Baltimore & Ohio reorganiza- 
tion  plan,  26;  oppose  Erie  reorganization 
plan, 63-6;  represented  on  Richmond  Ter- 
minal  investigating  committee,  170;  on 
Union Pacific reorganization  committee, 250; 
agree to take Northern Pacific collateral trust 
bonds, 288. 
Lacombe, Judge, 61, 300, 301. 
Lake Shore  & Michigan Southern, 3,  18, 32, 
145. 
Land grants, see State and federal aid. 
Leases, Baltimore  & Ohio, 2,  27; Erie, 51-3, 
56, 58,59-4371-2,74;  Reading, 97-9, 117, 
IW, 122, 123, 128, 130; Southern, 147, 148, 
149,  159,  161-2,  166,  188; Atchison,  197; 
Northern Pacific, 276, 283-4. 
Leeds, W.  B.,  317-18. 
Lehigh Valley, 74, 75; leased to Reading, IW, 
122, 123, 128-9, 130, 133. 
Lehigh Valley Terminal Railroad, 128. 
Lewis, Edwin A.,  81-2,  97. 
Lewis, Howard, 119. 
Little, Stephen, report on  Baltimore  & Ohio, 
21-3;  on Atchison, 208-10,  213; set to work 
on the Reading, 128. 
Live stock, 17. 
Livingston, Johnston, 294, 307. 
Lockwwd, E. Dunbar,  106, 112, 117. 
Logan, T.  M.,  forms Georgia  Central  Com- 
pany, 164; seeks control of  Richmond Ter- 
minal, 164-6. 
Long Dock Company, 58. 
Lord, N.  P.,  345. 
Loree, S.  F.,  33. 
Louisville  & Nashville, 146, 149. 
Maben, J.  C.,  175, note, 178. 
McCalmont Brothers, 86-91,  96. 
McCormick, Attorney-General, 143. 
McCullough, J.  G., 61. 
McGill, Chancellor, 122: 
McHenry, E.  H., 300, 301, 308. 
McHenry, James,  39-40? 49. 
McLeod,  A.  A.,  leases  Lehigh  Valley,  120; 
extends Reading into New England, 122-5; 
statement  by,  125-6;  resigns  by  request, 
126-7 ;  132. 
Macon  & Bmnswick, 149, 151. 
Manville, Allen, wz. 
Maryland,  subscribes to  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
stock,  I, 18. 
Mayer, Charles F.,  16, 18-20. INDEX  INDEX 
,  r  -, 
Mobile  & ~irin~ham,  146,  167,  168,  185, 
188. 
Memphis  & Charleston,  148,  158,  168,  185, 
188. 
Mercantile Trust Company, d,  288, 2%. 
Miller, 0. G.,  45-6. 
Mills, Captain J. H., 300. 
Mink, 0. W.,  240,  253. 
Missouri Pacific.  106.  220. 
Mobile  & Ohio,  r89, 329. 
Moore, James  H.,  318. 
Moore, William H.,  interested in Rock Island, 
317-18;  reorganization plan by,  321-6;  buys 
St. Louis  & San Francisco, 327-8;  extends 
Rock Island to the Gulf, 328  30; relations 
with Chicago & Alton, 330-1; distrusted by 
investors, 332. 
Morgan, J. P.  & Co.,  organize syndicate to 
relieve Baltimore  & Ohio, 11-13;  sell Cin- 
cinnati,  Hamilton  & Dayton  to  Erie,  74; 
reorganize Reading, 108-11,  139,  140,  141; 
members of  Southern voting trust,  188; of 
Union Pacific reorganization committee. uc: 
Patterson  & Corwin, criticise Mr.  Little** n_ 
port on the Baltimore  & Ohio, 23. 
Pape, Henry C.,  receiver of Northern Pa,&, 
289, 292,  293, 299. 
Payne, Oliver H.,  171,  note. 
PearsaU us. Grut  NorthernRailway Company, 
4.  -7. 
Pennsylvania Railroad,  2-8,  10,  17, 313, 38,  I  81.  108-10,  141. 147, 148.  ,  ,  .-  ...  . 
Perham, Josiah,  z6q, note. 
Pennsylvania Coal Company, 74. 
Pere Marquette, 74. 
Philadelphia & Reading, 9,10,18,32,75-145. 
Philadelphia, Reading  &  New Englmd,  123, 
128. 
Pierce, W.  S.,  243, 252,  253. 
Port Reading Railroad, 120,  122. 
Poughkeepsje Bridge, ~23. 
Powell, T. W.,  55,  56,  57-8,  84. 
Preferred  stock,  use  of,  in  +tiq 
366-8. 
Prevost, S. M.,  31. 
Oakes, -,  287,289,291,2929  293,299300. 
Oakman, W.  G.,  176. 
Olcott, F. P.,  prominent in Readingreorganiza- 
tion, 135-6,  138, 140;  in Southern reorgan- 
ization, 155  note, 171-4,  179. 
Olney, Richard, 243. 
Oregon  & Transcontinental Company, 2723, 
27~.  276. 
'  -TJ. 
take part in ~orthGrn  Pacific reorganization, 
296, 304, 307. 
Morgan, J. S.  & CO., 11,  69. 
Morris, John,  40,41. 
MuUen, Attorney-General C.  W.,  327. 
National Company, see Philadelphia  & Read- 
ing. 
New capital, provision for, 379-82. 
New York  & Erie. 34, 35. 
New York  & New England,  123,  124, 356. 
New York Central, 27, r7, 35,38,  259,  343. 
New York, Lake Erie  & Western, see Ene. 
New  York,  Pennsylvania  & Ohio, leased by 
Erie, 51-3,  59-60;  70-2. 
Norfolk  & Western, 149, 151, 355. 
Northern  Pacific,  18,  19, ~32~~36,  258,  263- 
3'09  3159  342. 
Northern Paafic  & Manitoba, 292,  306. 
Northern Securities Company, 258,  259. 
Notes,  short time,  Atchison,  199, 203; Union 
Pacific, 237,250, :51,  257; Northern Pacific, 
287-9. 
,>r  , 
Oregon  Railway  &  Navigation  Company, 
~3619  '45, Y9r 257,  2757, 275-6. 
Oregon  Short  Line,  zjaq, 236,  249,  257. 
276. 
Railroad failure, causes of, 336- 
Rate agreements, 47, 275. 
Rates, 3-5,  6-8,  17,  235. 
Rate wars, 3-59  6-83  17,  34-59  38, 9,  1961. 
240. 
Ream, Norman D.,  31. 
Receive-,  Baltimore  & Ohio, to,  23,  28,  29; 
Erie, 35,36,38-9,50,61;  Reading, 81-z,97, 
100-1,  117.  125-6,  127,  133-4;.  SdOthern, 
175, 176,187; Atchison, m~;  Umon Pacific, 
240-1,  2489; Northern Pacific, 289, qrz, 
295.  298301. 
Receivers' certificates, 23,  68,  127, 293. 
Reinhart, Joseph  H.,  202, w,+,  zo5,  209-10. 
Reid, D.  G.,  317-18. 
Rentals, reduced through reorganization, 369- 
72. 
Reorganization,  deiinition  of,  335;  causes of, 
33642; cancellation of  floating debt by, 348- 
56;  reduction of  fixed charges by,  35772; 
distribution of  losses  under,  361-2,  368-9, 
376-7;  general prinaples  of, 384-6. 
Reorganization  committees, Balhmore & Ohio, 
213-24,  29;  Erie,  35,  40,  45-6,  55-6,  61-2. 
63-5;  Reading, 82,84,  86,  lor, 103-5,  112. 
~~4,117,rz6,128,133-5,138;  Southern, 152, 
155,  170,  171,  174,  175,  178-9; Atchison, 
199-a;  206-8,  210,  215,  216;  Union Pa- 
cific, w-~,'  qy5o. 257 ;  Northern Pacific, 
267,  293-4,308;  General, 343-5. 
Reorganization  plans, Baltimore & Ohio, 24-8 ; 
Erie,34,35,41,42,43-9,57-8,61-5,6673; 
Readlag,  83-6,  5-1-4,  967. 1013,  1o)-51 
168,  11-13,  114-16,  129,  133-4,  135-6, 
138-40;  Southern,  152-3,  155-6,  171-41 
179-84,  185-6,  187;  Atchison, w,  W1 
4,  211-16;  Union Pacific,  2+,  228- 
30,  241-4,  245-8,  250-4;  Northem  Pacific, 
"kc-6,  26770,  296-8,  302-8;  Rock Island,  --J 
312-13,  321-4- 
~eorganization  trustees, for Erie, 35,  47;  for 
Reading, I--5,  106, Ig-10,  114. 
~~solutions,  Baltimore  & Ohio, 15, 39; com- 
plimentary to Mr.  Gowen, 9;  by  London 
hnndholders'  committee, 29;  by  Northern 
Staten Island Rapid Transit Company, 10,29. 
StockhoIders' Protective Committee, 2x5,  296, 
302. 
Stockton, Attorney-General, 121-2. 
Strong, W.  E.,  prominent in Southern  reor- 
ganization,  174-5,  178;  president  of  the 
Atchison, 194-5,  202. 
Sully, Alfred, 133, 160, 164. 
Surplus, on  Baltimore  & Ohio,  15,  22;  on  "-- 
Padc bondholders,  268;  by  Northern  railroads in 1893, 342-3. 
Pacific  preferred  stockholders,  281,  285,  Syndicates, Baltimore &  Ohio, 11-15,  w, 26; 
--+-;  by Northern Pacific directors.  28~.  Erie, 68,  69; Reading, 86, 108-10,  -- .  113-15,  -  .- 
YV..  _  , 
Rice, I. L.,  121,  I*,  127,  132, 136, 16~-6.  IW, 134, 1j9; Southern, 150; Union Yac~hc, 
n:-h-rond  & Dandle. see Southern Railway.  1  2~6,  2-0.  zqz; Northern Pacific, 264-5.271,  mlc-  . -..  <. 
Richmond  &West ~oht  Terminal ~ailwa~*&  274, 276,288, 296, 304; Gereral, 345-8.. 
Warehouse Company, 10,  18;  see Southern  Syndicates,  compensation to, Ene, 69; Reahg, 
n  ailway.  19,  111, 1x2; General, 347-8.  -.-- 
Riddle, augh, 314. 
Ripley, E. P.,  216. 
Roberts, George B.,  log, 110. 
Rock Island,  196, 277,3"-33,  337.343. 
Rockefeller, J. D.,  288.. 
Rouse, Henry C.,  289,  32, 293,  35  299. 
Ryan, Thomas F.,  178. 
Tappen, F.  D.,  155, note,  171, note. 
Terminals, of  Baltimore  & Ohio, 3-4,  9-10, 
19,33 ;  of  Erie, 58;  of  East Tennessee, 152; 
of  Atchison. 217:  of  Northern Paafic, 283-4, 
St. Joseph  & Grand Ihd,  249,  259. 
St.  Louis  &  San  Franaq controlled  by 
Atchison,  194,  202,  216;  by  Rock  Island, 
327-8,  329, 330.356. 
St.  Paul  & Northern  Pacific,  287,  288,  zgo, 
296. 
St. Paul, llinneapobs  &Manitoba,  see Great I  Union Pacific, 32-3, ~~-62,  275-6,  277,  310, 
Northern. 
katoga agreement, 4.  United  States  Government,  relations  with 
&hi%, Jacob H.,  rp,  zp.  Union  Pacific,  230,  ZZJ-Z, 238-44  241% 
Mqholders,  divergence in interest between,  252-3,  254-6;  with Northern Pacific, 
3-1 
Simmons, J. Edward, 128,  134 
Sonora Railroad, 194, 19,  217.  Vanderbilt, Commodore,  36,  95-6  10% 314- 
335. 
Selma, Rome  & Dalton, 149,  151. 
Sides, General Daniel E.,  86. 
Siemans,  George,  represents Deutsche Bank, 
"Y. 
Southern Kansas Railway Company, 196.  1  15. 
263-4,  265-6. 
United  States  Supreme Court,  decisions  by, 
238,  239s 298,  301. 
Valuation, of  Reading  coal  properties, 77-8, 
Southern Pacific,  193-5,  217,258-  Van Nostrand, 194. 
Southem Railway.  146-91,  330, 3@.  Vermilye  & Co.,  63-6. 
Southern Railway Searig  Company. 148.  Villard, Henry, 237,272-4,275,  2813,286-7,  -  -.--  ~pea,  Judge,  1i6. 
Spencer,  Samuel,  12-13;  president of  Balti- 
ma  & Ohio, 15, 16; of  Southem Kailway, 
187; killed, 191. 
speyer  & Co.,  26,  12s. 333. 
Spg~m  Bros.,  see Speyer  Co. 
Stanton, Henry, 289, note. 
State and federal aid.  Baltimore  & Ohio, 1; 
Erie, 34; ~ichmmd  & Dandle, 146; East 
Tennessee,  147; Atchison,  192,  194; Union 
Pacific,  2-1,  225,  238-40,  *I-4  249, 
2547; Northern Pacific, 2634,371. 
302, 308; of  ~bCk  Island, 300. 
Texas & Pacific,  194, 330,356. 
Texas Railroad Commission, 329. 
Thomas, General Samuel, 160,  174, 175. 
Thurman Act, 238-9,  tq~. 
Trunk lines,  see Rate wars. 
Trunk-line arbitrators, letter of  Mr. Khg  to, 6. 
Tyler, Captain, report of, 37. 
288, zgo,  291-2. 
Virginia,  subscribes to stock of  Baltimore  & 
Ohio, I; aids Richmond  & Danville, 146. 
Virginia Midland,  150, 159, 160.  note. 
Voting  trusts,  Baltimore & Ohio,  18-19,  27, 
32;  Erie, 61;  Reading, 111,  115,  "9,  140; 
Southern,  183,  188; Atchison,  2.01,  212-13 ; 
Northern  Pacific,  303,  307,  310;  Genaal, 
382-4. 
Walker, Major Aldace F.,  209,216, 217. 
Watkin, Sir Edward, 40,41,  43-5. 402  INDEX 
Watson, P. H.,  38,  39. 
Welsh,  John  Lowber,  108-10,  111,  128, 
134. 
Western  Union  Telegraph Company,  14, 22, 
27- 
Westlake, J., 55,56,57-8. 
Whelen,  Townsend,  101-3,  I%,  1%-5,  1~8, 
112. 
Wilbur, E. P.,  125, 127, 128. 
Winslow, Lanier  & Co., 274. 
Wisconsin Central, leased to Northern Pacific, 
~83-4,286,289,  zgo-gz,  302,308. 